Private

The pilot took off at around 14 h 45 from Maribo aerodrome (Denmark) bound for Cuers. He filed an IFR flight plan that he cancelled(2) at 17 h 15 near the St Tropez VOR (83). He explained that he had overflown the installations at Cuers at 1,500 ft and started an aerodrome circuit via the north for runway 11. He was visual with the ground and noted the presence of snow showers. He reckoned that these conditions made it possible to continue the approach. At about 600 ft, he went into a snow shower. At about 400 ft, he noticed that the horizontal visibility was zero and that he had lost all external visual references. He tried to make a go-around but didn’t feel any increase in engine power. At about 200 ft, he saw that he was to the right of the runway and decided to make an emergency landing. The aeroplane struck the ground on the right side of the runway. It slid for 150 metres and swung around before stopping. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern to land to the north. A surface wind from the west prevailed with gusts to 15 knots. Radar data revealed that the airplane was on final approach, about 1.16 miles from the runway and about 210 feet above the ground. The airplane then crashed in a pasture south of the airport, in a slight left-wing-low attitude, and came to rest upright. The cockpit and cabin were consumed in a postcrash fire. The pilot's wife, who was in the aft cabin and survived the accident, recalled that it was choppy and that they descended quickly. She recalled hearing two distinct warning horns in the cockpit prior to the crash. The airplane was equipped with two aural warning systems in the cockpit: a landing gear warning horn and a stall warning horn. The pilot likely allowed the airspeed to decay while aligning the airplane on final approach and allowed the airplane to descend below a normal glide path. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear were in transit toward the retracted position at impact, indicating that the pilot was attempting to execute a go-around before the accident. The pilot made no distress calls to air traffic controllers before the crash. The pilot did not possess a current flight review at the time of the accident. Examination of the wreckage, including a test run of both engines, revealed no evidence of a pre-existing mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

On the day of the accident, a mechanic taxied the airplane onto the runway and performed a full power check of both engines, exercised both propellers, and checked each magneto drop with no discrepancies reported. Following the engine run, the mechanic taxied the airplane to the fuel ramp where the fuselage fuel tank was filled; after fueling, the fuselage tank had 41.5 gallons of usable fuel. The mechanic then taxied the airplane to the ramp where the engines were secured and the fuel selector switches were placed to the off position. The mechanic reported that, at that time, the left fuel tank had 4 to 5 gallons of fuel, while the right fuel tank had about 2 to 3 gallons of fuel; the unusable fuel amount for each wing tank is 3 gallons. The pilot taxied the airplane to the approach end of runway 18 and was heard to apply takeoff power. A pilot-rated witness noted that, at the point of rotation, the airplane pitched up fairly quickly to about 20 degrees and rolled left to about 10 to 15 degrees of bank. The airplane continued rolling left to an inverted position and impacted the ground in a 40 degree nose-low attitude. A postcrash fire consumed most of the cockpit, cabin, both wings, and aft fuselage, including the vertical stabilizer, rudder, and fuselage fuel tank. Postaccident inspection of the flight controls, which were extensively damaged by impact and fire, revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Although the flap actuators were noted to be asymmetrically extended and no witness marks were noted to confirm the flap position, a restrictor is located at each cylinder’s downline port by design to prevent a rapid asymmetric condition. Therefore, it is likely that the flap actuators changed positions following impact and loss of hydraulic system pressure and did not contribute to the left roll that preceded the accident. Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. Postaccident examination of the fuselage fuel sump revealed the left fuel selector was in the crossfeed position, while the right fuel selector was likely positioned to the on position. (The as-found positions of the fuel selector knobs were unreliable due to postaccident damage.) The starting engines checklist indicates that the pilot is to move both fuel selectors from the on position to the crossfeed position, and back to the on position while listening for valve actuation/movement. The before takeoff checklist indicates that the pilot is to verify that the selectors are in the on position. Although the left engine servo fuel injector did not meet flow tests during the postaccident investigation, this was attributed to postaccident heat damage. Calculations to determine engine rpm based on ground scars revealed that the left engine was operating just above idle, and the right engine was operating about 1,315 rpm, which is consistent with a left engine loss of power and the pilot reducing power on the right engine during the in-flight loss of control. Examination of both propellers determined that neither was feathered at impact. Although the as-found position of the left fuel selector knob could be considered unreliable because of impact damage during the accident sequence, given that right wing fuel tank had no usable fuel, it is unlikely that the experienced pilot would have moved the left fuel selector to the crossfeed position in response to the engine power loss. It is more likely that the pilot failed to return the left fuel selector to the on position during the starting engines checklist and also failed to verify its position during the before takeoff checklist; thus, the left engine was being fed only from the right fuel tank, which had very little fuel. There was likely enough fuel in the right tank and lines for the pilot to taxi and takeoff before the left engine failed, causing the airplane to turn to the left, from which the pilot did not recover.

