Private

The pilot reported, and airport security video confirmed, that during a takeoff attempt, the right wing contacted the runway and the pilot pulled back excessively on the yoke. The airplane pitched up, stalled, and descended back on to the runway. It subsequently traveled off the end of the runway and impacted trees, before coming to rest on its side. The pilot added that in retrospect, he should have rejected the takeoff when the right wing contacted the runway. Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions, nor did the pilot report any. The inspector noted that both wings separated, and the fuselage was substantially damaged.

Shortly after taking off, the pilot was instructed to change from the airport tower frequency to the departure control frequency. Numerous radio transmissions followed between tower personnel and the pilot that indicated the airplane’s radio was operating normally on the tower frequency, but the pilot could not change frequencies to departure control as directed. The pilot subsequently requested and received approval to return to the departure airport. During the flight back to the airport, the pilot made radio transmissions that indicated he continued to troubleshoot the radio problems. The airplane’s flight track showed the pilot flew directly toward the runway aimpoint about 1,000 ft from, and perpendicular to, the runway during the left base turn to final and allowed the airplane to descend as low as 200 ft pressure altitude (PA). The pilot then made a right turn about .5 miles from the runway followed by a left turn towards the runway. A pilot witness near the accident location observed the airplane maneuvering and predicted the airplane was going to stall. The airplane’s airspeed decreased to about 53 knots (kts) during the left turn and video showed the airplane’s bank angle increased before the airplane aerodynamically stalled and impacted terrain. Post accident examination of the airframe, engines, and review of recorded engine monitoring data revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Toxicology testing showed the pilot had diphenhydramine, a sedating antihistamine, in his liver and muscle tissue. While therapeutic levels could not be determined, side effects such as diminished psychomotor performance from his use of diphenhydramine were not evident from operational evidence. Thus, the effects of the pilot’s use of diphenhydramine was not a factor in this accident. The accident is consistent with the pilot becoming distracted by the reported non-critical radio anomaly and turning base leg of the traffic pattern too early during his return to the airport. The pilot then failed to maintain adequate airspeed and proper bank angle while maneuvering from base leg to final approach, resulting in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain.

Following an uneventful flight from Memphis at FL260, the pilot initiated the descent to Yoakum Airport, Texas. On final approach to runway 31, the single engine airplane went out of control and crashed in an open field located about one mile southeast of the airfield. A passenger was able to get out from the cabin and was slightly injured while all four other occupants were killed.

The twin engine airplane departed Basseterre-Robert L. Bradshaw Airport in St Kitts & Nevis on a flight to Providenciales, Turks & Caicos Islands (distance 1,116 km). Approaching Cockburn Town (Grand Turk Island), the pilot informed ATC he was shot of fuel and later ditched the airplane offshore. All four occupants were rescued by a fisherman around 15h30. The aircraft sank.

The crew departed Celaya-Capitán Rogelio Castillo Airport in the early afternoon on a positioning flight to Saltillo. Contact was lost while the airplane was flying at FL260. It entered an uncontrolled descent and apparently disintegrated in a uninhabited area located near Venado. Both occupants were killed.

The single engine airplane departed Nashua Airport, New Hampshire, on December 13 on a flight to Nuuk, Greenland, with an intermediate stop in Goose Bay. Due to poor weather conditions at destination, the pilot diverted to Seven Islands Airport, Quebec, where the couple passed the overnight. On the morning of December 14, the airplane departed Seven Islands Airport at 0820LT bound for Goose Bay. At about 0958LT, the aircraft crossed the final approach fix / final approach waypoint FAFKO at 2,800 feet ASL, travelling at a ground speed of 104 knots, and began the final descent. Although the descent remained steady on a 3° profile, the ground speed decreased continuously for about 60 seconds. At 1000:31, the occurrence pilot reported at waypoint SATAK, and the ground speed had increased to above 80 knots. The tower provided the pilot with updated wind information and cleared the aircraft to land on Runway 08. The pilot acknowledged the clearance at 1000:49. Soon after, the ground speed began to decrease at a rate similar to the previous rate. At 1002:47, it had decreased to 51 knots. The aircraft departed controlled flight and impacted terrain when it was about 2.5 NM southwest of the airport along the extended centreline for Runway 08. The 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter activated, and the signal was received by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Halifax, Nova Scotia, at 1006. A helicopter search and rescue mission was launched from Canadian Forces Base 5 Wing Goose Bay at 1036; the helicopter arrived at the accident site 3 minutes later. Medical technicians extricated the 2 occupants, who were both seriously injured. The occupants were airlifted to a waiting ambulance and then transported to the local hospital. The pilot later died of his injuries. The aircraft was destroyed.

