Scottsdale

The pilot was conducting a personal flight and was descending the airplane to the destination airport. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that the airplane accomplished several turning maneuvers near the airport. These turns occurred from an elevation of 6,000 to 4,950 ft mean sea level, at which time the data ended. The airplane was 80 ft above ground level at the time. Witnesses reported seeing a low-flying airplane perform a turn and then veer toward the ground. The airplane came to rest about 4 miles east of the destination airport and 70 ft from the last data target. A postcrash fire ensued. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engines found no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the left engine revealed that the engine was likely producing power. The right engine examination revealed damage consistent with low or no rotation at the time of the accident, including distinct, localized contact marks on the rotating propeller shaft. In addition, no metal spray was found in the turbine section, and no dirt was found within the combustor section. The examination of the right propeller blades showed chordwise scoring with the blades bent aft and twisted toward a low-pitch setting. Examination of the fuel system noted no anomalies. The airplane was equipped with a single redline (SRL) autostart computer. Examination of the right (R) SRL-OFF annunciator panel light bulb showed signatures of hot filament stretch, which was consistent with illumination of the light at the time of the accident. The SRL light normally extinguishes above an engine speed of 80% rpm. Given the low rotational signatures on the right engine and the illuminated “R SRL-OFF” warning light, it is likely that the right engine lost engine power during the flight for reasons that could not be determined.

The pilot stated that, upon landing, the airplane touched down on the runway centerline with light and variable wind conditions. The pilot recalled that the touchdown felt normal but that, during the landing roll, the airplane began to veer to the right. The pilot added full left rudder, but the airplane continued to veer off the runway surface and encountered large rocks located between the runway and taxiway. A postaccident operational check of the nosewheel steering system revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The left nosewheel tire was not adequately inflated and was worn to the point at which the cord was exposed; the right nosewheel tire was within tolerances. Also, one-third of the rim was absent on the left nosewheel tire outer wheel half. The available evidence precluded a determination of whether the imbalance between the nosewheel tires contributed to the control problem on the runway. It could also not be determined if the left nosewheel tire damage occurred before the touchdown or as a result of the accident sequence.

The pilot executed an instrument approach and landing in heavy rain. The airplane touched down about 21 knots above the applicable landing reference speed, which was consistent with an unstabilized approach. The airplane touched down near the displaced runway threshold about 128 kts, and both wing ground spoilers automatically deployed. The pilot reported that the airplane touched down “solidly,” and he started braking promptly, but the airplane did not slow down. The main wheels initially spun up; however, both wheel speeds subsequently decayed consistent with hydroplaning in the heavy rain conditions. When the wheel speeds did not recover, the brake control unit advised the flight crew of an anti-skid failure; the pilot recalled an anti-skid CAS message displayed at some point during the landing. The pilot subsequently activated the emergency brake system and the wheel speeds decayed. The airplane ultimately overran the departure end of the runway about 60 kts, crossed an airport perimeter road, and encountered a small creek before coming to rest. The wings had separated from, and were located immediately adjacent to, the fuselage. The pilot reported light to moderate rain began on final approach. Weather data and surveillance images indicated that heavy rain and limited visibility prevailed at the airport during the landing. Thunderstorms were active in the vicinity and the rainfall rate at the time of the accident landing was between 4.2 and 6.0 inches per hour. About 4 minutes before the accident, a surface observation recorded the visibility as 3 miles. However, 3 minutes later, the observed visibility had decreased to 3/8 mile. A review of the available information indicated that the tower controller advised the pilot of changing wind conditions and of better weather west of the airport but did not update the pilot regarding visibility along the final approach course or precipitation at the airport. The pilot stated that the rain started 2 to 3 minutes before he landed and commented that it was not the heaviest rain that he had ever landed in. The pilot was using the multifunction display and a tablet for weather radar, which showed green and yellow returns indicating light to moderate rain during the approach. He chose not to turn on the airplane’s onboard weather radar because the other two sources were not indicating severe weather. The runway exhibited skid marks beginning about 1,500 ft from the departure end and each main tire had one patch of reverted rubber wear consistent with reverted rubber hydroplaning. The main landing gear remained extended and both tires remained pressurized. The tire pressures corresponded to a minimum dynamic hydroplaning speed of about 115 kts. The airplane flight manual noted that, in the case of an antiskid failure, the main brakes are to be applied progressively and brake pressure is to be modulated as required. The emergency brake is to be used in the event of a brake failure; however, the pilot activated the emergency brake when the main brakes still functioned; although, without anti-skid protection.

