Sarasota-Bradenton

After takeoff from his home airport with about 50 gallons of fuel in each fuel tank, the pilot climbed to 7,000 ft and proceeded to his destination. When he was about halfway there, he switched from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. Immediately after switching fuel tanks, the engine started to sputter and lost power. The pilot switched back to the right fuel tank but there was no change. He then tried different power settings, adjusted the mixture to full rich and switched tanks again without regaining engine power. The pilot advised air traffic control (ATC) that he was having an engine problem and needed to land at the nearest airport. ATC instructed him contact the control tower at the nearest airport and cleared him to land. The pilot advised the controller that he was not going to be able to make it to the airport and that he was going to land in the water. During the water landing, the airplane came to a sudden stop. The pilot and his passenger then egressed, and the airplane sank. An annual inspection of the airplane had been completed about 2 months prior to the accident and test flights associated with the annual inspection had all been done with the fuel selector selected to the right fuel tank, and this was the first time he had selected the left fuel tank since before the annual inspection. The airplane was equipped with an engine monitor that was capable of recording engine parameters. Examination of the data revealed that around the time of the loss of engine power, exhaust gas temperature and cylinder head temperature experienced a rapid decrease on all cylinders along with a rapid decrease of turbine inlet temperature, which was indicative of the engine being starved of fuel. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. During examination of the fuel system, the fuel selector was observed in the RIGHT fuel tank position and was confirmed to be in the right fuel tank position with low pressure air. However, when the fuel selector was positioned to the LEFT fuel tank position, continuity could not be established with low pressure air. Further examination revealed that a fuel selector valve labeled FERRY TANK was installed in the left fuel line between the factory-installed fuel selector and the left fuel tank. The ferry tank fuel selector was observed to be in the ON position, which blocked continuity from the left fuel tank to the engine. Continuity could only be established when the ferry tank fuel selector was positioned to the OFF position. With low pressure air, no continuity could be established from the ferry tank fuel line that attached to the ferry tank’s fuel selector. The ferry tank fuel selector valve was mounted between the pilot and copilot seats on the forward side of the main wing spar in the area where the pilot and copilot would normally enter and exit the cockpit. This location was such that the selector handle could easily be inadvertently kicked or moved by a person or object. A guard was not installed over the ferry tank fuel selector valve nor was the selector valve handle safety wired in the OFF position to deactivate the valve even though a ferry tank was not installed. Review of the airplane’s history revealed that about 3 years before the accident, the airplane had been used for an around-the-world flight by the pilot and that prior to the flight, a ferry tank had been installed. A review of maintenance records did not reveal any logbook entries or associated paperwork for the ferry tank installation and/or removal, except for a copy of the one-page fuel system schematic from the maintenance manual with a handwritten annotation (“Tank”), and hand drawn lines, both added to it in blue ink. A review of Federal Aviation Administration records did not reveal any record of a FAA Form 337 (Major Repair or Alteration) or a supplemental type certificate for installation of the ferry tank or the modification to the fuel system.

The pilot departed on the non-scheduled passenger flight with one passenger onboard; the flight was the 3rd leg of a 4-leg trip. About 13 minutes after departure, he advised air traffic control that the airplane was “fuel critical” and requested vectors to the nearest airport, which was about 7 miles away. Both engines subsequently lost total power and the pilot performed a forced landing on a street about 2 miles from the airport, during which the airplane collided with two vehicles. Examination of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the fuel tanks, with evidence of a small fire near the left wingtip fuel tank. Fuel consumption calculations revealed that the airplane would have used about 100 gallons of fuel since its most recent refueling, which was the capacity of the main (wingtip) tanks. Both fuel selectors were found in their respective main tank positions. Given the available information, it is likely that the pilot exhausted all the fuel in the main fuel tanks and starved the engines of fuel. Although the total amount of fuel on board at the start of the flight could not be determined, had all tanks been full, the airplane would have had about 63 gallons remaining in the two auxiliary tanks at the time of the accident. The auxiliary fuel tanks were breached during the accident and quantity of fuel they contained was not determined. Examination of the engines revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The private pilot, who had recently purchased the airplane, and the flight instructor were conducting an instructional flight in the multi-engine airplane to meet insurance requirements. Radar data for the accident flight, which occurred on the second day of 2 days of training, showed the airplane maneuvering between 1,000 ft and 1,200 ft above ground level (agl) just before the accident. The witness descriptions of the accident were consistent with the airplane transitioning from slow flight into a stall that developed into a spin from which the pilots were unable to recover before the airplane impacted terrain. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. After the first day of training, the pilot told friends and fellow pilots that the instructor provided non-standard training that included stall practice that required emergency recoveries at low airspeed and low altitude. The instructor used techniques that were not in keeping with established flight training standards and were not what would be expected from an individual with his extensive background in general aviation flight instruction. Most critically, the instructor used two techniques that introduced unnecessary risk: increasing power before reducing the angle of attack during a stall recovery and introducing asymmetric power while recovering from a stall in a multi-engine airplane; both techniques are dangerous errors because they can lead to an airplane entering a spin. At one point during the first day of training, the airplane entered a full stall and spun before control was regained at very low altitude. The procedures performed contradicted standard practice and Federal Aviation Administration guidance; yet, despite the pilot's experience in multi-engine airplanes and in the accident airplane make and model, he chose to continue the second day of training with the instructor instead of seeking a replacement to complete the insurance check out. The spin encountered on the accident flight likely resulted from the stall recovery errors advocated by the instructor and practiced on the prior day's flight. Unlike the previous flight, the accident flight did not have sufficient altitude for recovery because of the low altitude it was operating at, which was below the safe altitude required for stall training (one which allows recovery no lower than 3,000 ft agl).

