United States of America

At liftoff, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in flames. Six crew members were killed while two others were rescued.

During initial climb, the aircraft exploded in midair and crashed into the sea, killing all 11 crew members.

While on a test flight out from Wichita, the aircraft suffered a loss of electrical power while flying in negative G conditions. The aircraft went out of control and crashed near Skiatook, about 15 miles north of Tulsa. A crew member was injured while three other were killed.

Flight 181 originated at Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois, for Miami, Florida. Several stops were scheduled including Indianapolis, Indiana, and Louisville, Kentucky, the latter a point of crew change. Departure, scheduled for 0955, was at 1001, with a crew of Captain Clarence G. Chambers, Pilot Harold D. Bingham, and Stewardess Shirley Michael. To Indianapolis the flight was routine, with Captain Chambers flying, and arrival was on schedule. Departure from Indianapolis was on schedule, at 1105, with 31 passengers and 450 gallons of fuel. The aircraft’s gross weight was 41,126 pounds, 3,774 less than the maximum takeoff allowable of 44,900, and its center of gravity was located within prescribed limits. Captain Chambers instructed Pilot Bingham to do the flying and, accordingly, Bingham, seated on the right, made the takeoff and flew this segment of the flight. The aircraft proceeded along V-53 airway at 5,000 feet altitude on a VFR flight plan in clear weather. At 1133 the flight advised Standiford (Louisville) tower that it was over New Albany, Indiana, eight miles to the north-northwest, and requested clearance to the airport. At 1134 the flight asked landing information of its company radio station and was given the Louisville pressure altitude as 340 feet and the Louisville altimeter setting as 30.10 inches. A minute later the flight advised the tower that it was over the city and received clearance to land on runway 11. Wind conditions were given as southeast five to eight knots, variable both sides. Ceiling and visibility were unlimited. The “Fasten Seat Belt” sign had been put on. Pilot Bingham descended from 5,000 feet to 2,000 feet and then reduced both rate of descent and power. An airspeed of 165 knots was established, the landing gear was lowered, and the flaps were placed in takeoff position. Bingham then started a turn for final approach, and the flaps were placed in approach position. Captain Chambers saw that the aircraft was too high and reduced power still further; Bingham lowered the flaps to full down. The pre-landing checklist had been accomplished. At this point (the altitude was then 1,000 to 1,500 feet higher than the runway) the captain took over control. He nosed down sharply, holding as closely as possible to an airspeed of 100 knots. The landing gear remained down, flaps remained fully down, and throttles were pulled fully back. Neither pilot read the rate-of-climb (descent) indicator during the approach. When approximately over the threshold of the runway and while about 100 feet above it, the captain pulled back on the yoke to flare out. No power was used. The aircraft’s attitude was observed to change from nose-down to nose-up but its rate of descent did not seem to lessen markedly. The aircraft struck the runway on its main landing gear, the left wing separated inboard of the left engine nacelle, and the remainder of the aircraft half rolled to an inverted position. It slid along in that attitude, turning and coming to rest headed nearly opposite its direction at touchdown. Two minutes later, by estimate, all occupants were out of their inverted seats, in which they were belted, and away from the wreckage which had developed a small fire. This was confined by a passenger using a hand extinguisher until emergency apparatus, which had been alerted by the tower, arrived quickly and took the necessary steps to prevent further fire.

