Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver in Nandawar: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 31, 1988 at 0824 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VH-AAK
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Nandawar - Nandawar
MSN:
137
YOM:
1951
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot had been conducting superphosphate spreading operations in the area two days prior to the accident and had completed approximately 60 trips during that operation. On the morning of the accident, he had just completed the sixth load when the outboard section of the right wing struck powerlines. The right wing was torn from its attachment points and separated from the aircraft. The aircraft then impacted the ground in a steep nose down attitude and came to rest 169 metres from the powerlines.
Probable cause:
A detailed examination of the aircraft and its systems failed to reveal any defect which could have contributed to the accident. The engine was operating at high power at the time of the impact. It is probable that the pilot forgot about the presence of the powerlines. It was noted that the pilot was not wearing a shoulder harness and that an unapproved modification had been made to the lap harness. The toggle fitted to the lap harness was a type approved for 9 to 12g applications only and therefore was not suitable for agricultural operations, which require equipment capable of withstanding 25g loads.
The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:
1. The pilot did not see or avoid the powerline.
Final Report:

Crash of a Partenavia P.68B Victor in Kolane

Date & Time: Oct 14, 1988 at 1845 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-PFQ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kolane - Taroom - Kolane
MSN:
95
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The Taroom aerodrome had recently been equipped with a pilot activated lighting (PAL) system which was due to be commissioned on the evening of 15 October 1988. The pilot, who is a local Council member had flown from his property "Kolane" to Taroom late in the afternoon, to check that the PAL system was functional. He had intended to fly to Taroom the following evening to activate the lights for the official opening celebration, which was planned to be held at the aerodrome. After checking that the system was working the pilot decided to take the opportunity to practice some night circuits and landings before returning to his property. Before departing Taroom he arranged to have two vehicles positioned at his property landing area to illuminate the strip which is 850 metres long, aligned 235/055 degrees magnetic, and 1000 feet above sea level. He apparently intended to check the suitability of the strip for a night landing on his return. The aircraft was observed to fly over the strip in a north-easterly direction and then make a left turn. The aircraft was then seen to descend and the sound of impact was heard by the occupant of a vehicle near the strip. The aircraft had impacted the ground whilst in a descending left turn at a ground speed of approximately 125 knots. Initial impact was in a clearing near trees. The aircraft slid 91 metres before the left wing struck a large tree and was torn off. The aircraft slid another 45 metres before coming to rest and catching fire. The pilot was thrown from the aircraft while still strapped to his seat and was able to move himself away from the immediate vicinity of the fire before help arrived.
Probable cause:
The pilot has no recollection of events immediately prior to the accident. There is no indication that the aircraft was not functioning normally at the time of the accident. The weather was fine, there was a light northerly breeze, and there was no moonlight. Indications are that the pilot may have become disorientated whilst attempting to carry out a visual circuit when there was no visual horizon. The landing area did not meet the requirements for night operations published in the Visual Flight Guide.
The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:
The pilot was attempting to carry out a night visual circuit when there was no visual horizon.
Final Report:

Crash of a Fletcher FU-24-950 near Werris Creek: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jul 19, 1988 at 1045 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-HPP
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Werris Creek - Werris Creek
MSN:
162
YOM:
1970
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot was conducting superphosphate spreading operations in fine and clear weather conditions. The paddock being treated sloped uphill, and there were heavily timbered peaks beyond the paddock. The pilot had spread the paddock the previous day under similar conditions. On this occasion the aircraft was apparently performing normally as the first swath run was completed, but the aircraft did not appear to gain any appreciable height as it approached the hills. It was then seen to adopt a steep nose-up attitude and commence a wingover type manoeuvre. During this manoeuvre the aircraft struck trees and then impacted the ground. A fierce fire broke out and engulfed the wreckage. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
Although the investigation was hampered by the extensive fire damage, no defect or malfunction was discovered which might have contributed to the accident. The reason the pilot, who had extensive agricultural experience, chose to conduct swath runs towards steeply rising ground was not determined. The wind direction had changed since the previous day, and the aircraft was likely to have been affected by downdrafts on the lee side of the hills. When the pilot realised the aircraft was not performing as expected, he evidently attempted to dump the remaining load and reverse the direction. However, there was insufficient aircraft performance available to successfully complete this manoeuvre.