The airplane and two-person crew departed on a positioning flight. The pilot-in-command was not flying the airplane and sat in the right seat. The second-in-command was the pilot flying and sat in the left seat. The accident occurred on the second attempt to land at the destination airport on a snow-covered runway. While descending for the airport, the pilot not flying the airplane called the runway in sight. After assessing that they were too high the pilot not flying convinced the pilot flying to circle the airplane down to land on the runway. Circling at speeds greater than allowed by the approach categories, the crew performed a 360-degree turn to align themselves with the runway. The pilot flying did not have the runway in sight, and was verbally assisted by the pilot not flying. Both pilots stated that they were aligned with the center of the runway. During the flare to touchdown the pilot flying reported an unexpected gust of wind from the left requiring a correction. The airplane touched down about 20 feet off and to the right of the runway edge. Substantial damage was sustained to the airplane's wing and fuselage.

During a cross country flight, the pilot was informed by air traffic control that adverse weather was along his route of flight for terrain obscurement in clouds, precipitation, fog or mist. Turbulence was reported below 12,000 feet and occasional moderate rime or mixed icing was reported from the freezing level to 14,000 feet. Further along the route, the pilot reported to another controller that he was at 13,000 feet and descending. The controller inquired if the pilot was aware of the center weather advisory and the reports of severe rime ice in the direction that he was heading. The pilot acknowledged the controller by reporting that he was aware of the weather and that the aircraft was "equipped." The controller continued to inform the pilot of pilot reports from commercial aircraft flight crews of the reports of icing conditions, however, the pilot continued on his routing and again reported that the aircraft was "equipped." During the last transmissions from the pilot, he reported that he was "turning on (de-ice) equipment now." The controller recommended to the pilot to stay clear of the clouds. The pilot responded, "roger." The controller then asked the pilot if he was "going to orbit there for awhile." The pilot responded, "yes," followed by a partially unintelligible transmission of "getting some weather here." The pilot's last transmissions were "Ah, I'm in a little trouble," followed by "Ah, standby 9KM." Radar tracking indicated that the aircraft had been cruising at 16,500 feet before starting a gradual descent. The aircraft descended to 12,700 feet and it began a turn to the right. During this turn, the aircraft's altitude changed rapidly beginning with an increase, followed by a rapid loss of altitude from 8,000 feet per minute descent to 10,600 feet per minute descent before radar contact was lost. The aircraft was found 6 months later in an area of mountainous terrain. On site evidence indicated that the aircraft collided with trees and terrain in a nose low attitude with the majority of the wreckage contained in a large deep crater.

The pilot was performing a night, VFR traffic pattern, to a full stop at a non-towered airport in a turboprop aircraft. He entered the traffic pattern (6,800 feet; 1,000 feet AGL) on an extended downwind; radar data indicated that his ground-speed was 205 knots. Over the next 3 nautical miles on down wind, radar data indicated that he slowed to a ground-speed of 171 knots, lost approximately 500 feet of altitude, and reduced his parallel distance from the runway from 4,775 feet to 2,775 feet. Witnesses said that his radio transmissions on CTAF appeared normal. The two witnesses observed a bright blue flash, followed by a loss of contact with the airplane. Rescue personnel found a broken and downed static wire from a system of three sets of power transmission wires. The dark night precluded ground rescue personnel from locating the downed aircraft; a police helicopter found the airplane approximately 2 hours after the accident. The pilot had recently completed his factory approved annual flight training. His flight instructor said that the pilot was taught to fly a VFR traffic pattern at 1,500 feet AGL (or 500 feet above piston powered aircraft), enter the downwind leg from a 45 degree leg, and fly parallel to the downwind approximately 1 to 1.5 nautical miles separation from it. His speed on downwind should have been 145 to 150 knots indicated, with 90 to 95 knots on final for a stabilized approach. The flight instructor said that the base turn should be at a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees. Radar data indicates that the pilot was in a maximum descent, while turning base to final, of 1,800 to 1,900 feet per minute with an airspeed on final of 145 to 150 knots. His maximum bank angle during this turn was calculated to have been more than 70 degrees. The separated static wire was located 8,266.5 feet from the runway threshold, and was approximately 30 feet higher than the threshold. Post-accident examinations of the airplane and its engine revealed no anomalies which would have precluded normal operations prior to impact.

