Crash of a Britten-Norman BN-2A-20 Islander in Papua New Guinea

Date & Time: Mar 10, 1982
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
P2-HAC
MSN:
762
YOM:
1975
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Suffered an accident somewhere in PNG. Occupant fate unknown.

Crash of an Antonov AN-2 in Krasnogvardeyskiy: 4 killed

Date & Time: Feb 26, 1982
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-26172
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
1 54 473 04
YOM:
1955
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Krasnogvardeyskiy in strong winds, the single engine airplane encountered difficulties to gain height. It struck a high power transmission tower and crashed, bursting into flames. A passenger was seriously injured while four other occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The pilot was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 near Providence: 1 killed

Date & Time: Feb 21, 1982 at 1533 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N127PM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Groton - Boston
MSN:
105
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
PM458
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
6500
Captain / Total hours on type:
2700.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2100
Copilot / Total hours on type:
400
Aircraft flight hours:
27015
Circumstances:
At 4,000 feet light icing on the windshield was noted, and the deicing system was activated. After two cycles of deicing, alcohol was smelled in the cockpit, and smoke was coming up from the control yoke. An emergency landing was attempted at Providence, RI, but smoke and flames forced the crew to land on 10-12 inch thick ice on a reservoir. By then, heavy black smoke poured in the cockpit and fire was seen. Upon landing, the left main gear collapsed and the right wing was sheared off. Eleven occupants escaped and were injured while a passenger was killed.
Probable cause:
The deficient design of the isopropyl alcohol windshield washer/deicer system and the inadequate maintenance of the system which resulted in an in-flight fire. The ignition source of the fire was not determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-61 off Tokyo: 24 killed

Date & Time: Feb 9, 1982 at 0844 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
JA8061
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fukuoka - Tokyo
MSN:
45889/291
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
JL350
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
166
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
24
Aircraft flight hours:
36955
Circumstances:
JAL Flight 350 took off from Fukuoka (FUK) runway 16 at 07:34 for a regular flight to Tokyo-Haneda (HND). The aircraft climbed to the cruising altitude of FL290. At 08:22 the crew started their descend to FL160. After reaching that altitude, they were cleared to descend down to 3000 feet. The aircraft was cleared for a runway 33R ILS approach and 5° of flaps were selected at 08:35, followed by 25 degrees of flaps one minute later. The landing gear was lowered at 08:39 and 50 degrees of flaps were selected two minutes after that. At 08:42 the aircraft descended through 1000 feet at an airspeed of 135 knots with wind from a direction of 360deg at 20 knots. The co-pilot called out "500 feet" at 08:43:25 but the captain did not make the "stabilized" call-out as specified by JAL operational regulations. The airspeed decreased to 133 knots as the aircraft descended through 300 feet at 08:43:50 and the co-pilot warned the captain that the aircraft was approaching the decision height. At 08:43:56 the radio altimeter warning sounded, followed by the flight engineer calling out "200 feet", which was the decision height, three seconds later . At 08:44:01 the aircraft descended through 164 feet at 130 KIAS. At that moment the captain cancelled autopilot, pushed his controls forward and retarded the throttles to idle. The co-pilot tried to regain control but the aircraft crashed into the shallow water of Tokyo Bay, 510 m short of the runway 33R threshold. The nose and the right hand wing separated from the fuselage. The captain had recently suffered a psychosomatic disorder; preliminary reports suggested that the captain experienced some form of a mental aberration. He had been off duty from November 1980 to November 1981 for these reasons.
Probable cause:
Collision with approach lights during an unstabilized approach. Poor crew coordination and wrong approach configuration on part of the captain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 99 Airliner in Groton

