United States of America

The normal fuel load for the flight was 1,500 lbs, but with a forecast tail wind and an estimated flight time for only 1+10, the crew accepted the lower indicated (950 lb) fuel load. The flight was uneventful until an indication of 250 lbs per side, then the fuel 'seemed to dissipate faster.' With an indication of 150 lbs on downwind, the copilot recommended declaring an emergency. The captain's response was to ask ATC for the anticipated length of the downwind leg. He was told 20 miles. Priority handling was requested, but was only available for a declared emergency. The approach was continued with normal handling for approximately 10 minutes. At 1608:39, the crew declared an emergency, then reported the aircraft was out of fuel. It crash landed on rough terrain, short of runway 08. An exam revealed fuel sensors had been improperly installed (interchanged between the inboard and outboard tanks). Thus the gages indicated about 180 lbs more than the approximately 763 lbs that was actually aboard at takeoff. A special 500 hour inspection of the entire fuel system was made on 7/8/84 using the 'wet' method, but only the capacitance method checks each individual sensor. All 11 occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft was on IFR departure in minimal weather conditions. On takeoff roll, a power loss occurred on the right engine and the aircraft veered to the right. The pilot-in-command (owner) in left seat initiated aborted takeoff, but right seat pilot took control, continued takeoff and feathered the right propeller. Both pilots observed smoke from the engines on their respective sides, both thought landing gear was retracted. (Investigation revealed landing gear was down.) Aircraft could not maintain altitude, pilots elected to ditch in ocean. Investigation revealed aircraft had been serviced with 147 gallons of Jet fuel instead of Avgas at 0445 hrs by a fbo lineman. The lineman had 3 weeks total experience, 1 1/2 hrs video tape training and was working 2 jobs 7 days per week. All three occupants escaped uninjured.

On arrival at destination, pilot found airport obscured by fog, reported by unicom as one mile visibility. Pilot circled to await improvement. 15 minutes later, visibility improved to 1-1/2 mi. Aircraft observed briefly through breaks, then heard maneuvering to north and seen once on approximate downwind heading. Aircraft heard approaching airport then appeared in diving left turn below fog and to right of runway before impact. Approved ndb/vor dme/rnav approaches to airport have 700 feet ceiling minimum. Aircraft found configured for landing. No record of request for instrument approach. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Shortly after takeoff the pilot reported to the tower that the left engine had failed. The propeller was feathered and a left turn to downwind initiated. In the turn the right engine failed and the aircraft flew into trees in a residential area about 1 mile from the airport. No mechanical malfunctions were discovered. No fuel was found in either engine. The fuel selectors for both engines were on the outboard positions. Prior to departure the main fuel tanks were filled. No fuel was added to the outboard tanks. Impact ruptured the right outboard tank. Approximately one cup of fuel was drained from the left tank.

Shortly after takeoff, both engines lost power and a wheels up landing was made in an open field. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire. An investigation revealed that the aircraft had been refuel with Jet-A fuel rather than 100 low lead avgas. The lineman had inadvertently used the Jet-A fuel truck which was identical to the Avgas truck except for a decal, appx 4' by 16', which identified the type of fuel. The lineman stated that his training consisted of approximately 30 minutes of reading the company maintenance manual on how to refuel the different company aircraft, then was given on-the-job training for a brief time. When he went to refuel N89PB prior to the accident flight, he went to the parking space where the Avgas truck was normally parked, but on that occasion, the Jet-A fuel truck was there.

The aircraft descended into the water six and 1/2 miles southwest of Bridgeport, CT. The aircraft was on an ILS approach to runway 06. The aircraft was in communication with NY tracon arrival radar and on his initial call had indicated a desire for a clearance direct to Bridgeport. A brief radio exchange resulted in the desired clearance. There was no indication of any problems or low fuel state in the communication. Approximately 15 minutes after initial call, the controller was giving the final approach instructions to N100CT, after having used some turns and changes in airspeed to space the flight behind landing traffic, when radar and radio contact was lost. Post accident fuel calculations based on fuel aboard vs flight time en route and normal fuel consumption showed approximately 6 gallons of fuel remaining. The normal unusable fuel for this aircraft is 13 gallons which increases during maneuvering. Identifiable parts of the aircraft and some paper documents were recovered by the coast guard. The pilot's body was not recovered.

Pilot was executing an non-directional beacon approach to runway 23. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Radar information obtained during the investigation revealed the pilot did not stabilize the airspeed while executing the approach. Witnesses near the accident site indicated they had heard a low flying aircraft at the approximate time of the accident. The wreckage path revealed a gradual descent swath in the trees which terminated with ground impact. Witnesses near the airport stated that the airport was obscured by fog. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing an illegal flight and attempted to land in a remote area near St Petersburg when the aircraft crash landed in unclear circumstances. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was not found.

About 10 minutes after takeoff at 1005 mdt, the pilot was cleared to climb to FL190. This was ATC's last communication with the aircraft. At 1030:39, the controller attempted to contact the pilot to advise that he had lost radar contact and to recycle the transponder and squawk 6062. There was no response. Two witnesses reported seeing the aircraft just before it impacted the ground. According to them, they saw fire and/or an explosion before impact and one witness reported the aircraft broke up after it came below an estimated 1,000 to 1,200 feet ceiling. However, the wreckage was scattered over a 2 miles area. An exam revealed evidence of a catastrophic in-flight breakup from overload which included positive overload of both wings. Radar data showed that just before radar contact was lost, the aircraft's speed varied between 221 and 272 knots, heading varied from 072° to 014° and vertical velocity varied from +300 to -2,400 feet/min. Thunderstorms, turbulences, rain and cloud tops to 25,000 feet were reported. Probable light to moderate icing in clouds above the freezing level of 14,000 feet. Aircraft had weather radar aboard. All four occupants were killed.

Wings West Airlines Flight 628, a commuter flight, departed Los Angeles for San Francisco, with scheduled en route stops at Santa Maria and San Luis Obispo. At 11:10, Flight 628 left the gate at San Luis Obispo. The weather at the time was essentially clear and the visibility was 15 miles. At 11:16, after taking off from runway 29, Flight 628 called the Los Angeles ARTCC and reported that it was climbing through 2,700 feet 'IFR to San Francisco.' At 11:17:23, the Los Angeles ARTCC’s radar controller cleared Flight 628 to the San Francisco airport, as filed, to climb and maintain 7,000 feet. At 11:17:38 the aircraft collided head-on with Rockwell Commander N112SM at 3,400 feet. This single-engined aircraft had departed Paso Robles Airport on a training flight with two pilots on board. Nll2SM was flying in visual meteorological conditions and under VFR in the vicinity of the San Luis Obispo Airport just before the collision.