Scheduled Revenue Flight

Few minutes after takeoff from Erdenet Airport, while climbing in low visibility due to poor weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of a mountain (2,800 metres high) located few km west of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 28 occupants were killed, 16 adults and 12 children.

The aircraft, a Pilatus PC-12, serial number 151, was on a scheduled domestic flight from St. John's, Newfoundland, to Goose Bay, Labrador, with the pilot, a company observer, and eight passengers on board. Twenty-three minutes into the flight, the aircraft turned back towards St. John's because of a low oil pressure indication. Eight minutes later, the engine(Pratt & Whitney PT6A-67B) had to be shut down because of a severe vibration. The pilot then turned towards Clarenville Airport, but was unable to reach the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed during the forced landing in a bog one and a half miles from the Clarenville Airport. The pilot, the company observer, and one passenger sustained serious injuries. The Board determined that the pilot did not follow the prescribed emergency procedure for low oil pressure, and the engine failed before he could land safely. The pilot's decision making was influenced by his belief that the low oil pressure indications were not valid. The engine failed as a result of an interruption of oil flow to the first-stage planet gear assembly; the cause of the oil flow interruption could not be determined.

During the takeoff roll at Kendari-Wolter Monginsidi Airport, at Vr speed, the cargo door warning light illuminated on the cockpit panel. The captain decided to abort and initiated an emergency braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest 200 metres further. All 64 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

At Istanbul-Atatürk Airport, while preparing for takeoff, one of the engine caught fire and exploded. All 73 occupants (64 passengers and nine crew members) evacuated the aircraft and were uninjured. A fire erupted, destroying the rear part of the airplane.

While approaching Booué Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions. As a landing was impossible in such conditions, the crew decided to return to Libreville but en route, ATC confirmed that weather was poor and the crew decided to divert to La Lopé Airport. After landing on a wet runway surface (La Lopé runway is 800 metres long), the aircraft encountered difficulties to stop within the remaining distance and overran. While contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed then the aircraft rolled for about 50 metres before coming to rest in a rocky area. All 16 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The flight from Bogotá to Quito was completed by TAME on a wet-lease contract for Air France, second leg from the AF422 flight from Paris to Quito via Bogotá operated by an Airbus A340. After takeoff from runway 13 at Bogotá-El Dorado Airport, the crew was cleared for a Girardot 1 departure that consist of continuing on runway heading for 2 miles after takeoff, followed by a 90° right turn over the Romeo beacon. For unknown reasons, the crew continued straight forward until the aircraft impacted the Mt El Cable located ahead of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 53 occupants were killed, among them 25 European Nationals, seven Italians, six French, three Danish, three Spanish, two Germans, two Austrians, one British and one Swiss. The wreckage was found 50 metres below the summit. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were poor with rain, clouds at 2,300 feet and CB's.

After touchdown on a wet runway surface, the crew aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran at a speed of 80 knots, lost its right main gear and right engine before coming to rest few dozen metres further. All 88 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Flight PR137 was a regular scheduled passenger flight and departed Manila for Bacolod at 18:40. The airplane departed with the thrust reverser of engine n°1 inoperative. At 19:20, PR137 called Bacolod Approach Control and reported passing FL260 and 55 DME to Bacolod . The crew then requested landing instructions and was instructed to descend to FL90 after passing Iloilo and descend to 3,000 feet for a VOR runway 04 approach. Wind was 030° at 08 kts, altimeter 1014 mbs, transition level at FL60 and temperature at 28°C. At 19:28, the flight requested to intercept the final approach to runway 04 and Approach Control replied "PR 137 visual approach on final". At 19:37, Bacolod Tower cleared the flight to land at runway 04 and the clearance was acknowledged by the pilot. The approach was flown with the Autothrust system was engaged in SPEED mode. The thrust lever of engine no.1 was left in Climb detent. Upon touchdown the first officer called out "no spoilers, no reverse, no decel". Engine no.2 was set to full reverse thrust after touchdown, but the engine no .1 thrust lever was not retarded to idle and remained in the climb power position. Consequently, the spoilers did not deploy. Because one engine was set to reverse, the autothrust system automatically disengaged. With the autothrust disengaged, no. 1 engine thrust increased to climb thrust. Due to the asymmetrical thrust condition, the A320 ran off the right side of the runway. At this speed, rudder and nosewheel steering are ineffective. Engine no.2 was moved out of reverse up to more than 70 percent N1 and the airplane swerved back onto the runway. The A320 continued past the runway end. The aircraft hit the airport perimeter fence and then jumped over a small river. It continued to slice through a hallow block fence where it went through several clusters of shanties and trees. No fire ensued after the crash.

