Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

At 0916 Pacific standard time, the Seair Cessna 208 Caravan amphibious aircraft, serial number 20800310, took off from runway 19 at Abbotsford Airport, British Columbia, on the first leg of a private flight to the Bahamas. One pilot and five passengers were on board. About one minute later, as the aircraft was climbing through an altitude of about 400 feet above ground level and as the pilot retracted flaps from 10 to zero degrees, the aircraft became uncontrollable. The aircraft banked left, descended rapidly, and crashed in a field about one-half mile south of the runway threshold, in a left bank with a near-level pitch attitude. The aircraft was destroyed, and the pilot received serious injuries. Two passengers were also seriously injured, and three passengers received minor injuries. Daylight visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. There was no fire.

The three engine aircraft departed Havana Airport on a special flight to Valencia-Arturo Michelena Airport with 12 passengers and 10 crew members on board. They were on their way to Valencia to pick up Cuban rescuers who were recently dispatched in Venezuela to help local authorities following heavy floods that killed more than 10,000 people. Following a holding circuit of about 40 minutes, the crew was cleared to descend from 8,000 feet to 4,000 feet when, on final, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt San Luis located 12 km short of runway. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 22 occupants were killed.

While en route to the first schedule stop, the pilot heard a radio transmission that weather conditions in the vicinity of his next destination were 'bad.' Upon arriving, the pilot attempted to telephone Flight Service for a weather briefing and to file a flight plan. After efforts to contact Flight Service failed, the pilot elected to takeoff without a filing a flight plan. A few minutes into the flight, the pilot decided to return to the departure airport after the flight encountered deteriorating weather conditions that included heavy turbulence, and low ceilings. The airplane collided with trees as the pilot maneuvered the airplane. The post-accident examination of the airplane failed to disclose a mechanical malfunction or a component failure. The pilot did not report a mechanical problem with the airplane. A review of the en route flight charts disclosed that the terrain elevation at the departure point was approximately 24 feet. The terrain elevation at the approximate location of the accident site was 2,500 feet.

Leased from AOM French Airlines, the aircraft was completing a charter flight (service CU1216) from Havana to Guatemala City on behalf of Cubana de Aviacion, carrying 18 crew members and 296 passengers who were mostly young Guatemalan citizens studying medicine in Cuba. After touchdown on runway 19, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went down an embankment and eventually crashed onto several houses located in the district of La Libertad. Both pilots, six other crew members, eight passengers and two people on the ground were killed. Also, 57 people were injured (among them 20 on the ground) while 261 other occupants escaped uninjured. The aircraft was destroyed.

The crew of C-GKBN, a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air with 5 passengers, made a straight-in approach, with approach flap settings, to a snow-covered and icy runway at Hamburg, AB, Canada. Upon touchdown in 2 inches of snow, directional control was lost. The aircraft turned sideways on the strip, struck a snow windrow, which then pulled the aircraft off the strip into a stand of trees. The First Officer had made the landing. The aircraft had picked up about 1/8 inch of ICA on the approach. Approach flap had been used for the landing instead of landing flap. The aircraft had landed with a five knot tail wind. The landing touchdown was reported to be very firm. There were no injuries but the aircraft was substantially damaged. Company representatives examining the runway surface after the accident discovered a rut running diagonally across the runway, which was apparently present prior the landing and may have contributed to the loss of directional control of the aircraft.

