United States of America

The aircraft, at near gross weight (cg unknown), was on initial climb after takeoff. A witness reported that engines sounded normal. At about 400 feet agl the aircraft was reported to pitch up about 10°, then level off and entered a left turn. The aircraft made another left turn to the south-southwest. The pilot reported that he was returning to the field, but did not state problem. The witness said the aircraft was in a 30° left bank, turning toward the airport, when the aircraft stalled and descended to the ground in a vertical nose down attitude. Fire/explosion after impact. Left propeller found in feathered position. No engine problem found. On 1/28/87, left engine lost power after takeoff; no problem found; unable to duplicate. Pilot had two engine-out experiences in airplane previously, both when at low weight. Surrounding terrain suitable for off-airport landing. Both occupants were killed.

The crew was performing a local training mission at Altus AFB. After landing, smoke spread in the cockpit and a fire erupted. The crew immediately stopped the aircraft and the runway and evacuated the cabin safely. There were no injuries while the aircraft was totally destroyed by fire.

The pilot made a fairly long taxi from the ramp to the end of the runway and then started his takeoff roll with the parking brake still partially set. The brakes became very hot and the component parts expanded. After rolling almost 3,000 feet the brakes tightened up to the extent that both main gear tires started leaving black skid marks which continued until the aircraft ran off the end of the runway without obtaining flying speed, a distance of 3,168 feet. It was noted, through a design feature of the aircraft, that the parking brake handle could be placed in the released position without the brake being released. However, this would give the appearance that it had been released. The main gear tires were worn almost slick during this attempted takeoff. Both main gear brakes had been overheated during this time to the extent that they were destroyed. The aircraft was destroyed by collision with trees, rocks and a fire hydrant at the bottom of a hill off the end of the runway. The pilot escaped with serious injuries.

The pilot and his wife were en route from Palm Springs, CA, to Olathe, KS, and had stopped for fuel at Farmington, NM. After departure, the aircraft was eventually cleared to FL210. At 1934 the pilot gave Denver ARTCC the following pirep: 'there's been some snow but I've been mostly in and out of the tops. Looks like I got clear skies above me most of the time...and it is moderately rough from time to time.' At 2045 Kansas City ARTCC advised the pilot he was at FL213. The pilot acknowledged he had drifted off altitude and was correcting and was heading 060°. At 2047 the controller advised the pilot he was at FL203. The pilot replied, 'we've had a gyro failure.' At 2049 radar contact was lost. The aircraft impacted an open field in a near vertical attitude. There was no evidence of airframe, engine, propeller, or flight control failure. Only one vacuum pump was recovered. The instrument panel and autopilot system were destroyed. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft crashed one mile short of the runway. The accident occurred during an ILS approach in instrument meteorological conditions. During a post accident interview with the pilot he stated that he did not recognize and react in a timely manner to the gross deviation of the decision height. He continued down until striking the ground short of the runway.

The two aircraft, a Beech U-21A and a Piper PA-31-350, collided nearly head on at 7,000 feet msl over Independence, MO. In daylight VMC conditions with a visibility of 20 miles. The U-21 was in level cruise and the PA-31 was climbing eastbound to an undisclosed altitude enroute to Saint Louis. Both aircraft were equipped with operating mode-c transponders but the controller in contact with the U-21 did not observe the conflict and traffic advisories were not provided. The PA-31 was operating in accordance with visual flight rules. The U-21 was operating in accordance with instrument flight rules. After the collision both aircraft crashed in uncontrolled descent. There was no indication that either aircraft took any evasive action. The conflict alert subprogram of the ARTS III tracking system was not programmed to alert the controllers to the impending collision and the two controllers did not observe any target in the vicinity of the data block representing the U-21. All six occupants in both aircraft were killed.