When the crew boarded the aircraft in Hsinchu for the flight to Kaohsiung it had been a long and demanding day for the captain who was to fly the aircraft. He had been on duty more than 11 hours and performed nine flights. The accident flight, which was planned to be his last flight of the day, was to take place in darkness. The weather was above minima but IMC. During the pre-flight check the crew noted a failure in the RH Main Bus. This caused a number of systems to be unavailable, a.o.: the autopilot, the left hand EFIS, LH/RH Flight Director, LH RMI, EFIS Comparators, and the no. 2 engine anti-ice start bleed valve being open (as a result of this, the ITT on this engine was approximately 15°C higher than normal at selected power on this engine). Despite the fact that, according to the Minimum Equipment List (MEL), taking off for a flight with any of the Main Buses inoperative was not allowed, the captain decided to continue. During taxi to runway 05 the aircraft was cleared for a Chunan One (CN1) departure. The aircraft took off at 19:29:09. Because of the autopilot was not available, the captain now had to fly manually. In addition, the flying had to be performed without support from the yaw-damper that was also inoperative as a result of the RH Main Bus failure. This means that more active rudder control was required, while the DFDR-data shows that such input was not made. The more than 30°C ITT-split between the engines, of which approximately 15°C was caused by the RH Engine Anti-ice Start Bleed Valve being open, did have little effect on the behavior of the aircraft in the initial start-sequence. But when the crew, 30 seconds after lift off, disengaged CTOT and started to manually adjust the RH PLA downwards, possibly to get equal ITT in the engines, this ended up in a torque-split of more than 13% between the engines, with the RH engine being lower in torque. This asymmetry tended to yaw and roll the aircraft to the right and required higher aileron input than normal to the left in order to keep the aircraft at a constant bank angle. Normally the flaps are retracted at around 1,000 feet during initial climb. In this flight the flap retraction was not initiated until the first officer was reading the Climb Check List in which the flap position should be checked and verified. Flap retraction was done just prior to the aircraft reaching VFE15 (175 KIAS, which is the maximum allowed speed with flaps extended). When the climb power was set, a symmetric PLA change was made. However, due to the earlier RH Power Lever Angle (PLA) pull in combination with the normal backlash in the power lever cables between the PLA and the HMU, the RH engine torque was decreased while the LH engine torque remained unchanged. Hence, a torque split occurred. This resulted in an increased aerodynamic asymmetry giving a force tending to yaw and bank the aircraft to the right. Consequently, still more aileron input was required in order to maintain a correct bank angle. Because the behavior of the aircraft was very different from what the captain was used to, the need for continuous manual flying under IMC-conditions may have totally occupied his capacity. This could also explain why, during this phase of flight, he did not observe the aircraft starting a turn to the right 78 seconds after take off instead of continuing the left turn for a heading of 260. At about this same time, and for no obvious reasons, the positive rate of climb decreased and the aircraft leveled out at approximately 2,000 feet for a short time instead of continuing the climb to its assigned altitude of 3,000 feet. The captain's actions could be interpreted as signs that he might have been suffering from fatigue or spatial disorientation. It is difficult to determine if the F/O was aware of the captain's deviation from the cleared departure route. All indications point to the fact that he was not aware or that he out of respect for the captain did not report of the deviations. For example, the F/O transmitted back to Taipei Approach 114 seconds after takeoff, "Left 230, Bravo 12255," while at the same time the aircraft was in a right turn with a 21 degree right bank, passing through a heading of 312 degrees. In fact, his primary means for monitoring the flight were very limited due to dark, IMC-conditions since his EFIS instruments were black or flagged. This could also explain why the captain did not receive any support from the F/O about the flight becoming more and more uncontrolled. Not until 124 seconds after takeoff and 37 seconds prior to the last DFDR-recording did the captain state that he was having a problem with the heading and asked for help with the magnetic compass. At that time the aircraft was in a 24° right bank and 10° pitch up position and had a heading and roll rate by one degree per second. From that moment a continuous decrease in pitch angle was recorded down to -65,4° just prior to the impact. Just 19 seconds before the last DFDR-recording, with a heading of 022 and a bank angle of 36° to the right, the captain said "Ask for a radar vector." At this moment, he also initiates a short aileron input to the right, further increasing the bank angle. The other crewmembers did not answer or give any notable response to the captain's request for help with the magnetic compass. The reason might be that they also were very confused about the situation and unable to take any relevant action. When the captain, 14 seconds before the last DFDR-recording, said "Wah Sei!!! Everything is wrong." the aircraft was in a 8,4° pitch down and the right bank angle was 47,5°. Finally, only 10 seconds before the last data point was recorded, the first officer responds by asking "Sir, shall we look at this one? ". Pitch down was then 15,8° and the right roll angle 71,7°. In the last part of the flight the pitch and bank angles were at extreme values not to be experienced in normal operation. At this stage of the flight, the control inputs recorded are rapid aileron inputs to the right that further increased the adverse attitudes. The aircraft was then totally uncontrolled and the airspeed and sink rate increased dramatically. Four seconds before impact the Vmo warning started. The aircraft then crashed into the sea.

After takeoff from La Ceiba-Goloson Airport, while in initial climb, the right engine failed. The crew was cleared for an emergency landing and initiated a circuit to return. At low height, one of the wing struck the roof of a house and the airplane crashed on a road. All 17 occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.