Private

Shortly after takeoff from Tel Aviv-Sde Dov Airport, while climbing, the pilot encountered technical problems and declared an emergency. He elected to return to the airport but eventually ditched the airplane few dozen metres offshore. Both occupants were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While flying by night, the twin engine airplane crashed under unknown circumstances in the lake of Maracaibo and came to rest few dozen metres off Sabaneta de Palmas. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff from Campo de Marte Airport runway 30, the single engine airplane entered a right turn without gaining altitude. Less than one minute after liftoff, the aircraft impacted a building located in the Frei Machado Street, some 370 metres from runway 12 threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all seven occupants were killed. One people on the ground was slightly injured. Owned by the Brazilian businessman Roger Agnelli, the aircraft was on its way to Santos Dumont Airport in Rio de Janeiro. Among the victims was Roger Agnelli, his wife Andrea, his both children John and Anna Carolina, the pilot and two other friends. They were enroute to Rio to take part to the wedding of the nephew of Mr. Agnelli.

The airline transport pilot and pilot-rated passenger were departing on an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross country flight from runway 4 in a Cessna 340A about the same time that a private pilot and pilot rated passenger were departing on a visual flight rules repositioning flight from runway 36 in a Cessna 172M. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the airport. The runways at the nontowered airport converged and intersected near their departure ends. According to a witness, both airplanes had announced their takeoff intentions on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), which was not recorded; the Cessna 340A pilot's transmission occurred about 10 to 15 seconds before the Cessna 172M pilot's transmission. However, the witness stated that the Cessna 172M pilot's transmission was not clear, but he was distracted at the time. Both occupants of the Cessna 172M later reported that they were constantly monitoring the CTAF but did not hear the transmission from the Cessna 340A pilot nor did they see any inbound or outbound aircraft. Airport video that captured the takeoffs revealed that the Cessna 172M had just lifted off and was over runway 36 approaching the intersection with runway 4, when the Cessna 340A was just above runway 4 in a wings level attitude with the landing gear extended and approaching the intersection with runway 36. Almost immediately, the Cessna 340A then began a climbing left turn with an increasing bank angle while the Cessna 172M continued straight ahead. The Cessna 340A then rolled inverted and impacted the ground in a nose-low and left-wing-low attitude. The Cessna 172M, which was not damaged, continued to its destination and landed uneventfully. The Cessna 340A was likely being flown at the published takeoff and climb speed of 93 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). The published stall speed for the airplane in a 40° bank was 93 KIAS, and, when the airplane reached that bank angle, it likely exceeded the critical angle of attack and entered an aerodynamic stall. Examination of the Cessna 340A wreckage did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. Because of a postcrash fire, no determination could be made as to how the radios and audio panel were configured for transmitting and receiving or what frequencies were selected. There were no reported discrepancies with the radios of the Cessna 172M, and there were no reported difficulties with the communication between the Cessna 340A and the Federal Aviation Administration facility that issued the airplane's IFR clearance. Additionally, there were no known issues related to the CTAF at the airport. Toxicological testing detected unquantified amounts of atorvastatin, diphenhydramine, and naproxen in the Cessna 340A pilot's liver. The Cessna 340A pilot's use of atorvastatin or naproxen would not have impaired his ability to hear the radio announcements, see the other airplane taking off on the converging runway, or affected his performance once the threat had been detected. Without an available blood level of diphenhydramine, it could not be determined whether the drug was impairing or contributed to the circumstances of the accident.

