Cargo

A Cessna 208B Grand Caravan I was destroyed when it crashed in the Yahukimo District, Indonesia. Both crew members were killed. The airplane was being operated on a non-scheduled cargo flight from Wamena Airport to Kenyam Aerodrome in Papua, Indonesia. The flight was being conducted under visual flight rules (VFR) and the pilot reported to ATC that the planned altitude was 9,500 feet. On board the aircraft were two pilots, a manifested load of diesel drums and grocery items, and a non-manifested load of 25 bags of rice weighing 827 lb (375 kg). The takeoff weight, based on the manifested cargo and the additional load of rice was estimated by the investigation to be 9,681 lb (4,391 Kg) which was 619 lb (281 Kg) above the certificated maximum takeoff weight. Also, the aircraft Centre of Gravity (C of G) was outside the certificated C of G envelope. The aircraft took off from Wamena runway 15 at 12:17 local time. The aircraft was then flown along a track toward Kenyam which was consistent with the route used by other company pilots and previously flown by the pilot in command. The additional loading contributed to a reduced rate of climb during the flight which resulted in the aircraft being below 10,000 ft as it approached the high terrain. This altitude was 1,500 ft lower than the altitude specified in the operator's route guide for operations between Wamena and Kenyam, and lower than the altitude flown by other company pilots when operating in the area, including three other flights on the day of the accident which overflew the high terrain between 11,200 and 12,500 ft. At 12:29:43, as the aircraft approached the high terrain at an altitude of 9,538 ft, the airspeed commenced decreasing which was accompanied by the average rate of climb increasing to about 390 fpm. It is probable that the pilots recognized the proximity of the terrain and attempted to improve the aircraft's angle of climb by decelerating towards the best angle of climb speed of 72 kts. The recorded data showed that 31 seconds after the airspeed started to decrease, the engine power varied with a maximum engine torque of 1,675 ft/lb being recorded at 12:30:30 with changes in the other engine parameters being consistent with a selection of a higher power setting. This is likely to have been associated with the pilot's attempts to improve terrain clearance. The recorded data then showed the aircraft in a descending right turn for about 6 seconds. The altitude reduced over a period of 4 seconds from 9,865 ft to 9,728 ft at an average rate of descent of about 2,000 fpm. This turn was likely to have been initiated to either avoid cloud or improve terrain clearance. The aircraft subsequently commenced to roll to the left at 12:30:35 with the left roll continuing for the following 14 seconds. It was likely that the left turn was initiated to avoid either cloud or terrain. During the left turn, the angle of bank reached a maximum value of 46° and the aircraft descended from 9,728 ft to 9,045 ft at a high rate of descent. The airspeed also increased from 92 kts to 122 kts during the descent. The engine power was reduced to idle soon after the aircraft commenced descending which was most likely due to the handling pilot attempting to recover from the high descent rate and increasing airspeed. The recorded data indicated that three EGPWS alerts activated during the descent. The aircraft had stopped descending at 12:30:50 and had commenced climbing with a reducing left angle of bank when the airplane impacted terrain at an elevation of 9,100 feet.

