Australia

Just after liftoff, both engines failed simultaneously. The aircraft stalled and hit the runway surface. On impact, the left main gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest. There were no casualties but the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair and later transferred to the South Australian Aviation Museum in Port Adelaide.

The flight was intended to return patients to their home area following medical treatment in Melbourne. After an apparently normal take-off, the aircraft ceased climbing at about 100 feet above ground level. In response to a query from the Tower, the pilot advised that the left engine had failed, that he was feathering the propeller and would return for landing. The aircraft was seen to be deviating to the left, towards a large array of power lines. These lines extend from about 40 feet to 90 feet above the ground, and as the aircraft converged with the array it was probably below the height of the upper wires. The aircraft then suddenly veered to the left and subsequently struck the ground in a steep nose-down attitude. A fire broke out on impact and destroyed much of the wreckage. The final manoeuvre performed by the aircraft was typical of that which occurs when one engine of a twin-engine aircraft is producing considerably less power than the other, and airspeed is reduced to below that required to maintain directional control. The pilot had reported that the left engine had failed, and the loss of control as described by witnesses was consistent with a reduction of power from this engine, combined with low airspeed.

The pilot hired the aircraft privately from his employer to conduct a holiday flight during his leave. The journey commenced at Moorabbin on 25 August and the aircraft arrived at Cairns about midday 30 August, after stopovers at Coolangatta and Proserpine. The pilot and his passengers then spent the next three days at leisure in the Cairns area. On the day of the accident, the pilot attended the Cairns Briefing Office where he collected the relevant weather forecasts and submitted a flight plan. The flight plan indicated that the flight would be conducted in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules. It contained a deficiency in that no details were given for the first route segment from Cairns to Biboohra. It is apparent that the pilot had not noticed that the tracks to the west of Cairns, on the relevant enroute chart, emanate from Biboohra and not Cairns. There was no track line which joined Cairns and Biboohra. Such a line might have alerted the pilot at the time he planned the flight. The error in the flight plan was not detected when the plan was submitted. When the pilot was issued with an airways clearance prior to DEPARTURE it was apparent that he did not understand the terms of the clearance, which gave the initial tracking point as Biboohra. The location of this point was explained to the pilot and he subsequently accepted the clearance. He elected to depart using visual procedures, after being offered a choice of these or the published Standard Instrument DEPARTURE profile. A visual DEPARTURE from the particular runway in use allows an aircraft proceeding towards Biboorha to intercept the required track sooner than is possible with an instrument DEPARTURE. The aircraft was issued with takeoff instructions which included clearance for the pilot to make a right turn after takeoff. Witnesses observed that the aircraft complied with this clearance and headed in a southwesterly direction before turning to the north-west and subsequently entering cloud. The cloud base was estimated to be between 2000 and 2500 feet above mean sea level. No further communications were received from the aircraft and a search was commenced that afternoon. The search effort was hampered by the weather and the wreckage was not located until the following afternoon.

At the time of the attempted take-off, the night was dark, with overcast cloud conditions and light rain falling. Wind conditions were light and variable. The pilot reported that initial acceleration was normal, and the aircraft became airborne at about 95 knots. A positive rate of climb was established and the landing gear was selected up. The pilot subsequently advised that the speed then decayed to 90 knots. At this time there was nothing unusual in the engine noise and the controls felt normal. Shortly afterwards the propellers struck the ground 116 metres beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft then struck an embankment and passed through a fence before coming to rest 247 metres from the initial ground strike. All four occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Camden Airport. On final approach, the pilot-in-command initiated a go-around when the aircraft stalled and crashed. There were no casualties while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

When the aircraft arrived in the destination area, another aircraft was also in the circuit. The pilots were in communication with each other, and arranged that VH-CUO would land after the other aircraft. However, the pilot of VH-CUO apparently misjudged the relative speeds of the two aircraft. He initiated a go-around from a position on final approach to runway 15, when there was evidently insufficient separation with the preceding aircraft to allow a normal landing. The aircraft remained at a low height above the ground, and the pilot broadcast a message that he intended to land in the opposite direction, on runway 33. The wind at the time was from the south-east at about 10 knots. Witnesses observed the aircraft as it tracked along the western side of the runway. The turn onto base leg was made at an angle of bank of about 60 degrees, and about three-quarters of the way around the turn, the nose of the aircraft dropped rapidly. The aircraft then dived steeply to the ground, and was destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire.

The flight was planned to check the onboard survey equipment. After departing Jandakot the aircraft operated to the south of the airfield for about 80 minutes before the pilot advised that he would be extending his operation to the east over the Darling Ranges. The aircraft was then sighted, by several witnesses, over the foothills heading in an easterly direction. These witnesses reported that the engines were not operating normally. A short time later, the aircraft was observed to pass over the dam wall at an altitude of about 25 feet and head down a valley in a northerly direction before disappearing from sight. An inspection of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft had collided with two 30 metre high trees, in a nose high attitude at a low forward airspeed, before falling to the ground below the trees. At impact neither engine was delivering power. The fuel system, which was found to be relatively intact, contained only nine litres of fuel.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in an open field located about 80 km south of Adelaide and burnt. Both occupants were killed.

