Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2 in Pribuzh

Date & Time: Jun 9, 1980
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-32284
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
1G96-46
YOM:
1968
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances following a pilot error. There were no casualties.
Probable cause:
Pilot error.

Crash of a Yakovlev Yak-40 in Matala: 29 killed

Date & Time: Jun 8, 1980 at 1532 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
D2-TYC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Jamba - Lubango
MSN:
9 72 17 53
YOM:
1977
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
25
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
29
Circumstances:
17 minutes after its takeoff from Jamba Airport, while in cruising altitude, the three engine airplane was shot down by the pilot of a Zambian Shenyang J-6 fighter plane. Out of control, it entered a dive and crashed in a field located in Matala. All 29 occupants were killed. Angolan authorities confirmed the aircraft was shot down by mistake.
Probable cause:
Shot down by the pilot of a Zambian Shenyang J-6 fighter plane.

Crash of a Fairchild F27J in Yacuiba: 13 killed

Date & Time: Jun 2, 1980
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CP-1117
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Cochabamba - Yacuiba
MSN:
118
YOM:
1965
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
13
Circumstances:
While approaching Yacuiba Airport, the airplane struck the slope of Mt Tapecua located few km from the airfield. All 13 occupants were killed.

Crash of a Douglas C-47-DL in Útila

Date & Time: May 28, 1980
Operator:
Registration:
HR-SAC
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
4232
YOM:
1941
Country:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Útila Airport, the airplane was too low. It struck a concrete wall, lost its undercarriage and crash landed. There were no casualties.

Crash of an Antonov AN-2 near Cape Schmidt

Date & Time: May 23, 1980
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-01200
Flight Phase:
MSN:
1 68 473 12
YOM:
1956
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
En route, weather conditions deteriorated and the crew failed to return when the airplane struck the ground and crashed. Occupant fate unknown.

Crash of a Curtiss C-46A-45-CU Commando in Bonanza

Date & Time: May 16, 1980
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YN-BVL
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
30374
YOM:
1944
Country:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On approach to Bonanza-San Pedro Airfield, the airplane was too low and struck a wooden pile located near the runway threshold. The airplane crash landed and came to rest on the runway. There were no casualties.

Crash of a Swearingen SA226TC Metro II in Esperance

Date & Time: May 13, 1980 at 0745 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-SWO
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Perth - Esperance
MSN:
TC-275
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9010
Captain / Total hours on type:
1155.00
Circumstances:
Weather conditions at Esperance were fine; there was no cloud, visibility was in excess of 30 km and the surface wind was from the northwest at 5 to 10 knots. The aircraft entered the circuit on a left downwind leg for an approach to Runway 29. The flaps were lowered, firstly a quarter and then half-way, on the downwind leg and the landing gear was extended just before the aircraft turned onto a base leg. This configuration, and an airspeed of 133 knots (best single - engine rate of climb speed), was maintained until after the aircraft was straightened onto final approach. At an altitude of 1100 feet, the pilot considered he was at Decision Height and committed to land. He lowered full flaps and reduced the airspeed to 115 knots. At about this time, as he was retarding the power levers, the right engine flamed out. The pilot reported that he promptly sensed the engine failure and checked the engine instruments while re-opening both power levers. He noted both torque and fuel flow indication s for the right engine were zero. He briefly considered retracting the landing gear and flaps but decided to do neither. Left engine power was increased initially to the maximum available of 940°C ITT (Inter-turbine temperature) and then adjusted to the normal maximum limit of 923°C ITT. The right propeller was feathered. During this period the aircraft banked to the right and turned away from the runway. Its airspeed had reduced and the rate of descent increased. The turn had been opposed but the pilot found that the application of full left rudder and aileron would not enable him to maintain runway heading, although the airspeed was above the minimum control airspeed of 94 knots, specified in the aircraft flight manual. It was evident to the pilot that the aircraft would land short of the aerodrome, amongst trees to the right of the runway approach path. He therefore abandoned his efforts to regain the normal approach path and allowed the aircraft to turn further to the right, towards a large, clear paddock. Just before touchdown, he observed a power pole on his selected landing path and he again turned further right to avoid it. During this turn the right wing tip struck the ground. The nosegear then impacted heavily and collapsed . The aircraft slid and bounced across the ground for 188 metres before coming to rest. Fuel from ruptured line s ignite d under the left engine , but the fire was slow to develop and the occupants were able to make an orderly evacuation . By the time the fire brigade arrived from Esperance township, the fire had spread and most of the aircraft was consumed.
Probable cause:
The right engine had flamed out because of fuel starvation, when a spur gear in the fuel control drive train failed. Five teeth of the spur gear had broken off and the remaining teeth were badly worn. The failures and abnormal wear were due to looseness of the torque sensor housing, in which the spur gear was mounted, allowing the gear to move out of its correct alignment. The housing had probably loosened because of vibration, as its natural frequency was close to some frequencies generated by the engine during normal operation. The following contributing factors were reported:
- The natural frequency of the torque sensor housings in the engines fitted to VH-SWO were susceptible to vibration frequencies generated by the engines during normal operation,
- Vibration loosened the torque sensor housing on the right engine, which in turn led to misalignment of a spur gear in the fuel drive train, failure of the gear and fuel starvation
of the engine,
- The engine failed when the aircraft was being operated in a landing configuration which precluded a successful continuation of the landing approach,
- The landing procedure used by the pilot was in accordance with the operator's Company Operations Manual, which did not appreciate the poor performance and handing' difficulties of the Swearingen SA226TC in the event of an engine failure in the landing configuration.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 99 Airlines in Paris-Orly