Significant Factors:
The following factors were considered to be relevant to the development of the accident:
1. The pilot elected to conduct spreading runs towards steeply rising ground, when safer alternatives were available.
2. It was likely that downdraft conditions existed on the lee side of the hills.
3. The pilot evidently misjudged the climb performance of the aircraft.
4. The pilot delayed attempting a reversal of direction beyond the point where such a manoeuvre could be safely accomplished.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Grand Commander 680E in King Island

Date & Time: Jul 14, 1988 at 2017 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-CAY
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Melbourne – King Island
MSN:
680-0855-76
YOM:
1959
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The King Island aerodrome weather was forecast to include temporary periods of moderate to heavy rain showers, six eighths of cloud cover base 800 feet and visibility reduced to 3000 metres. The forecast surface wind was 340 degrees at 20-30 knots. The pilot's qualifications required a minimum visibility of 5000 metres for operation at night in Visual Meteorological Conditions, (NGT VMC). It was planned that another pilot, qualified for Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations, would act as pilot in command, but he became unavailable. The flight plan submitted by the pilot indicated he would be operating under the IFR category and when queried on taxiing he confirmed that this was so. Shortly after DEPARTURE, the pilot requested a weather report from an IFR pilot who had just landed at King Island. This gave a cloud base of 2000 feet, heavy rain showers and visibility of 2000 metres. Flares had been laid to allow the other pilot to use Runway 35 because of the strong northerly wind. The pilot of VH-CAY activated the electric lighting for Runway 28. He reported that the weather was satisfactory enroute and he could see lights ahead on the island. On crossing the coast flight conditions became rough in moderate to severe turbulence. The pilot advised he arrived over the aerodrome at 1500 feet above mean sea level and observed the lighted wind sock was horizontal, with the direction fluctuating rapidly between north and west. He turned to the south and broadcast his intention to land on Runway 28. Neither the pilot nor the passenger had any further recall of the events leading to the accident. VH-CAY was heard passing over the aerodrome and the engine sound was very loud, suggesting to the listener that the aircraft was low. It had been raining continuously for more than an hour, sometimes very heavily, and it was still raining at the time. The aircraft was subsequently seen flying at a very low height some six kilometres south of the aerodrome, tracking approximately north. It was raining very heavily in that area and the wind was very strong. Soon afterwards there was a sound of impact and a flash of light. The aircraft had struck the tops of trees 30 feet high, then descended to the ground. After the aircraft came to rest it was destroyed by a fire. Both occupants were seriously injured.
Probable cause:
Examination of the wreckage was severely hampered by the extreme fire damage sustained, but no evidence was found of any defects that might have contributed to the accident. The aircraft had evidently been under control at the time it collided with the trees. A post analysis of the conditions by the Bureau of Meteorology indicated the possible presence of strong up and down drafts, horizontal wind shear, turbulence, and estimated visibility as 2-3000 metres in rain. The evidence suggested that the pilot may have been lower than he believed as the aircraft overflew the
aerodrome. Having passed overhead, there there would have been few external visual references under the existing conditions to alert him that the aircraft was inadvertently being descended into the ground.
Significant Factors:
The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:
1. The pilot attempted to conduct an operation for which he was not qualified.
2. Severe weather conditions in the destination aerodrome area with strong winds, turbulence, heavy rain and poor visibility.
