Rapid City

The airline transport pilot was conducting a business flight with six passengers on board. Radar data showed that, after crossing the final approach fix for an instrument approach at the destination airport, the airplane descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 2,480 ft mean sea level (msl); dark night, instrument meteorological conditions existed at that time. Subsequently, when the airplane was about 2 miles from the airport and about 2,070 ft msl, the airplane impacted a utility pole, which was 10 ft above ground level (agl). After impacting the pole, the pilot executed a missed approach, and about 40 minutes later, he landed the airplane without further incident at another airport. On-scene examination showed that the impact had scattered debris from the separated utility pole for about 200 ft into a snow-covered field. Examination of the airplane revealed that the impact resulted in substantial damage to the nose structure, lower and upper fuselage, and horizontal stabilizer. Further examinations of the airplane, including its static system, both altimeters, both vertical speed indicators, and the radar altimeter system revealed no evidence of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that he thought he had leveled the airplane at an altitude above the MDA and that at no time during the descent and approach did the airplane's radar altimeter sound an alert indicating that the airplane was below 400 ft agl radar altitude. He also reported that he never saw the terrain, any obstructions, nor the runway lights or airport environment. Despite the pilot's statement, given the radar data and the impact evidence, it is apparent that he descended the airplane below the MDA, which resulted in the subsequent impact with the utility pole. It could not be determined why the radar altimeter did not alert the pilot that the airplane was only 10 ft above the ground. The pilot's second-class medical certificate, which had been issued more than 20 months before the accident, had expired. The medical certificate limitation section in the expired certificate stated, "Not valid for night flying or by color signal control." There is no evidence that these restrictions contributed to the accident.

Shortly after the airplane lifted off, the tower controller informed the pilot that a plume of smoke was visible behind the airplane. No communications were received from the pilot after he acknowledged the takeoff clearance. Witnesses reported that white smoke appeared to be trailing from the area of the left engine during takeoff. The witnesses subsequently observed flames at the inboard side of the left engine. The airplane began a left turn. As the airplane continued the turn, the flames and trail of white smoke were no longer visible. When the airplane reached a southerly heading, the nose dropped abruptly, and the airplane descended to the ground. Witnesses stated that they heard an increase in engine sound before impact. A postimpact fire ensued. The accident site was located about 3/4 mile from the airport. A postaccident examination determined that the left engine fuel selector and fuel valve were in the OFF position, consistent with the pilot shutting down that engine after takeoff. However, the left engine propeller was not feathered. Extensive damage to the right engine propeller assembly was consistent with that engine producing power at the time of impact. The landing gear and wing flaps were extended at the time of impact. Teardown examinations of both engines did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a loss of engine power. The left engine oil cap was observed to be unsecured at the accident site; however, postaccident comparison of the left and right engine oil caps revealed disproportionate distortion of the left oil cap, likely due to the postimpact fire. As a result, no determination was made regarding the security of left engine oil cap before the accident. Emergency procedures outlined in the pilot’s operating handbook (POH) noted that when securing an engine, the propeller should be feathered. Performance data provided in the POH for single-engine operations were predicated on the propeller of the inoperative engine being feathered, and the wing flaps and landing gear retracted. Thus, the pilot did not follow the emergency procedures outlined in the POH for single-engine operation.

The airplane was on an instrument flight rules flight in night instrument meteorological conditions when the accident occurred. The airplane had been cleared for an ILS approach and the pilot elected to use a non-published procedure to intercept the final approach. After becoming established on the final approach, the airplane impacted the ground about 7 miles from the destination airport at an elevation approximately the same as the airport elevation. Flight inspections of the instrument approach performed prior to and subsequent to the accident revealed satisfactory performance of both the localizer and glideslope functions. The number one altimeter setting did not match the altimeter setting that was current at the time of the accident. Post accident examination of the altimeters revealed that the number one altimeter read 360 feet high. No determination was made as to whether the discrepancy existed prior to impact. However, the pilot did not report any pre-flight discrepancies with regard to the airplane's altimeters. No other anomalies were found or reported with regard to the airplane's structure or systems.