On 13 December 1999 at 1029 5H-GTO took off from Zanzibar airport for a direct VFR flight to Chankonde. The endurance was six hours and the pilot was the only occupant. The aircraft was destined to pick a party of five hunters at Chankonde hunting airstrip for a flight to Dar es Salaam. The forward leg of the flight was uneventful and the pilot reported to Dar Control at 1153 hours that he has Chankonde in site and was estimating to land at 1215 hours. The aircraft did in fact land at 1216 hours. The pilot reported that shortly before he landed at Chankonde he circled around the airstrip and noticed that there were some pools of water on the runway. Five passengers boarded the aircraft at Chankonde for a flight to Dar es Salaam. The pilot said that all the heavy baggage and two members of the hunting party left by road for Dar es Salaam. The remaining five who boarded the aircraft carried only hand luggage. In the preparation for take-off the pilot taxied to the threshold of runway 07, made the "first selection" of flaps and applied full power on brakes. He testified that he did not lean the mixtures since he saw no requirement for this. The initial phase of the take-off rolI appeared' normal to the pilot. When the aircraft 'had' covered about 600 metres and was accelerating through 65/70 kt it went through a muddy ditch causing the pilot to feeI deceleration. It immediately became apparent that he was not going to achieve the take off speed and clear the trees in the foreground. The pilot subsequently decided to abort the take-off. When the engines were throttled back and brakes were applied the aircraft continued to rolI on wet and slippery sandy surface till it overran the end of runway 07 and collided with trees located about 60 metres beyond the end of the runway. As the aircraft impacted the trees in the accident sequence, both wing sections outboard of the engines separated and caught fire. The aircraft came to rest about 56 metres forward of the detached wing sections. The grass beneath the aircraft and the right engine were also on fire. The pilot was unable to open the cockpit door because it was blocked by a tree. He subsequently rushed behind and opened the main door. As he did so, one passenger, "who was tall and muscular" pushed the pilot causing him to falI by the doorway on the ground where grass surface was on fire. All the five passengers stepped on the pilot and escaped. The pilot managed to rise an his own, returned to the cabin and picked the fire extinguisher. He subsequently fought the fire under the fuselage, the tail and the right engine. He was also joined by a vehicle which had 20 litres of water and this was used to put out the fire on the left hand side of the fuselage. The passenger who was in the copilot seat sustained a cut on his eyebrow and another passenger suffered minor burns on his fingers. The pilot whom the passengers used as a stepping stone and a fire blanket sustained first degree burns to his face and both arms. Both wings and parts of the tail plane were torn off the fuselage by impact with the trees. They were also partly destroyed by fire. The fuselage suffered relatively less "damage and the cabin remained intact. However, much of the interior equipment was destroyed by unknown persons a few days after the accident when the wreckage was left unguarded. The weather at the time of the accident was reported to be sunny with no wind. The ground was wet from rains which had been falling in the area. Chankonde Airstrip, elevation 3,386 feet, has one runway 07/25 which is 1,000 metres long and 30 metres wide. The surface is sand with some patches of scattered grass. There are tall trees starting 60 metres beyond the end of runway 07.

Events prior to the flight:
On Wednesday the 8th of December 1999 at 08:32 hrs. the pilot took off with the aircraft from Gothenburg/Landvetter airport for an IFR flight to Sundsvall/Härnösand airport via Östersund/Frösön F4 airport. Present onboard were seven passengers, all employed by a company in Gothenburg. The flight proceeded via the reporting point of MEGEN (6001N 1424E) and they landed at 10:45 hrs. in Östersund. After a short groundstop to deplane one of the passengers, they took off 13 minutes later to continue the flight to Sundsvall. It was beautiful weather in Sundsvall. The wind was 320 degrees at 12 knots and the temperature –12°C. The pilot performed a visual approach to runway 34 and landed at 11:33 hrs. After the landing he parked the airplane for the night on spot 25 on the southern tarmac, designated “Apron S” (ref. 1.10). According to what he stated later that evening, he placed covers on the aircraft wings and stabilizer and connected electricity for heating in the cabin and engines before he, along with his passengers, departed for the city of Sundsvall. In Sundsvall they had lunch and had a business meeting with a subcontractor, which was concluded at approximately 16:00 hrs, at which time they were driven to the hotel. Around 19:00 hrs. the party dined at a restaurant together with a few of the employees from the subcontractor. The consumption of alcoholic beverages was sparse and none of the persons that SHK has talked with observed the pilot consume anything other than non-alcoholic beverage. Dinner concluded around 23:30, after which the party returned to the hotel. The following morning it was snowing. The group was picked-up around 08:00 hrs. and initially made a short visit at a factory. Thereafter they were driven to the subcontractor’s office where they had a short coffee break and then continued their business meeting. During the trip to the office the pilot called the airport and ordered weather information that was faxed to the office. On questions to the pilot concerning flying in the bad weather, his response was that it was no problem. If he had felt doubtful in that respect, he would cancel the flight. However, due to the weather situation the pilot decided not to perform the return flight to Gothenburg via Östersund. The passenger that was there had to get to Sundsvall with other means of transport and join the group at the airport.
Preparations before the flight:
The business meeting was concluded at time 10:30 hrs. A taxi had been booked for that time. Due to the taxi being somewhat late the group arrived at the airport around 11:15. The passengers remained in the flight planning room in the terminal building while the pilot ordered fueling and went out to prepare the aircraft for the flight. He had filed a flight plan by telephone earlier in the day. Departure was planned for 11:30 hrs. and the flight time was estimated to be 2 hours and 20 minutes. When the fueling order came, the fueling personnel were busy refueling another aircraft with type JET A-1 fuel. The tanker truck with AVGAS 100LL fuel had not been in use earlier that day. Prior to re-fueling with this truck it was drained and prepared for refueling. When the fueling personnel arrived at the aircraft the pilot was already in the aircraft warming-up the engines. He cut the engines and requested to have “full wings”. A total of 396 liters of fuel were uploaded in the aircraft's four fuel tanks. The fueling personnel noted that the aircraft wings were free from ice and snow. The pilot contacted the air traffic controller in the tower at 11:41.38 and requested clearance to taxi, which was granted, to the flight planning office next to Apron M, in order to pick up his passengers. At 11:49.24 hrs. the pilot again contacted the tower controller and requested clearance to startup the engines and at the same time reported that he had received the weather information. Four minutes later he requested taxi instructions and was cleared to taxi to holding position “Charlie” on the taxiway (ref. 1.10). After further instructions from the air traffic controller the pilot taxied to the specified position and held there for a departing SAS (Scandinavian Airlines) aircraft. The air traffic controller thought that the aircraft appeared to be free from snow when it was parked on Apron M, but that a thin layer of snow had accumulated when it taxied out for take off. The Commander of the departing SAS aircraft has recounted that both the approach and the departure from Sundsvall that day were difficult due to poor visibility, heavy snowfall and gusty winds. During taxi on the runway snowdrifts had occurred that created strands of blowing snow. He estimated the visibility to be 600-700 meters. During take off he was “fully occupied maneuvering the 58 ton heavy MD 80 in the wind gusts.
The Flight:
When the SAS aircraft had departed the pilot received clearance to taxi out to the take off position on runway 16. At the same time he received air traffic control clearance to Gothenburg/Landvetter via reporting point MEGEN at flight level 120 (approximately 3 660 meters), and the transponder code of 6377. He was also requested to report when the aircraft had reached the take off position, as the air traffic controller could not see the aircraft in the snowfall. At 12:00.18 hrs. the pilot reported that he had lined up into take off position. The controller then reported that the wind was 120 degrees at 17 knots, that the pilot was to make a right turn after take off and that he was cleared for takeoff. When the aircraft was airborne the pilot was to contact Sundsvall Control on frequency 135.02 MHz. The pilot read back these instructions and thereafter took off. The tower controller visually observed the aircraft a short moment during the take off as it passed abeam the control tower, then it disappeared again out of his sight due to the snowfall. A witness, who is a former pilot himself and was on the northern part of Alnön (an island), about 5 km south of the airport, heard the aircraft take off. After take off he heard that the engine rpm decreased somewhat and thereafter heard the characteristic sound that can arise on a multi-engine aircraft when the engines are not totally synchronized with the adjustment of the throttles and propeller levers. The sound of the engines became normal after a while. When the sound faded out is was perceived as normal for a twin engine aircraft. Witnesses who were situated along the flight path of the aircraft heard it and a few observed the aircraft during a short moment through the heavy snowfall. Several felt that the aircraft was flying low but that the sound of the engines was normal. One witness observed that the landing gear was retracted. In the vicinity of Kvickberget northwest of the airport a few witnesses heard that the engine rpm increased sharply. After that it was silent. Approximately two minutes after take off the tower controller observed that the echo from aircraft SE-GDN on his radarscope was not following the route cleared but had turned to the north. He made an inquiry with the air traffic controller at Sundsvall Control and received word that the same had not yet been contacted by the aircraft. The tower controller then contacted the aircraft on tower frequency and asked the pilot if he was experiencing problems. The pilot responded that he did have problems and in response to the controller’s inquiry about his intentions, the pilot answered “Climbing” twice and thereafter “-I have a problem with the eeee … uuumm .. with the compass at, at this moment, so could you, could you give me a … di, direction at this moment.” The tower controller then answered “Ja, you are climbing towards the north-west now, turn left about 90 degrees and climb as soon as possible, you meeting terrain.” Subsequently the tower controller was unable to attain any further radio contact with the aircraft.
Rescue operations:
At time 12:04.27 radio signals from an emergency locator transmitter were perceived in the area and the air traffic controller triggered the alarm button to the SOS center and alerted the air rescue services at ARCC. It was agreed upon to apply the yellow checklist, which meant assumed crash with unknown crash site. The airport was closed. The SOS center alerted according to the alert plan for an assumed crash. A suitable breakpoint (where the ground rescue party has to depart from the surface road structure) was chosen in connection with the area where the aircraft disappeared. ARCC alerted a search and rescue helicopter that was stationed at Sundsvall/Härnösand airport. The crew of the search and rescue helicopter received the alarm at 12:10 hrs. and was airborne with the helicopter at 12:24. Six minutes later the aircraft was located in the forest on the southern slope of a mountain known as Kvickberget. The helicopter lowered rescue personnel on the winch who ascertained that none of the persons on board had survived. They were only able however to find five persons and searched through an area around the downed aircraft without results. Police, ambulances and fire vehicles reached the breakpoint between 12:21 and 12:27 hrs. The SOS center received the exact position of the accident site at 12:35 hrs. and the breakpoint was moved to a road intersection about 4 km from there. The forest road towards the accident site was unplowed and two tracked vehicles had to begin the trip while snow plows cleared the forest road so that ambulances and fire vehicles could make their way. The last portion from the forest road up to the aircraft was approximately 300 meters long and consisted of a ravine and difficult terrain. Medical and fire personnel had to make there way on foot this last portion and reached the accident site at 13:30 hrs. They verified that none of the persons onboard had survived and found that there was an imminent risk of fire because of the large quantity of aviation gas that had been spread at the site. Hand-held fire extinguishers and police search and rescue dogs were requisitioned to the site. At 14:36 hrs. it was reported to SOS that additionally three people had been found in the aircraft. At 19:40 hrs. the last of the victims were transported from the accident site. A crisis group was established at Sundsvall/Härnösand airport. About 40 persons participated in the rescue operations at the site, which was concluded at 23:39 hrs. Despite the difficult terrain, which limited the availability of equipment, the general consensus was that the search and rescue action had worked well. The accident occurred at location: 6233N 1719E; approximately 200 m above sea level. All eight occupants were killed.

