Miami

According to the first officer, during the first cargo flight of the day, the left engine propeller control was not working properly and the captain indicated that they would shut down the airplane and contact maintenance if the left engine propeller control could not be reset before the return flight. For the return flight, the engines started normally, and both propellers were cycled. The captain and the first officer were able to reset the left propeller control, so the airplane departed with the first officer as the pilot flying. The takeoff and initial climb were normal; however, as the airplane climbed through 4,000 ft, the left engine propeller control stopped working and the power was stuck at 2,400 rpm. The captain tried to adjust the propeller control and inadvertently increased power to 2,700 rpm. The captain then took control of the airplane and tried to stabilize the power on both engines. He leveled the airplane at 4,500 ft, canceled the instrument flight rules flight plan, and flew via visual flight rules direct toward the destination airport. The first officer suggested that they return to the departure airport, but the captain elected to continue as planned (The destination airport was located about 160 nautical miles from the departure airport). The first officer's postaccident statements indicated that he did not challenge the captain's decision. When the flight began the descent to 1,500 ft, the right engine began to surge and lose power. The captain and the first officer performed the engine failure checklist, and the captain feathered the propeller and shut down the engine. Shortly afterward, the left engine began to surge and lose power. The captain told the first officer to declare an emergency. The airplane continued to descend, and the airplane impacted the water "violently," about 32 miles east of the destination airport. The captain was unresponsive after the impact and the first officer was unable to lift the captain from his seat. Because the cockpit was filling rapidly with water, the first officer grabbed the life raft and exited the airplane from where the tail section had separated from the empennage. The first officer did not know what caused both engines to lose power. The airplane was not recovered from the ocean, so examination and testing to determine the cause of the engine failures could not be performed. According to the operator, the flight crew should have landed as soon as practical after the first sign of a mechanical issue. Thus, the crew should have diverted to the closest airport when the left engine propeller control stopped working and not continued the flight toward the destination airport.

The twin engine aircraft departed Miami on a flight to Dickson, Tennessee. By night, the pilot decided to land at Cornelia Fort Airpak which is closed to traffic at this time. In unclear circumstances, the aircraft belly landed in a grassy area along the left side of runway 22 and came to rest. The pilot escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On December 19, 2005, about 1439 eastern standard time, a Grumman Turbo Mallard (G-73T) amphibious airplane, N2969, operated by Flying Boat, Inc., doing business as Chalk’s Ocean Airways flight 101, crashed into a shipping channel adjacent to the Port of Miami, Florida, shortly after takeoff from the Miami Seaplane Base. Flight 101 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Bimini, Bahamas, with 2 flight crewmembers and 18 passengers on board. The airplane’s right wing separated during flight. All 20 people aboard the airplane were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. Flight 101 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on a visual flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The pilot stated that when the airplane was 3 miles east of the shoreline, at 3,000 feet, he felt a short tremor in the left engine followed by loss of power from the left engine. The pilot elected to return to the departure airport while declaring an emergency to air traffic control. During the process of securing the left engine the pilot noticed the propeller did not feathered and the airplane was descending quickly. He maneuvered the airplane and ditched in a lake. On September 26, 2003 engine s/n: 34592 was removed from the accident airplane due to high oil consumption with 1,225 hours of time in service. It was reportedly preserved and stored at the operator's warehouse. The mechanic who reportedly preserved the engine stated he followed the steps in the manual that was provided by the operator. On October 27, 2004 the left engine, s/n: NK510332, which was producing metal for months, was removed and engine s/n: 34592 was taken out of preservation and installed in the left position on the accident airplane with a new overhauled propeller assembly. On November 06, 2004, the left engine's, s/n: 34592, propeller governor was replaced due to the left propeller slow to response to power setting. During the post accident engine examination, the engine's main oil screen was observed with deposits of metal flakes and fragments, the oil scavenge pump would not rotate and had deposits of metal fragments internally; the engine was seized and wound not rotate. Catastrophic damage was observed to the accessories drive gears, oil transfer tube, and protection covers in the front accessory area. It was observed during a visual inspection of the crankshaft and bearings, including the front journal and front crankpin had damaged and sections of their respective bearings missing. The master rod bearing had incurred a catastrophic failure. Several cylinders skirts were found with impact marks from piston rods. Before removing the propeller assembly from the engine, the propeller feather system was flush with fresh oil and pressured with a feathering pump; the propeller blades were observed moving toward the feather position. Examination of the propeller assembly revealed metal contamination throughout the system; the propeller's governor screen gasket was clogged with metal contamination. The maintenance manual provided by the operator used for the engine preservation details several tasks required to be accomplished to the engine for proper engine preservation (i.e. thrust bear, cylinder, and propeller shaft treatments), which the mechanic did not mention he performed. No documentation for inspection and condition status of the dehydrator plugs were available. Documentation for flushing of contamination from the metal producing engine, s/n NK510332, was not available nor knowledge by the operator if since a process was preformed to the left engine's oil tank and its system before installation of engine s/n: 34592. An FAA review of the cargo manifest discovered two different manifest weights. The cargo manifest obtained at the accident scene showed a total of 267 pieces of cargo annotated at a total weight of 10, 837 lbs. The sealed cargo manifest package showed a total of 267 pieces of cargo annotated at a total weight of 14,182 lbs. The maximum payload weight for the accident airplane is 13,586 lbs.