The two aircraft, a Beech U-21A and a Piper PA-31-350, collided nearly head on at 7,000 feet msl over Independence, MO. In daylight VMC conditions with a visibility of 20 miles. The U-21 was in level cruise and the PA-31 was climbing eastbound to an undisclosed altitude enroute to Saint Louis. Both aircraft were equipped with operating mode-c transponders but the controller in contact with the U-21 did not observe the conflict and traffic advisories were not provided. The PA-31 was operating in accordance with visual flight rules. The U-21 was operating in accordance with instrument flight rules. After the collision both aircraft crashed in uncontrolled descent. There was no indication that either aircraft took any evasive action. The conflict alert subprogram of the ARTS III tracking system was not programmed to alert the controllers to the impending collision and the two controllers did not observe any target in the vicinity of the data block representing the U-21. All six occupants in both aircraft were killed.

While on a day/VFR flight from Ontario, CA to Las Vegas, NV, the aircraft collided with mountainous terrain near the top of a 6,500 feet peak. Radar data showed that approximately 20 minutes before the accident, the aircraft began a gradual descent from about 10,000 feet. No preimpact part failure or malfunction of the aircraft, engine or autopilot was found. The pilot had a rest period on the previous day, but the investigation did not determine whether he had obtained any sleep before a 1700 pst flight. After the 1700 pst flight, he voluntarily flew on a late night flight with another company. That flight was delayed in returning and did not land at Ontario until about 0500 pst the next morning. Approximately 41 min later, the pilot took off on the accident flight.