3. The pilot continued flight into adverse weather conditions.
4. The pilot may have misread his altimeter and been lower than intended.
5. The pilot may have unintentionally descended the aircraft into the ground in conditions of poor visibility.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Shrike Commander 500S in Mount Garnet

Date & Time: May 20, 1988 at 1750 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-SDI
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kidston – Cairns
MSN:
500-3188
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The pilot was temporarily replacing the pilot who normally flew the aircraft. After arriving at Kidston he checked the fuel quantity gauge and decided that there was sufficient fuel on board for the return flight. As the aircraft approached top of climb, the pilot found that the fuel gauge indicated a lower fuel quantity than he had expected. He re-checked the indicated quantity after the aircraft was established in cruise and decided that sufficient fuel still remained to complete the planned flight. Shortly after passing Mt Garnet both engine fuel flow gauges began to fluctuate and the engines began to surge. The pilot immediately turned the aircraft towards the Mt Garnet strip, but shortly afterwards both engines failed. The pilot attempted to glide the aircraft to the strip, but it collided with trees and came to rest about one kilometre from the runway 27 threshold. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Both engines had failed due to fuel exhaustion. The pilot normally flew a different type of aircraft, this aircraft only being used by the company to supplement its services. For company aircraft normal route fuel requirements are specified. As a result, there was little need for him to make significant fuel calculations. On this occasion, the pilot found he had little time between his arrival at Cairns and the scheduled DEPARTURE of his next flight. He ordered that only 80 litres of fuel be added to the aircraft tanks. The calculated fuel burn for the proposed return flight to Kidston was approximately 240 litres. However, on DEPARTURE from Cairns it was estimated that only about 220 litres of fuel was in the aircraft tanks. Refuelling facilities were available at Kidston but no fuel was added to the aircraft tanks.
The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:
1. The aircraft design is such that the fuel quantity can only be determined by the gauge, unless the tanks are full.
2. The preflight preparation, in relation to fuel requirements, carried out by the pilot was inadequate.
3. The pilot lacked recent experience at more complex fuel calculations.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain off Coffs Harbour: 3 killed

Date & Time: Apr 7, 1988 at 2113 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-AOX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Brisbane – Coolangatta – Coffs Harbour – Port Macquarie
MSN:
31-7552013
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The aircraft was operating a scheduled service from Brisbane to Port Macquarie with planned intermediate stops at Coolangatta and Coffs Harbour. Weather conditions over the route were influenced by a widespread unstable airmass. The terminal forecast for Coffs Harbour indicated a surface wind of 360/15, visibility in excess of 10 km, 5 octas stratus at 1000 ft, 5 octas cumulus at 2000 ft. Thunderstorms, associated with visibility reduced to 2000 metres were also forecast for periods of up to 30 minutes. The actual weather conditions at Coffs Harbour were generally consistent with the terminal forecast. Runway 03 was in use throughout the evening. Coffs Harbour airport was equipped with NDB, VOR and domestic DME radio navigation aids. A VOR/DME procedure was published for runway 03 approaches. For aircraft not equipped with DME, a VOR or NDB approach was available using common tracking and minimum altitude criteria. Runway 03 was also equipped with a 6 stage T-VASIS and 3 stage runway lighting. All facilities were reported as functioning normally, with the exception of the VOR which was experiencing intermittent power failures due to the effects of heavy rain. The VOR was able to be reset manually from the Coffs Harbour control tower. Although the tower was scheduled to be unmanned before the arrival of VH-HOX, the duty air traffic controller elected to man the tower until the aircraft had landed. The controller also called out a technician to attend to the VOR. The aircraft was equipped with dual ILS/VOR and ADF receivers, plus International DME. Domestic DME equipment was not fitted to the aircraft, although required by ANO 20.8. After descending in the VOR/NDB holding pattern, the aircraft was cleared for an instrument approach. The pilot had been told of the intermittent operation of the VOR and had said he would revert to the NDB. At that time the weather conditions were fluctuating about the circling minima of 950 feet (QNH) and five km visibility. The controller advised the aircraft of a heavy shower to the south of the field. The aircraft subsequently completed the approach and the pilot reported "visual". The controller said he saw the lights of the aircraft in a position consistent with a right downwind leg for a landing on runway 03. The aircraft was then cleared to land. Shortly after, the controller saw the lights of the aircraft disappear briefly, consistent with the aircraft passing through a localised area of rain/cloud. The lights then reappeared briefly, as though the aircraft was turning onto finals, before disappearing. This was immediately followed by short series of "clicks" on the tower frequency. The aircraft was called immediately but failed to respond to any calls. The accident site was located about 1070 metres short of the landing threshold, and about 750 metres to the right of the extended runway centreline. The aircraft was found to have initially struck a nine metre high tree in a nose low attitude, steeply banked to the right, on a track of 050 degrees. After striking the tree with the outboard section of the right wing, the aircraft struck other trees before hitting the ground and overturning. A fire broke out shortly after the aircraft came to rest. As a result of his remaining on duty, the controller was able to provide immediate notification of the accident to the emergency services. This action facilitated the rescue of survivors.