The twin engine airplane departed Denton Enterprise Airport runway 36 at 1459LT and continued to the west at an altitude of 2,000 feet. Eight minutes later, the pilot initiated a left hand circuit to land at Decatur Airport. While descending on final, the speed decreased and the airplane crashed nearby a wooded area located 6 km short of runway 35. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The single engine airplane landed last October at Dade-Collier Airport, in the center of the Everglades National Park, following a flight from Sancti Spíritus, Cuba. The pilot defected Cuba and landed safely in the US. On November 14, in unclear circumstances, maybe while being transferred to Opa Locka Airport, the airplane crashed in a marshy area located 25 km west of Opa Locka Airport. Both occupants were uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing about 2.5 hours before departing on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) and weather data indicated the flight encountered low IFR (LIFR) conditions during the approach to the destination airport. These conditions included low ceilings, low visibility, localized areas of freezing precipitation, low-level turbulence and wind shear. The ADS-B data revealed that during the last minute of data, the airplane’s descent rate increased from 500 ft per minute to 3,000 ft per minute. In the last 30 seconds of the flight the airplane entered a 2,000 ft per minute climb followed by a descent that exceeded 5,000 ft per minute. The last data point was located about 1,000 ft from the accident site. There were no witnesses to the accident. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane’s flight instruments and avionics were destroyed during the accident and were unable to be functionally tested. The rapid ascents and descents near the end of the flight track were consistent with a pilot who was experiencing spatial disorientation, which resulted in a loss of control and high-speed impact with terrain. The pilot purchased the airplane about 3 weeks before the accident and received about 15 hours of transition training in the airplane, including 1 hour of actual instrument conditions during high-altitude training. The pilot’s logbook indicated he had 5.2 hours of actual instrument flight time. At the time of the pilot’s weather briefing, the destination airport was reporting marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions with the terminal area forecast (TAF) in agreement, with MVFR conditions expected to prevail through the period of the accident flight. LIFR conditions were reported about 40 minutes before the airplane’s departure and continued to the time of the accident. Light freezing precipitation was reported intermittently before and after the accident, which was not included in the TAF. The destination airport’s automated surface observing system (ASOS) reported LIFR conditions with overcast ceilings at 300 ft above ground level (agl) and light freezing drizzle at the time of the accident. Low-level turbulence and wind shear were detected, which indicated a high probability of a moderate or greater turbulence layer between 3,600 and 5,500 ft mean sea level (msl) in the clouds. During the approach, the airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions with a high probability of encountering moderate and greater turbulence, with above freezing temperatures. The National Weather Service (NWS) had issued conflicting weather information during the accident time period. The pilot’s weather briefing indicated predominately MVFR conditions reported and forecasted by the TAFs along the route of flight, while both the NWS Aviation Weather Center (AWC) AIRMET (G-AIRMET) and the Graphic Forecast for Aviation (GFA) were depicting IFR conditions over the destination airport at the time of the briefing. The TAFs, GAIRMET, and Current Icing Product (CIP)/Forecast Icing Products (FIP) were not indicating any forecast for icing conditions or freezing precipitation surrounding the accident time. The pilot reviewed the TAF in his briefing, expecting MVFR conditions to prevail at his expected time of arrival. The TAF was amended twice between the period of his briefing and the time of the accident to indicate IFR to LIFR conditions with no mention of any potential freezing precipitation or low-level wind shear (LLWS) during the period. Given the pilot’s low actual instrument experience, minimal amount of flight experience in the accident airplane, and the instrument conditions encountered during the approach with a high probability of moderate or greater turbulence, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation and lost control of the airplane.

The pilot flew a visual approach to his home airport but did a go-around due to ground fog. After receiving an instrument flight rules clearance, he flew an RNAV/GPS approach that he also discontinued due to ground fog. After executing a missed approach, the pilot flew another RNAV/GPS approach. The pilot reported that during this last approach he lost visual references and initiated a go-around, during which the airplane impacted trees about 800 ft to the right of the runway. The main wreckage came to rest upright and was consumed by a post-impact fire. The postaccident examination revealed no preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that he observed the right engine was slower to accelerate than the left engine during the attempted go-around, and that he was distracted looking at the engine indications. He reported that he did not notice if the airplane yaw to the right and, before he could correct for the altitude loss, the airplane descended into and struck the trees.