Date & Time: Apr 28, 1980
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
F-BTMO
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Limoges - Paris
MSN:
U-86
YOM:
1969
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Paris-Orly Airport, the twin engine crash landed in a field, lost its undercarriage and came to rest on its belly. All 13 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of an Avro 748-2-207 in Bangkok: 44 killed

Date & Time: Apr 27, 1980 at 0655 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HS-THB
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nakhon Phanom – Udon – Khon Kaen – Bangkok
MSN:
1568
YOM:
1964
Flight number:
TG231
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
49
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
44
Captain / Total flying hours:
18096
Captain / Total hours on type:
7796.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
24372
Copilot / Total hours on type:
11899
Aircraft flight hours:
12791
Circumstances:
On 27 April 1980, HS-748 Series 11, HS-THB was on a scheduled domestic passenger flight. The flight operated the route Bangkok - Khon Kaen - Udon - Nakhon Phanom - Udon - Khon Kaen - Bangkok. The departure flight was flight number TG221 which departed Bangkok International Airport at 0101 h, arrived Khon Kaen Airport at 0210 h, departed Khon Kaen Airport at 0233 h, arrived Udon Airport at 0251 h, departed Udon Airport at 0309 h, arrived Nakhon Phanom Airport at 0349 h. The return flight, flight number TG231, departed Nakhon Phanom Airport at 0408 h, arrived Udon Airport at 0448 h, departed Udon Airport at 0507 h, arrived Khon Kaen Airport at 0532 h, departed Khon Kaen Airport at 0550 h, ETA Bangkok International Airport at 0656 h. At 0559 h, after take-off from Khon Kaen Airport, the pilot reported to Bangkok Area Control Centre that he was climbing to 6 000 ft, ETA Korat at 0626 h, ETA Bangkok International Airport at 0656 h and requested ATC clearance to Bangkok International Airport via W6 - KT - W1 - BKK. Bangkok Area Control Centre cleared HS-THB to Bangkok International Airport via this route, to maintain FL 120 and asked the pilot to report when the aircraft reached FL 120.
- At 0614 h the pilot reported that HS-THB reached FL 120.
- At 0626 h the pilot reported that the aircraft was over KT.
- AT 0627 h Bangkok Area Control Centre informed the pilot that HS-THB was in radar contact, 5 miles northwest of KT.
- At 0642 h Bangkok Area Control Centre cleared HS-THB to descend to 8 000 ft and informed the pilot that the altimeter setting was 1 008 mb. This was acknowledged by the pilot.
- At 0644 h, Bangkok Area Control Centre advised the pilot to contact Bangkok Approach Control on 119.1 MHz.
- At 0644 h, the pilot contacted Bangkok Approach Control and reported that he was maintaining 8 000 ft. Bangkok Approach Control advised the pilot to descend to 6 000 ft and informed him that the altimeter setting was 1 008 mb. This was acknowledged by the pilot.
- At 0648 h Bangkok Approach Control advised HS-THB to descend to 6 000 ft.
- At 0651 h Bangkok Approach Control advised HS-THB to descend to 1 500 ft.
- At 0653 h the pilot reported that HS-THB had reached 1 500 ft.
- At 0654 h Bangkok Approach Control informed the pilot that HS-THB was 7 miles from the Outer Marker and cleared the aircraft to make an ILS approach to runway 21R. This was acknowledged by the pilot.
- At 0656 h Bangkok Approach Control advised the pilot to contact Bangkok Tower on 118.1 MHz but no answer from the pilot was received. Bangkok Approach Control tried to contact HS-THB until 0709 h but no answer was received. HS-THB operated in good weather conditions on both the outbound and return flights until, descending to runway 21R nearly at the airport, it encountered an area of rain. Later, HS-THB lost altitude rapidly. Many things in the passenger cabin fell to the cabin floor. It was raining with hail. Looking through the windows, some passengers saw grey clouds. Then the aircraft could maintain altitude. Thirty seconds later it again lost altitude, more severely than the first time. Finally it crashed into a paddy field and skidded forward about 510 feet. Fire occurred in both wings for a while. The accident site was 8 NM northeast of Bangkok International Airport.
Probable cause:
The pilot directed the aircraft into a thunderstorm in an early dissipating stage. The aircraft was severely affected by a downdraft and lost altitude rapidly. At that time the altitude of the aircraft was only 1500ft and the pilot could not maintain altitude of the aircraft. The aircraft crashed into the ground and ran forward.
Factors which caused the pilot to direct the aircraft into the thunderstorm were:
1. During flight prior to the accident, the pilot did not tune his radio to the ATIS frequency, so he did not receive the special weather report (SPECI) broadcast four minutes before the accident advising that there was a thunderstorm in the area he would soon encounter.
2. The pilot did not make use of airborne weather radar.
3. While the pilot was approaching at high altitude, he could see the thunderstorm, but it was not in his flight path to Bangkok International Airport. When the pilot was descending in compliance with Bangkok Approach Control instruction, he was not aware that the rain area which he was entering was a thunderstorm which was moving and developing severely. The thunderstorm which had developed to the severe stage was moving and intercepted the aircraft.
4. The pilot assumed that flying by radar vector would be safe as he thought that the Approach Control Radar could detect the thunderstorm and Bangkok Approach Control would not vector the aircraft into the thunderstorm.
Final Report: