Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

For unknown reasons, the twin engine aircraft landed hard at Bukavu-Kavumu Airport. It went out of control, veered off runway and came to rest. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft departed Walikale to Goma from an asphalt road connecting Walikale to Mubi and Kisangani as there is no airport in Walikale. Few minutes after takeoff, engines problems forced the crew to return to Walikale but the road was reopened to traffic. On landing, the aircraft collided with several vehicles, veered off road and eventually collided with a house. All four occupant escaped with minor injuries while one people in a car was killed. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft was performing an on-demand taxi flight from Toliara to the capital city Antananarivo with 4 pax and a two pilots on behalf of the company Magrama (Marbres & Granites de Madagascar). Less than two minutes after takeoff, while in initial climb, the aircraft suffered an engine failure and crashed about 1,500 metres from the runway end, bursting into flames. All 6 occupants were killed, among them 4 Italians and 2 Madagascar citizens.

At 0724 hours, Flesland approach gave clearance for FLI670 to start to descend to 4,000 feet. Three minutes later, it was cleared to leave controlled airspace and transfer to Sørstokken's frequency. In the meantime, the AFIS duty officer at Stord airport had visual contact with the plane and obtained confirmation of its position from Flesland approach. Based on aerodrome data, wind direction and wind speed, temperature and the aircraft's landing weight, the crew found it acceptable to plan for a visual approach and landing on runway 33. This would shorten the approach. They assumed that landing on runway 33 would involve a small tailwind component. The AFIS duty officer was informed of the decision to land on runway 33. The AFIS duty officer confirmed that the wind was 110° 6 kt. When asked, the crew also stated that there were 12 passengers on board. 1.1.6 The approach proceeded as normal. The landing gear was extended and the flaps were extended stepwise. At 07:31:12 hours, the aircraft was 2 NM from the threshold for runway 33 at a height of 800 ft and with a ground speed of 150 kt. The flaps were then extended to 33° and, according to radar data, the ground speed dropped to 130 kt. At 07:31:27 hours, the AFIS duty officer repeated the 'runway free' message and described the wind as 120° 6 kt. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) tells us that at 07:31:43 hours the first officer then confirmed that the plane was stabilised and held a speed of plus 5 (kt). Six seconds later, the first officer announced that the speed was plus 3 (kt). At 07:31:51 hours, the CVR recorded that a warning sound (ping) was emitted by the aircraft's audible warning Accident Investigation Board Norway system. The commander later told AIBN that he aimed for three red and one white on the PAPI (Precision approach path indicator). The first officer then announced twice that the speed was correct (bug speed). From the aircraft cockpit voice recorder (CVR) it is documented that the pilots kept a speed over threshold at Vref. According to the aircraft flight manual (AFM) correct airspeed is Vref =112 kt. According to data from the ground radar the aircraft's ground speed was 120 kt on passing the threshold for runway 33. The flight commander has stated that when the aircraft was approximately 50 ft above the runway, he lowered the thrust levers as normal to the 'Flight Idle' position. At 07:32:14 hours, sounds from the CVR indicated that the wheels touched the runway. Both pilots have stated that the landing took place a few metres beyond the standard landing point, and that it was a ‘soft’ landing. Next, the following occurred (times are stated in seconds
after nose wheel touchdown):
- 1 second: 'and spoilers' announced by first officer
- 1.5 seconds: sound of spoiler lever being moved to aft position (LIFT SPLR)
- 4 seconds: 'no spoilers' announced by first officer (standard phrase in accordance with the airline's standard operating procedures (SOP) when spoiler indicator lights does not come on)
- 6.6 seconds: sound of brake selector switch being turned
- 7.9 seconds: audio signal (single chime) from the aircraft's warning system
- 12.8 seconds: The first screeching noises from the tyres are audible
- 12.8 – 22.8 seconds: Varying degrees of screeching noises from the tyres can be heard
- 22.8 seconds: The aircraft leaves the runway, at the same time as the AFIS duty officer activates the crash alarm.
- 26 seconds: The cockpit voice recorder stops recording sound.
The first officer has informed the AIBN that, after landing, he verified that the commander moved the thrust levers from 'Flight Idle' to 'Ground Idle', at the same time as the nose of the aircraft was lowered. He also saw that the commander moved the spoiler lever from 'AIR BRAKE' (air brake fully engaged) to 'LIFT SPLR' (spoilers deployed). The first officer expected the two spoiler indicator lights (SPLR Y and SPLR G, see section 1.6.6.3) to come on after approximately three seconds. He was therefore surprised when this did not happen. In accordance with the airline's procedures, the first officer then verified, among other things, that hydraulic pressure and other instruments showed normal values and that the switches in question were set to the correct positions. The commander has explained to the AIBN that, when the speed had dropped to approximately 80 kt, he kept his left hand on the nose wheel steering and his right hand on the thrust levers. The first officer then took over the control wheel. The commander has stated that he felt that the brakes were working until they were about half way down the runway, after which the expected retardation did not occur. The aircraft had then got so far down the runway that it was too late to abort the landing. The commander applied full force on both brake pedals, without achieving a normal braking action. In an attempt to improve retardation he moved the brake selector lever from the 'Green' position to the 'Yellow' position, but this did