The commercial pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were flying the biplane to a fly-in gathering in another state. Witnesses saw the airplane flying over a frozen lake at a low altitude and low airspeed. One witness saw the airplane "listing" left and right before it entered a left turn, and he lost sight of it. Other witnesses saw the airplane turn left and nose-dive into the ground. A postimpact fire consumed most of the airplane. Damage to the wreckage indicated that the airplane impacted the ground in a nose down attitude. The examination did not reveal evidence of any preimpact anomalies with the airframe, engine, or the control system of the airplane. A witness reported that, at the time of the accident, the wind was from the south about 30 miles per hour. However, a burnt area extending east from the airplane's impact point indicated the wind was from the west. Additionally, although wind information from nearby weather stations varied in direction and intensity. One station, about 14 miles west-northwest of the accident site reported calm wind., However, another station, located about 11 miles south of the accident site, recorded wind from the west at 11 knots with gusts to 27 knots about the time of the accident and wind from the west at 33 knots with gusts to 48 knots about an hour after the accident. Further, the forecast for the accident area called for wind gusts to 40 knots from the west-northwest. Therefore, it is likely that strong gusty west winds prevailed in the accident area at the time of the accident. Although some witnesses speculated that the pilot may have been attempting to land the airplane on the frozen lake, the airplane was not equipped to land on ice, and the reason the pilot was maneuvering at a low altitude in strong gusty winds could not be determined. Based on the witness observations and the damage to the wreckage, it is likely that the pilot allowed the airspeed to decrease to a point where the critical angle of attack was exceeded, and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall/spin. Although the pilot was known to have heart disease, it is unlikely that his medical condition contributed to the accident. The witness observations indicate that the pilot was actively flying the airplane before the loss of control. Toxicology testing showed the presence of chlorpheniramine in the pilot's blood at a level that was likely in the therapeutic range. Chlorpheniramine is a sedating antihistamine available in a number of over the counter products, and it carries the warning, "May impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks (e.g., driving, operating heavy machinery)." Because of its sedating effect, chlorpheniramine may slow psychomotor functioning and cause drowsiness. It has also been shown in a driving simulator (after a single dose) to suppress visual-spatial cognition and visual-motor coordinating functions when compared to placebo. Such functions would have been necessary for the pilot to maintain control of the airplane while maneuvering close to the ground in the strong gusty wind conditions. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot's ability to safely operate the plane was impaired by the effects of chlorpheniramine.

The single engine aircraft departed Florianópolis-Hercilio Luz Airport at 0515LT on a private flight to Ji-Paraná, carrying one passenger and one pilot. While climbing by night at an altitude of 3,600 feet, the pilot initiated a right turn. Then the aircraft completed a 360 turn and crashed in the sea off Campeche Island. Few debris were found the following morning floating on water and the main wreckage was found two weeks later. Both occupants were killed.

The airline transport pilot and passenger departed on a cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions in the light business jet. About 1 minute after departure, air traffic control instructed the pilot to climb and maintain an altitude of 14,000 ft mean sea level (msl). About 3 minutes later, the pilot stated that the airplane's flight management system (FMS) had failed. Shortly thereafter, he requested a climb and stated that he was "trying to get to clear skies." Over the next several minutes, the controller provided the pilot with headings and altitudes to vector the airplane into visual meteorological conditions. During this time, and over the course of several transmissions, the pilot stated that he was "losing instruments," was hand-flying the airplane (likely indicating the autopilot was inoperative), and that he wanted to "get clear of the weather." Radar data indicated that, during the 10-minute flight, the airplane conducted a series of climbs and descents with large variations in airspeed. About 2 minutes before the loss of radar contact, the airplane entered a climbing right turn, reaching its highest altitude of about 21,000 ft, before it began a rapidly descending and tightening turn. Performance data revealed that, during this turn, the airplane entered a partially-inverted attitude, exceeded its design maneuvering speed, and reached a peak descent rate of about 36,000 ft per minute. Radar contact was lost at an altitude of about 16,000 ft msl, and the airplane subsequently experienced an inflight breakup. The wreckage was distributed over a debris path that measured about 3/4-mile long and about 1/3-mile wide. Postaccident examination and testing of various flight instruments did not indicate what may have precipitated the inflight anomalies that the pilot reported prior to the loss of control. Additionally, all airframe structural fractures were consistent with ductile overload, and no evidence of any preexisting condition was noted with the airframe or either engine. The airplane was equipped with three different sources of attitude information, all three of which were powered by separate sources. It is unlikely that all three sources would fail simultaneously. In the event the pilot experienced a dual failure of attitude instrumentation on both the pilot and copilot sides, airplane control could have been maintained by reference to the standby attitude indicator. Further, the pilot would have been afforded heading information from the airplane's standby compass. Although the pilot did not specifically state to the controller the nature of the difficulties he was experiencing nor, could the investigation identify what, if any, anomalies the pilot may have observed of the airplane's flight instruments, the pilot clearly perceived the situation as one requiring an urgent ascent to visual conditions. As a single pilot operating without the assistance of an additional crewmember in a high-workload, high-stress environment, the pilot would have been particularly susceptible to distraction and, ultimately, a loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation.

En route from Porlamar to Charallave, while cruising at an altitude of 3,000 feet, both engines failed simultaneously. The pilot reduced his altitude and ditched the aircraft 33 km north of Barcelona. All three occupants evacuated safely and found refuge in a lifeboat. They were rescued an hour later by Venezuelan coastguard. The aircraft sank and was lost.

