Crash of a Tupolev TU-154M in Überlingen: 69 killed

Date & Time: Jul 1, 2002 at 2335 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-85816
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Ufa - Moscow - Barcelona
MSN:
95A1006
YOM:
1995
Flight number:
BTC2937
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
60
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
69
Captain / Total flying hours:
12070
Captain / Total hours on type:
4918.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8500
Copilot / Total hours on type:
4317
Aircraft flight hours:
10788
Circumstances:
On 1 July 2002 at 21:35:32 hrs a Tupolev TU-154M on its flight from Moscow-Domodedovo /Russia to Barcelona/ Spain and a Boeing B757-200, which was on a flight from Bergamo /Italy to Brussels /Belgium, collided near the town of Ueberlingen (Lake Constance) in a dark night; the in-flight visibility at the flight level concerned was 10 km and more. Both airplanes impacted the ground north of the town of Ueberlingen. A larger number of witnesses had become aware of the accident by explosive noises, a prolonged roaring and rumbling as well as reflections of fire. Many of them saw pieces of debris burning while falling from the sky. The histories of the flights were reconstructed on the basis of the evaluation of the airborne flight data recorders (FDR) and cockpit voice recorders (CVR) and of the TCAS data stored in the airplanes, the radio communications between the Swiss Air Traffic Control Centre (ACC Zurich) and the crews of the Tupolev TU-154M and the Boeing B757-200 stored on the ground and the ground radar data recorded by the Swiss Air Navigation Services.
Boeing B757-200:
During the whole month of June 2002 both pilots, the pilot-in-command (PIC) and the copilot, had flown together as a crew. Several times they flew the route Bahrain - Bergamo - Brussels -
Bahrain. The last flight prior to this flight cycle was conducted on 28 June 2002 on the route Brussels – Bahrain. Prior to this flight the crew was off duty for 75 hours. They checked in at 11:50 hrs in Bahrain. At 13:30 hrs the airplane departed from Bahrain airport (OBBI) for a cargo flight to Brussels EBBR) with one intermediate stop at Bergamo (LIME). Only the two pilots were aboard the aircraft. The landing at Bergamo airport took place at 19:10 hrs after a flight time of 05 hours 40 minutes. In Bergamo, the airplane was refuelled, unloaded and reloaded with cargo. Take-off to continue the flight to Brussels was at 21:06 hrs. The airplane was flown by the copilot (PF). The flight was conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR). The flight plan (FPL) included the following information relevant to the flight: Aerodrome of departure: LIME, scheduled time of departure: 21:00 hrs, cruise speed: 463 kt, cruise level: FL 360, flight route: ABESI-UN851-TGO-UL608-LAMGO-UZ738-ANEKI-UZ917- BATTY, aerodrome of destination: EBBR, estimated flight time: 01:11 hrs, alternate aerodrome: EDDK (Cologne). At 21:21:50 hrs, the PIC contacted ACC Zurich on the frequency 128.050 MHz at FL 260 and in direct approach to the waypoint ABESI. At 21:21:56 hrs, the transponder code 7524 was assigned. With the identification of the airplane a clearance for a direct approach to the TANGO VOR as well as for a climb from FL 260 to FL 320 was given. The PIC requested to climb to FL 360, which was approved approximately four minutes later at 21:26:36 hrs. At 21:29:50 hrs the airplane reached this flight level, without the pilots reporting it. At 21:34:30 hrs the copilot handed over the control of the airplane to the PIC in order to go to the lavatory installed in a cubicle at the rear of the cockpit. At 21:34:31 hrs the PIC confirmed that he had taken over. At 21:34:42 hrs the airborne TCAS alarmed the crew about possibly conflicting traffic by a Traffic Advisory (TA): “traffic, traffic". After the TA the CVR recorded clicking noises. 14 seconds later (21:34:56 hrs) TCAS issued a Resolution Advisory (RA) “descend, descend". Approximately two seconds later the autopilot (AP) was switched off, the control column pushed and the thrust of the engines reduced. FDR data shows that the pitch was reduced from 2.5° to approximately 1.5° and the vertical acceleration lowered from about 1.0 g to 0.9 g. According to the FDR and the TCAS recordings the airplane had reached a rate of descent of 1500 ft/min 12 seconds after the autopilot had been switched off. At 21:35:05 hrs the CVR recorded via the cockpit area microphone the remark of the copilot “traffic right there“ which was confirmed by the PIC with “yes“. At 21:35:10 hrs, i.e. 14 seconds after the RA “descend, descend“, TCAS issued the advisory to increase the descent (“increase descent, increase descent“). At this time the copilot had returned to his work station and put on his headset. His reaction to the RA was recorded as "increase". Following this RA, the rate of descent was changed and reached approximately 2600 ft/min 10 seconds later. During the descent the pitch angle decreased to –1° and the powerplant thrust was reduced to approximately 1.2 (EPR). According to the CVR at 21:35:14 hrs a Master Caution Aural Warning is heard for two seconds. According to the FDR the autothrottle was switched off by the crew at 21:35:18 hrs. At 21:35:19 hrs the crew reported the “TCAS descent“ to ACC Zurich. Subsequently the copilot requested the PIC twice to descend. Once with the word “descend“ (21:35:26 hrs) and then by saying “descend hard“ (21:35:30 hrs). Approximately two seconds prior to the collision the control column was pushed fully forward. At 21:35:32 hrs the airplane flying a northern heading (MH = 004°) with a pitch angle of approximately – 2° and no bank angle collided with the TU154M at 34 890 ft.
Tupolev TU-154M:
The crew was off duty for 24 hours before take-off for the charter flight to Barcelona (LEBL). They checked in at 17:30 hrs. At 18:48 hrs the airplane departed from the airport Moscow-Domodedovo (UUDD). Nine crew members and 60 passengers were aboard the airplane. The flight was conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR) in accordance with the flight plan (FPL) filed. The FPL included the following information relevant to the flight: Aerodrome of departure: UUDD, planned time of departure: 18:30 hrs, cruise speed: 880 km/h, cruise level: 10 600 m, flight route: KLIMOVSK-KAMENKA-ZAKHAROVKA-R11-YUKHNOVB102-BAEVO/cruise speed: 470 kt, cruise level: FL 360, flight route: UL979-MATUS-UM984-BOLMU-UT43-STOCKERAU-UR23-SALZBURG-UL856-TRASADINGEN-Z69-OLBEN-UN869-OLRAK-UN855-PERPIGNAN-UB384-GIRONA-UB38-SABADELL, aerodrome of arrival: LEBL, estimated flight time: 04:20 hours, alternate aerodrome: LEGE (Girona). Five flight crew members were in the cockpit. The commander (under supervision) - who was the PF (Pilot flying) on this flight - occupied the left-hand seat in the cockpit. The right-hand seat was occupied by an instructor, who as a PNF (Pilot non flying) also conducted the radio communications. He was also the pilot-in-command (PIC). The seat of the flight navigator was between and slightly behind the pilots. The work station of the flight engineer was behind the instructor. A further pilot (copilot), who had no function on this flight, was on a vacant seat behind the commander. At 21:11:55 hrs - near Salzburg still over Austrian territory - the crew received the clearance from Vienna radar for a direct approach to the Trasadingen VOR at FL 360. At 21:16:10 hrs, the airplane entered German airspace and was controlled by Munich Radar. At 21:29:54 hrs, the crew was instructed by Munich to change over to ACC Zurich on 128.050 MHz. At 21:30:11 hrs and at FL 360 the PNF contacted ACC Zurich. At 21:30:33 hrs, ACC Zurich assigned the transponder code 7520 to the airplane, which was acknowledged 6 seconds later. For the time between about 21:33:00 hrs and 21:34:41 hrs the CVR recorded crew discussions concerning an airplane approaching from the left which was displayed on the vertical speed indicator (VSI/TRA) which is part of the TCAS. All flight crew members with the exception of the flight engineer were involved in these discussions. These recordings suggest that the crew strived to localize the other airplane as to its position and its flight level. At 21:34:36 hrs, the commander stated: “Here it is in sight“, and two seconds later: “Look here, it indicates zero“. During the time from 21:34:25 hrs to 21:34:55 hrs, the airplane turned at a bank angle of approximately 10° from a magnetic heading (MH) of 254° to 264°. At 21:34:42 hrs, TCAS generated a TA (“traffic, traffic“). The CVR recorded that both the PIC and the copilot called out “traffic, traffic“. At 21:34:49 hrs - i.e. seven seconds later - ACC Zurich instructed the crew to expedite descent to FL350 with reference to conflicting traffic (“...... descend flight level 350, expedite, I have crossing traffic“). While the controller was giving the instruction - the radio transmission took just under eight seconds - the PIC requested the PF to descend. At 21:34:56 hrs, the control column was pushed forward, the autopilot (pitch channel) was switched off and the powerplant thrust reduced to approximately 72 % (N1). FDR data shows a reduction of the pitch angle of the airplane from 0° to approximately –2.5° as well as a reduction of the vertical acceleration from approximately 1 g (normal acceleration of the earth near the airplane centre of gravity) to 0.8 g. The instruction to descend was not verbally acknowledged by the crew. At the same time (21:34:56 hrs) TCAS generated an RA (“climb, climb“). At 21:34:59 hrs, the CVR recorded the voice of the copilot stating: “It (TCAS) says (говорит): “climb“. The PIC replied: “He (ATC) is guiding us down“. The copilot's enquiring response: “descend?