Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan off Belize City

Date & Time: Dec 4, 2014 at 1420 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
V3-HHU
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
San Pedro – Belize City
MSN:
208B-2025
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
9N281
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After landing at Belize City-Sir Barry Bowen Municipal Airport in marginal weather conditions, the single engine aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its right main gear, plunged into the sea and came to rest in shallow water. All six occupants were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan in Great Slave Lake

Date & Time: Nov 20, 2014 at 0721 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FKAY
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Yellowknife – Fort Simpson
MSN:
208B-0470
YOM:
1995
Flight number:
8T223
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3500
Captain / Total hours on type:
1800.00
Aircraft flight hours:
25637
Circumstances:
The Air Tindi Ltd. Cessna 208B Caravan departed Yellowknife Airport, Northwest Territories, on 20 November 2014 at 0642 Mountain Standard Time under instrument flight rules as Discovery Air flight DA223 to Fort Simpson, Northwest Territories. The flight had been rescheduled from the previous night because of freezing drizzle at Fort Simpson. During the climb to 8000 feet above sea level, DA223 encountered icing conditions that necessitated a return to Yellowknife. On the return to Yellowknife, DA223 was unable to maintain altitude. At 0721, flying in darkness approximately 18 nautical miles west of Yellowknife, it contacted the frozen surface of the North Arm of Great Slave Lake. The aircraft sustained substantial damage when it struck a rock outcropping, but there were no injuries to the pilot or to the 5 passengers. The pilot established communication with Air Tindi via satellite phone, and the pilot and passengers were recovered approximately 4 hours after the landing. The emergency locator transmitter did not activate during the landing, but was activated manually by the pilot.
Probable cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. Not using all enroute information led the pilot to underestimate the severity and duration of the icing conditions that would be encountered.
2. Inadequate awareness of aircraft limitations in icing conditions and incomplete weight-and-balance calculations led to the aircraft being dispatched in an overweight state for the forecast icing conditions. The aircraft centre of gravity was not within limits, and this led to a condition that increased stall speed and reduced aircraft climb performance.
3. The pilot’s expectation that the flight was being undertaken at altitudes where it should have been possible to avoid icing or to move quickly to an altitude without icing conditions led to his decision to continue operation of the aircraft in icing conditions that exceeded the aircraft’s performance capabilities.
4. The severity of the icing conditions encountered and the duration of the exposure resulted in reductions in aerodynamic performance, making it impossible to prevent descent of the aircraft.
5. The inability to arrest descent of the aircraft resulted in the forced landing on the surface of Great Slave Lake and the collision with terrain.
6. The Type C pilot self-dispatch system employed by Air Tindi did not have quality assurance oversight or adequate support systems. This contributed to the aircraft being dispatched in conditions not suitable for safe flight.
Findings as to risk:
1. If passenger briefings on cabin door operations are ineffective, there is a risk of passenger egress in an accident being compromised, affecting survivability.
2. If survival equipment is stowed in a location that may be inaccessible following an accident, such as the belly pod, there is a risk of survival being compromised if search and rescue is delayed.
Other findings:
1. The aircraft was under control and in a level attitude when it contacted the ice. This minimized structural damage and increased survivability for the aircraft’s occupants.
2. The survival skills of the crew and passengers were indispensable in a situation in which access to the survival equipment on the aircraft was limited.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-4Y0 in Kabul

Date & Time: Nov 7, 2014 at 1500 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YA-PIE
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Herat - Kabul
MSN:
26086/2475
YOM:
1993
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Upon touchdown at Kabul Airport runway 29, the right main gear collapsed, causing the right engine nacelle to struck the runway surface. The aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Beechcraft A100 King Air in Timmins

Date & Time: Sep 26, 2014 at 1740 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FEYT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moosonee – Timmins
MSN:
B-210
YOM:
1975
Flight number:
CRQ140
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2400
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
580
Copilot / Total hours on type:
300
Aircraft flight hours:
14985
Aircraft flight cycles:
15570
Circumstances:
The aircraft was operating as Air Creebec flight 140 on a scheduled flight from Moosonee, Ontario, to Timmins, Ontario, with 2 crew members and 7 passengers on board. While on approach to Timmins, the crew selected “landing gear down,” but did not get an indication in the handle that the landing gear was down and locked. A fly-by at the airport provided visual confirmation that the landing gear was not fully extended. The crew followed the Quick Reference Handbook procedures and selected the alternate landing-gear extension system, but they were unable to lower the landing gear manually. An emergency was declared, and the aircraft landed with only the nose gear partially extended. The aircraft came to rest beyond the end of Runway 28. All occupants evacuated the aircraft through the main entrance door. No fire occurred, and there were no injuries to the occupants. Emergency services were on scene for the evacuation. The accident occurred during daylight hours, at 1740 Eastern Daylight Time.
Probable cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. During the extension of the landing gear, a wire bundle became entangled around the landing-gear rotating torque shaft, preventing full extension of the landing gear.
2. The entanglement by the wire bundle also prevented the alternate landing-gear extension system from working. The crew was required to conduct a landing with only the nose gear partially extended.
Other findings:
1. The wire bundle consisted of wiring for the generator control circuits, and when damaged, disabled both generators. The battery became the only source of electrical power until the aircraft landed.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2 in Shoyna

Date & Time: Sep 24, 2014 at 1225 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-02322
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Shoyna – Arkhangelsk
MSN:
1G239-26
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
OAO718
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Shoyna Airport on a regular schedule service to Arkhangelsk-Vaskovo Airport, carrying eight passengers and two pilots. At liftoff, the aircraft banked right, causing the right lower wing to struck the ground. The right main gear was torn off upon impact. Out of control, the aircraft veered off runway and came to rest in a grassy area. All 10 occupants were rescued, among them three were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It is believed that the crew encountered strong cross winds upon takeoff.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 near Port Moresby: 4 killed

Date & Time: Sep 20, 2014 at 0935 LT
Operator:
Registration:
P2-KSF
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Woitape - Port Moresby
MSN:
528
YOM:
1977
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
19290
Captain / Total hours on type:
5980.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
432
Copilot / Total hours on type:
172
Aircraft flight hours:
34327
Aircraft flight cycles:
46302
Circumstances:
A DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft was returning from Woitape, Central Province, to Jacksons Airport, Port Moresby on the morning of 20 September 2014 on a charter flight under the instrument flight rules (IFR). The weather at Woitape was reported to have been clear, but at Port Moresby the reported weather was low cloud and rain. Witnesses reported that the summit of Mt Lawes (1,700 ft above mean sea level (AMSL)) was in cloud all morning on the day of the accident. When the aircraft was 36 nm (67 km) from Port Moresby, air traffic control gave the flight crew a clearance to descend maintaining visual separation from terrain and to track to a left base position for runway 14 right (14R) at Jacksons Airport, Port Moresby. The clearance was accepted by the crew. When the aircraft was within 9.5 nm (17.5 km) of the airport, the pilot in command (PIC) contacted the control tower and said that they were “running into a bit of cloud” and that they “might as well pick up the ILS [instrument landing system] if it’s OK”. The flight crew could not have conducted an ILS approach from that position. They could have discontinued their visual approach and requested radar vectoring for an ILS approach. However, they did not do so. The Port Moresby Aerodrome Terminal Information Service (ATIS), current while the aircraft was approaching Port Moresby had been received by the flight crew. It required aircraft arriving at Port Moresby to conduct an ILS approach. The PIC’s last ILS proficiency check was almost 11 months before the accident flight. A 3-monthly currency on a particular instrument approach is required under PNG Civil Aviation Rule 61.807. It is likely the reason the PIC did not request a clearance to intercept the ILS from 30 nm (55.5 km) was that he did not meet the currency requirements and therefore was not authorized to fly an ILS approach. During the descent, although the PIC said to the copilot ‘we know where we are, keep it coming down’, it was evident from the recorded information that his assessment of their position was incorrect and that the descent should not have been continued. The PIC and copilot appeared to have lost situational awareness. The aircraft impacted terrain near the summit of Mt Lawes and was substantially damaged by impact forces. Both pilots and one passenger were fatally injured in the impact, and one passenger died on the day after the accident from injuries sustained during the accident. Of the five passengers who survived the accident, three were seriously injured and two received minor injuries. One of the fatally injured passengers was not wearing a seat belt.
Probable cause:
The following contributing factors were identified:
- The flight crew continued the descent in instrument meteorological conditions without confirming their position.
- The flight crew’s assessment of their position was incorrect and they had lost situational awareness
- The flight crew deprived themselves of the “Caution” and “Warning” alerts that would have sounded about 20 sec and about 10 sec respectively before the collision, by not deactivating the EGPWS Terrain Inhibit prior to departure from Woitape.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fokker 50 in Mogadishu

Date & Time: Sep 6, 2014 at 1030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-BYE
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Galkayo - Mogadishu
MSN:
20204
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
6J715
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
21
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Upon landing on runway 05 at Mogadishu Airport, the right main gear failed. The aircraft veered off runway to the right then rolled for few dozen metres, collided with a concrete perimeter fence and came to rest. There was no fire. It appears the right wing and the right engine suffered severe damage (the right broke in two). The nose of the aircraft was destroyed and the fuselage was bent on several areas. All 24 occupants evacuated safely. The aircraft was completing a domestic schedule flight on behalf of Jubba Airways.

Crash of a BAe 3102 Jetstream 31 in Doncaster

Date & Time: Aug 15, 2014 at 1936 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-GAVA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Belfast – Doncaster
MSN:
785
YOM:
1987
Flight number:
LNQ207
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8740
Captain / Total hours on type:
3263.00
Circumstances:
G-GAVA took off from Belfast City Airport at 1745 hrs operating a scheduled air service to Doncaster Sheffield Airport with one passenger and a crew of two pilots on board. The commander was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the co-pilot was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The departure, cruise and approach to Doncaster Sheffield were uneventful. The 1820 hrs ATIS for the airport stated that the wind was from 260° at 5 kt, varying between 220° and 280°. Visibility was greater than 10 km, there were few clouds at 3,000 ft aal, the temperature was 17°C and the QNH was 1,019 hPa. Although Runway 02 was the active runway, the crew requested radar vectors for a visual final approach to Runway 20, a request which was approved by ATC. The load sheet recorded that the aircraft’s mass at landing was expected to be 5,059 kg which required a target threshold indicated airspeed (IAS) of 101 kt. The aircraft touched down at 1836 hrs with an IAS of 102 kt and a peak normal acceleration of 1.3 g, and the commander moved the power levers aft to ground idle and then to reverse. As the aircraft decelerated, the commander moved the power levers forward to ground idle and asked the co-pilot to move the RPM levers to taxi. At an IAS of 65 kt, eight seconds after touchdown, the left wing dropped suddenly, the aircraft began to yaw to the left and the commander was unable to maintain directional control with either the rudder or the nosewheel steering tiller. The aircraft ran off the left side of the runway and stopped on the grass having turned through approximately 90°. The left landing gear had collapsed and the aircraft had come to a halt resting on its baggage pannier, right landing gear and left wing. The commander pulled both feather levers, to ensure that both engines were shut down, and switched the Electrics Master switch to emergency off. The co-pilot transmitted “tower……[callsign]” and the controller replied “[callsign] copied, emergency services on their way”. The commander instructed the co-pilot to evacuate the aircraft. The co-pilot moved into the main cabin where he found that the passenger appeared to be uninjured. He considered evacuating the aircraft through the emergency exit on the right side but judged that the main exit on the left side at the rear of the cabin would be the best option. The left side cabin door released normally but would not open completely because the sill of the doorway was at ground level (Figure 1) but, all occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft. The Aerodrome Controller in the ATC tower activated the Crash Alarm at 1836 hrs while the aircraft was still on the paved surface of the runway. Two Rescue and Fire Fighting Service vehicles arrived on scene at 1838 hrs by which time the occupants were clear of the aircraft.
Probable cause:
The aircraft’s left main landing gear failed as a result of stress corrosion cracking in the forward pintle housing, at the top of the left landing gear cylinder. The landing gear material is known to be susceptible to stress corrosion cracking. The investigation determined that a design solution implemented by the aircraft manufacturer following the 2012 accident, which was intended to prevent stress corrosion cracking, had not met its original design intent.
Final Report:

Crash of a HESA IrAn-140-100 in Tehran: 40 killed

Date & Time: Aug 10, 2014 at 0921 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EP-GPA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tehran – Tabas
MSN:
90-05
YOM:
2008
Flight number:
SPN5915
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
42
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
40
Captain / Total flying hours:
9478
Captain / Total hours on type:
2000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
572
Copilot / Total hours on type:
400
Aircraft flight hours:
1405
Aircraft flight cycles:
1058
Circumstances:
On August 10,2014, at 04:52 UTC daylight time, an AN-140-100 aircraft , Iranian registration EP-GPA ( MSN 90-05), operated by Sepahan Airlines flight # 5915, experienced engine number 2 shutdown just about 2 seconds before lift-off and crashed shortly after take-off nearby Mehrabad International Airport (THR), TEHRAN; IR. Of IRAN; the aircraft was on lift off from runway 29L. The airplane was completely destroyed by impact forces and post-crash fire. Fatality incorporates 34 of the 40 passengers; 4 of the 4 flight attendants, and 2 of the 2 flight crewmembers. The 11 passengers received serious injuries, which finally as a result of that accident there are 40 fatalities and 8 passengers recovered from injury. Sepahan Airline was operating under the provisions of CAO.IRI operational requirement for commercial air transport. Before the accident flight the airplane dispatch from Isfahan and arrived at Tehran about 03:30. The dispatcher and PIC perform the load calculation using the aircraft FM performance charts. Because of load limitation for 15° flap position, load sheet change and re-write with 10° flap position and re-calculated MTOM. The aircraft was enrouted to Airport Tabbas Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. Figure 1 below is a map showing the location of the accident and the aircraft flight path. Figure 2 shows THR runway 29L SID and figure 3 show timeline of event in the flight path. According to overview of flight crew performance, it is indicated that the crewmembers were provided with the flight release paperwork, which included weather information, notices to airmen (NOTAM), and the flight plan.
Probable cause:
The accident investigation team determined that the main cause of this accident was combination of:
1. Electronic engine control (SAY-2000) failure simultaneously with engine No: 2 shutdown, just about 2 seconds before aircraft lift-off.
2. AFM Confusing performance chart resulted the pilots relying on performance calculation that, significantly over-estimate the aircraft MTOM.
Contributing Factors to the accident were:
1. Aircraft flight manual unclear procedure, including the procedure for calculating maximum allowable take-off weight, VR and V2 and ambiguity in the climb segment definition and applications.
2. Crew performance, including:
- PIC rotated the aircraft at the speed of about 219 km/h (whereas 224 km/h is the speed recommended by the AFM table 4.2.3),
- The crew failed to perform the manual propeller feathering procedure for the failed engine,
- The PIC's decision to fly with the aircraft, notwithstanding, had about 190 kgf overweight,
- Aircraft fuel was about 500 kg more than required fuel for the accident flight.
3. The appearance of negative thrust from the unfeathered propeller blades at takeoff were not considered during the aircraft certification tests, as it was considered improbable. However, in
the accident flight the negative thrust did appear and affected the flight performance.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante in Foz do Iguaçu

Date & Time: Jul 28, 2014 at 1500 LT
Operator:
Registration:
PT-TAW
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Foz do Iguaçu - Curitiba
MSN:
110-258
YOM:
1980
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Foz do Iguaçu-Cataratas Airport, while climbing, the crew reported technical problems and elected to return. The crew realized he could not make it so he attempted an emergency landing in a corn field. Upon landing, the aircraft lost its undercarriage and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Among the four occupants, one passenger was slightly injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.