Crash of a BAe 146-200 near San Luis Obispo: 43 killed

Date & Time: Dec 7, 1987 at 1616 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N350PS
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Los Angeles – San Francisco
MSN:
E2027
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
PS1771
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
38
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
43
Captain / Total flying hours:
11600
Captain / Total hours on type:
1600.00
Aircraft flight hours:
8571
Circumstances:
A recently discharged USAir employee boarded PSA flight 1771 after having left a goodbye message with friends. He bypassed security and carried aboard a borrowed 44 caliber pistol. A note written by this passenger, found in the wreckage, threatened his former supervisor at USAir, who was aboard the flight. At 1613, the pilot reported to Oakland ARTCC that he had an emergency and that gunshots had been fired in the airplane. Within 25 seconds, Oakland control controllers observed that PSA 1771 had begun a rapid descent from which it did not recover. Witnesses on the ground said the airplane was intact and there was no evidence of fire before the airplane struck the ground in a steep nose-down attitude. The cover tape revealed the sounds of a scuffle and several shots which were apparently fired in or near the cockpit. The pistol was found in the wreckage with 6 expended rounds. FAA rules permitted airline employees to bypass security checkpoints. All 43 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Occurrence #1: loss of control - in flight
Phase of operation: cruise - normal
Findings
1. (f) security - inadequate - company/operator management
2. (f) procedure inadequate - company/operator management
3. (f) insuff standards/requirements, operation/operator - faa (organization)
4. (c) control interference - intentional - passenger
5. (c) sabotage - intentional - passenger
6. (c) emotional reaction - passenger
7. Incapacitation - pilot in command
8. Incapacitation - copilot/second pilot
9. Suicide - intentional - passenger
----------
Occurrence #2: in flight collision with terrain/water
Phase of operation: descent - uncontrolled
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-9-32 in Cerritos: 79 killed

Date & Time: Aug 31, 1986 at 1152 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XA-JED
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Mexico City – Guadalajara – Loreto – Tijuana – Los Angeles
MSN:
47356
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
AM498
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
58
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
79
Captain / Total flying hours:
10641
Captain / Total hours on type:
4632.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1463
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1245
Circumstances:
AeroMéxico flight AM498 was a scheduled passenger flight from Mexico City to Los Angeles with intermediate stops at Guadalajara, Loreto and Tijuana. The DC-9, named 'Hermosillo', departed Tijuana Airport at 11:20 and proceeded toward Los Angeles at FL100. At 11:44 Coast Approach Control cleared the flight to 7,000 feet. Just three minutes earlier Piper PA-28-181 Cherokee N4891F departed Torrance Airport, CA for a VFR flight to Big Bear, CA. On board were a pilot and two passengers. The Piper pilot turned to an easterly heading toward the Paradise VORTAC and entered the Terminal Control Area (TCA) without receiving clearance from ATC as required by FAR Part 91.90. At 11:47 the AeroMéxico pilot contacted LA Approach Control and reported level at 7,000 feet. The approach controller cleared flight 498 to depart Seal Beach on a heading of 320 degrees for the ILS runway "two five left final approach course...". At 11:51:04, the approach controller asked the flight to reduce its airspeed to 190 KIAS and cleared it to descend to 6,000 feet. At about 11:52:09, flight 498 and the Piper collided over Cerritos at an altitude of about 6,560 feet. The Piper struck the left hand side of the DC-9's horizontal and vertical stabilizer. The horizontal stabilizer sliced through the Piper's cabin following which it separated from the tailplane. Both planes tumbled down out of control. The wreckage and post impact fires destroyed five houses and damaged seven others. Fifteen persons on the ground were killed. The sky was clear, the reported visibility was 14 miles.
Probable cause:
The limitations of the ATC system to provide collision protection, through both ATC procedures and automated redundancy. Factors contributing to the accident were:
- The inadvertent and unauthorized entry of the PA-28 into the Los Angeles Terminal Control Area and
- The limitations of the 'see and avoid' concept to ensure traffic separation under the conditions of the conflict.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-10-30CF in Anchorage

Date & Time: Dec 23, 1983 at 1406 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HL7339
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Seoul - Anchorage - Los Angeles
MSN:
46960
YOM:
1977
Flight number:
KE084
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
12562
Captain / Total hours on type:
6471.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8157
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2995
Circumstances:
While taxiing out in fog, the KAL crew became disoriented and ended up on the wrong runway. During the takeoff run, the aircraft collided head-on with South Central Air Flight 59, a Piper PA-31 which was taking off from runway 06L-24R for a flight to Kenai. The 9 occupants of N35206 were injured. The DC-10 overran the runway by 1434 feet and came to rest 40 feet right of the extended centreline.