“ At 21:35:02 hrs, (six seconds after the RA “ climb, climb”) the PF pulled the control column. As a result, the rate of descent ceased to increase. The vertical acceleration rose from 0.75 g to 1.07 g. The engine thrust remained unchanged in conjunction with this control input (refer to Appendix 5a). At 21:35:03 hrs, the engine throttles were pulled back further. The discussion between the crew members was interrupted at 21:35:03 hrs by the controller instructing the crew once again to expedite descend to FL 350 (“... descend level 350, expedite descend“).This instruction was immediately acknowledged by the PNF. The controller then informed the crew about other flight traffic at FL 360 in the 2 o’clock position (“...Ya, … we have traffic at your 2 o’clock position now at 3-6-0“) and the PIC asked: “Where is it?“, the copilot answered: “Here on the left side!“. At the time, the rate of descent was approximately 1 500 ft/min. The voice of the flight navigator can be heard on the CVR saying:" It is going to pass beneath us!" while the controller was giving his last instruction. At 21:35:04 hrs the roll channel of the autopilot was switched off. At 21:35:05 hrs, the PF pushed the control column again and the rate of descent increased to more than 2 000 ft/min. From 21:35:07 hrs to 21:35:24 hrs the aircraft heading changed to the right from 264° to 274° MH. At 21:35:24 hrs TCAS issued an RA “increase climb“. The copilot commented this with the words: “It says ‘climb”! At the time of the RA „increase climb“, the FDR recorded a slow movement of the control column nose down leading to a change in pitch angle from –1° to approximately –2° and in a reduction in vertical acceleration. The descent rate was approximately 1800 ft/min (refer to Appendix 5b). Five seconds before the collision the control column was pulled back, associated with a minor increase of thrust levers setting. One second prior to the collision the pitch angle reached –1° and the vertical acceleration 1.1 g. During the last second before the collision the control column was pulled back abruptly and the thrust levers were pushed fully forward. At the time of the collision the pitch angle was 0°; the vertical acceleration was 1.4 g but the airplane was still in a descent. The airplane collided with a heading of 274° and a bank angle to the right of 10° with the Boeing B757-200 at 21:35:32 hrs at a flight level of 34 890 ft. After the collision, the TU154M rolled with increasing rate about the longitudinal axis to the left. Simultaneously with this rolling movement the extension of the aileron-spoiler on the right wing was recorded. Within approximately two seconds after the collision the pitch angle changed from 0° to -6° and the cabin differential pressure decreased within one second from 0.6 kg/cm2 to a value close to 0 kg/ cm2.
Probable cause:
The following immediate causes have been identified:
• The imminent separation infringement was not noticed by ATC in time. The instruction for the TU-154M to descend was given at a time when the prescribed separation to the B757-
200 could not be ensured anymore.
• The TU-154M crew followed the ATC instruction to descend and continued to do so even after TCAS advised them to climb. This manoeuvre was performed contrary to the generated TCAS RA.
The following systemic causes have been identified:
• The integration of ACAS/TCAS II into the system aviation was insufficient and did not correspond in all points with the system philosophy. The regulations concerning ACAS/TCAS published by ICAO and as a result the regulations of national aviation authorities, operational and procedural instructions of the TCAS manufacturer and the operators were not standardised, incomplete and partially contradictory.
• Management and quality assurance of the air navigation service company did not ensure that during the night all open workstations were continuously staffed by controllers.
• Management and quality assurance of the air navigation service company tolerated for years that during times of low traffic flow at night only one controller worked and the other one retired to rest.
Final Report:

