Private

The aircraft was substantially damaged while landing at the Gladewater Municipal Airport (07F), Gladewater, Texas. The private pilot and three passengers received minor injuries, and the forth passenger was seriously injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The cross-country flight originated from the Natchitoches Regional Airport (IER), Natchitoches, Louisiana, around 1550. While preparing to enter the traffic pattern at 1,800 feet above ground level, the pilot checked the wind on his Garmin 696 with NEXRAD and also heard a wind update on the radio for the nearest weather facility. The current wind was understood to be from 170 degrees between 20 and 25 knots. The pilot entered the pattern in a left downwind for runway 14 and began to slow the airplane down. The pilot stated he was on short final and at an airspeed of about 120 knots when a gusting crosswind pushed the airplane 30 feet right of the runway centerline and began to descend very quickly. The pilot decided to perform a go-around maneuver and added full engine power. As engine power was added, the twin-engine airplane began to roll to the right. The pilot then elected to reduce engine power and land. The airplane impacted and exited the runway before coming to rest in an upright position. Investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, Cessna Aircraft Co., and Continental Motors, Inc. performed a post accident examination of the airplane and the engines. Examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the fuselage, empennage, wings, and landing gear. No preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures were found that would have precluded normal operation. At 1553, the aviation routine weather report at East Texas Regional Airport in Longview, Texas, about 16 nautical miles southeast of the accident location was: wind 170 degrees and 16 knots gusting to 23 knots; visibility 10sm; few clouds at 4,900 feet above ground level; temperature 23 degrees Celsius and dew point 13 degrees Celsius; altimeter 29.92 inches of mercury. At 1530, the weather station reported a peak wind gust of 27 knots from 190 degrees.

Forty seconds after its take off from Ecuvillens Airport runway 28, while flying at a speed of 120 knots, the aircraft slightly turned to the right without gaining sufficient altitude. Then, its altitude fluctuated and it descended and climbed again. Suddenly, the aircraft hit tree tops, lost some wing's and empennage elements while all engine cowlings separated. The fuel tanks were spoiled and the aircraft caught fire. It overflew the wooded area for a distance of 120 metres then impacted a powerline before crashing in an open field located 275 metres after the initial impact, bursting into flames. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot departed Toussus-le-Noble Airport at 0810LT on an IFR flight to Lyon. After contacting ATC, the pilot was vectored for a LOC DME approach to runway 16 at Lyon-Bron Airport. He reported being established on localizer at 0907LT, then was transferred to the tower and was cleared to land. At 0910LT, he reported he was initiating a go-around procedure and was instructed to climb to 3,000 feet maintaining a straight-in path. ATC requested twice the pilot to confirm the approach interruption but he failed to respond. A few moments later, the pilot reported 'Now, I'm not good at all'. The airplane crashed in a retention basin located 1,500 meters short of runway 16 threshold, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The airplane was approaching the destination airport in night visual meteorological conditions. After losing sight of the runway once and going around, they continued the approach, even though the pilot in command (PIC) stated that he thought they were going to land long. The PIC stated that the main landing gear touched down near the 1,000-foot marker of the 4,801-foot-long runway, about the landing reference speed (Vref) of 120 knots. The PIC stated that he then applied the brakes but thought they were not working; he had not yet activated the thrust reversers. He alerted the second in command (SIC), who also depressed the brake pedals with no apparent results. The PIC suggested a go-around, but the SIC responded that it was too late. The airplane subsequently traveled off the end of the runway, struck a gravel berm, and came to rest about 816 feet beyond the end of the runway. During the impact, one of the passenger seats dislodged from its seat track and was found on the cabin floor, with the passenger still in it. Review of cockpit voice recorder, video, and performance data revealed that the main landing gear touched down at Vref and about 1,650 feet beyond the approach end of the runway. The nosegear then touched down 2.4 seconds later and about 2,120 feet beyond the approach end of the runway, with about 2,680 feet of runway remaining. Digital electronic engine control data revealed that about 8 seconds after weight-on-wheels, the power levers were advanced from the idle position to the takeoff position. The power levers were then returned to the idle position 6 seconds later. The power levers were moved to the reverse thrust position 8 seconds after that and remained in that position for the duration of the accident sequence; both thrust reversers deployed when commanded. Examination and testing of the airplane systems did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions with the wheels brakes or any other systems. Although armed, the airbrakes did not deploy upon touchdown; the data available was inconclusive to determine what position the throttles were in at touchdown and why the airbrakes did not deploy. It is likely that the pilots did not detect the wheel braking because its effect was less than expected with the airplane at full power and with the airbrakes stowed. Landing distance data revealed that the airplane required about 2,551 feet to stop at its given weight in the given weather conditions. With a runway distance of 2,680 feet remaining, the airplane could have stopped or gone around uneventfully with appropriate use of all deceleration devices. The landing procedure stated to activate the thrust reversers after nosewheel touchdown and then apply the brakes, as necessary; however, the PIC only applied the brakes. Further, no callouts were made to verify ground spoiler or reverse thrust deployment. The PIC then stated that he was going to go around, but the SIC said it was too late, so the thrust levers were brought back to idle and the reversers were deployed. The PIC's delayed decision to stop or go around resulted in about a 22-second delay in thrust reverser activation, which resulted in the runway overrun. Additionally, the procedure for a (perceived) failed brake system would have been to activate the emergency brake, which neither pilot did. Examination of the seats revealed that a forward-facing seat was installed in the aft-facing position and an aft-facing seat was installed in the forward-facing position. Additionally, the ejected seat's shear plungers were found in the raised position. Had the seat been installed correctly, the plungers would have been in the lowered position, in the seat track. The improper installation most likely resulted in the passenger’s seat separating from the seat track and exacerbating his injuries.