Date & Time: Feb 1, 1982 at 0045 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N451C
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New Haven - Groton
MSN:
U-66
YOM:
1969
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7108
Captain / Total hours on type:
400.00
Aircraft flight hours:
19188
Circumstances:
After crossing the mondi intersection inbound for an ILS runway 05 approach, the captain felt that a proper descent was not possible due to a strong tailwind and their present altitude. They turned and proceeded outbound to lose altitude. The crew then established themselves again on the inbound course at an airspeed of approximately 120 knots. The copilot reported that around 300 feet "the bottom dropped out." the aircraft crashed onto the surface of a frozen cove and slid onto marshy terrain and stopped about 500 feet short of the runway. An NTSB weather summary shows that the following wind regimes existed when the aircraft made its approach: 5,000 to 24,000 ft asl, wind 220/50; 2,400 to 450 feet asl, wind 180/30; 450 feet asl to surface, wind 100/5. Using the above wind regimes and assuming an approach airspeed of 123 knots, the following ground speeds were computed: 5,000 to 2,400 ft asl, 155 knots; 2,400 to 450 feet asl, 147 knots; 450 feet asl to surface, 118 knots.
Probable cause:
Occurrence #1: in flight encounter with weather
Phase of operation: approach - faf/outer marker to threshold (ifr)
Findings
1. Light condition - dark night
2. (f) weather condition - low ceiling
3. (f) weather condition - fog
4. (f) weather condition - turbulence in clouds
5. (f) weather condition - downdraft
6. (c) weather condition - windshear
----------
Occurrence #2: loss of control - in flight
Phase of operation: approach - faf/outer marker to threshold (ifr)
----------
Occurrence #3: undershoot
Phase of operation: descent - uncontrolled
----------
Occurrence #4: in flight collision with terrain/water
Phase of operation: descent - uncontrolled
Findings
7. Terrain condition - icy
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-10-30CF in Boston: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 23, 1982 at 1936 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N113WA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oakland - Newark - Boston
MSN:
47821/320
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
WO30H
Crew on board:
12
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
200
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
18091
Captain / Total hours on type:
1969.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8600
Aircraft flight hours:
6327
Circumstances:
Following a non-precision instrument approach to runway 15R at Boston-Logan International Airport, the airplane touched down about 2,800 feet beyond the displaced threshold of the 9,191-foot usable part of the runway. About 1936:40, the airplane veered to avoid the approach light pier at the departure end of the runway and slid into the shallow water of Boston Harbor. The nose section separated from the fuselage in the impact after the airplane dropped from the shore embankment. Of the 212 persons on board, 2 persons are missing and presumed dead. The other persons onboard evacuated the airplane safely, some with injuries.
Probable cause:
The minimal braking effectiveness on the ice-covered runway; the failure of the Boston-Logan International Airport management to exercise maximum efforts to assess the condition of the runway to assure continued safety of landing operations; the failure of air traffic control to transmit the most recent pilot reports of braking action to the pilot of Flight 30H; and the captain's decision to accept and maintain an excessive airspeed derived from the auto throttle speed control system during the landing approach which caused the aircraft to land about 2,800 feet beyond the runway's displaced threshold. Contributing to the accident were the inadequacy of the present system of reports to convey reliable braking effectiveness information and the absence of provisions in the Federal Aviation Regulations to require:
- Airport management to measure the slipperiness of the runways using standardized procedures and to use standardized criteria in evaluating and reporting braking effectiveness and in making decisions to close runways.
- Operators to provide flight crews and other personnel with information necessary to correlate braking effectiveness on contaminated runways with aircraft stopping distances, and
- Extended minimum runway lengths for landing on runways which adequately take into consideration the reduction of braking effectiveness due to ice and snow.
Final Report:

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-26 Marquise near Kelowna: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 18, 1982
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GRFU
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
343
YOM:
1976
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
Struck the slope of a mountain located near Kelowna, killing both pilots.

