United States of America

The airplane impacted a ridgeline about 1.5 miles from the runway and approximately 7 to 14 seconds after the pilot reported a dual engine flameout. The airplane's altitude was about 400 feet agl when the pilot reported the flameout. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preexisting anomalies. Icing conditions were forecast and PIREPS indicated that light to moderate rime/mixed icing conditions existed along the route of flight. The Continuous Ignition switches were found in the OFF position. The Approach procedures listed in the Airplane's Flight Manual stated, 'CONTINUOUS IGNITION SHALL BE SELECTED TO ON DURING APPROACH AND LANDING WHILE IN OR SHORTLY FOLLOWING FLIGHT IN ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL ICING CONDITIONS.' The aircraft manufacturer had issued a Service Bulletin in 1995 for the installation of an auto-ignition system to '... reduce the possibility of engine flame-out when icing conditions are encountered and the continuous ignition is not selected.' The operator had not installed the non-mandatory service bulletin. On May 5, 2000, the FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive that required the installation of an auto-ignition system. The toxicology test detected extremely high levels of dihydrocodeine in the pilot's blood. The pilot received a special issuance second-class medical certificate on August 22, 1995, after receiving treatment for a self disclosed history of drug abuse. The drug testing that this pilot underwent as a consequence of his previous self disclosed history of drug abuse would not have detected these substances.

The airline transport certificated pilot was landing a twin-engine turboprop airplane at a remote airport on a scheduled air taxi flight. Rising hilly terrain is located east of the airport. The pilot said that during the approach for landing, he noticed the airport wind sock indicating a wind from the east about 25 knots. When the pilot descended to 500 feet, about mid-base, the airplane encountered moderate turbulence and an increased rate of descent. He added engine power to arrest the descent. As he turned toward the runway, the airplane encountered 3 to 4 rolling oscillations with a bank angle up to 90 degrees while descending toward the runway. According to a company mechanic who traveled to the scene, it appeared that the airplane struck the runway about 1,200 feet from the approach end with the left wing and left elevator, while yawed about 45 degrees to the left of the runway centerline. The airplane then slid off the left side of the runway. After the collision, the pilot evacuated the passengers, and noticed the airport wind sock was indicating a tailwind. The Airport/Facility Directory contains the following in the airport remarks: 'Unattended. Easterly winds may cause severe turbulence in vicinity of runway.'

On January 31, 2000, about 1621 Pacific standard time, Alaska Airlines, Inc., flight 261, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, crashed into the Pacific Ocean about 2.7 miles north of Anacapa Island, California. The 2 pilots, 3 cabin crewmembers, and 83 passengers on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. Flight 261 was operating as a scheduled international passenger flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Lic Gustavo Diaz Ordaz International Airport, Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington, with an intermediate stop planned at San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

Freezing rain, mist, and ice pellets were forecast for the destination airport with temperatures 34 to 32 degrees F. During the daylight IMC descent and vectors for the approach, the airplane began to accumulate moderate clear ice, and a master warning light illumination in the cockpit indicated that the horizontal stabilizer heat had failed. The airplane was configured at 120 knots and 10 degrees flaps in accordance with the flight manual abnormal procedures checklist; however, the crew did not activate the horizontal stabilizer deice backup system. The aircraft touched down 1,500 ft down the runway, which was contaminated with slush, and did not have any braking action or antiskid for 3,000 ft on the 7,753-ft runway. Therefore, 3,253 ft of runway remained for stopping the aircraft, which was 192 feet short of the 3,445 ft required for a dry runway landing. Upon observing a down hill embankment and support poles beyond the runway, the captain forced the airplane to depart the right side of the runway to avoid the poles. After the airplane started down the embankment, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to a stop.

The pilot reported that light snow was falling, with approximately 2 inches already on the ground, and the runway had been plowed approximately one hour prior to his departure. About 20 minutes had elapsed since the airplane had been towed from the '68 degree F' hangar. During the takeoff, the airplane accelerated 'normally' and became airborne after traveling about 2,160 feet down the 3,240-foot runway. After liftoff, the airplane did not climb above 25 or 30 feet agl. The airplane impacted an embankment at the end of the runway, continued across railroad tracks, and through a fence coming to rest in a brick storage yard about 800-1,000 feet from the departure end of the runway. The pilot stated that someone told him that the airport did not have any deicing equipment, therefore, he did not deice the airplane. The weather facility, located 5 miles from the accident site, reported the wind from 100 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 1/2 mile with snow and freezing fog, temperature 27 degrees F.