Witnesses reported that shortly after lift-off, the aircraft entered an unusually steep, nose high attitude, while still at low airspeed. One witness (an ATP pilot) reported the aircraft attained an altitude of approximately 75 to 100 feet and appeared to slow down and enter a VMC roll, then it crashed. Impact occurred in an inverted, nose down attitude, left of the runway. An investigation revealed that a coupling shaft (PN 865888-3) had failed in the left engine and the left prop had feathered. A metallurgical examination of the coupling showed evidence of fatigue. One pilot was killed and three other occupants were injured, one seriously.

After takeoff from Kansas City Airport, while climbing, the airplane suffered an engine failure. The airplane lost height and entered a spin then crashed in a field, bursting into flames. All four occupants were killed.

On final approach to Rapid City Airport, the pilot encountered gusty winds and lost control of the airplane that crashed in a huge explosion in a field. All nine occupants were killed.

On approach to Ogden-Hill AFB, at an altitude of 6,500 feet, the aircraft went out of control, dove into the ground and crashed in a field located in Plain City, about 10 miles from the airbase. The aircraft was destroyed and both crew members were killed.

Western Air Lines' Flight 314 departed Los Angeles, California, on a scheduled flight to Minneapolis, Minnesota, with intermediate stops scheduled at Las Vegas, Nevada; Cedar City and Salt Lake City, Utah; Casper, Wyoming, and Rapid City, South Dakota. The flight was routine to Salt Lake City, where a relief crew consisting of Captain M. R. Cawley, First Officer R. E. Crowther and Stewardess Mary Grace Creagan took over the flight in accordance with company crew assignment schedules. Prior to departure from Salt Lake City the aircraft was refueled to a total of 1,000 gallons, which filled all tanks, Flight 34 departed from the Salt Lake City ramp at 0721, but returned a few minutes later because of a broken nose wheel steering cable. The cable was replaced and Flight 34 was off the ground at 0850. According to company records, at takeoff the gross weight was 36,990 pounds, 2,144 pounds less than the maximum allowable weight of 39,134 pounds; the load was properly distributed so that the center of gravity of the aircraft was within approved limits. There were an passengers. The flight plan filed with Air Route Traffic Control specified Instrument Flight Rules at 15,000 feet via Green 3 and Blue 76 Airways. Eastward from Salt Lake City the Casper weather went below company minimums and Flight 34 elected to overfly this scheduled stop. After being advised of this action by the company Casper radio, Air Route Traffic Control issued a new clearance for the flight to descend to and maintain 13,000 feet to the Rapid City range station via Blue 37 and Red 2 Airways. However, an altitude change to 17,000 feet was requested by the flight and this was authorized by ARTC. At 1010 N8407H reported 17,000 over Casper, estimating the Wright intersection (122 miles west of Rapid City) at 1027. The Flight reported as being over the Wright intersection at 1025, at 17,000 feet, estimating Rapid City at 1050. The Casper company radio operator gave the flight the 0930 en route weather and the 1010 Rapid City Special #2 terminal weather. This, the last radio contact, was acknowledged by the flight at 1027. At 1041 the Rapid City radio operator attempted unsuccessfully to contact the flight to deliver a clearance for an instrument approach to Rapid City. Attempts continued until 1053 and at that time the Denver company dispatcher was advised that contact with the flight had been lost. At 1106 emergency procedures were initiated. Intermittent snows and restricted visibilities hampered intensive air search efforts. The wreckage was sighted by a Western Air Lines pilot the afternoon of February 28, and ground parties reached the scene that night. The aircraft had crashed in an isolated ranch area and all nine occupants had been killed.

On landing, the undercarriage collapsed and punctured the fuel tank. The aircraft slid on its belly for dozen yards and came to rest in flames on the runway. All 22 occupants evacuated safely before the aircraft would be destroyed by fire.