The pilot reported that, immediately after touchdown, the airplane began “wavering” and moments later veered to the left. He attempted to regain directional control with the application of “full right rudder” and the airplane subsequently departed the right side of the runway. A witness reported that the airplane’s touchdown was “firm” but not abnormal. As the airplane approached the left side of the runway, it yawed right and skidded down the runway while facing right. As the airplane began moving to the right side of the runway, the witness heard the right engine increase to near full power. The airplane spun to the left, coming to rest facing the opposite direction from its approach to landing. Another witness reported seeing the propellers contact the ground. The pilot attributed the loss of directional control to a main landing gear malfunction. Post accident examination of the airplane revealed that the left propeller assembly was feathered and that the right propeller blades were bent forward, indicative of the right engine impacting terrain under high power. Both throttle levers were found in the aft/closed position, and both propeller control levers were in the full-forward position. The propeller control levers exhibited little friction and could be moved with pressure from one finger. The evidence suggested that the pilot inadvertently feathered the left propeller assembly during the accident sequence. The pilot did not report any pre accident malfunctions or failures with the airplane’s engines or propeller assemblies that would have precluded normal operation.

The crew stated that the preflight examination, takeoff checks, takeoff roll, and rotation from runway 26 were "normal." However, once airborne, and with the landing gear down and the flaps at 20 degrees, the airplane began a roll to the right. The captain used differential thrust and rudder to keep the airplane from rolling over, and as he kept adjusting both. He noted that as the airspeed increased, the airplane tended to roll more; as the airspeed decreased, the roll would decrease. The captain also recalled thinking that the airplane might have had an asymmetrical flap misconfiguration. Both pilots stated that there were no lights or warnings. As the airplane continued a right turn, runway 13 came into view. The captain completed a landing to the right of that runway, landing long and in the grass with a 9-knot, left quartering tailwind. The airplane then paralleled the runway and ran into an airport perimeter fence beyond the runway's end. The cockpit voice recorder revealed that the crew initially used challenge and reply checklists and that after completing the takeoff checklist, engine power increased. About 7 seconds after the first officer called "V1," the captain stated an expletive, and the first officer announced "positive rate." During the next 50 seconds, the captain repeated numerous expletives, an automated voice issued numerous "bank angle" warnings, and the first officer asked what he could do, to which the captain later told him to declare an emergency. There were no calls by either pilot for an emergency checklist nor were there callouts of any emergency memory items. Each of the airplane's wings incorporated four hydraulically-actuated spoiler segments. The outboard segment, the roll control spoiler, normally extends in conjunction with its wing aileron after the aileron has traveled more than about 3 degrees, and extends up to 50 degrees at full control wheel rotation. When the airplane was subsequently examined in a hangar, hydraulic power was applied to the airplane via a ground hydraulic power unit, and the right roll spoiler elevated to 7.9 degrees above the flush wing level. Multiple left/right midrange turns of the yoke, with the hydraulic ground power unit both on and off, resulted in the roll spoiler being extended normally, but still returning to a resting position of 7.8 to 7.9 degrees above the flush position. When the yoke was turned full right and left, whether the aileron boost was on or off, both wings' roll spoilers extended to their full positions per specifications; however, once the full deflection testing was completed, the right roll spoiler returned to 6.1 degrees above the flush position. A final yoke turn