United States of America

At 1400 cst, modified Douglas DC-3C/BT-67R, TZ-389, and Beech A36, N3657A, began formation flight to get DC-3 flying time and for the 2nd occupant of the A36 to get aerial photos of the DC-3. A witness saw the airplanes at 500 feet to 700 feet agl, "flying close together heading north." He said "the big plane (DC-3) was flying straight and level. The little plane (A36) was just to the west of the big plane. The little plane then hit the big plane near the middle." After impact, pieces of acft were seen falling. Another witness saw the DC-3 heading north and the A36 circling it above and below. On its last pass, the A36 circled behind the DC-3, then crossed over the top and hitting the top of the DC-3. About 5 seconds after impact, the DC-3 gently rolled/turned westbound (apparently descending and gaining airspeed); the left wing then came off, followed by the right wing about 2 seconds later. Parts of the A36 empennage were found 3590 to 4,910 feet from the main wreckage. There was evidence that during impact, the DC-3 elevator and rudder controls were severed. No preimpact anomalies were found. At 1445 cst, an AIRMET had been issued, forecasting light to moderate turbulence below 8,000 feet msl. Toxicology tests of the DC-3 copilot's blood showed 0.127 mcg/ml amitriptyline (a prescription antidepressant with sedative side effects), 0.039 mcg/ml nortriptyline (metabolite of amitriptyline), and an undetermined amount of ephedrine and phenylpropanolamine (over-the-counter medications used in cold preparations, diet aids and stimulants).

After landing on wet runway 35 at Houston-Sugar Land Airport, the crew encountered nil braking action. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and came to rest in a ditch. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

About two minutes into the flight, the pilot noticed a high cylinder head temperature on the right engine. The pilot opened the cowl flap doors and the cylinder head temperature dropped 200 degrees. When the pilot noticed a reduction in right engine power, he elected to shut down the engine. The copilot was instructed to secure the right engine in accordance with the emergency procedures. Unable to maintain altitude, the pilot selected an emergency landing to a large open field, and the landing gear collapsed during the landing. Examination of the airplane at the accident site disclosed that the engine cowl flaps on both engines were in the open position. Examinations of the right engine subsystems failed to disclose a mechanical malfunction or component failure. A review of the normal and emergency procedures for the aircraft disclosed that the cowl flaps normal position for the shutdown engine is closed. A review of the aircraft performance data revealed that the airplane was capable of maintaining flight and a climb attitude with one engine. There was no cargo on the airplane. During the pilot's subsequent type rating reexamination in the Convair 240-27, the pilot failed to demonstrate a satisfactory level of knowledge in emergency procedures during the oral examination. The pilot subsequently surrendered the Convair 240-27 type rating to the FAA.

The flight had been delayed due to severe weather over the departure airport. The preflight weather briefing received by the pilot included AIRMETS and SIGMETS for icing and severe thunderstorms, possible tornadoes, hail to 2 inches, and wind gusts to 70 knots near the ground. The Beech 18 was not equipped with a storm scope or weather radar. Prior to takeoff, a passenger stated to a witness that the weather was 'really really bad,' and that they would have to 'do some deviating to get around it.' After takeoff, the airplane cruised at 10,000 feet uneventfully for 1 hour and 50 minutes, when a center controller advised that radar contact was lost, which the pilot acknowledged. The next and last transmission occurred 13 minutes later when the controller received a 'Mayday' radio transmission that the airplane was 'going down.' The last radar target revealed a 6,000 foot per minute rate of descent. Training records revealed the pilot, also the company chief pilot, had flown solo 6.3 hours in the Beech 18 and credited it as dual flight instruction. He then passed a Part 135 evaluation with the FAA Principal Operations Inspector (POI), which lasted 1.6 hours. The next day the POI issued the pilot check airmen authorization for the Beech 18, all models. According to the POI, the airplane was not approved for Part 135 operations; however, the company had a bogus approval for the airplane, signed by the POI, that allowed the company to apply to Canadian Authorities for authorization to operate in Canada. The bogus approval had been used to justify the accident flight.

The flight was on a coupled instrument landing system (ILS) approach with 1/2 mile visibility in snow showers. Three successive fixes on the localizer are defined by distance measuring equipment (DME) paired with the ILS; prior to the ILS DME commissioning 6 months before the accident, the DME fixes were defined by a VORTAC 4.7 nautical miles past the ILS DME. The aircraft was 800 feet high at the first fix and 1,500 feet high at the second, but approximately on altitude 4.7 nautical miles past the first and second fixes, respectively. It passed the outer marker 900 feet high and captured the glide slope from above about 1.8 nautical miles from the threshold, 500 feet above decision height (DH) and 700 feet above touchdown. The aircraft was on glide slope for 28 seconds, during which time its speed decayed to stall speed; it then dropped below glide slope and crashed 1.3 nautical miles short of the threshold. The pilot's FLT DIR DME-1/ DME-2 switch, which control the DME display on the pilot's horizontal situation indicator (HSI), was found set to DME-2; the NAV-2 radio was set to the VORTAC frequency. Up to 800 feet may be required for stall recovery.