On September 2, 2011, about 1335 Alaska daylight time, a Cessna 208B airplane, N207DR, and a Cessna 207 airplane, N73789, collided in midair about 9 miles north of Nightmute, Alaska. Both airplanes were being operated as charter flights under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 in visual meteorological conditions when the accident occurred. The Cessna 208B was operated by Grant Aviation Inc., Anchorage, Alaska, and the Cessna 207 was operated by Ryan Air, Anchorage, Alaska. Visual flight rules (VFR) company flight following procedures were in effect for each flight. The sole occupant of the Cessna 208B, an airline transport pilot, sustained fatal injuries. The sole occupant of the Cessna 207, a commercial pilot, was uninjured. The Cessna 208B was destroyed, and the Cessna 207 sustained substantial damage. After the collision, the Cessna 208B descended uncontrolled and impacted tundra-covered terrain, and a postcrash fire consumed most of the wreckage. The Cessna 207’s right wing was damaged during the collision and the subsequent forced landing on tundra-covered terrain. Both airplanes were based at the Bethel Airport, Bethel, Alaska, and were returning to Bethel at the time of the collision. The Cessna 208B departed from the Toksook Bay Airport, Toksook Bay, Alaska, about 1325, and the Cessna 207 departed from the Tununak Airport, Tununak, Alaska. During separate telephone conversations with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge on September 2, the chief pilot for Ryan Air, as well as the director of operations for Grant Aviation, independently reported that both pilots had a close personal relationship. During an initial interview with the NTSB IIC on September 3, in Bethel, the pilot of the Cessna 207 reported that both airplanes departed from the neighboring Alaskan villages about the same time and that both airplanes were en route to Bethel along similar flight routes. She said that, just after takeoff from Tununak, she talked with the pilot of the Cessna 208B on a prearranged, discreet radio frequency, and the two agreed to meet up in-flight for the flight back to Bethel. She said that, while her airplane was in level cruise flight at 1,200 feet above mean sea level (msl), the pilot of the Cessna 208B flew his airplane along the left side of her airplane, and they continued to talk via radio. She said that the pilot of the Cessna 208B then unexpectedly and unannounced climbed his airplane above and over the top of her airplane. She said that she immediately told the pilot of the Cessna 208B that she could not see him and that she was concerned about where he was. She said that the Cessna 208B pilot then said, in part: "Whatever you do, don't pitch up." The next thing she recalled was moments later seeing the wings and cockpit of the descending Cessna 208B pass by the right the side of her airplane, which was instantaneously followed by an impact with her airplane’s right wing. The Cessna 207 pilot reported that, after the impact, while she struggled to maintain control of her airplane, she saw the Cessna 208B pass underneath her airplane from right-to-left, and it began a gradual descent, which steepened as the airplane continued to the left and away from her airplane. She said that she told the pilot of the Cessna 208B that she thought she was going to crash.She said that the pilot of the Cessna 208B simply stated, “Me too.” She said that she watched as the Cessna 208B continued to descend, and then it entered a steep, vertical, nose-down descent before it collided with the tundra-covered terrain below. She said that a postcrash fire started instantaneously upon impact. Unable to maintain level cruise flight and with limited roll control, the Cessna 207 pilot selected an area of rolling, tundra-covered terrain as a forced landing site. During touchdown, the airplane’s nosewheel collapsed, and the airplane nosed down. The Cessna 207’s forced landing site was about 2 miles east of the Cessna 208B’s accident site.

A Cessna 208B and a Cessna 207 collided in flight in daylight visual meteorological conditions. The Cessna 208B and the Cessna 207 were both traveling in an easterly direction. According to the Cessna 207 pilot, the airplanes departed from two neighboring remote Alaskan villages about the same time, and both airplanes were flying along similar flight routes. While en route, the Cessna 207 pilot talked with the Cessna 208B pilot on a prearranged, discreet radio frequency, and the two agreed to meet up in flight for the return to their home airport. The Cessna 207 pilot said that the pilot of the Cessna 208B flew his airplane along the left side of her airplane while she was in level cruise flight at 1,200 feet mean sea level and that they continued to talk via the radio. Then, unexpectedly and unannounced, the pilot of the Cessna 208B maneuvered his airplane above and over the top of her airplane. She said that she immediately told the Cessna 208B pilot that she could not see him and that she was concerned about where he was. She said that the Cessna 208B pilot then said, in part: "Whatever you do, don't pitch up." The next thing she recalled was seeing the wings and cockpit of the descending Cessna 208B pass by the right side of her airplane, which was instantly followed by an impact with her airplane's right wing. She said that after the collision, the Cessna 208B passed underneath her airplane from right-to-left before beginning a gradual descent that steepened as the airplane continued to the left. It then entered a steep, vertical, nose-down descent before colliding with the tundra-covered terrain below followed by a postcrash fire. Unable to maintain level cruise flight, the Cessna 207 pilot selected an area of rolling, tundra-covered terrain as a forced landing site. An examination of both airplanes revealed impact signatures consistent with the Cessna 208B's vertical stabilizer impacting the Cessna 207's right wing. A portion of crushed and distorted wreckage, identified as part of the Cessna 208B's vertical stabilizer assembly, was found embedded in the Cessna 207's right wing. The Cessna 208B's severed vertical stabilizer and rudder were found about 1,000 feet west of the Cessna 208B's crash site.

The four engine aircraft departed Komsomolsk-on-Amur Airport on a cargo service (flight LN9209) to Keperveyem with an intermediate stop in Magadan, carrying 17,43 tons of various goods, two passengers and a crew of nine. The aircraft departed Komsomolsk-on-Amur Airport at 1437LT. At 1520LT, while cruising at an altitude of 7,500 metres about 430 km northeast from his departure point, the crew informed ATC about a fuel leak on the engine n°1, requested a descent to 6,600 metres then the clearance to return to Komsomolsk-on-Amur. After the engine n°1 caught fire, the crew declared an emergency and started an emergency descent. Out of control, the aircraft crashed on the slope of a mountain located about 82 km southwest from Omsukchan. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and the debris were found a day later at an altitude of 1,006 metres. All 11 occupants were killed. This Antonov AN-12 was the oldest model still in commercial service in Russia.

On 28 July 2011, about 04:11 Korean Standard Time), Asiana Airlines flight 991, a B747-400F airplane, HL7604 (hereafter referred to as AAR991), a scheduled cargo flight from Incheon, Republic of Korea, to Shanghai, China, crashed into the international waters about 130 km west of Jeju International Airport (hereafter referred to as Jeju Airport after the flight crew reported a cargo fire to SHI ACC near a reporting point SADLI on airway A593 about 03:54 and attempted to divert to Jeju Airport. Due to the crash impact and fire, the captain and the first officer (FO) were fatally injured, the aircraft was destroyed, and the cargo shipments were damaged, incapable of being recovered, or washed away. AAR991 was a scheduled international cargo flight operated at night under the instrument flight rule in accordance with the Aviation Act of the Republic of Korea and the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The captain and the FO showed up at the flight crew ready room of Asiana Airlines in Incheon International Airport (hereafter referred to as Incheon Airport) an hour before the scheduled time of departure) and signed the "show-up log," respectively. The line mechanic stated that on 28 July, about 02:00, the flight crew arrived at the airplane and that the captain performed the ramp inspection. The loadmaster stated that about 02:15, under the guidance with him, the captain inspected the loaded status of dangerous goods and other shipments in the main deck cargo compartment. The transcript) of ATC radio communications shows that at 03:04:28, AAR991 took off from runway 15L in Incheon Airport. From this moment, the captain) took control of radio communications. At 03:05:48, AAR991 made initial contact with Seoul Area Control Center (SEL ACC) after takeoff and was instructed to climb to 34,000 ft and fly direct to MALPA. At 03:12:19, the flight crew were advised to contact Incheon Area Control Center (ICN ACC). At 03:12:35, AAR991 was climbing to 34,000 ft on a permitted route when it made initial contact with ICN ACC, and at 03:13:05, was allowed to fly direct to NIRAT. At 03:26:05, ICN ACC instructed AAR991 to change its radio frequency to 124.52 MHz. From this moment, the FO mainly assumed control of radio communications, but the captain also occasionally made communication. At 03:26:21, the crew were instructed to fly direct to SADLI, and at 03:50:46, ICN ACC advised AAR991 to contact SHI ACC on frequency 134.0 MHz. At 03:51:15, AAR991 stated that it was maintaining at 34,000 ft and flying direct to SADLI when it made initial contact with SHI ACC. At 03:52:39, SHI ACC instructed AAR991, "AAR991 radar contact, off-set 5 miles right of track," and the flight crew carried out this instruction at 03:52:51. The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) messages) received by the ground station were as follows: about 03:53, "EQUIPMENT SMOKE," "EQUIP COOLING," and "CGO DET 11 MN DK"; and about 03:54, "CGO DET 6 MN DK" and "CGO DET 10 MN DK." At 03:54:23, the FO stated, "Shanghai control, Shanghai control, AAR991 request emergency descent, emergency, declare emergency due to fire main deck. Request descent, and descent to one-zero thousand." At 03:54:37, SHI ACC gave AAR991 a descent clearance and instructed it to turn at its discretion, and the FO acknowledged this instruction. The radar data of ICN ACC shows that AAR991 started descending at 03:54:59. At 03:55:08, the FO requested a diversion to Jeju Airport, stating "We have fire main deck, AAR991, return to Jeju AAR991," and SHI ACC approved the request. At 