Probable cause:
The failure of the pilot of Korean Air Lines Flight 084 to follow accepted procedures during taxi, which caused him to become disoriented while selecting the runway; the failure of the pilot to use the compass to confirm his position; and the decision of the pilot to take off when he was unsure that the aircraft was positioned on the correct runway. Contributing to the accident was the fog, which reduced visibility to a point that the pilot could not ascertain his position visually and the control tower personnel could not assist the pilot. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of legible taxiway and runway signs at several intersections passed by Flight 084 while it was taxiing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-54F in Detroit: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jan 11, 1983 at 0252 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N8053U
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cleveland - Detroit - Los Angeles
MSN:
46010
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
UA2885
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
16102
Captain / Total hours on type:
2711.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9360
Copilot / Total hours on type:
6493
Aircraft flight hours:
31902
Aircraft flight cycles:
13474
Circumstances:
United Flight 2885 departed Cleveland at 01:15 for a cargo flight to Los Angeles via Detroit. The DC-8 arrived at Detroit at 01:52. Cargo for Detroit was unloaded, the airplane was refueled, and cargo for Los Angeles was loaded. The engines were started, and then the crew called for taxi instructions at 02:45:58. During the taxi, the flightcrew accomplished the before takeoff checklist. The second officer called "trim" and the first officer responded "set". The flightcrew however, inadvertently overlooked setting the stabilizer trim for takeoff, and the setting of 7.5 units ANU was the previous landing trim setting. At 02:49:16, the captain, the first officer, and the second officer discussed the idea of the first officer switching seats with the second officer. They then switched seats about 02:49:40. United 2885 called for clearance onto runway 21R at 02:49:58 and was cleared for takeoff at 02:50:03. The throttles were advanced for takeoff at 02:51:05 and power stabilized 7 seconds later. Speed callouts "eighty knots" and "Vee One" were called by the captain and the airplane broke ground about 02:51:41. The airplane continued to climb with wings level to about 1,000 feet. The airplane then rolled to the right in a gradual right turn until it was in a wings vertical position (right wing down, left wing up) and crashed into a freshly plowed farm field.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's failure to follow procedural checklist requirements and to detect and correct a mistrimmed stabilizer before the aircraft became uncontrollable. Contributing to the accident was the captain allowing the second officer, who was not qualified to act as a pilot, to occupy the seat of the first officer and to conduct the take-off.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft H18 in Fresno

Date & Time: Jun 18, 1982 at 1856 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N74JT
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fresno - Los Angeles
MSN:
BA-639
YOM:
1963
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3767
Captain / Total hours on type:
2475.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6988
Circumstances:
Just after liftoff from runway 29R, the aircraft began to pitch up. As the pitch up progressed, the pilot applied right aileron and full right rudder. The aircraft responded by rolling to the right with the nose falling thru. Subsequently, the pilot was able to pull out before the aircraft hit the ground. It collided with a 6 feet wire fence which tore off the engines and caused the aircraft to rotate clockwise on the ground. Cargo in the aircraft was thrown thru the side of the fuselage. The pilot exited the aircraft without injury. The aircraft immediately burst into flames and the fuselage was badly burned. An investigation revealed that 2,989 lbs of freight plus a 359 lb motorcycle were being carried between bulkheads 5 & 11. The bulkhead loads were limited to 450 lbs (5-8) and 300 lbs (8-10). The max gross weight at takeoff was estimated to be 10,310 lbs. The pilot reported that none of the freight was tied down.
