Mobile

The pilot stated that he was on a repositioning flight to Tampa, Florida. He was cruising at 11,000 feet msl when, with no warning or spool down time, the engine failed. The engine indications instantly went to zero. The pilot declared an emergency to the air traffic controller and was advised that the nearest airport was 29 miles away. He maneuvered the airplane toward the airport and went through the engine failure procedures. The attempts to restart the engine were unsuccessful. The pilot configured the airplane for best glide speed. After gliding for 22 miles, the airplane's altitude was about 300 feet msl. The pilot slowed the airplane to just above stall speed before impacting small pine trees pulling back on the yoke and stalling the airplane into the trees. The engine was examined at Pratt and Whitney of Canada, with Transportation Safety Board of Canada oversight. The engine compressor turbine blades were fractured at varying heights from the roots to approximately half of the span. Materials analysis determined the blade fractures to display impact damage and overheating. The primary cause of the blade fractures could not be determined. There were no other pre-impact anomalies or operational dysfunction observed to any of the engine components examined. Impact damage to the blade airfoils precluded determination of the original fracture mechanism.

A review of communications between Mobile Downtown Control Tower, and the pilot revealed that while on approach the pilot reported having a problem. The Ground Controller reported that he had the airplane in sight and cleared the flight to land on runway 18. The pilot stated that he had a "run away engine", and elected to shut down the engine and continued the approach. The Controller then cleared the pilot again to runway 18. The pilot then stated that he did not think that he was going to "make it." The airplane collided with a utility pole and the ground and burst into flames short of the runway. The post-accident examination of the engine found that the fuel control unit arm to the fuel control unit interconnect rod end connection was separated from the rod end swivel ball assembly. The swivel ball assembly was found improperly attached to the inboard side of the arm, with the bolt head facing inboard, instead of outboard, and the washer and nut attached to the arm's outboard side instead of the inboard side. The rod separation would resulted in a loss of power lever control. The published emergency procedures for "Power Lever Control Lose," states; If minimum power obtained is excessive: 1) reduce airspeed by setting airplane in nose-up attitude at IAS < 178 KIAS. 2) "inert Sep" switch--On. 3) if ITT >800 C "Inert Sep"--Off. 4) Landing Gear Control--Down. 5) Flaps--Takeoff. 6) Establish a long final or an ILS approach respecting IAS < 178 KIAS. 7) When runway is assured: Condition Lever to --Cut Off. 8) Propeller Governor Lever to-- Feather. 9) Flaps --Landing as required (at IAS <122 KIAS). 10) Land Normally without reverse. 11) Braking as required. The pilot stated to Mobile Downtown Control Tower, Ground Control that he had a "run away engine" and that he "had to shut down the engine". As a result of the pilot not following the published emergency procedures, the airplane was unable to reach the runway during the emergency.

