Scheduled Revenue Flight

The failure of the right engine was the result of the failure of the fuel pump due to poor maintenance and a possible use beyond prescribed limits. The presence of iron oxide inside and outside the fuel pump as well as the lack of cleanliness of the internal components indicates a probable lack of maintenance. When the right engine stopped running, the generator No. 1 was then responsible for powering the aircraft's electrical system. As the latter was not in good working order, the primary generator could not withstand the overload and ceased to function, leaving only the battery to power the entire electrical system. To maintain power to critical systems, the crew would have had to select the backup power system. Since after the engine stopped, there was no monitoring of the electrical system, the pilots only realized the failure of the electrical system when they attempted to extend the landing gears. The emergency hydraulic system was then used to lower the gears, after which the crew did not return the system selection valve to the 'normal' position, resulting in the brakes and the steering systems to be inoperative after landing. The chain of failures may be associated with not reading the checklist when performing procedures after the engine failure.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Poor flight preparation,
- The crew failed to follow the SOP's, and took the decision to initiate the flight with an aircraft that was overloaded by 503 kilos,
- When the emergency situation presented itself to the crew, they failed to follow the checklist,
- On an organizational level, the company did not have an effective personnel training system in place, so that the crew did not have sufficient skills to respond to emergency situations,
- Because the aircraft was overloaded and that one engine was inoperative, the crew was forced to complete the approach with a speed higher than the reference speed,
- An improper use of the controls allowed the aircraft to land 700 meters past the runway 28 threshold, reducing the landing distance available,
- The crew focused their attention on the failure of the right engine and did not identify the failure of the electrical system, which delayed their tasks assignment, all made worse by the failure to comply with the checklist,
- The operations cleared the crew to start the flight despite the fact that the aircraft was overloaded on takeoff based on weight and balance documents,
- The crew did not prepare the flight according to published procedures and did not consider the total weight of the aircraft in relation to the number of passengers on board and the volume of fuelin the tanks, which resulted in an aircraft to be overloaded by 503 kilos and contributed to the failure of the right engine,
- A lack of maintenance on the part of the operator.

It is possible that one of the engine or maybe both suffered a loss of power during takeoff after the aircraft passed through a puddle.

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from a truck while landing, and the vehicle operator's decision to ignore runway warning signals. Contributing to the accident was an inoperative vehicle gate system and the failure of airport management to adequately maintain the gate system and issue a NOTAM.

 The following findings were identified:
- The throttle, after placement by the PIC (PF), could not be moved into 'ground idle' or reverse,
- The landing was not aborted after the plane had flown over the touchdown zone,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure,
- During the flare for landing, the engine throttles were not selected to 'flight idle', which was not noted by both pilots,
- The flight crew flew the approach not in accordance with SOPs, and thereby pushing and even exceeding the limits.
The following factors contributed to the accident:
- Many non-precision approaches and landings at Mannheim City were not performed according to air carriers OMs,
- The TRs and FOIs of the aircraft manufacturer were not incorporated into the OM/B and D of the air carrier,
- The practical training of the flight crew by the air carrier was inadequate in terms of preventing an erroneous operation of the throttle control on the basis of the manufacturer of the Do 328-100 issued instructions,
- The flight crew conducted a non-precision approach, which did not meet the procedural requirements of the OM of the air carrier and the AIP,
- The design of the power lever was not forgiving enough,
- The risks of existing problems in the operation of the power levers were not correctly identified and eliminated by by the relevant authorities and the relevant type certificate holder, in spite of several relevant events and various safety recommendations,
- The touchdown zone in Mannheim was not marked,
- The size and design of the safety area at the end of runway 27 was not sufficient to guarantee the operation of the flight within the safety levels set by ICAO and the legislator.

The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data were downloaded. The CVR data showed that the aircraft was flying below the correct glide path indicated by a glide slope aural warning, and the crew had difficulty in recovering the condition. The CVR also recorded landing gear warning after touchdown which indicated the landing gear had collapsed. The FDR data showed that the vertical acceleration during landing was 2.97 g, however this amount of vertical acceleration should not damage the landing gear. The FDR data showed that just after touchdown, the right main landing gear collapsed. The FDR also recorded that the aircraft experienced hard landing and had bounced on a previous flight, and the value of the vertical acceleration recorded was 1.78 g. It was most likely that the hard landing and bounce had affected the strength of the landing gear. The examination of the failed landing gear also found corrosion on the fracture surface of the right main landing gear strut.

After departure from runway 25, the crew planned to use an unpublished procedure. Climbing through clouds a 180-degree turn was initiated. Using the unreliable magnetic compass, the flight made a 270 degree turn, heading towards rising terrain. The captain took over control from the copilot. When visual contact with terrain was regained, the crew noted they were heading for mountains. The captain tried to avoid rising terrain but the aircraft impacted the side of a mountain at 4,100 metres.

The accident involving aircraft CRJ-100LR registration number EW-101PJ was the result of an asymmetric loss of lift of the wing during take-off, which led to the toppling of the aircraft immediately after liftoff from the runway, the left wing tip contacting the ground, the subsequent destruction and fire. The reason for the loss of lift of the wing at the actual weather conditions, was the formation of frost, which "pollutes" the surface of the wing. The cause of formation of frost, most likely, was the fuel icing, while the aircraft was parked at the airport and during taxiing for the return flight, resulting in a difference in temperature of the surrounding air and cold fuel in the tanks after the flight. The situation could be aggravated when exceeding the values recommended by the operations manual of the angular velocity when lifting the nose wheel during takeoff with "contaminated" wings when it is impossible to monitor this parameter instrumentally. Existing procedural methods of control of the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft before departure, along with the inefficiency, during takeoff, the existing system of protection from stalling due to increased sensitivity of the wing, even to a slight contamination of the leading edge, can not fully guarantee the prevention of similar accidents in future. An Airworthiness Directive on the need to include anti-icing systems on the wing in the final stage of taxiing at the actual weather conditions was issued by Transport Canada after the accident. This probably could have prevented the accident.