On January 15, 1987, at 1216 mountain standard time, SkyWest flight 1834, a Fairchild Swearingen SA-226TC (METRO II), registration Nl635W, departed Pocatello, Idaho, on a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Salt Lake City, Utah (SLC). The flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 with two pilots and six passengers aboard. Flight 1834 was handed off from the SLC Air Route Traffic Control Center to the Bear Sector controller at the SLC Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) for a left downwind arrival to SLC International Airport. At 1237:49, the Bear sector controller issued a heading of 100” to flight 1834 and advised the flight to expect vectors for a visual approach to runway 34L. (See Air Traffic Control Transcript in appendix C). During the next few minutes, flight 1834 was given further vectors and descent clearances, and at 1247:21, it was given a frequency change to the TRACON Final controller. At 1250:28, after being cleared to descend to 7,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the Final controller advised, “SkyWest eight thirty four, traffic ten to nine o’clock, four miles, six thousand, Boeing seven, ah, thirty seven three hundred.” Flight 1834 acknowledged, “SkyWest eight thirty four has the traffic.” At 1250:35, the Final controller advised, “SkyWest eight thirty four, plan to follow that traffic, there’s traffic south of him eleven o’clock, six miles north bound, [a] seven thirty seven out of seven thousand five hundred, for the right.” Flight 1834 responded, “OK, we’ll follow the first one, SkyWest eight thirty four.” At 1250:44, the Final controller advised, “SkyWest eight thirty four, wait a minute, report the other one in sight.” Flight 1834 responded, “We’re looking for him.” At 1251:02, the Final controller transmitted, “SkyWest eight thirty four, ten o’clock four miles, seven thousand four hundred.” Flight 1834 replied, “Eight thirty four, we’re looking.” The Final controller then issued instructions at 1251: 15 for flight 1834 to make a left turn to 070”, and the flight acknowledged. At 1251:32, the Final controller transmitted, “SkyWest eight thirty four, traffic’s ten to eleven o’clock, three miles.” Flight 1834 did not acknowledge that transmission, and at 1251:43, the Final controller advised, “SkyWest eight thirty four, turn left heading zero five zero.” The flight acknowledged and reported, “Still have no contact on that traffic.” At 1251:50, the Final controller transmitted, “SkyWest eight thirty four, roger, turn further left heading three six zero.” Flight 1834 acknowledged and at 1251:58, an expletive was transmitted over the TRACON Final control frequency during a transmission from SkyWest flight 575. There were no further transmissions from flight 1834. According to the UNICOM I/ operator at SLC Municipal 2 Airport (SLC 2) about 1115 or 1120, a pilot in Mooney M20C, registration N6485U, operating under 14 CFR Part 91, called to inquire if the runway was clear. The Mooney was occupied by a private pilot in the left seat and an instructor pilot in the right seat. The UNICOM operator advised that the runway was clear, and a few minutes later, a pilot in the Mooney called for and was given an airport advisory. The UNICOM operator observed the Mooney taxi to runway 34 and take off about 1125 or 1130. The Mooney remained in the traffic pattern at SLC 2 performing touch-and-go landings. There were no other aircraft in the traffic pattern at the time. The UNICOM operator stated that she last talked to the Mooney about 1145 to 1150 when a pilot called, “Final for 34.” The UNICOM operator said that she observed the airplane perform a touch-and: go landing, but she did not observe the direction of departure of the airplane. There were no further known communications with the Mooney regarding departing the traffic pattern or any additional aspects of the flight. According to recorded air traffic control (ATC) radar data, after the Mooney departed the SLC 2 traffic pattern at 1235, y the airplane flew south and maneuvered about 25 miles south southeast of SLC International Airport before beginning a turn to the northwest. The airplane continued in a northwesterly direction until it was about 9 miles south of SLC International Airport where it began a gradual left turn until its target merged with the target of SkyWest flight 1834. The targets merged at 1257 :58--the time the expletive was recorded on the ATC tape at the SLC TRACON. The Final approach controller stated that he did observe a visual flight rules (VFR) target about 3 to 4 miles southwest of SLC 2 moving north to northwest when flight 1834 was on downwind. He said he had no more than normal cause to monitor the target. He also stated that it was not unusual to observe VFR targets in the pattern near SLC 2 during visual meteorological conditions. Other controllers at SLC TRACON also stated that it was not uncommon to observe numerous targets operating in the traffic pattern at SLC 2. The Final controller and other controllers added that they normally would observe the VFR targets near SLC 2 disappear from the radarscope and then reappear during practice touch-and-go landings. The Final controller said that he did not recall seeing any VFR targets in the vicinity of SkyWest 1834 as it was turning toward final just before the collision. The Fin.al controller stated that his workload was moderate, and all of his equipment was operating normally before the accident. In addition, the Local controller in the SLC tower stated that he did not observe the target of the Mooney on the tower Bright Radar Indicator Tower Equipment display. There was no evidence that the Mooney pilots were in radio contact with any ATC facility at the time of the accident. Several eyewitnesses were interviewed who observed the airplanes before and after the collision. Some of the witnesses stated that the nose of the METRO II pitched up just before impact. The witnesses stated that the METRO II was headed northeasterly and the Mooney was headed northwesterly just before impact. They stated that the METRO II had made a few left turns as it turned toward the northeast. In general, the eyewitnesses agreed that the two airplanes collided with the Mooney striking the METRO II’s right forward fuselage area with its nose. After the collision, both airplanes fell to the ground with wreckage scattered over 2 square miles in a residential section of Kearns, Utah. There was no fire. The collision occurred at 7,000 feet msl in daylight visual meteorological conditions. All 10 occupants in both aircraft were killed. There were no casualties on the ground.

Weather conditions on the day of the accident were reported to be extremely variable. Initially, when the pilot obtained a weather briefing, VFR flight was not recommended. Later, the weather improved and the pilot elected to proceed on the flight. While en route, he encountered snow showers and descended to 500 feet agl to insure best visibility. The pilot stated that without warning, he encountered a snow squall and whiteout conditions while he was flying over a ridge immediately west of the Kustatan River. He attempted a 180 turn, but the aircraft crashed on snow covered terrain. One occupant, an infant, died from impact injuries. The survivors were located about 21 hours after the accident. The ELT switch was found in the 'off' position; no ELT signal was heard by other pilots. Another pilot who encountered weather at about the same time and place diverted to another airport.