Libya

A final approach carried out in common managed guidance mode should have relieved the crew of their tasks. The limited coordination and cooperation between the two crew members, especially the change into vertical selected guidance mode by the PF, probably led to a lack of a common action plan. The lack of feedback from the 28 April 2010 flight, flown by the same crew on the same aircraft, did not allow them to anticipate the potential risks associated with managing non-precision approaches. The pilots’ performance was likely impaired because of fatigue, but the extent of their impairment and the degree to which it contributed to the performance deficiencies that occurred during the flight cannot be conclusively determined. During the go-around, the crew was surprised not to acquire visual references. On one hand the crew feared exceeding the aircraft’s speed limits in relation to its configuration, and on the other hand they were feeling the effects of somatogravic illusion due to the aircraft acceleration. This probably explains the aircraft handling inputs, mainly nose-down inputs, applied during the go-around. These inputs were not consistent with what is expected in this flight phase. The degraded CRM did not make it possible for either crew member to identify and recover from the situation before the collision with the ground, even when the TAWS warnings were activated close to the ground.
Based on elements from the investigation, the accident resulted from:
- The lack of common action plan during the approach and a final approach continued below the MDA, without ground visual reference acquired.
- The inappropriate application of flight control inputs during a go- around and on the activation of TAWS warnings,
- The lack of monitoring and controlling of the flight path.
These events can be explained by the following factors:
- Limited CRM on approach that degraded during the missed approach. This degradation was probably amplified by numerous radio-communications during the final approach and the crew’s state of fatigue,
- Aircraft control inputs typical in the occurrence of somatogravic perceptual illusions,
- Inappropriate systematic analysis of flight data and feedback mechanism within the AFRIQIYAH Airways.
- Non adherence to the company operation manual, SOP and standard terminology.
In addition, the investigation committee found the following as contributing factors to the accident:
- Weather available to the crew did not reflect the actual weather situation in the final approach segment at Tripoli International Airport.
- In adequacy of training received by the crew.
- Occupancy of tower frequency by both air and ground movements control.

The following findings were identified:
- The crew was properly certificated and qualified for the flight.
- There was no evidence of factors which would have detracted from the crews physical ability to operate the aircraft,
- The aircraft was properly certificated.
- The certificate of airworthiness has no expiry date according to Swiss regulations and considered to be valid and of transport category.
- The certificate of maintenance was valid.
- The insurance policy certificate was valid.
- The aircraft weight and CofG were within prescribed limits.
- The aircraft flew five sectors on that day before the crash flight.
- The emergency doors were not used except the cockpit emergency hatch.
- Fuel samples analyzed and found up to jet a1 specification.
- The aircraft was not in landing configuration, landing gear up and flaps up.
- The passengers were not informed about the aircraft ditching.
- The tail unit and the aircraft nose has destroyed which led the aircraft to sink in few minutes.
- The aircraft was equipped with a GPWS system.
- The aircraft maintenance schedule was not approved by FOCA.
Probable causes:
- Melting of ice formed at engines intake resulted in ware ingestion and both engine flame out.
- The flight crew failed to operate the engine anti-icing system.
- The flight crew were busy with a discussion not relevant to their flight of the aircraft.