Crash of an Ilyushin II-18V near Kalyazin: 27 killed

Date & Time: Nov 19, 2001 at 2119 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-75840
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Khatanga - Moscow
MSN:
182 0053 01
YOM:
1962
Flight number:
LDF9602
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
18
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
27
Aircraft flight hours:
11617
Aircraft flight cycles:
5582
Circumstances:
En route from Khatanga to Moscow-Domodedovo Airport, while cruising by night at an assigned altitude of 7,800 metres in good weather conditions, the four engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent. After it reached an excessive speed of 850 km/h, the aircraft rolled to the left to an angle of 60° and nosed down to an angle of 42°. The aircraft suffered structural failure, lost several elements, partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in a snow covered field located 15 km southeast of Kalyazin. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 27 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Failure of the protection system of the elevator trim, causing a spontaneous deflection of the elevator. This caused the aircraft to enter an uncontrolled descent and the crew was unable to regain control. Violations about aircraft maintenance, flight organization and operational aspects were identified within the operator. Excessive G loads during the descent caused the aircraft to partially disintegrate before final impact.

Crash of an Ilyushin II-114T in Moscow: 5 killed

Date & Time: Dec 5, 1999 at 0512 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UK-91004
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow - Tashkent
MSN:
10838 00305
YOM:
1998
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Aircraft flight hours:
240
Aircraft flight cycles:
123
Circumstances:
While taxiing at Moscow-Domodedovo Airport, the aircraft encountered strong crosswinds and the rudder got stuck in the full left position. The flight engineer suggested the captain to return to the apron to proceed to an inspection but the pilot prefered to takeoff. After liftoff from runway 32L, while climbing to a height of about 24 metres, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in a wooded area located 365 metres past the runway end. Two occupants were seriously injured and five others were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the rudder was blocked in the full left position prior to takeoff, probably due to the strong crosswinds encountered during the taxi procedure.

Crash of an Antonov AN-12BP in Luzino

Date & Time: Feb 24, 1996
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-11403
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow – Omsk – Bratsk – Yakutsk
MSN:
6 4 019 06
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
K29052
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Moscow to Yakutsk with intermediate stops in Omsk and Bratsk, carrying three passengers, seven crew members and a load of 10,990 kilos of various goods (not declared before departure from Moscow). On approach to Omsk-Tsentralny Airport, at an altitude of 1,150 metres, all four engines failed simultaneously. The captain reduced his altitude and made a belly landing in a snow covered field located near Luzino, about 22 km west of the airport. After touchdown, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres, collided with a car and came to rest. All 10 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Failure of all four engines due to fuel exhaustion. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Poor flight planning,
- The crew failed to calculate the correct amount of fuel necessary for the all flight and reserves according to procedures,
- The captain decided to initiate the descent prematurely, increasing the fuel consumption during the last portion of the flight,
- The flight engineer failed to monitor the fuel consumption during flight,
- Failure of the fuel pump n°5,
- The captain failed to divert to an alternate airport while en route from Moscow to Omsk.

Crash of a Tupolev TU-154 in Irkoutsk: 125 killed

Date & Time: Jan 3, 1994 at 1207 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-85656
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Irkutsk - Moscow
MSN:
89A801
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
BKL130
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
115
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
125
Circumstances:
While preparing the flight, the crew encountered technical problems with the engine n°2 and 17 minutes were necessary to start all three engines. A technical issue occurred with the starter of the engine n°2 and a warning light came on in the cockpit. The crew did not find any corrective actions in the operations manual and as he thought the warning was false, decided to take off. Four minutes after the aircraft departed Irkutsk Airport runway 12, while climbing, the starter located in the engine n°2 failed. Debris scattered around and hydraulic and fuel lines were cut. The crew declared an emergency and was cleared for an immediate return after the engine n°2 caught fire. Unfortunately, the crew was unable to extinguish the fire and the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and eventually crashed on farm buildings located about 11 km from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 124 occupants were killed as well as one farmer. Another farmer was seriously injured.
Probable cause:
The commission found that the air starter malfunction occurred when the engine was started due to a structural element of the air conditioning system, probably a fragment of the air-to-air radiator (VVR) splitter of engine n°2, hit under the constant pressure flap. This became possible due to the lack of protection against the ingress of foreign objects from the air lines and the low operational reliability of the VVR. A constant supply of air under pressure from the engines operating at a mode close to the nominal through an open damper led to the starter not switching off and the turbine rotor spinning up to off-design speed with the alarm "Dangerous starter speed" being triggered, which was detected by the flight engineer after starting all the engines. Pressing the starter shutdown button did not turn off the alarm. There were no other signs of failure other than the operation of the warning lamp. The crew, believing that the alarm was false, made the wrong decision to take off, which was a consequence of the unwillingness to act in such a situation due to shortcomings in the regulatory documentation, information support, as well as insufficient information content of the starter's technical condition monitoring system in the cockpit. Laying the mains of all three hydraulic systems through the fire-hazardous compartment of the engine n°2 is a constructive disadvantage of the Tu-154M aircraft.