On the day of the accident, a line service technician had disconnected the airplane from a battery charger. After disconnecting the battery, he left the right access door open which provided access to the fuel control unit, fuses, fuel line, oil line, and battery charging port as he always did. He then towed the airplane from the hangar it was stored in, and parked it in front of the airport's terminal building. The three passengers arrived first, and then about 30 minutes later the pilot arrived. He uploaded his navigational charts and did a preflight check "which was normal." The engine start, taxi, and engine run up, were also normal. The wing flaps were set to 10°. After liftoff he "retracted the landing gear" and continued to climb. Shortly thereafter the right cowl door opened partially, and started "flopping" up and down 3 to 4 inches in each direction. He reduced the torque to try to prevent the right cowl door from coming completely open. However, when he turned on the left crosswind leg to return to the runway, the right cowl door opened completely, and the airplane would not maintain altitude even with full power, so he "put the nose back down." The airplane struck trees, and then pancaked, and slid sideways and came to rest, in the front yard of an abandoned house. The private pilot and one passenger received minor injuries. Two passengers received serious injuries, one of whom was found out of her seat, unconscious, on the floor of the airplane shortly after the accident, and died about 227 days later. During the investigation, it could not be determined, if she had properly used the restraint system, as it was found unlatched with the seatbelt portion of the assembly extended. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. It was discovered though, that the right access door had not been closed and latched by the pilot before takeoff, as examination of the right access door latches and clevis keepers found them to be functional, with no indication of overstress or deformation which would have been present if the access door had been forced open due to air loads in-flight, or during the impact sequence. Further examination also revealed that the battery charging port cover which was inside the compartment that the right access door allowed access to, had not been placed and secured over the battery charging port, indicating that the preflight inspection had not been properly completed. A checklist that was provided by a simulator training provider was found by the pilot's seat station. Examination of the checklist revealed that under the section titled: "EXTERIOR PREFLIGHT" only one item was listed which stated, "EXTERIOR PREFLIGHT…COMPLETE." It also stated on both sides of the checklist: "FOR SIMULATOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY." A copy of the airplane manufacturer's published pilot's operating handbook (POH) was found in a cabinet behind the pilot's seat where it was not accessible from the pilot's station. Review of the POH revealed that it contained detailed guidance regarding the preflight check of the airplane. Additionally, it was discovered that the landing gear was in the down and locked position which would have degraded the airplane's ability to accelerate and climb by producing excess drag, and indicated that the pilot had not retracted the landing gear as he thought he did, as the landing gear handle was still in the down position. Review of recorded data from the airplanes avionics system also indicated that the airplane had roughly followed the runway heading while climbing until it reached the end of the runway. The pilot had then entered a left turn and allowed the bank angle to increase to about 45°, and angle of attack to increase to about 8°, which caused the airspeed to decrease below the stalling speed (which would have been about 20% higher than normal due to the increased load factor from the steep turn) until the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall, indicating that the pilot allowed himself to become distracted by the open door, rather than maintaining control of the airplane. One of the seriously injured passenger passed away 227 days after the accident.

The private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot told the air traffic controller that he needed to return to the airport due to an attitude heading reference system (AHRS) "miscommunication." Air traffic control radar data indicated that, at that time, the airplane was about 1.75 miles north of the airport on a southeasterly course about 2,000 ft. mean sea level. About 20 seconds after the pilot requested to return to the airport, the airplane began to descend. The airplane subsequently entered a right turn, which appeared to continue until the final radar data point. The airplane struck power lines about 3/4 of a mile from the airport while maneuvering within the traffic pattern. The power lines were about 75 ft. above ground level. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Although the pilot reported a flight instrumentation issue to air traffic control, the investigation was unable to confirm whether such an anomaly occurred based on component testing and available information. Examination of the standby airspeed indicator revealed that the link arm had separated from the pin on the rocking shaft assembly; however, it likely separated during the accident sequence. No other anomalies were observed. Functional testing indicated that the standby airspeed indicator was likely functional and providing accurate airspeed information to the pilot throughout the flight. Finally, examination of the left and right annunciator panel bulb filaments associated with the left fuel pump advisory revealed that they were stretched, indicating that the left fuel pump advisory indication annunciated at the time of the accident; however, this likely occurred during the accident sequence as a result of an automatic attempt to activate the left fuel pump due to the loss of fuel pressure immediately after the left wing separated. Toxicology testing of the pilot detected low levels of three different sedating antihistamines; however, antemortem levels could not be determined nor could the underlying reason(s) for the pilot's use of these medications. As a result, it could not be determined whether pilot impairment occurred due to the use of the medications or the underlying condition(s) themselves. Although the pilot reported a flight instrumentation issue, this problem would not have affected his ability to control the airplane. Further, the pilot should have been able to see the power lines given the day/visual weather conditions. It is possible that the pilot become distracted by the noncritical anomaly, which resulted in his failure to maintain clearance from the power lines.