Shortly after takeoff from runway 09 at Tijuana-General Abelardo L. Rodríguez Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed onto a garage, bursting into flames. Both occupants as well as one people in his car were killed.

The pilot, accompanied by three passengers who were family members, took off at 1835LT from Kassel-Calden Airport (Germany) for a private flight under IFR to Toulouse-Blagnac. After about three hours of flight, he was cleared for approach and received radar vectoring for the runway 14R ILS. During the last exchange with the controller, as the aeroplane was on final at 900 feet, the pilot stated that he had a problem without specifying what type, as the message was interrupted. Shortly afterwards, radar and radio contact was lost. The wreckage was found close to the threshold of runway 14R. Two passengers were rescued while the pilot and another passenger were killed. The occupants were four members of the same family : the parents and two children, a boy aged nine and a girl aged 13. While the parents were killed upon impact, the daughter died from her injuries a day later and the boy died three days later.

During the takeoff roll from runway 25 at Hildesheim Airport, the twin engine aircraft accelerated slowly and lifted off from the mid-runway only. After takeoff, the climb gradient was low then the airplane lost height and descended until it impacted a wall and crashed in an industrial area located about 900 metres from the runway end, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed.

During cruise flight, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller that the airplane was having engine fuel pressure problems. The controller advised the pilot of available airports for landing if necessary and asked the pilot's intentions. The pilot chose to continue the flight. GPS data recorded by an onboard avionics system indicated that the engine had momentarily lost total power about 20 seconds before the pilot reported a problem to the controller. About 7 minutes later, when the airplane was about 7,000 feet above ground level, the engine lost total power again, and power was not restored for the remainder of the flight. The pilot attempted to glide to an airport about 10 miles away, but the airplane crashed in a field about 3 miles from the airport. GPS data showed a loss of fuel pressure before each of the engine power losses and prolonged lateral g forces consistent with a side-slip flight condition. The rudder trim tab was found displaced to the left about 3/8 inch. Flight testing and recorded flight data revealed that the rudder trim tab displacement was consistent with that required to achieve no side slip during a typical climb segment. The GPS and flight data indicated that the lateral g-forces increased as the airplane leveled off and accelerated, indicating that the automatic rudder trim feature of the yaw damper system was either not engaged or not operating. The recorded data indicated autopilot system engagement, which should have automatically engaged the yaw damper system. However, the data indicated the yaw damper was not engaged; the yaw damper could have subsequently been turned off by several means not recorded by the avionics system. Testing of the manual electric rudder (yaw) trim system revealed no anomalies, indicating that the pilot would have still been able to trim the airplane using the manual system. It is likely that the pilot's failure to properly trim the airplane's rudder led to a prolonged uncoordinated flight condition. Although the fuel tank system is designed to prevent unporting of the fuel lines during momentary periods of uncoordinated flight, it is not intended to do so for extended periods of uncoordinated flight. Therefore, the fuel tank feed line likely unported during the prolonged uncoordinated flight, which resulted in the subsequent loss of fuel pressure and engine power. The propeller and propeller controls were not in the feathered position, thus the windmilling propeller would have increased the airplane's descent rate during the glide portion of the flight. The glide airspeed used by the pilot was 20 knots below the airspeed recommended by the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), and the reduced airspeed also would have increased the airplane's descent rate during the glide. The flight and GPS data indicated that the airplane had a gliding range of about 16 nautical miles from the altitude where the final loss of engine power occurred; however, the glide performance was dependent on several factors, including feathering the propeller and maintaining the proper airspeed, neither of which the pilot did. Although the POH did not contain maximum range glide performance data with a windmilling propeller, based on the available information, it is likely that the airplane could have glided to the alternate airport about 10 miles away if the pilot had followed the proper procedures.

The single engine aircraft was performing an on-demand flight from Petropavlovka to Toora-Khem with seven fishermen and a pilot who want to go to a remote fish camp located in the natural reserve of Azas. While flying at low altitude, the aircraft went out of control and crashed on the shore of the Choigan-Khole Lake, near the Sorug River. While all seven passengers escaped with minor injuries, the pilot was killed. It appears that the aircraft was not registered and did not have any certificate of airworthiness. Therefore, the flight was considered as illegal and no flight plan was filed.

Two aircraft, ZS-NJX and ZU-MMI, with 6 and 7 people on board respectively, took off from Tzaneen aerodrome (FATZ) on 14 August 2011 at approximately 0820Z, engaged in private flights with the intention of landing at Rand Airport (FAGM) on the same day. As both aircraft had not arrived at Rand Airport at their expected time of arrival, numerous attempts were made to contact the aircraft and these were unsuccessful. The search and rescue mission was initiated to try and locate these aircraft. The search and rescue mission was based around the area where the aircraft were believed to have had last contact with each other and with other traffic. Unfortunately due to bad weather in and around the area of last contact of these aircraft, they could only be located approximately two days after they had collided with a mountain in the Lekgalametse valley. Both aircraft were destroyed by post-impact fire and all the occupants of both aircraft were fatally injured.