not help. He then moved the lever to the 'Emergency Brake' position, whereby the aircraft's anti-skid system was disconnected. At that point the commander realised that it was impossible to stop the aircraft, even by continuously applying full pressure on the brake pedals, and that the aircraft would probably run off the runway. He considered that it was not advisable to let the aircraft run off the runway towards the steep area to the left of the aircraft or towards the rocks on the right. His local knowledge told him that the best alternative was therefore to steer the aircraft towards the end of the runway. In a last attempt to stop the aircraft, he steered it towards the right half of the runway and then manoeuvred it with the intent to skid sideways towards the left. The commander hoped that skidding would increase friction and hopefully help to reduce the speed of the aircraft. The aircraft left the runway in a skid a few metres to the left of the centerline. The commander believed that he would have been able to stop the aircraft had the runway been longer by approximately 50-100 metres. The first officer believed that the aircraft had a speed of approximately 5-10 km/h when it left the edge and that they would have been able to stop had the runway been 10-15 metres longer. The AFIS duty officer has stated that he followed OY-CRG visually during parts of the approach and landing. He believed that the aircraft may have flown a little higher and faster than normal during the final approach. The duty officer was not quite sure about where the aircraft touched down, but he estimated that it was within the first third of the runway. For a moment during the rollout OY-CRG was obscured for the AFIS duty officer behind an aircraft of the same type (OY-RCW) from Atlantic Airways that was parked at the apron (see Figure 2). When the AFIS duty officer again got the aircraft in sight, he realised that something was not right. The aircraft had a greater speed than normal. He saw that the aircraft towards the end turned into the right half and then turned back towards the left half of the runway. The duty officer observed the plane leave the runway in a skid at approximately 45° in relation to the runway direction. The duty officer immediately triggered the crash alarm. The AFIS duty officer has stated that the speed of the aircraft was moderate enough for him to hope for a while that it would be able to stop before reaching the end of the runway. He suggested that the aircraft would perhaps have been able to stop had the runway been another 50 metres long. He felt that it was unreal when the aircraft's tail fin moved high into the air and he witnessed the aircraft disappear off the end of the runway. The AFIS duty officer had previously seen blue smoke coming from the main wheels of other aircraft of the same type during braking. He observed a great deal of dampness and smoke emanating from the back of the main wheels of OY-CRG during rollout. The spray, which was about 30% higher than the top of the main wheels, appeared to form a triangle behind the wheels. The spray was of a white colour, extended considerably higher than during previous landings and continued along the length of the runway. He did not register whether the aircraft's spoilers were deployed or not, but he saw that the aircraft continued to produce wake vortices during rollout. When smoke started rising from the crash site, he saw that the fire crews were already on their way. In accordance with procedure, the fire and rescue service at Stord airport are on standby beside the fire engines when aircraft take off and land at the airport. The duty officer and three firemen were therefore in position at the fire station and observed the landing. The duty officer believed that the aircraft touched down in the standard place, possibly a little further along the runway than usual. Everything appeared to be normal until an estimated five to ten seconds after touchdown, when they noticed that the speed of the aircraft was higher than usual. When OY-CRG passed the taxiway to the south, the duty officer and firefighter n°1 both heard that the aircraft was beginning to brake heavy, because of the extremely loud noises emitted by the aircraft’s tyres and brakes. The duty officer had heard similar noises on some other occasions, but only for a second or two as aircraft were brought to a full stop or passed painted areas of the runway. In the case of OY-CRG the noises were persistent. They also observed that the wings continued to produce wake vortices during rollout, something they had not seen before. They realised that the aircraft would need assistance and prepared to respond. The last that the duty officer saw of the aircraft was when it skidded with its nose pointing an estimated 45° towards the left and banked violently to the right as it left the runway. In his opinion, the speed of the aircraft at that point was approximately 30-70 km/h (16-38 kt). When the aircraft disappeared over the edge of the runway and the crash alarm was activated, the airport's two fire engines were on their way to the site. The passengers interviewed by the AIBN provided varying descriptions of the approach and landing, but none of them noticed any braking action after touchdown. All the passengers have confirmed that the aircraft swayed from side to side when nearing the end of the runway. They heard the 'screeching' of brakes and the aircraft turned leftwards. One person observed blue smoke coming from the wheels. One person believed that one of the engines on the left increased its speed. Most passengers felt that the speed was relatively low when the aircraft tipped over the edge of the runway. The cabin crew seated at the back of the cabin have stated that the flight proceeded as usual until the landing at Stord airport, apart from the fact that, shortly before landing, she heard a relatively loud whistling noise. She said that she has heard similar noises during other flights, but not so loud. She assumed that the noise came from the seal around the door to her left. She did not otherwise register anything out of the ordinary until the aircraft left the runway.