Crash of a Boeing 737-222 in Washington DC: 78 killed

Date & Time: Jan 13, 1982 at 1601 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N62AF
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Washington DC - Tampa - Fort Lauderdale
MSN:
19556/130
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
QH090
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
74
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
78
Captain / Total flying hours:
8300
Captain / Total hours on type:
1852.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3353
Copilot / Total hours on type:
992
Aircraft flight hours:
23608
Aircraft flight cycles:
29549
Circumstances:
Air Florida Flight 90 was scheduled to leave Washington National Airport at 14:15 EST for a flight to Fort Lauderdale International Airport, FL (FLL), with an intermediate stop at the Tampa, FL (TPA). The aircraft had arrived at gate 12 as Flight 95 from Miami, FL, at 13:29. Because of snowfall, the airport was closed for snow removal from 13:38 to 14:53. At about 14:20 maintenance personnel began deicing the left side of the fuselage with deicing fluid Type II because the captain wanted to start the deicing just before the airport was scheduled to reopen (at 14:30) so that he could get in line for departure. Fluid had been applied to an area of about 10 feet when the captain terminated the operation because the airport was not going to reopen at 14:30. Between 14:45 and 14:50, the captain requested that the deicing operation be resumed. The left side of the aircraft was deiced first. No covers or plugs were installed over the engines or airframe openings during deicing operations. At 15:15, the aircraft was closed up and the jet way was retracted and the crew received push-back clearance at 15:23. A combination of ice, snow, and glycol on the ramp and a slight incline prevented the tug, which was not equipped with chains, from moving the aircraft. Then, contrary to flight manual guidance, the flight crew used reverse thrust in an attempt to move the aircraft from the ramp. This resulted in blowing snow which might have adhered to the aircraft. This didn't help either, so the tug was replaced and pushback was done at 15:35. The aircraft finally taxied to runway 36 at 15:38. Although contrary to flight manual guidance, the crew attempted to deice the aircraft by intentionally positioning the aircraft near the exhaust of the aircraft ahead in line (a New York Air DC-9). This may have contributed to the adherence of ice on the wing leading edges and to the blocking of the engine’s Pt2 probes. At 15:57:42, after the New York Air aircraft was cleared for takeoff, the captain and first officer proceeded to accomplish the pre-takeoff checklist, including verification of the takeoff engine pressure ratio (EPR) setting of 2.04 and indicated airspeed bug settings. Takeoff clearance was received at 15:58. Although the first officer expressed concern that something was 'not right' to the captain four times during the takeoff, the captain took no action to reject the takeoff. The aircraft accelerated at a lower-than-normal rate during takeoff, requiring 45 seconds and nearly 5,400 feet of runway, 15 seconds and nearly 2,000 feet more than normal, to reach lift-off speed. The aircraft initially achieved a climb, but failed to accelerate after lift-off. The aircraft’s stall warning stick shaker activated almost immediately after lift-off and continued until impact. The aircraft encountered stall buffet and descended to impact at a high angle of attack. At about 16.01, the aircraft struck the heavily congested northbound span of the 14th Street Bridge and plunged into the ice-covered Potomac River. It came to rest on the west end of the bridge 0.75 nmi from the departure end of runway 36. When the aircraft struck the bridge, it struck six occupied automobiles and a boom truck before tearing away a 41-foot section of the bridge wall and 97 feet of the bridge railings. Four persons in vehicles on the bridge were killed; four were injured, one seriously.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's failure to use engine anti-ice during ground operation and takeoff, their decision to take off with snow/ice on the airfoil surfaces of the aircraft, and the captain’s failure to reject the takeoff during the early stage when his attention was called to anomalous engine instrument readings. Contributing to the accident were the prolonged ground delay between deicing and the receipt of ATC takeoff clearance during which the airplane was exposed to continual precipitation, the known inherent pitch up characteristics of the B-737 aircraft when the leading edge is contaminated with even small amounts of snow or ice, and the limited experience of the flight crew in jet transport winter operations.
Final Report:

Crash of a Let L-410M near Praskoveyevka: 18 killed

Date & Time: Jan 7, 1982 at 1335 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-67290
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Gelendzhik – Sukhumi
MSN:
78 11 01
YOM:
1977
Flight number:
SU96G
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
16
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
18
Aircraft flight hours:
1895
Aircraft flight cycles:
3747
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Gelendzhik Airport at 1325LT on a schedule service to Sukhumi, Georgia, carrying 16 passengers and two pilots. Weather at that time was marginal with rain falls and a relative low ceiling. Four minutes after takeoff, at 1329LT, the crew informed ATC he was leaving the airport area and his position was about 12 km from the airport at an altitude of 450 meters. Six minutes later, while flying in clouds, the airplane struck trees and crashed in a wooded area located 22 km southeast of Gelendzhik Airport, bursting into flames. The burned wreckage was found three days later, on January 10, near Praskoveyevka, at an altitude of 350 meters. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 18 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the crew decided to continue the flight under VFR mode in adverse weather conditions and also failed to consider the wind component. This caused the aircraft to drift off course by 3,7 km to a mountainous area. While cruising in clouds at an insufficient altitude, the airplane contacted trees and crashed.