Probable cause:
A subsequent examination of the aircraft structure, systems and components, found no evidence of any pre-existing defect or malfunction which could have contributed to the accident. The pilot was properly licenced and qualified to conduct the flight. Evidence was provided to show that the pilot had probably flown a total of 930 hours in the previous 365 days, thereby exceeding the ANO 48 limitation of 900 hours. Other breaches of Flight and Duty Limitations were found to have occurred during the previous 12 months, however, during the three months prior to the accident no significant breaches of ANO 48 were found which could have contributed to the accident. Specialist medical advice considered the 30 hour exceedence of the 900 hour limitation was not significant in this accident. Other specialist advice was obtained concerning the possibility of the aircraft being affected by low level windshear or a microburst during the final stage of the night circling approach. It was considered this was not a factor in the accident. Considerable evidence was presented during a subsequent Coroners' Inquest concerning allegations of irregular operating practices by the operator over a period of several years prior to the accident. Much of this evidence was only provided after the granting to witnesses of immunity from prosecution. Despite this, no new evidence was presented which related to the accident flight. The investigation concluded that, on the evidence available, the aircraft was turning onto a short right base leg when it entered a localised area of rain and low cloud. The pilot was required to look out of the right cockpit window to enable him to maintain visual reference with the approach end of the runway. It is considered probable that the pilot briefly diverted his attention from the flight instruments while attempting to maintain that visual reference as the aircraft passed through an area of reduced visibility. During that period the aircraft continued to roll to the right, resulting in an inadvertent loss of height. The pilot was unable to effect a recovery before the aircraft struck trees.
The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:
1. Low cloudbase, with localised rain squalls and reduced visibility.
2. Low level, right hand, night circling approach.
3. Pilot lost visual reference at a critical stage of the approach.
4. Pilot did not initiate missed approach.
5. Pilot probably diverted attention from the flight instruments.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-60 Aerostar (Ted Smith 600) near Cassilis: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 22, 1987 at 1620 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-IGV
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Bankstown – Coolah
MSN:
60-0054-123
YOM:
1971
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The pilot was conducting a freight charter flight, and witness evidence confirmed that on DEPARTURE he was occupying the left-hand seat. The pilot was accompanied by a friend who was also a commercial pilot, but not endorsed on this type of aircraft. Approximately 18 minutes prior to the estimated time of arrival at the destination, the pilot reported leaving the cruising altitude of 6500 feet on descent. Several minutes after the descent report had been made, a witness about 50 kilometres from the destination reported seeing the aircraft pull-up into a very steep climb from an extremely low height with its wings level, and then become inverted. It then entered what was described by the witness as a spin or spiral dive, before impacting the ground in a near vertical descent. The pilot was found in the right-hand seat, and the passenger had been thrown clear of the wreckage. It was established that neither seat belt had been fastened at the time of the impact. Although it could not be determined which pilot was flying the aircraft at the time of the pull-up, medical evidence suggested that the pilot occupying the right-hand seat position was handling the controls at the time of ground impact. The weather at the time of the accident was fine and clear, with 10-15 knot winds.
Probable cause:
A thorough examination of the aircraft wreckage did not reveal any malfunction or mechanical failure which may have caused a sudden and severe loss of control. Investigation showed that at the
moment of impact the aircraft was in a near vertical descent, without any rotation about the vertical axis, and the wings were in a stalled condition. No reason was found which could have explained either the low flying, or the steep pull-up. During the investigation it was established that with this aircraft type, a considerable degree of sustained elevator force would need to be applied by a pilot in order to achieve the type of flight path reported by the witness. It is considered that such a control input would need to be deliberately executed.