Probable cause:
Occurrence #1: loss of control - in flight
Phase of operation: takeoff - initial climb
Findings
1. (f) aircraft weight and balance - exceeded - pilot in command
2. (c) tie down - not performed - pilot in command
3. Aircraft handling - not possible
----------
Occurrence #2: in flight collision with object
Phase of operation: takeoff
Findings
4. (f) object - fence
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Prescott

Date & Time: Feb 10, 1981 at 0810 LT
Registration:
N27661
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sedona - Prescott - Los Angeles
MSN:
31-7852093
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3078
Captain / Total hours on type:
860.00
Circumstances:
After takeoff from Prescott-Ernest A. Love, while in initial climb, the twin engine airplane stalled and crashed. All 10 occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Stall during initial climb due to inadequate maintenance and inspection. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Flight control surfaces: elevator assembly, attachments,
- Improperly secured,
- Inadequate preflight preparation,
- Improperly loaded aircraft,
- 658 lbs over max limit,
- CofG 1.28 inch behind aft limit,
- Nosed up, unable to lower the nose with elevator down.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-10-10 in Mexico City: 73 killed

Date & Time: Oct 31, 1979 at 0542 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N903WA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Los Angeles - Mexico City
MSN:
46929/107
YOM:
1973
Flight number:
WA2605
Country:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
77
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
73
Captain / Total flying hours:
31500
Captain / Total hours on type:
2248.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
354
Aircraft flight hours:
24614
Aircraft flight cycles:
7345
Circumstances:
The airplane had taken off from Los Angeles International Airport, California, for Mexico City, at 0140LT on 31 October 1979. The Mexico centre had cleared the crew to approach Mexico City via Tepexpan, subsequently instructing the aircraft crew to change frequency to the control tower. The tower operator informed the crew that the runway in use was 23 Right and provided the crew with information on the weather conditions prevailing at Mexico City International Airport, and landing data. When the aircraft was on final approach, the control tower operator repeated that the runway in use was 23 Right and drew the attention of the pilot to the fact that he was left of the flight path he should be following to land on the runway in use. The pilot acknowledged the information and the fact that he was slightly to the left. The transcription of the magnetic tape which contains the communications between the control tower operator and the crew of aircraft N-903WA reveals that et one point the control tower operator asked the pilot whether he could see the approach lights on his left, to which the pilot replied "negative". The data obtained from the aircraft's flight recorder shows that the crew was making an instrument approach. The instrument landing procedure authorized in the aeronautical information publication (AIP) for Runway 23 Left with transition to 23 Right specifies that if the pilot does not have the runway in sight at 600 ft during an instrument landing approach, he must break off the approach and climb to 8 500 ft. In this case the crew continued with the landing procedure, ignoring the requirement to call out the altitude values and the decision minimum, and descended until the landing gear touched down off-centre of Runway 23 Left, which was closed to all operations. On the transcription of the cockpit voice recorder the pilot-in-command is heard to have said that he was on the flight path to Runway 23 Left, just before the left landing gear wheels touched down on the grass to the left of Runway 23 Left and the right landing gear wheels on the runway shoulder. The aircraft did not enter the runway until it had travelled some 100 m. According to the flight recorder data and the wheel traces at the site of the accident, the crew re-applied power for the go-around procedure and lifted the aircraft nose by 100-210. Now airborne, the aircraft's right landing gear collided with a truck located on the left shoulder of the runway which was closed for repairs. The impact left a distinct mark in the left-hand side of the vehicle's bonnet corresponding exactly to the shape and size of the aircraft's wheel. The collision with the truck, which was loaded with 10 tonnes of earth, removed the right landing gear leg with part or sections of the main gear beam to which it is attached, bursting three of the four tires. The two front tires came off the wheels, whose hubs disintegrated, scattering pieces away from the aircraft. The horizontal shaft which carries the two front wheels and the associated brake units also broke off and were projected forward over a distance of over 400 m. After breaking off, the right landing gear leg struck the right tailplane and elevator, severing the two almost completely. This caused the landing gear leg complete with the two rear tires, wheels and brake units to be thrown about 70 m beyond the point of collision with the truck. The left side panel of the truck's dumper body, the only part to break off, was