resulted in the roll spoiler being elevated to 5.5 degrees. The right wing roll spoiler actuator was subsequently examined at the airplane manufacturer, and the roll spoiler was found to jam. The roll spoiler actuator was disassembled, but no specific reason(s) for the jamming were found. The roll spoiler parts were also examined and no indications of why the actuator may have jammed were found. According to the flight manual, if any of the spoiler segments should float, moving the spoiler hold down switch to "Spoiler Hold Down" locks all spoiler panels down. The roll control spoilers may then be used in the roll mode by turning on the auxiliary hydraulic pump. Also, an "Aileron/Spoiler Disconnect" T-handle is available to release the tie between the ailerons and the roll control spoilers in the event of a jam in either system. When used, the pilot's yoke controls only the ailerons, and the copilot's yoke controls only the roll control spoilers. Although the jamming of the right spoiler initiated the event, the crew's proper application of emergency procedures should have negated the adverse effects. Memory items for an uncommanded roll include moving the spoiler hold-down switch to the "on" position, which was not done; the spoiler hold-down switch was found in the "off" position. (The captain thought that he may have had an asymmetrical flap configuration; however, if an asymmetry had been the initiating event, the flap system would have been automatically disabled and the flap segments would have been mechanically locked in their positions.) The aileron/spoiler disconnect T-handle was found pulled up, which the crew indicated had occurred when the first officer's shoe hit it as he evacuated the airplane. While pulling the aileron/spoiler disconnect T-handle would have been appropriate for a different emergency procedure to release the tie between the ailerons and the roll control spoilers in the event of a jam in either system, it would have actually hindered the captain's attempts to control the airplane in this case because it would have disconnected the left roll spoiler from the captain's yoke, making it more difficult to counter the effects of the displaced right roll spoiler. Although the crew indicated that the t-handle was pulled during the first officer's exit of the airplane, its position, safety cover, and means of activation make this unlikely. In addition, precertification testing of the airplane showed that even with the right roll spoiler fully deployed, as long as the pilot had the use of the left roll spoiler in conjunction with that aileron, the airplane should have been easily controlled.

Toward the end of a 6 hour, 20 minute flight, during a night visual approach, the pilot flew the airplane to a left traffic pattern downwind leg. At some point, he lowered the landing gear and set the flaps to 30 degrees. He turned the airplane to a left base leg, and after doing so, was heard on the common traffic frequency stating that he had an "engine out." The airplane then passed through the final leg course, the pilot called "base to final," and the airplane commenced a right turn while maintaining altitude. The angle of bank was then observed to increase to where the airplane's wings became vertical, then inverted, and the airplane rolled into a near-vertical descent, hitting the ground upright in a right spin. Subsequent examination of the airplane and engines revealed that the right engine was not powered at impact, and the propeller from that engine was not in feather. No mechanical anomalies could be found with the engine that could have resulted in its failure. The right fuel tank was breeched; however, fuel calculations, confirmed by some fuel found in the right fuel tank as well as fuel found in the engine fuel filter housing, indicated that fuel exhaustion did not occur. Unknown is why the pilot did not continue through a left turn descent onto the final approach leg toward airport, which would also have been a turn toward the operating engine. The pilot had a communication device capable of voice calls, texting, e-mail and alarms, among other functions. E-mails were sent by the device until 0323, and an alarm sounded at 0920. It is unknown if or how much pilot fatigue might have influenced the outcome.