03:58:03, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to maintain 10,000 ft, however, followed by no response from AAR991. At 03:58:25, SHI ACC requested KAL886 flying near AAR991 to relay any information from AAR991 to SHI ACC. KAL886 stated that AAR991 was descending to 10,000 ft and flying direct to Jeju. According to the radar data of ICN ACC, AAR991 was flying at 16,000 ft at a ground speed of 452 kt on a heading of 345°. At 03:59:13, AAR991 requested a radar vector to Jeju. At 03:59:50, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to fly heading 045, and AAR991 acknowledged this instruction. At 03:59:26, according to the ATC transcript, the sound of the FO's breathing through an oxygen mask was recorded four times when he communicated with SHI ACC. The last ACARS messages received by the ground station about 04:00 are as follows: "YAW DAMPER UPR," "RUD RATIO DUAL," and "FLAPS CONTROL." At 04:00:23, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to contact ICN ACC on 124.52 MHz for a radar vector to Jeju, however, AAR991 stated that it was unable to contact on this frequency. Consequently, SHI ACC instructed the crew to monitor frequency 134.0 MHz. The radar data of ICN ACC shows that at 04:01:43, AAR991 was flying at 8,200 ft at a ground speed of 404 kt on a heading of 033°, and after this, AAR991's altitude, ground speed, and heading changed inconsistently. At 04:02:00, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to contact Fukuoka Area Control Center (FUK ACC) on 133.6 MHz. At 04:02:10, the FO stated, "AAR991" and 12 seconds later, added, "Fukuoka AAR991 mayday mayday mayday, we have cargo fire, request direct to Jeju please," followed by no response from FUK ACC. At 04:03:01, the FO called SHI ACC and stated that it was unable to contact FUK ACC. Consequently, SHI ACC instructed AAR991 to pass information to KAL886 and let KAL886 relay the information to FUK ACC and ICN ACC. At 04:03:01, the flight track data of the Incheon radar shows that AAR991's transponder code in Mode 3/A was set to 7700 from 6353 when the aircraft was flying at 8,500 ft at a ground speed of 410 kt on a heading of 027°. At 04:03:24, KAL886 advised AAR991 that it would relay its message to ICN ACC, and the FO stated, "Yes, now direct Jeju heading 030." KAL886 informed AAR991 that SHI ACC gave it heading 045, and the FO acknowledged this instruction. At 04:04:14, SHI ACC instructed KAL886 to use another transmitter to contact ICN ACC on 124.52 MHz, to request heading to Jeju from its present position, and to report back to SHI ACC. Regarding this, KAL886 gave an affirmative response. At 04:05:30, the captain called KAL886, and KAL886 responded, "Relay from Incheon Control, from Incheon Control, maintain heading 060, radar vector for final, and you may descend to 7,000 ft." At 04:05:52, KAL886 again relayed the message, "Maintain heading 060, radar vector for final, and descend to 7,000 ft," followed by the captain's response, "Descend 7,000 ft." Beginning 04:06:25, the captain called "Korean Air" twice. At 04:06:30, KAL886 responded, "Stand by, stand by," followed by the captain's statement at 04:06:32, "Ah… we are now that rudder control is not working and seems to be fired… (jamming)." At 04:06:41, SHI ACC instructed KAL886 to contact ICN ACC on 124.52 MHz, and at 04:07:16, instructed AAR991 to try contacting KAL886 on 124.52 MHz, followed by the captain's acknowledgement. At 04:07:34, the captain stated, "We have to open the hatch, hatch." Subsequently, KAL886 instructed AAR991 to change its frequency to ICN ACC frequency 124.52 MHz. At 04:08:52, ICN ACC instructed KAL886 to relay the message to AAR991 that JEJ APP established radar contact with AAR991 and that AAR991 should contact JEJ APP on 121.2 MHz. At 04:09:08, KAL886 relayed this message to AAR991. At 04:09:47, the captain said to JEJ ACC, "Rudder control… flight control, all are not working." The FO said to JEJ ACC, "Did you contact? Uh… do you contact us?" and JEJ ACC responded, "AAR991… yes, I can hear you." At 04:10:06, the FO stated, "We have heavy vibration on the airplane, may need to make an emergency landing, emergency ditching," and JEJ ACC responded, "Yes, say again, please." He stated, "Altitude control is not available due to heavy vibration, going to ditch… ah." At 04:10:26, JEJ ACC asked AAR991, "Can you make approach to Jeju?" and subsequently, tried to contact AAR991 three times, however, followed by no response from AAR991. The aircraft crashed in the East China Sea and both pilots were killed. Debris were found about 130 km west of Jeju.