Witnesses reported that during the airplane's takeoff roll they heard a heard a series of repeated sounds, which they described as similar to a "backfire" or "compressor stall." Several witnesses reported seeing the airplane's right propeller "stopped." One witness reported that as the airplane lifted off the ground, he heard "a loud cracking sound followed by an immediate prop wind down into feather." He continued to watch the airplane, as the gear was retracted and the airplane entered a climb and right turn. Subsequently, the airplane pitched up, entered a "Vmc roll-over," followed by a 360-degree turn, and then impacted the ground. Radar data indicated the airplane took off and climbed on runway heading to a maximum altitude of about 200 feet agl. The airplane than entered a right turn and began to lose altitude. A radar study revealed that the airplane's calibrated airspeed was 97 knots when the last radar return was recorded. According to the flight manual, minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc) was 93 knots. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted the ground in a near vertical attitude. A post-crash fire erupted, which destroyed all cockpit instruments and switches. Examination of the propellers revealed that neither of the
propellers were in the feathered position at the time of impact. Examination of the left engine revealed signatures consistent with operation at the time of impact. Examination of the right engine revealed that the second stage impeller shroud exhibited static witness marks indicating that the engine was not operating at the time of impact. However, rotational scoring was also observed through the entire circumference of the impeller shroud. The static witness marks were on top of the rotational marks. Examination of the right engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The left seat pilot had accumulated a total flight time of about 950 hours of which 16.9 hours were in an MU-2 flight simulator and 4.5 hours were in the accident airplane. Although he had started an MU-2 Pilot-Initial training course, he did not complete the course. The right seat pilot had accumulated a total flight time of about 2,000 hours of which 20.0 hours were in an MU-2 flight simulator and 20.6 hours were in the accident airplane. He had successfully completed an MU-2 Pilot-Initial training course one month prior to the accident.

The pilot requested and received clearance to execute the SDF approach, and was instructed to maintain 4,000 feet until established on the approach. Radar data revealed the airplane was never established on the approach, and started to descend before reaching the IAF. The airplane passed the IAF at 2,900 feet, and continued in a descending left hand turn into unprotected airspace. The airplane disappeared from radar at 1,900 feet, as it completed 180 degrees of turn. The turn did not match any of the four instrument approaches to the airport. The airplane struck a guy wire on a lighted communications antenna 3.3 MN southeast of the airport on a heading of 360 degrees. No evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction of the airplane or its systems was found. A flight check by the FAA confirmed no navigation signal was received for the approach, which had been turned off and listed as out of service for over 4 years. In addition, the pilot did not report the lack of a navigation signal to ATC or execute a missed approach. Interviews disclosed the ATC controller failed to verify the approach was in service before issuing the approach clearance.

The pilot reported that the start, taxi and run-up were normal. The engines were producing full power for the takeoff ground roll. The pilot stated that the airplane lifted off and attained an altitude of approximately five feet when it began to bank and roll to the left. The pilot applied corrective action, however, the airplane would not respond. The pilot elected to abort the take off and reduced engine power. The airplane touched down in the soft dirt/grass next to the runway. The main landing gear collapsed and the airplane slid to a stop. The pilot reported that there was no indication of a mechanical failure or malfunction with the engines. An FAA inspector verified flight control continuity with no abnormalities noted.

While operating in IMC, the pilot was vectored to the final approach course for an ILS approach. Weather at the airport was ceiling 200 feet and visibility 3/4 mile in mist. The pilot was cleared for the approach, which he acknowledged. No other transmissions were received from the accident airplane. Radar data showed the airplane intercept the final approach course, then track inbound. The airplane crossed the outer marker 420 feet below the glide slope. The last radar return showed the airplane at 440 feet agl, 3.9 miles from the runway. The airplane impacted the ground at a shallow angle about 1 mile north of the airport on the opposite side of the missed approach procedure. The elevation of the accident site was approximately 40 feet lower than the airport. The pilot had about 350 hours of total flight
experience. No pre-impact failures were identified with the airframe, engines, flight controls, or flight instruments.

The non-instrument rated private pilot departed Montrose, Colorado, southbound in a Cessna 421B. According to radar data, the airplane climbed from 14,300 to 16,600 feet msl at a rate of 1,792 fpm. The data shows that 19 seconds later, the airplane lost 4,000 feet of altitude, or descended at a rate of 12,631 fpm. The airplane then climbed back to 13,300 feet msl at a rate of 1,448 fpm, and then disappeared from radar. The airplane crashed in snow covered mountainous terrain. Snowmobilers, who were in the vicinity of the impact site at the time of the accident, said that snow showers made visibility less than 1/2 sm. A pilot departing Telluride Regional Airport (located 33 nm at 045 degrees from the crash site), on a heading of 300 degrees, at approximately 1015 said that it was clear right over Telluride. He said that as he climbed out, he got into weather at 12,000 feet msl, and didn't break out until 22,000 feet msl. He also said that he experienced no icing or turbulence during his climb out.