Alaska Airlines, Inc., is an air carrier certificated to conduct scheduled operations within the Territory of Alaska and between Alaska and the continental United States. Flight 100 of March 2 originated at Fairbanks, Alaska, as a regularly scheduled nonstop flight to Seattle, Washington. The aircraft, N 90449, had arrived from Seattle at 0717 March 2 as Trip 101/1. Two minor discrepancies reported by the inbound crew were corrected during a turnaround inspection and by 0930 that morning the aircraft was ready for the return flight to Seattle. The crew assigned to Flight 100, Captain Lawrence F. Currie, Copilot Lyle O. Edwards, and Stewardess Elizabeth Goods, arrived at operations and made the normal routine preparations for the flight. The pilots discussed the flight with the station agent and all necessary flight papers were completed. Weather for the route was given to the pilots. The weight and balance were determined and both were well within allowable limits. The aircraft was serviced with 2,380 gallons of fuel. The following IFR flight plan was filed with Fairbanks ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control): Alaska 100, a DC-4, departing 10,000 feet Amber 2 Snag, 12,000 Blue 79 Haines, 10,000 Blue 79 Annette, 9,500 direct Port Hardy, 10,000 Amber 1 Seattle; airspeed 185; estimating 7 hours, 44 minutes en route; proposing 0955. At 0940 the two passengers and crew boarded the aircraft. Takeoff was made in VFR weather conditions at 0958. Shortly thereafter Fairbanks center called N 90449 and relayed the ATC clearance, approving the flight plan as filed. The weather conditions at Fairbanks and en route were forecast to be generally good and the flight proceeded in the clear as planned, making routine position reports as it progressed. At 1240, when over Haines, Alaska, at 12,000 feet, Flight 100 canceled its instrument flight plan and informed ARTC that they would proceed VFR to Annette and would file DVFR 2 (Defense Visual Flight Rule) after Annette and before entering the CADIZ (Canadian Air Defense Identification Zone). Thereafter the flight proceeded, reporting its position as DVFR at 1,000 feet. The flight was observed at Patricia Bay, British Columbia, at an estimated 3,000 feet m. s. l. by a tower operator. It was also observed leaving the CADIZ. At 1717 the Alaska Airlines Seattle dispatch office received the following position report by radio from Flight 100: "Dungeness at 16 VFR estimating Seattle at 34." This was the last contact with the flight, which crashed shortly thereafter. All five occupants were killed. N 90449 crashed in heavily timbered mountainous terrain March 2 and was not located until March 3, 1957. The crash occurred approximately in the center of the "on course" zone of the northwest leg of the Seattle low frequency radio range, about 11 nautical miles southeast of the Dungeness fan marker. This leg of the Seattle range defines the center of Amber Airway 1 between the Dungeness intersection and the range station. The minimum instrument en route altitude for this segment is 5,000 feet. Because of adverse weather and inaccessibility of the location, CAB investigators were unable to reach the scene until March 6. The investigators noted that the wreckage had been disturbed prior to their arrival; some components were missing, presumably carried away by persons unknown. The path of the aircraft during the final seconds of flight was clearly defined in the heavy timber growing on the steep slope against the aircraft smashed. The aircraft’s first contact with the trees was at a point 650 feet from the wreckage. From this point it cut a level swath on a heading of 106 degrees magnetic, the width of its wing span, into the steeply rising wooded slope at an elevation of approximately 1,500 feet m. s. l. The terrain immediately ahead of the aircraft‘s path rose to an altitude of 2,000. 2,100 feet MSL.

Northeast Airlines Flight 8232 a DC-6A, N34954, was scheduled to originate at La Guardia Field, a nonstop to Miami, Florida, with a departure time of 1445. This aircraft and the same crew operating as Flight 822, had arrived at LaGuardia from Miami at 1250. The crew consisted of Captain Alva V. R. Marsh, First Officer Basil S. Dixwell, Flight Engineer Angelo V. Andon, and Stewardesses Doris Steele, Catherine Virchow, and Emily Gately. A short time before the scheduled departure time the crew and passengers boarded the aircraft. Snow, which had started at LaGuardia at 1202, began to accumulate on the aircraft's horizontal surfaces after its arrival at the LaGuardia ramp position. Snow removal by ground personnel, during preflight, was ineffective because of the continuing snowfall. Accordingly, about 1600 the aircraft was taxied, with all occupants aboard, to a nose hangar on the west side of the airport for snow removal. This was accomplished and at 1745 the crew advised LaGuardia ground control that they were ready to taxi from the nose hangar for the IFR, departure to Miami. Flight 823 was then cleared to runway 4 and was advised that the wind was northeast 10, the altimeter setting 30.12, and a time check of 1747-1/2. Air Route Traffic Control cleared the flight as follows. "Cleared to Bellemead, maintain 7,000 feet." A supplementary climb-out clearance was then given: "After takeoff, a left turn direct Paterson, direct Chatham, cross 081-degree radial of Caldwell 4,000 feet or above, cross Paterson between 5,000 and 6,000 feet and cross the northwest course of Idlewild not above 6,000 feet." Both clearances were repeated and acknowledged. Takeoff clearance was issued at 1800 and a tower controller saw the aircraft airborne at approximately 1801.2 The controller advised the flight to contact LaGuardia radar departure control on 120.4 mcs. This message was acknowledged but the radar controller did not receive a call from the flight; however, he did observe a target on the scope that indicated an aircraft over the runway. The next two sweeps on the scope disclosed the target beyond the end of the runway. A subsequent sweep indicated that the target was turning left. The target then disappeared from the scope. The LaGuardia tower controllers observed a large flash at approximately 1802 in the vicinity of Rikers Island, the approximate center of which is about one mile north of the point where the aircraft left the runway. It was learned at 1819, by telephone, that Northeast Airlines Flight 823 had crashed on Rikers Island. The airplane was destroyed by a post crash fire and 20 passengers were killed.