The four engine aircraft departed Baku-Bina Airport at 2126LT on a cargo flight to Bagram AFB, carrying 9 crew members and a load of 18 tons of various goods destined to the NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan. While approaching Bagram AFB by night, at an altitude of 12,500 feet, the aircraft impacted the slope of a mountain located 25 km from the airport. The wreckage was found at the first light of day. The aircraft was destroyed and all 9 occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Maracay on a cargo flight to Puerto Ordaz, carrying one pilot, one passenger and some bank documents. While in cruising altitude, the pilot informed ATC about smoke in the cockpit and elected to divert to the nearest airport. Eventually, he attempted an emergency landing in an open field located some 20 km east from Zaraza. After touchdown, the aircraft rolled for few dozen metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. While both occupants escaped uninjured, the aircraft was totally destroyed by fire.

The crew departed Port Gentil on a cargo flight to Libreville on behalf of DHL Airways. On approach to Libreville-Léon Mba Airport, the captain informed ATC about hydraulic problems and initiated a go-around procedure. Shortly later, the aircraft stalled and crashed in the sea some 2,3 km southeast of the airport. All four occupants were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Due to the failure of the hydraulic system, the crew was unable to lower the gear.

After taking off from runway 9L at his home airport and making an easterly departure, the pilot, who was also the president, director of operations, and chief pilot for the on-demand passenger and cargo operation, advised the air traffic controller that he was turning downwind. According to witnesses, the airplane did not sound like it was developing full power. The airplane climbed to about 100 feet, banked to the left, began losing altitude, and impacted a tree, a fence, and two vehicles before coming to rest in a residential area. A postcrash fire ensued, which consumed the majority of the cabin area and left wing. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane had struck the tree with its left inboard wing about 20 feet above ground level. Multiple tree branches exhibiting propeller cuts were found near the base of the tree. Propeller strike marks on the ground also corresponded to the location of the No. 1 (left side) propeller. There were minimal propeller marks from the No. 2 (right side) propeller. Examination of the propellers revealed that the No. 1 propeller blades exhibited chordwise scratching and S-bending, consistent with operation at impact, but the No. 2 propeller blades did not exhibit any chordwise scratching or bending, which indicates that the No. 2 engine was not producing power at the time of impact. There was no evidence that the pilot attempted to perform the manufacturer’s published single engine procedure, which would have allowed him to maintain altitude. Contrary to the procedure, the left and right throttle control levers were in the full-throttle position, the mixture control levers were in the full-rich position, neither propeller was feathered, and the landing gear was down. Postaccident examination of the No. 1 engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact malfunction or failure. However, the No. 2 engine's condition would have resulted in erratic and unreliable operation; the engine would not have been able to produce full rated horsepower as the compression on four of the nine cylinders was below specification and both magnetos were not functioning correctly. Moisture and corrosion were discovered inside the magneto cases; the left magneto sparked internally in a random pattern when tested and its point gap was in excess of the required tolerance. The right magneto's camshaft follower also exhibited excessive wear and its points would not open, rendering it incapable of providing electrical energy to its spark plugs. Additionally, the main fuel pump could not be rotated by hand; it exhibited play in the gear bearings, and corrosion was present internally. When the airplane was not flying, it was kept outdoors. Large amounts of rain had fallen during the week before the accident, which could have led to the moisture and corrosion in the magnetos. Although the pilot had been having problems with the No. 2 engine for months, he continued to fly the airplane, despite his responsibility, particularly as president, director of operations, and chief pilot of the company, to ensure that the airplane was airworthy. During this period, the pilot would take off with the engine shuddering and would circle the departure airport to gain altitude before heading to the destination. On the night before the accident, the director of maintenance (DOM) replaced the No. 1 cylinder on the No. 2 engine, which had developed a crack in the fin area and had oil seeping out of it. After the DOM performed the replacement, he did not do a compression check or check the magnetos; such checks would have likely revealed that four of the remaining cylinders were not producing specified compression, that the magnetos were not functioning correctly, and that further maintenance was necessary. Review of the airplane's maintenance records did not reveal an entry for installation of the cylinder. The last entry in the maintenance records for the airplane was an annual and a 100-hour inspection, which had occurred about 11 months before the accident.

The twin engine aircraft departed Robinson Crusoe Island on a cargo flight to Valparaiso, carrying one passenger, one pilot and a load consisting of 1,000 lbs of lobsters. Upon landing at Valparaiso Airport in good weather conditions, the airplane went out of control, veered off runway, crossed a road and came to rest in a wooded area located along the highway. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair and both occupants escaped with minor injuries.