The airline transport pilot was departing to the north from a narrow stream in a float-equipped airplane with lodge guests aboard, on a Title 14, CFR Part 91 flight. Northerly winds between 25 and 35 knots, were reported at the time of the accident. The accident pilot reported that after departure, he turned left, and a strong downdraft "threw the airplane to the ground." The passengers said that the airplane started its takeoff run directly into the strong winds, but shortly after becoming airborne, the pilot made a steep turn to the left, about 150 feet above the ground. The passengers indicated that as the airplane continued to turn left, it began to shudder and buffet, then abruptly descended nose low into the marsh-covered terrain. During the impact, the right wing folded, and the airplane's fuselage came to rest on its right side. One of the occupants, seated next to the right main cabin door, was partially ejected during the impact sequence, and was pinned under the fuselage and covered by water. Rescue efforts by the pilot and passengers were unsuccessful. In the pilot's written statement to the NTSB, he reported that there were no pre accident mechanical anomalies with the airplane, and during the on-site examination of the wreckage by the NTSB investigator-in-charge, no pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered.

Shortly after takeoff from Bukavu-Kavumu Airport, the single engine aircraft lost height and crashed, bursting into flames. All five occupants were rescued, among them two were injured.

The twin engine aircraft departed Asunción on a charter flight to Salta with intermediate stops in Resistencia and Joaquín Víctor González, carrying 10 passengers and two pilots. On approach to Salta-Martín Miguel de Güemes Airport, both engines failed. The crew attempted an emergency landing but the aircraft struck trees and crashed in an open field located 3 km short of runway. All 12 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The Hawker and the glider collided in flight at an altitude of about 16,000 feet above mean sea level about 42 nautical miles south-southeast of the Reno/Tahoe International Airport (RNO), Reno, Nevada, which was the Hawker's destination. The collision occurred in visual meteorological conditions in an area that is frequently traversed by air carrier and other turbojet airplanes inbound to RNO and that is also popular for glider operations because of the thermal and mountain wave gliding opportunities there. Before the collision, the Hawker had been descending toward RNO on a stable northwest heading for several miles, and the glider was in a 30-degree, left-banked, spiraling climb. According to statements from the Hawker's captain and the glider pilot, they each saw the other aircraft only about 1 second or less before the collision and were unable to maneuver to avoid the collision in time. Damage sustained by the Hawker disabled one engine and other systems; however, the flight crew was able to land the airplane. The damaged glider was uncontrollable, and the glider pilot bailed out and parachuted to the ground. Because of the lack of radar data for the glider's flight, it was not possible to determine at which points each aircraft may have been within the other's available field of view. Although Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) require all pilots to maintain vigilance to see and avoid other aircraft (this includes pilots of flights operated under instrument flight rules, when visibility permits), a number of factors that can diminish the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle were evident in this accident. For example, the high closure rate of the Hawker as it approached the glider would have given the glider pilot only limited time to see and avoid the jet. Likewise, the closure rate would have limited the time that the Hawker crew had to detect the glider, and the slim design of the glider would have made it difficult for the Hawker crew to see it. Although the demands of cockpit tasks, such as preparing for an approach, have been shown to adversely affect scan vigilance, both the Hawker captain, who was the flying pilot, and the first officer reported that they were looking out the window before the collision. However, the captain saw the glider only a moment before it filled the windshield, and the first officer never saw it at all.

Shortly after takeoff from Caño Negro Airport, while climbing, the single engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed. Both occupants were killed.

While descending to Bukavu-Kamembe Airport, the crew encountered stormy weather with limited visibility due to rain falls. Too low, the twin engine aircraft impacted trees and crashed on hilly and wooded terrain located about 15 km from Bukavu Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all 17 occupants were killed.