Crash of an Ilyushin II-62 in Yakutsk

Date & Time: Nov 21, 1990 at 1245 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-86613
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow - Yakutsk
MSN:
1901
YOM:
1975
Flight number:
SU95
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
179
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Moscow-Domodedovo Airport, the crew started the approach to Yakutsk-Intl Airport. Due to poor weather conditions and a visibility below minima, the crew diverted to Magan Airport. The aircraft overflew the runway threshold at a height of 22 meters and a speed of 297 km/h. It 'floated' for 22 seconds and eventually landed 1,647 meters past the runway threshold. For unknown reasons, the captain maintained the aircraft in a nose-up attitude and the nose gear landed nine seconds after the first touchdown only. Reverse thrust were not activated and the spoilers were finally deployed but too late. At a distance of 47 meters from the runway end, the captain shut down all four engine when the aircraft overran at a speed of 167 km/h. It went down an embankment, lost its undercarriage and came 538 meters past the runway end, 3,978 meters from the runway threshold and 2,331 meters from the touchdown point. Four passengers were injured and 185 other occupants were evacuated safely. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a poor planned approach and a wrong approach configuration. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Lack of crew training,
- It was the first time (except for one crew member) that the crew was landing at Yakutsk-Magan Airport,
- Marginal weather conditions (visibility below minimums at the initial destination airport),
- Failure to comply with flight crew recommandations,
- Poor crew instructions and interaction,
- The crew failed to follow the published procedures for a standard approach and landing,
- Deviations in aircraft piloting during approach and landing, causing the aircraft to land too far down the runway,
- The pilot-in-command maintained the aircraft in a nose-up attitude for a period of 9 seconds between the main gear touchdown and the nose gear landing,
- The reverse thrust systems were not activated,
- The spoilers were deployed too late,
- Lack of leadership on part of the captain during the approach and landing,
- The crew did not make the decision to initiate a go-around procedure when the landing maneuver was obviously missed.

Crash of an Ilyushin II-62M in Yakutsk

Date & Time: Jul 1, 1990 at 0019 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-86456
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow - Yakutsk
MSN:
2623717
YOM:
1976
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
99
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft departed Moscow-Domodedovo Airport at 1237LT with 99 passengers and 10 crew members on board. Following an uneventful flight of 5 hours and 42 minutes, the crew started the approach to Yakutsk-Intl Airport by night. After touchdown on runway 23 (3,300 meters long), the flight engineer mistakenly selected reverse thrust on engine n°2 and 3 only, letting both engines n°1 and 4 running at takeoff power. Both pilots took few seconds to identify the problem and the aircraft's speed was about 265-270 km/h and there were 655 meters of remaining runway. The captain attempted an emergency braking procedure when all tyres burst and the aircraft overran runway at a speed of 200 km/h, lost its undercarriage and came to rest 397 meters further, broken in three. All 109 occupants were evacuated, among them six were injured, two seriously. The aircraft was written off.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of an error on part of the flight engineer who mistakenly selected reverse thrust on engine n°2 and 3 only, letting both engines n°1 and 4 running at takeoff power.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- The spoilers could not deploy because reverse thrust was not activated on all four engines,
- The crew was disorganized during the landing phase,
- Poor crew coordination,
- The mistake committed by the flight engineer was identified too late by the rest of the flying crew, ¨
- Heavy verbal charge during the landing phase,
- Insufficient professional skills of the flight engineer.

