Scheduled Revenue Flight

The airline transport pilot was on an approach to land on Runway 30 at the conclusion of a visual flight rules (VFR)scheduled commuter flight. Through a series of radio microphone clicks, he activated threshold warning lights for vehicle traffic on a roadway that passes in front of the threshold of Runway 30. Gates that were supposed to work in concert with the lights and block the runway from vehicle traffic were not operative. On final approach, the pilot, who was aware that the gates were not working, noticed a large truck and trailer stopped adjacent to the landing threshold. As he neared the runway, he realized that the truck was moving in front of the threshold area. The pilot attempted to go around, but the airplane's belly struck the top of the trailer and the airplane descended out of control to the runway, sustaining structural damage. The truck driver reported that, as he approached the runway threshold, he saw the flashing red warning lights, but that the gates were not closed. He waited for about 45 seconds and looked for any landing traffic and, seeing none, drove onto the road in front of the threshold. As he did so, he felt the airplane impact the trailer, and saw it hit the runway. The accident truck's trailer is about 45 feet long and 13 feet tall. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Facility Directory/Alaska Supplement recommends that pilots maintain a 25-foot minimum threshold crossing height. The NTSB's investigation revealed that the gate system had been out of service for more than a year due to budgetary constraints, and that there was no Notice to Airman (NOTAM) issued concerning the inoperative gate system. The FAA certificated airport is owned and operated by the State of Alaska. According to the Airport Certification Manual, the airport manager is responsible to inspect, maintain, and repair airport facilities to ensure safe operations. Additionally, the airport manager is responsible for publishing NOTAM's concerning hazardous conditions. A 10-year review of annual FAA certification and compliance inspection forms revealed no discrepancy listed for the inoperative gates until 16 days after the accident.

While approaching Lawa-Antino airport, the crew was informed that another airplane was on the runway at that time. The crew initiated a go-around procedure when the aircraft hit a wooded hillside and crashed, bursting into flames. All 19 occupants were killed.

Following an uneventful flight from Berlin-Tempelhof Airport, the crew started a LOC/DME approach to runway 27 at Mannheim Airport. The copilot was the pilot-in-command and reported to the captain he has difficulties to land in Mannheim. On approach, the aircraft descended below the prescribed altitude of 5,000 feet. At an altitude of 3,800 feet, some 100 feet below the Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA), the captain instructed the copilot to arrest the descent and climb back to 5,000 feet. After he was established on the localizer, the crew continued the approach. Shortly before landing, the aircraft floated over the runway and the touchdown zone and landed too far down the runway, about 530 metres past the runway threshold. After touchdown, the aircraft encountered difficulties to decelerate and was unable to stop within the remaining distance of 480 metres. It overran at a speed of 50 knots, lost its left main gear and came to rest against an embankment. All 27 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 10 March 2008, a Boeing Company 737-400 aircraft, registered PK-KKT, was being operated by Adam SkyConnection Airlines (Adam Air) as scheduled passenger flight with flight number DHI292. The flight departed Soekarno – Hatta Airport, Jakarta at 01:30 UTC with destination Hang Nadim Airport, Batam and the estimated time of arrival was 03:05 UTC. On board in this flight were 177 people consisted of two pilots, four flight attendants, and 171 passengers. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as pilot flying (PF) and the Second in Command (SIC) acted as pilot monitoring (PM). The flight until commencing descend was uneventful. Prior to descend, the flight crew received weather information indicating that the weather was fine. At 0302 UTC the flight crew contacted Hang Nadim tower controller and informed them that the visibility was 1,000 meters and they were sequence number three for landing runway 04. The flight crew of the aircraft on sequence number two informed to Hang Nadim tower controller that the runway was insight at an altitude of about 500 feet. The Hang Nadim tower controller forwarded the information to the flight crew of DHI 292, and followed this by issuing landing clearance, and additional information that the wind velocity was 360 degrees at 8 knots and heavy rain. The DHI 292 flight crew acknowledged the information. The landing configuration used flaps 40 degrees with landing speed of 136 knots. The flight crew were able to see the runway prior to the Decision Altitude (DA), however the PIC was convinced that continuing the approach to landing was unsafe and elected to go around. The Hang Nadim tower controller instructed the flight crew to climb to 3000 feet, maintain runway heading, and contact Singapore Approach. At 0319 UTC, DHI 292 was established on the localizer runway 04, and the Hang Nadim tower controller informed them that the visibility improved to 2,000 meters. While on final approach, the flight crew DHI 292 reported that the runway was in sight and the Hang Nadim tower controller issued a landing clearance. On touchdown, the crew felt that the main wheels barely touch the runway first. During the landing roll, as the ground speed decreased below 30 knots, the aircraft yawed to the right. The flight crew attempted to steer the aircraft back to centerline by applying full left rudder. The aircraft continued yaw to the right and came to stop on the runway shoulder at approximately 40 meters from the right side of the runway edge, and 2,760 meters from the runway 04 threshold. No one was injured in this accident. The aircraft was seriously damaged with the right main landing gear assembly detached and collapsing backward and damaging the right wing and flaps. The right engine was displaced from its attachment point.

After takeoff from Mérida-Alberto Carnevalli Airport runway 25, the aircraft climbed in clouds when it collided with a mountain located 10 km northwest of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 46 occupants were killed. The wreckage was found at an altitude of 4,100 metres.

During the takeoff roll, the captain noticed an asymmetrical engine thrust and decided to reject takeoff. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, rolled for about 30 metres and collided with an embankment, coming to rest broken in two. All 57 occupants evacuated safely.

A Canadair CRJ100ER passenger jet, operated by Belavia, was destroyed when crashed and burned on takeoff from Yerevan-Zvartnots Airport (EVN), Armenia. All three crew members and eighteen passengers survived the accident. The airplane arrived as flight BRU1833 from Minsk-2 International Airport (MSQ), Belarus at 02:05. Refueling was carried out in preparation for the return flight and the crew conducted the flight planning. After refueling the pilot carried out a tactile and visual inspection of all critical surfaces of the wing and visual inspection of the tail assembly. All the planes were clean and dry. The weather reported for the 04:00 was: wind 110 degrees at the ground 1 m/sec, visibility 3500 meters, haze, small clouds, vertical visibility of 800 meters, scattered clouds at 3000 m, a temperature of minus 3° C, dew point minus 4° C, pressure 1019 hPa. At 04:08 both engines were started. The engine air intake heating (cowl anti-ice) was switched on but the wing anti-icing system was not switched on. The crew taxied to runway 27 and were cleared for departure. During takeoff the airplane progressively banked left until the left wing tip contacted runway. The airplane went off the side with the airplane rolling the right. The right hand wing broke off and spilled fuel caught fire. The airplane came to rest upside down.

Upon landing at Los Roques Airport, the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest on the edge of a lagoon. All 16 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful flight from La Paz, the crew started the descent to Cobija Airport when he was informed by ATC that a landing was impossible due to poor weather conditions at destination. The crew decided to divert to the Trinidad-Jorge Heinrich Arauz Airport which is located about 600 km southeast of Cobija Airport. On final approach to Trinidad Airport, the crew reported technical problems and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft crash landed in a dense wooded and marshy area located 4 km short of runway. All 159 occupants were rescued but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful flight from Maracaibo, the crew completed a night approach and landing on runway 13L at Bogotá-El Dorado Airport. After touchdown, the crew initiated the braking procedure but due to a technical issue on the left engine, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went through a perimeter fence and came to rest in a grassy area with its left main gear folded. All 41 occupants were evacuated, among them two passengers were seriously injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.