The airplane collided with mountainous terrain 5 miles from the departure airport during a dark night takeoff. Review of recorded radar data found a secondary beacon code 7267 (the code assigned to the airplane's earlier inbound arrival ) on the runway at 2021:08, with a mode C report consistent with the airport elevation. Two more secondary beacon returns were noted on/over the runway at 2021:12 and 2021:19, reporting mode C altitudes of 1,600 and 1,700 feet, respectively. Between 2021:08 and 2021:38, the secondary beacon target (still on code 7267) proceeded on a northeasterly heading of 035 degrees (runway heading) as the mode C reported altitude climbed to 2,000 feet and the computed ground speed increased to 120 knots. Between 2021:38 and 2021:52, the heading changed from an average 035 to 055 degrees as the mode C reports continued to climb at a mathematically derived 1,300 feet per minute and the ground speed increased to average of 170 knots. At 2022:23, the code 7267 target disappeared and was replaced by a 1200 code target. The mode C reports continued to climb at a mathematically derived rate of 1,200 feet per minute as the ground speed increased to the 180- knot average range. The computed average heading of 055 degrees was maintained until the last target return at 2022:53, which showed a mode C reported altitude of 3,500 feet. The accident site elevation was 3,710 feet and was 0.1 miles from the last target return. The direct point to point magnetic course between Scottsdale and Santa Fe was found to be 055 degrees. Numerous ground witnesses living at the base of the mountain where the accident occurred reported hearing the airplane and observing the aircraft's lights. The witnesses reported observations consistent with the airplane beginning a right turn when a large fireball erupted coincident with the airplane's collision with the mountain. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were found during an examination of the wreckage. The radar data establishes that the pilot changed the transponder code from his arrival IFR assignment to the VFR code 30 seconds before impact and this may have been a distraction.

The right engine lost power after an uncontained engine failure during the initial takeoff climb. The airplane would not climb and the pilot was forced to land. The pilot selected a street for a forced landing area. The pilot landed gear up while maneuvering to avoid hitting street light poles and automobiles. After touchdown, the airplane slid into a block wall. A fire erupted as a result of a post impact fuel leak in the left wing. The airplane's engines were examined at the manufacturer's facilities. The right engine exhibited evidence of an uncontained separation of the second stage turbine rotor disk. Examination of the disk fragments revealed a low cycle fatigue fracture mode. The fatigue initiated from multiple areas at and adjacent to the inside diameter bore surface near the aft side of the disk. According to the engine manufacturer, the multiple indication areas were associated with uninspectable size porosity and the primary carbides in the cast material. There were no material or casting defects detected on any of the fractures through the wheel.

The pilot reported that he had lost the left engine during the initial climb phase of a cross-country flight. Ground witnesses observed that the airplane's landing gear was down and the left propeller was feathered as it turned left onto the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. Other witnesses observed the airplane's wings dip before it nosed over into the terrain while turning onto the final approach course. The airplane struck the ground and a fence that separated two residential yards. The wreckage examination disclosed that the left engine's scavenge pump failed. This failure led the pilot to believe that the engine failed. The pilot's improper emergency procedures by failing to retract the landing gear and maintain airspeed precipitated the resulting stall and uncontrolled descent. Both occupants were killed.

During arrival, the pilot contacted Sedona unicom and was advised that runway 21 was in use and that the winds were gusting to 25 knots. He reported that turbulence was strong thru-out the traffic pattern. Full flaps were lowered on final approach. A strong downdraft was encountered on final approach and power was increased 'to maintain vasi and vref.' Turbulence and a downdraft were reported to be exceptionally strong over the threshold. The pilot stated the aircraft touched down on all three gear, then it pitched up and began to porpoise with increasing amplitude. On the 2nd touchdown, power was applied, but the engine needed 5 to 7 seconds to spool up. The pilot said that after the aircraft porpoise three times, it was in a stall from which it would not recover. Subsequently, it went off the right side of the runway, crossed a parallel taxiway and entered a wooded area before stopping. No mechanical problem of the aircraft was reported that would have resulted in the accident.