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces. There was no evidence of fire. Wreckage examinations and all recovered wreckage from the impact area revealed no evidence of an inflight collisionor breakup, or of external contact by a foreign object. An examination of the engine and the propeller indicated that the engine was producing power at impact. The recovered components showed no evidence of preexisting powerplant, system, or structural failures. Wreckage examinations showed crushing and bending consistent with a moderate angle of descent and a moderate right-wing-down attitude at impact. The amount of wreckage recovered indicates that all parts of the airplane were at the crash site. The wreckage was scattered over an area of about 600 feet. An examination of radar and airplane performance data indicated that the accident airplane initiated a descent from 3,000 feet immediately after the accident pilot was given a second traffic advisory by air traffic control. The pilot reported that the traffic was above him. At the time the pilot stated that he needed to deviate, data indicate that the accident airplane was in or entering an uncontrolled descent. Radar data indicated that, after departure from the airport, the closest identified airplane to the accident airplane was a DC-10, which was at an altitude of about 4,000 feet. The horizontal distance between the two airplanes was about 1.1 nautical miles, and the vertical distance between the airplanes was about 1,600 feet. The accident airplane was never in a location at which wake turbulence from the DC-10 would have intersected the Cessna's flightpath (behind and below the DC-10's flightpath). Given the relative positions of the accident airplane and the DC-10, wake turbulence was determined to not be a factor in this accident. Although the DC-10 was left of the position given to the pilot by Mobile Terminal Radar Approach Control, air traffic controllers do not have strict angular limits when providing traffic guidance. The Safety Board's airplane performance simulation showed that, beginning about 15 seconds before the time of the pilot's last transmission ("I needed to deviate, I needed to deviate"), his view of the DC-10 moved diagonally across the windscreen from his left to straight in front of the Cessna while tripling in size. The airplane performance simulation also indicated that the airplane experienced high bank and pitch angles shortly after the pilot stated, "I needed to deviate" (about 13 seconds after the transmission, the simulation showed the airplane rolling through 90° and continuing to roll to a peak of about 150° 3 seconds later) and that the airplane appeared to have nearly recovered from these extreme attitudes at impact. Performance data indicated that the airplane would had to have been structurally/aerodynamically intact to reach the point of ground impact from the point of inflight upset. There was no evidence of any other aircraft near the accident airplane or the DC-10 at the time of the accident. Soon after the accident, U.S. Coast Guard aircraft arrived at the accident scene. The meaning of the pilot's statement that he needed to deviate could not be determined. A review of air traffic control radar and transcripts revealed no evidence of pilot impairment or incapacitation before the onset of the descent and loss of control. A sound spectrum study conducted by the Safety Board found no evidence of loud noises during the pilot's last three radio transmissions but found that background noise increased, indicating that the cockpit area was still intact and that the airspeed was increasing. The study further determined that the overspeed warning had activated, which was consistent with the performance study and extreme fragmentation of the wreckage. Radar transponder data from the accident airplane were lost below 2,400 feet. The signal loss was likely caused by unusual attitudes, which can mask transponder antenna transmissions. A garbled transponder return recorded near the DC-10 was likely caused by the accident airplane's transponder returns masking the DC-10's returns (since the accident airplane was projected to be in line between the DC-10 and the ground radar) or by other environmental phenomena. Red transfer or scuff marks were observed on many pieces of the airplane wreckage, and these marks were concentrated on the lower airframe skin forward of the main landing gear and the nose landing gear area. The Safety Board and four laboratories compared the red-marked airplane pieces to samples of red-colored items found in the wreckage. These examinations determined that most of the red marks were caused by parts of the airplane, cargo, and items encountered during the wreckage recovery. The marks exhibited random directions of motion, and none of the marks exhibited evidence of an in-flight collision with another aircraft. A small piece of black, anodized aluminum found embedded in the left wing was subsequently identified as a fragment from a cockpit lighting dimmer. The accident occurred at night, with the moon obscured by low clouds. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, although visual conditions were reported between cloud layers. The terminal aerodrome forecast reported a possible cloud layer at 3,000 feet. Weather data and observations by the DC-10 pilot indicated that, after flying about 100 to 500 feet above the cloud layer and soon after sighting the DC-10, the accident airplane would have entered clouds. A number of conditions were present on the night of the accident that would have been conducive to spatial disorientation. For example, no visible horizon references existed between the cloud layers in which the pilot was flying because of the night conditions. In addition, to initiate a visual search and visually acquire the DC-10, varying degrees of eye and head movements would have accompanied the pilot's shifting of attention outside the cockpit. Once the DC-10 was visually acquired by the pilot, it would have existed as a light source moving against an otherwise featureless background, and its relative motion across and rising in the Cessna's windscreen could have been disorienting, especially if the pilot had fixated on it for any length of time. Maneuvering the airplane during this search would likely have compounded the pilot's resultant disorientation.