Significant Factors:
It was considered that the following factors were relevant to the development of the accident:
1. The pilot, or passenger, performed what was apparently a deliberate steep pull-up from low-level. The reason for the pull-up was not established.
2. Loss of control occurred as a consequence of the aircraft becoming stalled.
3. There was insufficient height for the pilot to effect recovery following the loss of control.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402C in Bundaberg: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jun 21, 1987 at 0318 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-WBQ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bundaberg - Brisbane
MSN:
402C-0627
YOM:
1982
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Circumstances:
The flight had been arranged to transport a critically injured patient to hospital in Brisbane. The pilot evidently experienced some difficulty in starting one of the engines. However, witnesses reported that the engines sounded normal as the aircraft commenced moving from the parking area. At 0310 hours the pilot contacted Brisbane Flight Service Unit and reported that the aircraft was taxying. He advised that he was in a hurry, and indicated that he would provide details of the flight after takeoff. Two minutes later he advised that takeoff was being commenced from Runway 14. No further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The aircraft was seen to become airborne and shortly afterwards enter a fog bank. Other witnesses subsequently reported hearing the sounds of an impact. The flight had been arranged to transport a critically injured patient to hospital in Brisbane. The pilot evidently experienced some difficulty in starting one of the engines. However, witnesses reported that the engines sounded normal as the aircraft commenced moving from the parking area. At 0310 hours the pilot contacted Brisbane Flight Service Unit and reported that the aircraft was taxying. He advised that he was in a hurry, and indicated that he would provide details of the flight after takeoff. Two minutes later he advised that takeoff was being commenced from Runway 14. No further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The aircraft was seen to become airborne and shortly afterwards enter a fog bank. Other witnesses subsequently reported hearing the sounds of an impact. The flight had been arranged to transport a critically injured patient to hospital in Brisbane. The pilot evidently experienced some difficulty in starting one of the engines. However, witnesses reported that the engines sounded normal as the aircraft commenced moving from the parking area. At 0310 hours the pilot contacted Brisbane Flight Service Unit and reported that the aircraft was taxying. He advised that he was in a hurry, and indicated that he would provide details of the flight after takeoff. Two minutes later he advised that takeoff was being commenced from Runway 14. No further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The aircraft was seen to become airborne and shortly afterwards enter a fog bank. Other witnesses subsequently reported hearing the sounds of an impact. The investigation revealed that the aircraft had collided with a tree 800 metres beyond the aerodrome boundary, while tracking about 10 degrees to the right of the extended centreline of the runway. It had then continued on the same heading until striking the ground 177 metres beyond the initial impact point. The wreckage was almost totally consumed by fire.
Probable cause:
The extensive fire damage hampered the investigation of the accident. The surviving passenger believed that the aircraft was on fire before the collision with the tree. No other evidence of an in-flight fire could be obtained, and it was considered possible that the survivor's recall of the accident sequence had been affected by the impact and the fire. Such discrepancies in recall are not uncommon among accident survivors. The elevator trim control jack was found to be in the full nose-down position, but it was not possible to establish whether the trim was in this position prior to impact. Such a pre-impact position could indicate either a runaway electric trim situation or that, in his hurry to depart, the pilot had not correctly set the trim for takeoff. The aircraft was known to have had an intermittent fault in the engine fire warning system. The fault apparently caused the fire warning light to illuminate, and the fire bell to sound, usually just after the aircraft became airborne. The pilot was aware of this fault. It was considered possible that, if the fault occurred on this occasion as the aircraft entered the fog shortly after liftoff, the pilot's attention may have been focussed temporarily on the task of cancelling the warnings. During this time he would not have been monitoring the primary flight attitude indicator, and would have had no external visual references. It was also possible that, if for some reason the pilot was not monitoring his flight instruments as the aircraft entered the fog, he suffered a form of spatial disorientation known as the somatogravic illusion. This illusion has been identified as a major factor in many similar accidents following night takeoffs. As an aircraft accelerates, the combination of the forces of acceleration and gravity induce a sensation that the aircraft is pitching nose-up. The typical reaction of the pilot is to counter this apparent pitch by gently applying forward elevator control, which can result in the aircraft descending into the ground. In this particular case, the pilot would probably have been more susceptible to disorientating effects, because he was suffering from a bronchial or influenzal infection. Although all of the above were possible explanations for the accident, there was insufficient evidence available to form a firm conclusion. The precise cause of the accident remains undetermined.
