Stuart-Witham Field

According to the pilot, he checked the fuel gauges before departure and believed he had enough fuel for the flight. As he approached his destination airport, he was instructed by an air traffic controller to enter a 2-mile left base. About 3 miles from the airport, the controller advised him to intercept a 6-mile final. About 1 1/2 miles from the runway, the left engine “quit.” The pilot repositioned the fuel valve to the left inboard fuel tank and was able to restart the engine, but, shortly after, the right engine “quit.” He then attempted to reposition the right fuel valve to the right inboard fuel tank to restart the right engine, but the left engine “quit” again, and the pilot subsequently made a forced landing in a field. An examination of the engine and airplane systems revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The left wing fuel tanks were found empty. The right wing was found separated from the fuselage. No evidence of fuel was noted in the right wing fuel tanks, and no evidence of fuel leakage was found at the accident site. The pilot reported that he saw fuel leaking out of the right wing fuel vent after the accident; it is possible that a small quantity of the airplane’s unusable fuel for the right tank could have leaked out immediately after the accident. Although the pilot believed that the airplane had enough fuel onboard for the flight, his assessment was based on his calculations of the airplane’s fuel burn during several short flights he made after having the airplane topped off with fuel the night before the accident; he did not visually check the fuel level in the tanks before departing on the accident flight. The lack of fuel in the fuel tanks, the lack of evidence of fuel leakage, the loss of engine power in both engines, and the lack of mechanical anomalies are consistent with fuel exhaustion.

The airplane was approaching the destination airport in night visual meteorological conditions. After losing sight of the runway once and going around, they continued the approach, even though the pilot in command (PIC) stated that he thought they were going to land long. The PIC stated that the main landing gear touched down near the 1,000-foot marker of the 4,801-foot-long runway, about the landing reference speed (Vref) of 120 knots. The PIC stated that he then applied the brakes but thought they were not working; he had not yet activated the thrust reversers. He alerted the second in command (SIC), who also depressed the brake pedals with no apparent results. The PIC suggested a go-around, but the SIC responded that it was too late. The airplane subsequently traveled off the end of the runway, struck a gravel berm, and came to rest about 816 feet beyond the end of the runway. During the impact, one of the passenger seats dislodged from its seat track and was found on the cabin floor, with the passenger still in it. Review of cockpit voice recorder, video, and performance data revealed that the main landing gear touched down at Vref and about 1,650 feet beyond the approach end of the runway. The nosegear then touched down 2.4 seconds later and about 2,120 feet beyond the approach end of the runway, with about 2,680 feet of runway remaining. Digital electronic engine control data revealed that about 8 seconds after weight-on-wheels, the power levers were advanced from the idle position to the takeoff position. The power levers were then returned to the idle position 6 seconds later. The power levers were moved to the reverse thrust position 8 seconds after that and remained in that position for the duration of the accident sequence; both thrust reversers deployed when commanded. Examination and testing of the airplane systems did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions with the wheels brakes or any other systems. Although armed, the airbrakes did not deploy upon touchdown; the data available was inconclusive to determine what position the throttles were in at touchdown and why the airbrakes did not deploy. It is likely that the pilots did not detect the wheel braking because its effect was less than expected with the airplane at full power and with the airbrakes stowed. Landing distance data revealed that the airplane required about 2,551 feet to stop at its given weight in the given weather conditions. With a runway distance of 2,680 feet remaining, the airplane could have stopped or gone around uneventfully with appropriate use of all deceleration devices. The landing procedure stated to activate the thrust reversers after nosewheel touchdown and then apply the brakes, as necessary; however, the PIC only applied the brakes. Further, no callouts were made to verify ground spoiler or reverse thrust deployment. The PIC then stated that he was going to go around, but the SIC said it was too late, so the thrust levers were brought back to idle and the reversers were deployed. The PIC's delayed decision to stop or go around resulted in about a 22-second delay in thrust reverser activation, which resulted in the runway overrun. Additionally, the procedure for a (perceived) failed brake system would have been to activate the emergency brake, which neither pilot did. Examination of the seats revealed that a forward-facing seat was installed in the aft-facing position and an aft-facing seat was installed in the forward-facing position. Additionally, the ejected seat's shear plungers were found in the raised position. Had the seat been installed correctly, the plungers would have been in the lowered position, in the seat track. The improper installation most likely resulted in the passenger’s seat separating from the seat track and exacerbating his injuries.