Crash of an Antonov AN-32 in Semenivka: 9 killed

Date & Time: Sep 28, 1989 at 2008 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-48095
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Mukachevo - Moscow
MSN:
1705
YOM:
1988
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Aircraft flight hours:
382
Aircraft flight cycles:
209
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Mukachevo Airbase on a cargo flight to Moscow, carrying nine crew members and a load of air-air missiles that must be transferred for maintenance purposes. About 35 minutes into the flight, while cruising by night, the autopilot system failed and an alarm sounded. The crew was able to identify the problem so the autopilot was reconnected and the crew continued the flight. One hour and 43 minutes into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 7,500 meters, the autopilot system failed again but this time, no alarm sounded so the crew was unable to identify the problem. Forty seconds later, the aircraft entered a dive and crashed in a swampy area located near Semenivka. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all nine occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The exact reason why the autopilot system disconnected by himself could not be determined with certainty. However, investigators did not ruled out the two following assumptions: a crew member may inadvertently disconnected the autopilot while touching the button with his body; the possible failure of a switch connected to the autopilot system command circuit. Nevertheless, the crew was considered as partly responsible as he failed to pay sufficient attention to the conduct of flight and various instruments, which would prevent him from identifying the problem and intervening in a timely manner to correct the situation.

Crash of an Antonov AN-8 near Sosenky: 5 killed

Date & Time: Sep 27, 1988 at 1922 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-48101
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Moscow - Lviv - Baku
MSN:
0G3490
YOM:
1960
Flight number:
92055
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Aircraft flight hours:
12272
Aircraft flight cycles:
5853
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Moscow-Domodedovo at 1838LT on a cargo flight to Baku with an intermediate stop in Lviv, carrying five crew members and a load of various goods for a total weight of 400 kilos, among them metallic hoses. Nine minutes after takeoff, while climbing to a height of about 3,600 meters, the crew noticed discrepancies in the fuel system which resulted in a slight reduction of the fuel pressure in the fuel supply line connected to the left engine. The left part of the aircraft was visually inspected and as nothing abnormal was noted, the crew decided to continue the flight. 18 minutes later, while approaching the altitude of 7,200 meters, the crew noticed an important increase in the fuel consumption while the fuel supply system pressure dropped. An analysis of the system made it possible to detect a leak and as the crew was attempting to shut down the left engine, a fire started in the bottom of the left engine nacelle. At 1914LT, the captain informed ATC about the failure of the left engine and was cleared to return to Domodedovo Airport. Less than two minutes later, the captain reported to ATC that the left engine was on fire and requested to be vectored to the nearest airport. At that time, the nearest airport was Tula-Klokovo located 140 km from his position. Few minutes later, the left engine, engulfed by flames, detached and fell away. As the captain realized it would not be possible to reach Tula Airport, he continued the descent with a rate of descent of 100 meters per second in an attempt to land in an open field. The aircraft entered clouds and at a height of 300 meters, the pilot-in-command suffered a spatial disorientation. The aircraft nosed down by an angle of 80° and crashed at a speed of 612 km/h in a wooded area located 3,5 km northeast of Sosensky. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all five occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The left engine caught fire and detached after a fuel line broke in flight, causing the fuel to leak in the engine nacelle and to ignite while in contact with high temperature parts. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Failure of the crew to identify the fuel leak in time,
- Failure of the crew to abort the flight and to return to the departure airport in time,
- Failure of the crew to shut off the fuel supply system in time, which contributed to the fire development,
- Failure of the crew to follow the emergency procedures,
- Loss of control after the pilot-in-command suffered a spatial disorientation.

Crash of a Tupolev TU-154B-1 in Krasnovodsk: 11 killed

Date & Time: Jan 18, 1988 at 0519 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-85254
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moscow – Krasnovodsk – Ashgabat
MSN:
78A254
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
SU699
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
137
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Aircraft flight hours:
15859
Aircraft flight cycles:
8082
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Moscow-Domodedovo, the crew started a night approach to Krasnovodsk Airport. The visibility was reduced due to the night combined with clouds down to 400 meters. The copilot was the pilot-in-command and he completed the approach at a speed of 270 km/h with flaps down at 28°. During the last segment, flaps were downed to an angle of 45° when the rate of descent increased to 10 meters per second. At a height of 30 meters, the copilot did not have visual contact with the runway but the captain decided to continue the approach. At an excessive speed of 275 km/h, the aircraft touched down 3 meters to the left of the runway centerline. It bounced, rolled for few hundred meters and came to rest on the main runway, broken in two. Eleven passengers were killed, 120 people were injured while 15 other escaped uninjured.
Probable cause:
Wrong approach configuration on part of the pilot-in-command (copilot) who continued the approach after passing the minimum descent altitude without any visual contact with the runway.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- Excessive approach speed and rate of descent,
- Poor approach planning and landing preparation,
- Lack of crew coordination,
- Lack of supervision on part of the captain,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure,
- Poor visibility due to the night and low clouds.