The airline completed weight and balance and dispatch release forms for the initial flight showed an incorrect fuel load at the time the engines were started. The first officer performed a walk-around before the first flight leg which included checking the fuel tanks. A total of 460 gallons of fuel were added to the fuel tanks, and a delay loading cargo occurred. After both engines were started to begin the first flight, the engines remained operated for between 9-10 minutes before they were secured due to a radio problem. Maintenance personnel reracked the VHF radios, and again the engines were started where the airplane remained on the ramp 3-4 minutes before taxiing to the runway. The airplane remained at the runway hold short area for between 20 and 25 minutes before returning to the ramp due to a radio problem. The engines were secured, and a new VHF radio was purchased and installed. The company did not prepare new dispatch release, or weight and balance forms for the flight taking into account the additional fuel consumed with the engines operating. The engines were started, and the airplane was taxied to the runway and departed for the planned first leg. The airplane landed uneventfully at the destination airport where the cargo was offloaded. The first officer performed a walk-around which included checking the fuel tanks; 300 gallons of fuel were added to the fuel tanks (150 gallons in each side). The flight departed to return and when near the coastline, the flight was vectored to an airport other than the planned destination due to a issue with U.S. Customs. The flight landed uneventfully, and experienced a delay clearing customs. While on the ground before departure on the accident flight, the first officer reportedly performed a walk-around which included checking the fuel tanks with the captain looking on. The first officer reported that each fuel tank had approximately 1,100 pounds of fuel, and he and the captain both agreed before takeoff as to the quantity of fuel on-board as indicated by the magna-sticks. No fuel was purchased. Following starting of both engines for the accident flight, the first officer checked the fuel quantity gauges indications against the magna-sticks indications he observed; the fuel quantity gauges indicated approximately 200 pounds more. The flight departed, proceeded eastbound, and climbed to approximately 2,100 feet msl. During a right turn from a southeast to westerly heading, the right engine experienced a loss of horsepower which decreased from 900 to zero. The right engine was secured as a precaution, and priority handling to the destination airport was requested with air traffic control. The left engine horsepower remained the same (900) for a period of 31 seconds following the right engine horsepower decrease, then increased to 2,200, and remained at that value for 1 minute 13 seconds. The left engine horsepower then began to decrease and dropped to zero. The airplane was turned to the east, then turned to the south and ditched. The captain and first officer evacuated but remained with the airplane, and made it to shore where the first officer advised his wife that something was wrong with the fuel gauges. Following recovery of the airplane, pressure testing of the left fuel tank revealed no evidence of preimpact leakage. Pressure testing of the right fuel tank revealed slight leakage past the fuel cap. Boroscope examination of the engines, and functional test of each engine ignition system, fuel control units and fuel pumps revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the installed magna-sticks revealed no evidence of preimpact failure. The left fuel tank was drained and found to contain 2 gallons of Jet A fuel, while the right fuel tank was drained and found to contain approximately 540 gallons of salt water and 1/2 gallon of Jet A fuel. Fuel consumption calculations performed by FAA personnel revealed that at the time of engine start for the accident flight, the fuel tanks contained approximately 714 pounds of fuel. According to a representative of the engine manufacturer, the amount of fuel drained from the engine components post accident was consistent with, "low residual fuel."

About 5 hours and 10 minutes after departure, both engines failed due to fuel exhaustion at 11,000 feet approximately 40 miles from Haiti. According to the pilot, the aircraft was using more fuel than normal and the destination was changed accordingly. A short time after initiating the divert, both engines quit. The crew made an emergency landing in the sea about 64 km off Port-de-Paix and was rescued. The aircraft was lost.

The pilot reported that after he taxied to the rwy, the n°1 oil temperature was not up to the minimum temperature. He set the parking and advanced the n°1 throttle to 1,500 rpm until the engine warmed up. When both oil temperatures were within limits, he advanced both throttles to 30 inches manifold pressure and 2,250 rpm for a pretakeoff check. At that time, he used the normal (toe) brakes, since the parking brake would not hold the aircraft above approximately 1,700 rpm. He then applied full power and released the brakes for takeoff. As he started to roll with a slight left crosswind, the aircraft began drifting left. He corrected with right rudder, some right brake and right aileron. The aircraft then began drifting right and the pilot suspected a wind-shift from that direction. He applied left rudder and right aileron, but the plane veered right, went off the runway and headed for a ditch. Unable to stop, the pilot tried to clear the ditch. As the aircraft became airborne, the left wing dropped and hit the ground, and the aircraft yawed and crashed. The parking brake was found partially engaged. Tire marks were evident on the runway. All four occupants escaped uninjured.

While en route at 9,000 feet msl at night, the right engine reportedly lost power and was feathered. The pilot reported that the left engine had a partial loss of power and the aircraft would not maintain altitude. Communication was maintained with Miami Center until the pilot reported ditching about 40 miles south of Nassau, Bahamas. At 0600, a US Navy vessel rescued the pilot and two passengers. The aircraft was not recovered from the ocean.

The flight departed the Tamiami Airport, Miami, Florida at approximately 2100 est on February 9, 1982. There was no flight plan filed and the purpose, destination, and locations of possible enroute stops were not determined. The next reported communication with the flight was at 0533 on February 11, 1982 when the following transmission was recorded on the Miami international airport's control tower frequency: "mayday-mayday-mayday twin Cessna 421CC going in west of Miami, going in west of Miami." The aircraft initially impacted the terrain while on an easterly heading in a near level attitude. It bounced and impacted the second time in a 40° nose down attitude and flipped inverted. The wing fuel tanks ruptured in the crash but the main tanks were intact and found void of fuel. Both propellers separated during the crash sequence and the blade distortions were not indicative of power at the time of impact.

The twin engine airplane was engaged in a local post maintenance test flight at Miami and was carrying one engineer and one pilot. While flying at low height, both engines lost power. The pilot attempted an emergency belly landing in an field. While both occupants escaped uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.