The pilot-in-command stated he was cleared for an ILS approach. He had to use spoilers to intercept the glideslope. The landing was extended at the outer marker as the airspeed was slowed through 200 knots. As the airspeed decreased the spoilers were retracted and the flaps were extended to 20-degrees. The airplane was drifting to the right and flaps were lowered to 40-degrees as the drift was corrected. The airplane floated and touched down long. The spoilers, and brakes were applied as well as full reverse. There was no braking due to hydroplaning. Examination of the crash site revealed the airplane went off the end of the runway, skidded through 200 feet of sod, vaulted off a 25 foot embankment, skidded across a road, and collided with a ditch.

The airplane was loaded with mail & freight within 57 lbs of its max takeoff weight limit. No malfunction was noted during start or taxi. The pilot made a near-midfield intersection departure from runway 08L at 0622:35 local time. Seconds earlier, a Boeing 747 had completed its landing roll-out on runway 4R, which crossed runway 8L near its departure end. Winds were from 285° at 2 kts. The pilot and loader (a private pilot) said nothing unusual occurred during takeoff until the aircraft climbed to 100 feet agl, then 'suddenly the airplane yawed to the left as though the left engine had lost power.' Despite use of full right rudder, directional control was lost, and the pilot decreased the pitch attitude because of 'severe yawing and rolling tendencies.' The airplane's left wing tip impacted the right side of the runway, the tricycle gear collapsed, and the airplane slid to a stop and was consumed by fire. Due to fire damage and lack of accurate records, neither the total fuel load, the freight's actual weight, the cargo's preimpact location within the aircraft, nor the adequacy of the cargo tie down system could be validated. Weight and balance documents filed with the FAA were at variance with 'duplicate' documents held by the operator. Exam of the engines did not reveal evidence of a preimpact failure. Propeller ground scars on the runway indicated both engines were operating during impact. The accident occurred during the pilot's last flight as an employee with the company.

The CFR Part 135 cargo flight departed at night on an IFR flight with a load of mining equipment. Route of flight was over remote/mountainous terrain. About 2 hours after takeoff, while cruising at 12,000' feet msl, the right engine and propeller began to overspeed. The captain feathered the #2 engine and declared an emergency. He began to divert to an alternate destination, about 120 miles away in an area of lower terrain, but the aircraft would not maintain altitude (single engine service ceiling, as loaded, was about 8,700 feet). The captain increased power to the left engine, but it began to produce banging and coughing noises. The captain elected to perform an emergency landing at a nearby, remote, military airfield (A/F). The A/F was located in mountainous terrain and had a one-way, daylight only approach. The captain lowered the gear and flaps, and began a visual approach while attempting to keep the runway end identifier lights (REIL) in view. The aircraft encountered severe turbulence, and the captain applied full throttle to the left engine in an attempt to climb. The REIL disappeared from view, and the aircraft collided with snow covered terrain about 2 miles west of the A/F. Ground personnel at the A/F reported high winds and blowing snow with limited visibility. Postcrash exam of the right engine revealed a loss of the propeller control system hydraulic oil. Flight at 12,000 feet was conducted without crew oxygen. The crew had exceeded their maximum allowable duty day without adequate crew rest.

The pilot had made a refueling stop at Vandalia, Illinois. She did not observe the refueling process, but the FBO also operated a King Air and she felt he knew the proper procedure to follow. The airplane was reportedly serviced with 235 gallons of Jet-A fuel (total capacity is 384 gallons). The pilot flew between 7,500 and 10,500 feet. When the airplane was 45 minutes from its destination, the fuel transfer pump lights illuminated, indicating the wing tanks were empty. The nacelle tank gauges registered 3/4 full and the pilot determined she had sufficient fuel to complete the flight. When the airplane was three minutes from its destination, both engines flamed out and the pilot made a wheels up forced landing. When the salvage company recovered the airplane, they reported finding no evidence of fuel aboard. The pilot was provided and used performance charts for the Beech 65-A90 instead of the Beech B90.

After landing at the airport, the airplane was taxied to a fixed base operator to pick up a passenger. Rime ice, as thick as two inches was seen on the airplane, and the pilots of the airplane attempted to manually remove the ice. The airplane was topped off with fuel before departure. During departure from runway 31R, the airplane collided with a fence. Numerous areas of ice were found on the airplane following the accident. Both propellers had similar damage. The pilots had reported to the FAA that the left engine had sustained a loss of power. The passenger reported that he did not notice any loss of power from either engine. No preimpact part failure or malfunction of the left engine was found.