The pilot received a preflight weather briefing and was advised of thunderstorms with tops to 45,000 feet along a portion of the route of flight. En route, the pilot was advised of significant areas of heavy precipitation to which the pilot responded, 'uh roger one nine whiskey it looks like on our radar here that uh we go straight ahead we'll be all right there.' The flight was cleared to descend to 11,000 feet and the pilot requested deviation to the right for weather avoidance. The pilot made several routine radio communications while descending at a calculated average rate of descent of approximately 2,571 fpm before encountering adverse weather. During this time while descending, the calculated calibrated airspeed increased from approximately 190 knots to approximately 265 knots (the design dive speed Vd). The flight encountered a level 5 weather echo then began a high rate of descent. Both horizontal stabilizers with elevators and both outer portions of both wings failed in a down direction. Examination of the flight control cables, fracture surfaces of the wings and horizontal stabilizers, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The pilot did not request pilot reports. The design maneuvering speed of the airplane is 169 knots indicated; the POH indicates to slow to this speed for turbulence penetration.

The airplane crashed into houses while on an ILS approach to runway 05 at the Birmingham Airport. The weather briefing data that the captain received in Mobile was accurate, advising him to expect thunderstorms in the Birmingham area. Birmingham atis information whiskey and xray, mentioning thunderstorms, was also accurate, and the flight crew heard them, as well as information from the approach controller that the airport was experiencing thunderstorm activity. The captain and a passenger survived while 13 other occupants were killed. There were no injuries on the ground.

The airplane collided with trees and power lines during takeoff from a 2,000 foot long open area with 10 parachutists aboard. The pilot said he experienced an unsolicited rollback in engine power prior to the collision. Reportedly, some power was regained. However, not in time to avoid the collision. But, the jump club chairman reported that no change in the engine's operation was observed throughout the mishap. Witnesses at the takeoff area reported that the winds were 12 knots out of the northeast, which would have given the flight a quartering tailwind component for the takeoff. According to the flight manual, the maximum demonstrated crosswind is 12 knots. The examination of the airplane failed to indicate any system malfunction or failure.

The flight was cleared to maintain 3,000 ft msl until over the airport, then cruise. The pilot had previously stated that he could see the lights on the ground and that he was 15 miles from the airport. At 2013 the pilot stated "we oughta be able to cancel here." The aircraft would have been about 6 mi from the airport. The airport operator heard an aircraft low overhead and was able to see stars. Other ground witnesses closer to the point of impact observed very thick patchy fog with visibility about 200 ft. One witness observed the aircraft navigation lights do some unusual maneuvering, while another witness saw the lights very low. The aircraft impacted the ground in a left wing low, near level flight attitude. The wreckage was co-located with an approximate downwind to base leg turn. There is a single VOR/DME approach to rwy 11. The MDA is 1,260 ft and requires a minimum visibility of 1 mile. The circling approach has an MDA of 1,420 ft and also requires a minimum visibility of 1 mile. The pilot had received an altimeter setting of 29.77. The aircraft's altimeter was set between 30.29 and 30.30.

Flight 193 operated as a scheduled passenger from Miami to Pensacola, FL, with en route stops at Melbourne and Tampa, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Mobile. About 21:02 CDT the flight departed Mobile on an IFR flight plan to Pensacola and climbed to the cruising altitude of 7,000 feet. At 21:09, the crew were told that they would be vectored for an airport surveillance radar (ASR) approach to runway 25. At 21:13, the radar controller told National 193 that it was 11 nm NW of the airport and cleared it to descend and maintain 1,700 feet. At 21:17 flaps were selected at 15° and two minutes later the flight was cleared to descend to 1,500 feet and shortly after that further down to the MDA (480 feet). As the aircraft rolled out on the final approach heading, the captain called for the landing gear and the landing final checklist. At 21:20:15, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) whooper warning continued for nine seconds until the first officer silenced the warning. Nine seconds later the 727 hit the water with gear down and flaps at 25°. It came to rest in about 12 feet of water. The weather at the time of the accident was 400 feet overcast, 4 miles visibility in fog and haze, wind 190°/7 kts. Three passengers were killed while 55 other occupants were rescued, among them 11 were injured.

Directional control was lost after touchdown at Key Largo-Ocean Reef Airport. The twin engine airplane ground looped and came to rest. All seven occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine airplane departed Birmingham with one pilot and six potential customers on board for a demonstration flight to Mobile. While in normal cruise, the airplane suffered a complete in-flight breakup, dove into the ground and crashed near Demopolis. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all seven occupants were killed.