According to a statement provided by the Jacksonville Center air traffic control (ATC) facility, the pilot contacted ATC while at flight level 270. About 25 minutes later, the airplane began to deviate from the ATC-assigned altitude and route. The controller’s attempts to contact the pilot were unsuccessful. The North American Aerospace Defense Command launched military fighter aircraft to intercept the airplane. The military pilots reported that the airplane was circling in a left turn at a high altitude and low airspeed and that its windows were partially frosted over. They also reported that the pilot was slumped over in the cockpit and not moving. They fired flares, and the pilot continued to be unresponsive. The airplane circled for about 3 hours before it descended into the Gulf of Mexico and sank. The pilot and airplane were not recovered. Review of the pilot’s Federal Aviation Administration medical records did not reveal any recent medical conditions that would have deemed him unfit to fly.

On July 24, 2011, about 0920 central daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P, N46TW, owned and operated by a private pilot, sustained substantial damage when it impacted powerlines and terrain during takeoff from runway 27 at the Rantoul National Aviation Center Airport-Frank Elliott Field (TIP), near Rantoul, Illinois. A post impact ground fire occurred. The personal flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was on file. The pilot and two passengers sustained fatal injuries. The flight was originating from TIP at the time of the accident and was destined for Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), near Sarasota, Florida. A witness, who worked at the fixed base operator, stated that the pilot performed the preflight inspection of the airplane in a hangar. An estimated 80 pounds. of luggage was loaded behind the airplane's rear seat. The witness said that the pilot's wife told the pilot that she had to use the restroom. The pilot reportedly replied to her to "hurry because a storm front was coming." The witness said that the engine start was normal and that both passengers were sitting in the rear forward-facing seats when the airplane taxied out. A witness at the airport, who was a commercial pilot, reported that he observed the airplane takeoff from runway 27 and then it started to turn to the south. He indicated that the landing gear was up when the airplane was about 500 feet above the ground. The witness stated that a weather front was arriving at the airport and that the strong winds from the northwest appeared to "push the tail of the plane up and the nose down." The airplane descended and impacted powerlines and terrain where the airplane subsequently caught on fire. The witness indicated that the airplane's engine was producing power until impact.

The pilots stated that approach and landing were normal. During landing rollout, about 2,000 feet down the runway, the brakes became ineffective. The aircraft continued to roll off the end of the runway, down an embankment, across a 4 lane road, and came to rest in a drainage ditch. Post-crash examination of the main landing gear brakes showed that 3 out of the 4 brake assemblies were worn beyond allowable limits and all 4 antiskid wheel generators were not producing voltage within the allowable limits. The outboard right main tire had failed during landing roll do to the antiskid becoming inoperative due to the low voltage of the wheel generator. The airplane had received an A-1 through A-6 inspection 2 days before the accident and this was the first flight since the inspection. The A-5 inspection requires inspection of the landing gear brake assemblies for wear, cracks, hydraulic leaks, and release.

The aircraft collided with trees and the ground during flight in adverse weather. There is no record of the pilot receiving a pre-flight briefing and no flight plan was filed. Witnesses heard an aircraft flying low followed by a loud thud. About 16 miles north at Sarasota, FL, the 2128 est weather was: 200 feet partial obscuration, visibility 3 miles with fog. Persons in the vicinity of the accident stated that the area had heavy, patchy ground fog. All four occupants were killed.

Just after takeoff from Palma Sola, an engine failed. The pilot lost control of the airplane that collided with a fence. The pilot was uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While cruising along the west coast of Florida on a cargo flight from Kingston to Tampa, the pilot informed ATC about an engine fire and elected to divert to Sarasota-Bradenton Airport for an emergency landing. On approach, the pilot realized he could not make it so he landed the airplane in a prairie. The aircraft rolled for few dozen yards before coming to rest in flames. While the pilot escaped uninjured, the aircraft was destroyed by fire.