Canada

Preliminary investigation revealed that an apprentice AME moved a line in the landing gear well prior to the flight. The work was neither scheduled nor required. The apprentice left the work unfinished when he went to do something else, then forgot that a fastener was not in place. There was no flag or note to inform the other technicians or the crew that the aircraft was not in an airworthy state. The apprentice has two years experience with this company. The management was satisfied with the quality of his work. Two other licensed AMEs were working in the hangar with the apprentice. He was the only apprentice they had to supervise. The apprentice attended a type training course for this aircraft.

Double engine failure on final approach due to a fuel exhaustion.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. When the pilot entered a turn, the combined effects of the increased g-forces, power reduction, the aircraft=s heavy weight, the aft CofG, retraction of the flaps, and the wind conditions resulted in
the aircraft stalling. The aircraft struck the lake surface before the pilot was able to re-establish a level-flight attitude.
2. The aircraft was operating in excess of 385 pounds above the maximum gross takeoff weight, and the CofG was about 2.7 inches aft of the aft limit. This loading configuration aggravated the stall characteristics of the aircraft.
3. The pilot reduced power and raised the flaps before the climb was complete, contrary to the Pilot Operating Handbook, thereby increasing the aircraft's stall speed.
Other Findings:
1. The shoulder harnesses worn by the pilot and the front passenger likely prevented serious head injuries.
2. The centre seat broke from its footings. This may have incapacitated the two passengers inside the aircraft or impeded their escape.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The captain's attempt to continue the landing during the second approach was contrary to company standard operating procedures and Federal Aviation Regulations, in that the approach was unstable and the aircraft was not in a position to land safely.
2. Following the aborted landing, the flight crew proceeded to conduct a circling approach to runway 09, rather than the missed approach procedure as briefed.
3. The pilot lost situational awareness during the overshoot after the third failed attempt to land, likely when he was subjected to somatogravic illusion.
4. Breakdown in crew coordination after the aborted landing, lack of planning and briefing for the subsequent approach, operating in a dark, instrument meteorological conditions environment with limited visual cues, and inadequate monitoring of flight instruments contributed to the loss of situational awareness.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot lost control of the aircraft while conducting a go-around from a balked landing on an ice strip.
2. The aircraft's centre of gravity (C of G) on the accident flight was beyond the aft C of G limit.
3. The actual C of G of the aircraft at basic operating weight was 16.7 inches aft of the C of G provided in the weight and balance report.
4. The load sheet index number used by the crew was inaccurate.
5. The stack of 2x4 lumber was inadequately secured and may have shifted rearward during the go-around.
6. The crew did not recalculate the aircraft's weight and balance for the second flight.
7. Leaks in the heater shroud allowed carbon monoxide gas to contaminate cockpit and cabin air.
8. The captain's carboxyhaemoglobin level was 17.9%, which may have adversely affected his performance, especially his decision making and his visual acuity.
Other Findings:
1. The carbon monoxide detector had no active warning system. The user directions for the detector, which are printed on the back of the detector, are obscured when the detector is installed.
2. The company maintenance facility overhauled the heater as required by the Transport Canada-approved inspection program.
3. Although the manufacturer's maintenance instruction manual for the S200 heater, part number 27C56, lists inspection and overhaul procedures, it does not specify their intervals.
4. No maintenance instructions are available for the heater, part number 27C56. The company maintenance facility did not conduct inspections, overhauls, or pressure decay tests as specified for later manufactured heaters.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot executed a missed approach on his first NDB approach, and, during the second missed approach, after momentarily seeing the runway, he decided to conduct a visual approach, descending below MDA in an attempt to fly under the cloud base.
2. In flying under the cloud base during the visual portion of his approach, the pilot likely perceived the horizon to be lower on the windscreen than it actually was.
3. There was no indication that there was any form of pressure from management to influence the pilot to land at the destination airport. However, the pilot may have chosen to land in Stony Rapids because he had an early flight the following day, and he did not have the keys for the accommodations in Fond-du-Lac.
Findings as to Risk:
1. No scale was available to the pilot in Edmonton for weighing aircraft loads.
2. The maximum allowable take-off weight of the aircraft was exceeded by about 115 pounds, and it is estimated that at the time of the crash, the aircraft was 225 pounds below maximum landing weight. The aircraft's centre of gravity was not within limits at the time of the crash.
3. The rear baggage area contained 300 pounds of baggage, 100 pounds more than the manufacturer's limitation.
4. Two screws were missing from each section of the broken seat track to which the anchor points were attached.
5. Cargo net anchorage system failure contributed to passenger injuries.
6. The stitching failed on the seat belt's outboard strap that was mounted on the right, middle, forward-facing cabin seat.
Other Findings:
1. Hand tools were required to access the ELT panel, since the cockpit remote switch could not be accessed.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. Weather conditions at the time and location of the occurrence were not suitable for visual flight.
2. While the pilot was attempting to regain visual flight, he allowed the aircraft to descend and it struck the ice surface. The weather and surface conditions were such that it would have been virtually impossible to visually detect the ice surface.
Other Finding:
1. In the absence of en route weather reporting facilities, the pilot could only estimate weather conditions based on the area forecast and informal reports received from lay personnel.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The aircraft probably stalled with insufficient altitude for the pilot to execute a recovery.
2. The prevailing conditions were conducive to optical illusions associated with low-altitude flight over rising terrain.
3. The aircraft was not equipped with a stall warning system, nor was it required by regulation.
4. The pilot's decision to fly at low altitude and probably use cutback power for the climb did not allow for safe obstacle clearance.
5. The pre-flight safety briefing did not inform passengers where to find the survival equipment on board the aircraft. Consequently, they could not use the sleeping bags to protect themselves from exposure and thereby delay hypothermia.
6. Rescue was late because the mostly white aircraft blended into the snowy ground, making it difficult to locate, and the ELT antenna was broken, reducing the range of the signal. Consequently, the survivors' exposure time was increased.
Other Findings:
1. The pilot was certified and qualified for the flight.
2. The autopsy and toxicological test results revealed no indication that physiological factors affected the pilot's performance.
3. Records indicate that the aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures.
4. The aircraft's weight and centre of gravity were within the limits specified in the aircraft fight manual.
5. There is no indication that there was an emergency situation or that the aircraft experienced problems prior to impact.
6. The ready-to-use weight and balance calculation form is not consistent with the standard. Transport Canada reported this irregularity in 1992, but no change was made in the form, which is still part of the company operations manual approved by Transport Canada on 23 October 1999.
7. The weather conditions were suitable for visual flight.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot took off with frost adhering to the aircraft's lifting surfaces, which increased drag and reduced the ability of the wings to produce lift.
2. At take-off, the aircraft was about 510 pounds in excess of its maximum take-off weight, adversely affecting aircraft performance.
3. The aircraft experienced an aerodynamic stall and loss of control when the flaps were retracted from 10 degrees to zero. Retracting the flaps reduced the amount of lift being produced by the wing, already performing poorly because of contamination.
Other Findings:
1. Appropriate entries were not recorded in the aircraft=s journey and maintenance logs, and the weight and balance documentation was not amended.
2. The floats absorbed much of the impact energy and likely enhanced survivability of the accident.