The twin engine aircraft departed Rosario-Islas Malvinas Airport at 2215LT on a return trip to Córdoba, carrying two pilots. Bound to the northwest at an altitude of 8,000 feet, the crew was cleared to descend to 6,000 feet few minutes after takeoff. At 2242LT, the crew reported his position over Ubrel. Twenty minutes later, at 2300LT, while cruising in poor weather conditions, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an open field located 6 km from Las Varillas. The wreckage was found the following morning. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.

Although the pilot filed an instrument flight rules flight plan through the Direct User Access Terminal System (DUATS), no evidence of a weather briefing was found. The flight departed in visual meteorological conditions and entered instrument meteorological conditions while climbing through 12,800 feet. The air traffic controller advised the pilot of moderate rime icing from 15,000 feet through 17,000 feet, with light rime ice at 14,000 feet. The controller asked the pilot to advise him if the icing worsened, and the pilot responded that he would let them know and that it was no problem for him. The controller informed the pilot that he was coordinating for a higher altitude. The pilot confirmed that, while at 16,800 feet, "…light icing has been present for a little while and a higher altitude would be great." About 15 seconds later, the pilot stated that he was getting a little rattle and requested a higher altitude as soon as possible. About 25 seconds after that, the flight was cleared to flight level 200, and the pilot acknowledged. About one minute later, the airplane reached a peak altitude of 17,800 feet before turning sharply to the left and entering a descent. While descending through 17,400 feet, the pilot stated, "and N731CA's declaring…" No subsequent transmissions were received from the flight. The airplane impacted the paved surfaces and a wooded median on an interstate highway. A postaccident fire resulted. The outboard section of the right wing and several sections of the empennage, including the horizontal stabilizer, elevator, and rudder, were found about 1/4 mile southwest of the fuselage, in a residential area. Witnesses reported seeing pieces of the airplane separating during flight and the airplane in a rapid descent. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the outboard section of the right wing separated in flight, at a relatively low altitude, and then struck and severed portions of the empennage. There was no evidence of a preexisting mechanical anomaly that would have precluded normal operation of the airframe or engine. An examination of weather information revealed that numerous pilots reported icing conditions in the general area before and after the accident. At least three flight crews considered the icing "severe." Although severe icing was not forecasted, an Airmen's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisory included moderate icing at altitudes at which the accident pilot was flying. The pilot operating handbook warned that the airplane was not certificated for flight in severe icing conditions and that, if encountered, the pilot must exit severe icing immediately by changing altitude or routing. Although the pilot was coordinating for a higher altitude with the air traffic controller at the time of the icing encounter, it is likely that he either did not know the severity of the icing or he was reluctant to exercise his command authority in order to immediately exit the icing conditions.

During the takeoff roll at Huambo-Albano Machado Airport, the crew decided to reject takeoff for unknown reasons. The aircraft veered off runway and came to rest. All 10 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was destroyed when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona. The commercial pilot and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) and operated by PAI under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The airplane had departed Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 1825 and was destined for Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona. PAI’s director of maintenance (DOM) and the director of operations (DO), who were co owners of PAI along with the president, conducted a personal flight from SAD to FFZ. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night VMC. After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying. The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. According to a witness, engine start and taxi-out appeared normal. Review of the recorded communications between the pilot and the FFZ tower air traffic controllers revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and the pilot was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, when the airplane was about 1.1 miles from the departure end of the runway, the tower local controller issued a "right turn approved" advisory to the flight, which the pilot acknowledged. Radar data revealed that the airplane flew the runway heading for about 1.5 miles then began a right turn toward SAD and climbed through an altitude of about 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). About 1828, after it momentarily climbed to an altitude of 4,700 feet, the airplane descended to an altitude of 4,500 feet, where it remained and tracked in an essentially straight line until it impacted the mountain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56 and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The impact location was near the top of a steep mountain that projected to over 5,000 feet msl. Witnesses reported seeing a fireball, and law enforcement helicopters were dispatched.