The pilot stated that he initiated a fuel transfer due to a fuel imbalance. To affect the fuel transfer, he said he "began crossfeed right to left." When the airplane was about 5 to 10 miles away from Spruce Creek Airport, the pilot said he began his descent from 12,500, and also executed a left turn to begin setting up to land, when suddenly, both engines ceased operating. When he leveled the wings both engines restarted due to auto-ignition. He said the fuel gages showed 300 to 350 lbs of fuel for the right tank, and 100 to 150 pounds on the left, so he decided to continue his approach to Spruce Creek Airport. As he approached Spruce Creek Airport, he again entered a left bank to prepare for a left base to runway 23, and while established in the left turn, both engines ceased operating a second time. He said he did not think he could reach the runway, and decided to make an landing on a taxiway. When the wings became level after the turn, he said both engines again restarted while in the vicinity of the beginning of the taxiway. As he was about to land, he said a car pulled out onto the taxiway, and stopped on the centerline, so he applied power to avoid the car. He said he climbed straight out, and when he made a climbing left turn, he said the engines ceased operating a third time, and the airplane descended towards a cluster of condos. With no runway or clear area in sight, the pilot said he guided the airplane to a retention pond. Follow-on/detailed examinations of the aircraft, engines, and propellers were conducted by an FAA Inspector, as well as technical representatives from Raytheon Aircraft Company, Pratt & Whitney Canada, and Hartzell Propeller Company, and no pre accident anomalies were noted with the airframe, flight controls, engines/accessories, or propellers. According to the FAA Inspector, and the technical representative from the airplane manufacturer, Raytheon Aircraft Company, the pilot was transferring fuel from the left fuel tank to the right fuel tank, and with the reduced amount of fuel in the left tank, as he performed left turns, the engine ceased operating. The Raytheon Aircraft Company representative stated that the Pilot Operating Handbook specifies the use of crossfeed for those times when the airplane is operating on a single engine.

During takeoff from runway 22, the pilot reported that he had a problem, then there was no further communication from the aircraft. Several witnesses saw an object fall from the aircraft and one witness observed that a 'hood' had opened. The aircraft was maneuvered onto final approach to runway 36. A witness said that as the aircraft was lining up on final approach, it entered a steep bank and descended out of his sight. Subsequently, it collided with trees in a 27° descent, crashed and burned. A bag from the nose baggage compartment was found near the departure end of runway 22. No preimpact part failure or system malfunction of the aircraft was found. Before the flight, a ramp person observed the pilot servicing the left engine with oil, but he did not know if the pilot had secured the baggage door. An examination of the recovered door assembly failed to disclose a malfunction of the rear latch assembly. The forward latch assembly area was destroyed by fire. All three occupants were killed.

Flight entered near vertical descent while flying in area of level 1 and 2 thunderstorms just after pilot had called requesting permission to deviate around rain showers. A level 5 thunderstorm was present 8 miles west. The aircraft descended at rates up to 13,800 feet per minute. Witnesses saw aircraft exit bottom of clouds at approximately 4,000 feet in a near flat attitude and rotating around the yaw axis to the left. Engine sounds increased and decreased as the aircraft rotated and all components appeared to be present on the aircraft. No smoke or flame was visible. At approximately 500 feet above the water the rotation stopped and the nose dropped to a 30 to 70° nose down angle and both engines could be heard increasing in power. Before the recovery could be completed the acft struck the ocean. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The crew was conducting a local training flight at Stuart-Witham Field Airport. Just after liftoff, while taking off with one engine inoperative to simulate a failure, the aircraft stalled and crashed. Both pilots were killed.

Crew was performing a flight from Fort Wayne, Indiana, to the Morrison AFB located near West Palm Beach. While cruising in poor weather conditions in the region of Stuart, the aircraft went out of control and dove into the ground, killing all five occupants.

The airplane departed Wright-Patterson AFB in Dayton on a flight to Stuart-Witham Field, Florida. On approach, it entered a sudden squall near Port Sewall. In heavy rain falls and turbulences, the airplane lost a wing, caught fire and plunged into the Saint Lucie River. All seven occupants were killed.
Crew:
2nd Lt John R. Evans, pilot,
1st Lt Harry E. Bullock Jr., copilot,
Sgt Ercel Stallard, flight engineer,
Cpl Clarence F. Ayers, radio operator.
Passengers:
2nd Lt Raymon D. Clements,
2md Lt Newton H. Simpson,
Sgt John A. Rutko.