The charter operator was involved in a weekly operation to transport computer programmers and training staff, from a Johannesburg company, from Rand Airport to Oranjemund in Namibia. The outward leg of the flights to Oranjemund took place on the Monday morning and the pilot and aircraft stayed at Oranjemund for the week. The return flight to Johannesburg usually took place on the Friday afternoon. On the morning of the accident flight the set time of departure was 0500z. The passengers were assisted through the process of passport control, boarding and settling in by the operator's staff. The baggage was put next to the aircraft. According to a witness the pilot carried out the loading of the baggage. An instrument flight plan was filed and the pilot obtained departure clearance before the aircraft was taxied to the holding point. According to the air traffic controller, the take-off run was normal for this type of aircraft. Shortly after take-off the pilot declared an engine failure and requested to be routed back to land on the runway. Seconds later the pilot communicated they were going to crash. Several witnesses stated that the aircraft was very low when it passed over the highway close to the accident site. One of the witnesses stated that he noticed the right-hand engine stopped and he could see the blades of the propeller. The fire fighting services were alerted. It was apparent by the smoke that the aircraft crashed on an extended line of Runway 29. The accident took place at 0506z in daylight conditions. All 10 occupants were killed.

Shortly after a night takeoff from runway 24 at Nairobi-Jomo Kenyatta Airport, the single engine aircraft went out of control and crashed near the runway end. All four occupants were killed. The aircraft was completing a flight to Dar es Salaam on behalf of DHL. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with strong wind and fog.

Upon touchdown at Benguela-General Deslandes Airport, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane slid on its nose for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.