On January 31, at 1015, N8210H took off tram runway 03 of the Santa Monica, California, Airport. The aircraft was a new DC-7B being flown for the first time for the purpose of functionally checking the aircraft and its components in flight following production. The flight crew were Douglas Aircraft employees consisting of Pilot William G. Carr; Copilot Archie R. Twitchell; Flight Engineer Waldo B. Adams; and Radio Operator Roy Nakazawa. The aircraft had been subject to many regular inspections during its manufacture and numerous inspections which were required after production preceding the first flight. Accordingly, it was presumed the DC-7B was in airworthy condition. Preparations for the flight by its crew were routine, Departure was on a local VFR flight plan filed with the operations office of the company. The plan showed six hours of fuel aboard end that the flight duration wee estimated as 2 hours 15 minutes. It also showed the gross takeoff night of N8210H was 88,000, pounds, well under the maximum allowable. The load was properly distributed with respect to center of gravity limitations. According to routine procedure the flight switched to the Douglas company radio frequency after takeoff and made periodic progress reports. At 1030 the crew reported over the Catalina intersection, 9,000 feet, routine, and thereafter, at 1106, over Ontario, 25,000 feet, routine. At 1050 that morning, the Northrop operated F-89J, 52-1870, took off from runway 25 of the Palmdale, California, Airport, accompanied by another F-89J, 53-25 6A. The flight of 52-1870 was one of a series of functional flight checks following the completion of IRAN (inspection and repair as necessary), an overhaul project performed under contract by Northrop Aircraft for the United States Air Force. The specific flight was in accordance with provisions of the contract and its purpose was to check the radar fire control systems of both of the all-weather interceptors. The two-member flight crew of 52-1870 consisted of Pilot Roland E. Owen and Radar Operator Curtiss A. Adams, both employees of Northrop. Preparations for the operation were routine and departure was in accordance with a local VFR flight plan filed with the flight department of the company. The plan indicated the estimated duration of the operation as one hour with sufficient fuel aboard for approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes, considering afterburner time, altitude, and power settings for the mission. The F-89's took off individually, using afterburners, with a separation interval, of 20 seconds. In a wide starboard orbit the pilots utilized radar in a “snake climb” to 25,000 feet. At that altitude, a predetermined scissoring flight pattern was utilized which positioned the F-89's, without ground radar control, for simulated all-weather interceptor attacks on each other, during which the operation of airborne radar equipment could be checked. Radio transmissions, on company frequency, were recorded by ground facilities. These were routine commands between the pilots as they executed the radar check pattern and intercepts. At 1118 activity in the Douglas radio roan was interrupted by an emergency transmission from N 8210H. The voices were recognized by radio personnel familiar with the crew members. Pilot Cart first transmitted, “Uncontrollable," Copilot Twitchell then said, “We‘re a midair collision - midair collision, 10 How (aircraft identification using phonetic How for H) we are going in-uncontrollable - uncontrollable - we are . . . we've had it boy - poor jet too - told you we should take chutes - say goodbye to everybody.” Radio Operator Nakazawa’s voice was recognized and he concluded the tragic message with, "We are spinning In the valley.” This final transmission from the flight is presented because it contained important information relative to the accident investigation. It not only establishes the midair collision but also indicates the DC-7 was rendered uncontrollable. It further indicates that Mr. Twitchell at least recognized the aircraft with which they collided as a jet. Further, the DC-7 spun during its descent to the ground. All four crew members on board the DC-7 were killed plus three people on the ground. Seventy others have been injured. Weather conditions in the area at the time of the accident were reported by the Weather Bureau as clear, visibility 50 miles. Winds aloft at 25,000 were approximately 30 knots from 320 degrees.

The crew was performing a local training sortie at Fort Devens AFB consisting of materials dropping on a supply mission. On final, the airplane hit tree tops and crashed in flames 1,5 mile short of runway. The pilot was killed while the second occupant was injured.

Just after liftoff from Elmendorf AFB, while in initial climb, the crew informed ground about an engine failure and elected to return. The captain realized it could not make it so he ditched the aircraft in the icy Cook Inlet. The airplane came to rest and was damaged beyond repair while all 12 occupants were rescued.

The aircraft was on its way from Miramar to Detroit, carrying a crew of seven. They made a stop at Albuquerque to carry the body of a USN pilot who was killed in an accident two days earlier. While descending to Willow Run Airport, the pilot briefed his crew about the minimums and confirmed that if runway was not in sight at 800 feet, they will divert to Grosse Isle NAS. The approach was completed in a low visibility due to snow falls and a ceiling at 550 feet when the airplane hit the ground near a pond, lost an engine and crashed in flames in an open field located about two miles short of runway 05. LCDR William E. Sale was killed while six others were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.