thrown to the left of the runway; this panel bore traces of tires about halfway along its top edge. The inner right-hand section of the wing flaps also struck the dumper body, which removed the complete section; this was found to the right of the aircraft's flight path some 40 m beyond the final location of the dumper body. The underside of the flap was full of earth and the fractures in the structure contained earth from the truck. The right-hand side panel of the dumper body also bore evidence of having been struck by a metal object. The truck broke up completely and parts of it were scattered over a considerable distance on and off the runway, the area covered being some 400 m long by 100 m wide. Three seconds before the collision with the truck the engine throttles were opened. The collision occurred under these conditions and in spite of the violence of the impact the aircraft remained airborne and flew on, although lift was precarious due to the loss on the right side of the tailplane complete with elevator and the inner section of the wing flap. The aircraft was banked to the right and this inclination increased so much that when the aircraft was approximately 1 500 m from the threshold of Runway 23 Left, the outer section of the right wing flap struck the cab of an excavator which was parked parallel to the right-hand edge of Runway 23 Left. The impact completely destroyed the cab and parts of the trailing edge of the wing flap were found embedded in the twisted framework of the excavator. The aircraft continued, veering to the right and increasing its bank angle towards that side until the right wing tip was scraping Taxiway "A", leaving a deep score in the pavement, damaging a telephone manhole and destroying some taxiway edge lights. A severed section of the right wing was found deeply embedded in the ground at this point and the first signs of the fire which burned the nearby grass were also in this area. The distance from the marks left by the landing gear in the grass and on the runway shoulder 167 m from the threshold of Runway 23 Left, to the score made in Taxiway "A" by the right wing tip, is approximately 2 500 m, and over this entire distance the aircraft left no mark or trace on the ground, except a few metres beyond the excavator. From this point a score of constant depth and width had been made in the grass over a distance of about 70 m, possibly by something suspended underneath the aircraft. Small fragments of glass fibre, the material used for the trailing edges of the aircraft's control surfaces, were found along this score. The evidence above proves that the aircraft had remained airborne from the time it collided with the truck until reaching Taxiway "A", as confirmed by the flight recorder data. After the traces left by the right wing tip on Taxiway "A", scores of varying depths were made in Taxiway "Ptt by the aileron and the outer section of the right flap. A few metres further on the right wing collided with the corner of the PCV repair hangar, knocking down a pillar, a cross tie and part of the roof corner. Various aircraft components were found inside the hangar, e.g. the flap guides and hinges, sections of the leading edge of the right aileron, etc., besides the fuel which was spilled from the fractured wing onto a PCV under repair and on parked cars and vans. The collision of the right wing with the PCV repair hangar hardly interrupted the aircraft along its flight path and it finally crashed against the front of a building, which was demolished by the impact. This was the main impact, during which the tail fin complete with rudder and engine No. 2, the tail unit and the left tailplane with its elevator broke off, together with what remained of the right tailplane and elevator removed earlier by the right landing gear leg. The left wing was also severed at its attachment to the centre section and was thrown more than 200 m, turning over in the process and falling on a house outside the airport; part of this house was burned out. Engines No. 1 and 3 broke away from the wings and were destroyed by the impact and fire. 16 people were injured while 72 occupants, including nine crew members were killed as well as one people in the building.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of the combination of the following factors:
- Non-compliance with the meteorological minima for the approach procedure, as cleared,
- Failure to comply with the aircraft's operating procedures during the approach phase,
- Landing on a runway closed to traffic,
- During the final approach to the runway assigned and having reached a height of 800 feet above the ground, the aircraft flew into a fog bank which concealed it from the control tower operator,
- The aircraft's crew did not comply with the procedural minima for the approach for which it had been cleared, in that the crew descended below the minima without reporting the runway in sight or initiating a go-around procedure,
- The crew never reported to the control tower operator that the runway was in sight and no landing clearance was therefore given,
- The data obtained from the cockpit voice recorder revealed that the crew did not comply with the operational procedures laid down in the relevant manuals, in particular the requirement to call out the altimeter readings during the final approach phase.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-10-10 in Chicago: 273 killed

Date & Time: May 25, 1979 at 1504 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N110AA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Chicago - Los Angeles
MSN:
46510/22
YOM:
1971
Flight number:
AA191
Crew on board:
13
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
258
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
273
Captain / Total flying hours:
22500
Captain / Total hours on type:
3000.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9275
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1200
Aircraft flight hours:
19871
Circumstances:
American Airlines Flight 191, a McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-10, crashed on takeoff from Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, Illinois, USA. The aircraft was destroyed and all 271 occupants were killed. Additionally, two persons on the ground sustained fatal injuries. At 14:59 hours local time Flight 191 taxied from the gate at O'Hare Airport. The flight was bound for Los Angeles, California, with 258 passengers and 13 crew members on board. Maintenance personnel who monitored the flight's engine start, push-back, and start of taxi did not observe anything out of the ordinary. The weather at the time of departure was clear, and the reported surface wind was 020° at 22 kts. Flight 191 was cleared to taxi to runway 32R for takeoff. The company's Takeoff Data Card showed that the stabilizer trim setting was 5° aircraft nose up, the takeoff flap setting was 10°, and the takeoff gross weight was 379,000 lbs. The target low pressure compressor (N1) rpm setting was 99.4 percent, critical engine failure speed (V1) was 139 kts indicated airspeed (KIAS), rotation speed (VR) was 145 KIAS, and takeoff safety speed (V2) was 153 KIAS. Flight 191 was cleared to taxi into position on runway 32R and hold. At 15:02:38, the flight was cleared for takeoff, and at 15:02:46 the captain acknowledged, "American one ninety-one under way." The takeoff roll was normal until just before rotation at which time sections of the No.1 (left) engine pylon structure came off the aircraft. Witnesses saw white smoke or vapor coming from the vicinity of the No. 1 engine pylon. During rotation the entire No. 1 engine and pylon separated from the aircraft, went over the top of the wing, and fell to the runway. Flight 191 lifted off about 6,000 ft down runway 32R, climbed out in a wings-level attitude. About nine seconds after liftoff, the airplane had accelerated to 172 knots and reached 140 feet of altitude. As the climb continued, the airplane began to decelerate at a rate of about one knot per second, and at 20 seconds after liftoff, and an altitude of 325 feet, airspeed had been reduced to 159 knots. At this point, the airplane began to roll to the left, countered by rudder and aileron inputs. The airplane continued to roll until impact, 31 seconds after liftoff, and in a 112-degree left roll, and 21-degree nose down pitch attitude. At 15:04 Flight 191 crashed in an open field and trailer park about 4,600 ft northwest of the departure end of runway 32R. The aircraft was demolished during the impact, explosion, and ground fire. The No.1 engine pylon failure during takeoff was determined to have been caused by unintended structural damage which occurred during engine/pylon reinstallation using a forklift. The engine/pylon removal and reinstallation were being conducted to implement two DC-10 Service Bulletins. Both required that the pylons be removed, and recommended that this be accomplished with the engines removed. The Service Bulletin instructions assumed that engines and pylons would be removed separately, and did not provide instructions to remove the engine and pylon as a unit. Additionally, removal of the engines and pylons as a unit was not an approved Maintenance Manual procedure. The lack of precision associated with the use of the forklift, essentially an inability to perform the fine manipulations necessary to accomplish reinstallation of the engine/strut assembly, in combination with the tight clearances between the pylon flange and the wing clevis resulted in damage to the same part that had just been inspected. Inspections of other DC-10 pylon mounts following the accident resulted in nine additional cracked mounts being identified.
Probable cause:
The asymmetrical stall and the ensuing roll of the aircraft because of the uncommanded retraction of the left wing outboard leading edge slats and the loss of stall warning and slat disagreement indication systems resulting from maintenance-induced damage leading to the separation of the no.1 engine and pylon assembly procedures which led to failure of the pylon structure. Contributing to the cause of the accident were the vulnerability of the design of the pylon attach points to maintenance damage; the vulnerability of the design of the leading edge slat system to the damage which produced asymmetry; deficiencies in FAA surveillance and reporting systems which failed to detect and prevent the use of improper maintenance procedures; deficiencies in the practices and communications among the operators, the manufacturer, and the FAA which failed to determine and disseminate the particulars regarding previous maintenance damage incidents; and the intolerance of prescribed operational procedures to this unique emergency.
Final Report:

Crash of a Nord 262A-33 off Los Angeles: 3 killed

Date & Time: Mar 10, 1979 at 1752 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N418SA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Los Angeles - Santa Maria
MSN:
41
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
WI235
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
8500
Captain / Total hours on type:
879.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5600
Copilot / Total hours on type:
424
Aircraft flight hours:
11300
Circumstances:
On March 10, 1979, Swift Aire Lines, Inc., Flight 235, an Aerospatiale Nord 262, N418SA, was being operated as a scheduled passenger flight from Los Angeles, California, to Santa Maria, California. About 1745 PST, flight 235 departed the commuter passenger terminal at the Los Angeles International Airport to taxi to the end of runway 24L via the parallel taxiway. The flight was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan; there were four passengers and three crew members on board. At 1748:11, the crew reported that it was ready for takeoff, and at 1749:04, the flight was cleared to taxi into position on runway 24L and hold. At 1749:34, the tower controller cleared the flight for takeoff and cautioned "possible turbulence, preceding heavy departure. You'll be more than 6 miles in trail." The crew acknowledged the clearance and began the takeoff roll. At 1750:27, the flight was changed over to the departure control radio frequency. At 1751:08, the crew of Flight 235 reported, "We got an emergency, we are going down." The departure controller asked if the flight wanted to return to land. At 1751:14, the crew replied, "We lost both of them." Witnesses who were located along the flightpath of the aircraft at the time of the accident stated that when the aircraft lifted off the runway exhaust smoke from both engines was visible, and when the aircraft crossed the departure end of the runway, the right propeller was observed slowing to a stop. As the aircraft crossed the shoreline, popping sounds were heard from the left engine, and the aircraft stopped climbing and turned north paralleling the shoreline. The witnesses did not hear any engine sounds after the aircraft turned parallel to the shoreline. The witnesses also stated that as the aircraft flew north along the shoreline, it descended in a wings-level attitude, it contacted the water smoothly, bounced twice, impacted the water in a nose down attitude, and sank almost immediately. The flight attendant, who was seated in a rear passenger seat during the takeoff, said that she listened to the crew over the intercom until she heard the gear-up call by the captain and that, until the gear-up call, everything had been normal. At that point, she removed her headset. Shortly thereafter, she noticed that there was no engine noise, and she looked out of the window. Seeing that the aircraft was over water, she then briefed the passengers on crash landing and ditching procedures. She stated that before the aircraft struck the water, the crew had given her two aural warnings of an emergency landing. One passenger stated that acceleration was good during the takeoff and climb out to about 300 to 400 ft. Ile said that shortly after he heard the landing gear go up, he heard a pop, and the right engine lost power and stopped running. This was followed by an increase in power on the left engine, and the aircraft continued to climb momentarily. Then, as it leveled off, the left engine quit. He said it appeared that the captain tried to restart the left engine. The accident occurred during the hours of dusk.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the flightcrew's mismanagement of an emergency procedure following an autofeather of the right propeller which resulted in their shutting down the remaining engine. Contributing to the accident was the unavailability of vital restart information to the crew. The following findings were reported:
- Shortly after landing gear retraction, the right propeller autofeathered and the engine shut down,
- The right engine shutdown was followed closely by the shutdown of the left engine,
- A leak or break in the propeller pressure line to the autofeather selector probably caused the right propeller to autofeather and the engine to shut down,
- The left engine was shut down inadvertently,
- The left engine probably was shut down because the flight crew failed to properly identify the engine on which the autofeather occurred and moved the left power lever to the stop position,
- A possible restart attempt was not successful because the flight crew was probably unaware that feathering the propeller was a prerequisite to a successful airborne restart,
- The engine restart procedures contained in the aircraft operations manual did not contain sufficient information to effect a restart from an unfeathered condition,
- After the left engine was shut down, there was enough altitude and time available for the crew to get a restart,
- The fatalities occurred when the crewmembers and passenger became trapped or disoriented, or both, by the fast, rushing water that entered the aircraft after it was ditched in the Santa Monica Bay.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 707-323C in the Pacific Ocean: 6 killed

Date & Time: Jan 30, 1979 at 2100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PP-VLU
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Tokyo – Los Angeles – Lima – Rio de Janeiro
MSN:
19235
YOM:
1961
Flight number:
RG967
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
23000
Circumstances:
The four engine airplane departed Tokyo-Narita Airport at 2023LT on a cargo flight to Rio de Janeiro with intermediate stops in Los Angeles and Lima. There were six crew members on board as well as 53 paintings by Manabu Mabe, returning from a Tokyo exhibition, valued at US$1.24 million. At 2045LT, the last radio transmission was recorded with ATC and about 15 minutes later, while in cruising altitude, the airplane disappeared from the radar screens. SAR operations were immediately initiated by Japanese and American Authorities but eventually suspended after several days as no trace of the aircraft nor the six occupants was found. The captain, Gilberto Araújo da Silva, was flying the Varig Boeing 707 that crashed while approaching Paris-Orly Airport on July 11, 1973.
Probable cause:
Due to lack of evidences as the wreckage was not found, the exact cause of the accident could not be determined. However, it was reported that the crew did not send any distress call and it is believed that the accident may have been caused by a sudden and accidental decompression of the cabin.