IAI 1124 Westwind aircraft, registered VH-IWJ, was operating under a current Certificate of Registration, the holder of which was Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd (Pe1-Air). The aircraft was operated by Pel-Air and, at the time of the accident, it was engaged on a regularly scheduled cargo service. This service was operated under the terms of a current Charter and Aerial Work Licence, and was flown on behalf of Ansett Air Freight, a subsidiary of Ansett Transport Industries Pty Ltd. The particular flight, designated Flight 474, was operated on 4 nights each week from Sydney to Brisbane and Cairns, Queensland. The aircraft had departed Cairns earlier in the evening and had flown via Brisbane to Sydney, arriving at 2336 hours. The arriving crew reported that the aircraft was performing normally. A total of 1,350 litres of fuel was added to the aircraft tanks and loading of general cargo was carried out by Ansett Air Freight personnel. The flight plan submitted to Air Traffic Control (ATC) indicated that the flight would follow the normal Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) procedures. The estimated time interval to Brisbane was 70 minutes at planned Flight Level 370 (approximate altitude of 37,000 feet). The aircraft carried sufficient fuel for 164 minutes of flight, and refuelling was planned to take place at Brisbane prior to departure for Cairns. Pel-Air intended to use the flight to assess the performance of the rostered co-pilot, who was being considered for upgrading to command status. He was to occupy the left hand control seat, while the right hand seat occupant was the Chief Pilot of the company. At 0033 hours the crew established radio contact on the Sydney ATC Clearance Delivery frequency, and were given a "16 West Maitland One" Standard Instrument Departure (SID). The flight pattern associated with this clearance requires the aircraft to maintain heading after take-off on Runway 16 until reaching a height of 500 feet, when a left turn is made to intercept the 126 radial of the Sydney VOR (Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range). At a position of 6 nautical miles by Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) from the aerodrome, a left turn onto 357 degrees is made in order to continue tracking with reference to the West Haiti and VOR. A copy of the applicable SID chart is shown at Appendix A. Shortly before 0049 hours the crew contacted Sydney Control Tower, and the aircraft was directed to taxi for a departure from Runway 16. At the time the wind was light and variable. After receiving the appropriate clearance, an evidently normal take-off was made, and at 0056 hours contact was established with Sydney Departures Control. The pilot in command advised that the aircraft was on climb to Flight Level 370 , and requested the direct track to Brisbane. This was a standard request, to allow the aircraft to proceed directly to the destination rather than follow the various radio navigation aids along the route. Such a request was normally granted by ATC if the general traffic situation permitted use of the direct track, and provided the aircraft was equipped with a suitable navigation system. VH-IWJ was fitted with a VLF/Omega navigation system which was capable of direct tracking. After ascertaining this, the Departures controller advised the aircraft that the direct track to Brisbane would probably be available. The acknowledgment of this comment was the last recorded transmission from the aircraft. Shortly before 0059 hours the Departures controller broadcast the clearance for the aircraft to track direct to Brisbane at the planned cruising level. No response was received from the aircraft, although the controller noted that radar returns were still visible on his screen. Shortly afterwards, these returns faded, and the Distress Phase of Search and Rescue procedures was Instituted at 0100 hours. At about this time, a number of persons observed what appeared to be the lights of an aircraft descending rapidly towards the sea. The lights maintained their position relative to each other, indicating that the aircraft was not rotating as it descended. The aircraft had faded from the radar screen at a point about 11 kilometres south-east of Sydney Airport. A search of the area was commenced using helicopters and boats. Wreckage Identified as being from the aircraft was sighted by a helicopter at 0245 hours. Recovery of pieces of the aircraft structure, freight and human remains was effected by Police and Department of Aviation launches. The degree of destruction indicated that the aircraft had struck the water while travelling at high speed. The bulk of the wreckage was presumed to be lying in about 85 metres of water about 5 kilometres out to sea from Botany Bay. An Intensive search was carried out by vessels from the Royal Australian Navy, later assisted by a vessel from the NSW Department of Fisheries and Agriculture. Use was made of various underwater detection devices. Search efforts were hampered by persistent unfavourable sea conditions and no trace was found of the wreckage. Operations were finally suspended towards the end of November 1985. An Internationally recognised underwater location and salvage expert was then employed, and the wreckage was ultimately located and identified in 92 metres of water on 20 January 1986. Recovery of the Flight Data and Cockpit Voice Recorders, the major portions of both engines, and sundry other pieces of the aircraft structure, was effected the following month.

This aircraft had only recently been acquired by the company. It had a fuel system different to other aircraft of the same type in the fleet. On the other aircraft there were three detents for each fuel selector, On, Off, Crossfeed. On this aircraft there were four detents, Off, Outboard, Inboard, Crossfeed. The pilot had not previously flown this aircraft. After a flight time of about 110 minutes the pilot reported that both engines had stopped and he was unable to access fuel from the outboard tanks. When the wreckage was located no evidence of fuel was found in the inboard tanks. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.