It is considered that some of the following factors may have been relevant to the development of the accident
1. The pilot was making a hurried DEPARTURE. It is possible that he did not correctly set the elevator trim and/or the engines may not have reached normal operating temperatures before the takeoff was commenced.
2. Shortly after liftoff the aircraft entered a fog bank, which would have deprived the pilot of external visual references.
3. The aircraft had a defective engine fire warning system. Had the system activated it may have distracted the pilot at a critical stage of flight.
4. The aircraft might have suffered an electric elevator trim malfunction, or an internal fire, leading to loss of control of the aircraft.
5. The pilot may have experienced the somatogravic illusion and inadvertently flown the aircraft into the ground. The chances of such an illusion occurring would have been increased because the pilot was evidently suffering from an infection.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402B in Mount Dianne: 5 killed

Date & Time: Feb 2, 1987 at 0639 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-TLQ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cairns – Mount Dianne
MSN:
402B-1236
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The aircraft was the first of a group of four aircraft being used to return staff to an alluvial gold mine after a weekend break. The weather in the area of the destination was not suitable for a visual arrival and the aircraft was initially held for several minutes in an area five kilometres to the south of the strip, awaiting an improvement in the weather. The aircraft was then flown towards the strip and the pilot reported to a following aircraft that there had been a lot of rain and that the strip looked wet. He also advised that he intended to carry out a precautionary circuit and check if it was safe to land. No further transmissions were received from VH-TLQ. The wreckage of the aircraft was subsequently found burning in a river valley, 300 metres west of the threshold of runway 34. Surviving passengers stated that the aircraft struck trees shortly before impact. There were no ground witnesses. The aircraft had impacted the ground in a steep nose down left wing low attitude, at a low forward speed, then cartwheeled up rising ground before coming to rest inverted, 42 metres from the point of impact. The cabin area was destroyed by an ensuing fire.
Probable cause:
An inspection of wreckage did not reveal any mechanical defect or failure that could have contributed to the accident. The reasons for the apparent loss of control of the aircraft could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Walcha: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 22, 1986
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-AAY
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Winterbourne - Winterbourne
MSN:
136
YOM:
1951
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Superphosphate spreading was being carried out, with the aircraft uplifting one tonne loads about every 6 minutes. Fuel endurance with both tanks full was approximately 2 hours. The pilot was conducting his 25th takeoff for the day, about one hour after refuelling. Witnesses observed that the aircraft did not become airborne at the usual point, two-thirds of the way along the 675 metre strip. Lift-off finally occurred at the end of the strip, but almost immediately afterwards the aircraft clipped a fence. It was seen to sink slightly, before climbing at a steeper than normal angle until some 250 metres beyond the fence. At this point the nose dropped suddenly and the aircraft dived into rising ground in a steep nose down attitude. Fire broke out on impact and consumed much of the wreckage. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
Preliminary investigation revealed that the fuel selector was in the "off" position. This had been the first occasion that the pilot had flown this particular aircraft. The fuel selector in this aircraft was different to that in the other Beaver the pilot had operated. In the previous aircraft, rotating the fuel selector through 180 degrees anti-clockwise changed the selection from the rear to the forward fuel tanks. In the accident aircraft, a similar movement of the selector changed the selection from the rear tank to the "off" position. This difference had not been brought to the pilot's attention, and it was possible that he had not thoroughly familiarized himself with the aircraft prior to commencing operations. It was considered likely that the takeoff had been commenced with the fuel selector positioned to the almost empty rear tank. During the takeoff roll, the fuel low quantity bell and associated light had activated, and the pilot had changed the fuel selector by feel, while continuing with the takeoff. With the fuel supply turned off, the engine had failed from fuel starvation, and the aircraft had subsequently stalled at too low a height above the ground to permit recovery before impact.
Final Report: