Chesterfield-Spirit of St Louis

A witness reported that the multi-engine turboprop airplane was on final approach to land when it suddenly veered to the left and entered a rapid descent. The witness stated that he heard the "whine of the engines" before the airplane impacted terrain about 1/2 mile south of the runway threshold. In the days preceding the accident flight, the airplane had been at a maintenance facility to resolve a vibration in the rudder system while the autopilot system was engaged. There were no anomalies reported with the autopilot system during a test flight completed immediately before the accident flight. However, anomalies with the rate gyro were noted by a mechanic who recommended replacing it, but the pilot departed on the accident flight without the recommended repair having been completed. Further, examination of the autopilot annunciator panel indicated that the autopilot was likely not engaged at the time of impact, likely because the airplane was on a short final approach for landing. Accordingly, any existing autopilot faults would not have affected the flight as the autopilot system was likely not in use. There were no failures identified with the primary flight controls, engines, or propellers that would have prevented the pilot from maintaining control of the airplane manually. Toxicological testing revealed the presence of Zolpidem in the pilot's blood (Zolpidem, the trade name for Ambien, is used for short-term treatment of insomnia); however, the reported levels would likely not have resulted in any impairment.

Shortly after takeoff the pilot experienced a loss of power on the right engine. He attempted to return to the airport to land, but determined that he was not going to reach the runway so he elected to land on a dirt field. He flew under power lines that were in his flight path and attempted to flare the airplane prior to it impacting the terrain. The airplane was equipped with Teledyne Continental GTSIO-520 engines. Post accident examination of the right engine revealed that all of the teeth on the starter adapter gear and several of the teeth on the crankshaft gear were missing. Several gear teeth and metal filings were located in the oil sump. The torsional damper to shaft gear woodruff key was sheared. The torsional damper was placed on a test bench to determine the damping time. The consecutive tests averaged a damping time of 6.9 seconds. The damping time of a new damper is min/max 1.5 to 3.125 seconds. Metallurgical examination revealed 15 starter gear teeth and 11 crankshaft gear teeth were fractured near their root. No indications of preexisting cracking were noted. At least two of the starter gear teeth and several of the crankshaft gear teeth displayed spalling and wear at the pitch line of the teeth. On June 13, 1994, Teledyne Continental issued a Mandatory Service Bulletin, MSB94-4, addressing the possible failure of the starter adapter gear and/or crankshaft gear on GTSIO-520 and GIO-550 engines. On October 31, 2005, Teledyne Continental issued revision, MSB94-4G. The service bulletin called for an inspection of the starter adapter viscous damper and shaft gear backlash every 100 hours of engine operation, and a visual inspection of the starter adapter shaft and crankshaft gear teeth for spalling, pitting, and wear, every 400 hours of engine operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2005-20-04, effective November 1, 2005, requiring compliance with the Teledyne Continental Mandatory Service Bulletin. Maintenance records showed the mandatory service bulletin had been complied with when the right engine was overhauled and installed in March 2001. There was no indication in the maintenance records that either the mandatory service bulletin or the AD had been complied with since the engine was installed. The engine had a total time of 541.9 hours at the time of the accident. The pilot did not follow the published emergency procedures.

The Hansa 320, a corporate turbojet airplane departed runway 26L at night on a maintenance ferry flight at 1954 central standard time, and was destroyed when it impacted a river two miles west of the departure airport. Radar track data indicated that the airplane climbed to about 900 feet msl at about 180 knots before it began losing altitude and impacted the river. The current weather was: winds 270 degrees at 13 knots gusting to 19 knots, visibility 7 miles, light rain, 1,000 feet scattered ceiling, 1,800 feet broken, 2,400 feet overcast, temperature 2 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 2 degrees C, altimeter 29.90. The FAA had issued the pilot a Special Flight Permit for the flight. The limitations listed in the flight permit included the following limitations: Limitation number 6 stipulated, "IFR in VMC conditions approved, provided all equipment required for IFR flight is operational and certified iaw 14 CFR Part 91.413. If this equipment is NOT certified and operational, then VFR in VMC conditions ONLY." The ferry permit listed, "Additional Limitations: Engine power assurance runs, compass swing, and functional check of avionics equipment must be performed, and appropriate maintenance entries in the aircraft log prior to departure." The pilot was informed that none of the additional limitations had been performed prior to takeoff. The pilot had aborted a previous takeoff at about 1830 due to no airspeed indications. At the request of the pilot, maintenance personnel disconnected the lines to the pitot tubes and blew out the tubes, but no leak check, as required by FAR 91.411, was performed prior to the accident flight. The pilot performed a high-speed taxi to test the airspeed indicators prior to takeoff. The copilot did not have any ground school or flight time in a Hansa 320. The second-in-command requirements stated in FAR 61.55 9 (f) (1), required that the flight be conducted under day VFR or day IFR. The Toxicology report for the pilot indicated that 0.106 (ug/ml, ug/g) Diphenhydramine was detected in the blood. Diphenhydramine is an antihistamine commonly used in over-the-counter cold/allergy preparations. In therapeutic doses, the medication commonly results in drowsiness, and has measurable effects on performance of complex cognitive and motor tasks (e.g. flying an aircraft). The pilot's currency in the Hansa 320 expired on November 30, 2004, the day of the accident. He would be required to have an FAA checkride in a Hansa 320 to be a pilot-in-command (PIC) after November 30th. Engine teardown inspections revealed that both engines were developing power at the time of impact. The inspection of the elevator trim system revealed that the elevator trim cables were improperly installed when they were replaced to comply with an Airworthiness Directive (AD) 224-01-11. The maintenance manager who inspected the installation of the elevator trim cables did not perform an operational check of the elevator trim tabs. The maintenance manager signed the aircraft log stating the "Aircraft is approved for one time ferry flight from SUS to TOL," although all stipulations of the ferry permit had not been met, and that a leak check of the pitot-static system had not been performed after the pitot tubes had been blown out.

The Beech 200 was substantially damaged during an aborted landing. The winds were gusting in excess of the airplane's maximum demonstrated crosswind component. A witness reported finding landing gear strut pieces on the runway after the Beech 200's landing attempt. The flight then aborted the landing and continued on to its originating airport where the airplane veered off the runway and damaged airport property during its landing.

The pilot and passengers departed the Spirit of St. Louis Airport and flew to Springfield Regional Airport, a 50 to 60 minute flight. The fuel on board was about 25 to 30 gallons in the left wing tanks, and 75 to 80 gallons in the right wing tanks. Each engine burned about 25 to 30 gallons per hour. The airplane was not fueled prior to the return flight. About five minutes after takeoff, the airplane had reached 4,300 feet msl (3,033 feet agl) and began a 402 fpm descent. The airplane continued the descent away from the airport for about 7 nm before turning 180 degrees to the left. The airplane had descended to 2,200 feet msl (933 feet agl) and was 10 miles from the airport. The pilot reported to the controller that he had a '...partial engine failure on the left side.' The airplane impacted the ground in an inverted, vertical nose down attitude. The landing gear were down at impact. Neither propeller was feathered. The right wing, right engine, fuselage, and empennage received extensive fire damage. The left wing was consumed by fire between the nacelle and the wing root. The remaining left wing, left nacelle, and engine were not destroyed by fire. Examination of the engines and airframe did not reveal any pre-existing anomalies that prevented normal operation. The Airplane Flight Manual did not contain procedures which explained fuel cross feeding procedures in case of fuel exhaustion to a wing's fuel tanks.

Two foreign pilots took off VFR to remain in the vicinity of an airport on the outskirts of a metropolitan area. No record was found to show the airplane had been fueled either before or after the preceding flight. The flight crew contacted an area approach control and requested an ILS approach to test their ILS equipment without specifying an airport. Approach control issued and the flight crew accepted vectors to another airport for which the pilots had no approach plate or airport information. Vectors took the airplane about 25 miles from the departure airport. The flight crew requested to proceed back to the departure airport. A short time later, the flight crew declared an emergency due to low fuel, then radar contact was lost. Witnesses at a landfill heard an intermittent sound from the engine(s). The airplane came into their view with one engine running, then the engine sound ceased. They indicated the airplane went out of control and crashed, but one engine accelerated just before impact. A small fire was confined to the left wing. Both occupants were killed.

During engine runup, Flight 529 was given its air traffic control clearance which was: "cleared to the Las Vegas Airport via Victor 6 Naperville, Victor 8 flight plan route, maintain 5,000 feet." The clearance was acknowledged correctly and TWA Flight 529 departed on runway 22L at 0200, making a right turn out of traffic. The 0200 Midway Airport weather was: scattered clouds at 10,000 feet; high overcast, visibility three miles in haze and smoke; wind south eight knots. The Chicago O'Hare Airport weather at 0200 was: partial obscuration; scattered clouds 15,000 feet; high overcast; visibility two and one-half miles in ground fog and smoke; wind south six knots. Radar contact was established with the flight one minute and 34 seconds after the flight acknowledged takeoff clearance and as the aircraft proceeded outbound in a right turn. At 0204, Flight 529 was observed on radar by the departure controller to be five miles west of Midway Airport proceeding on course. Northwest Airlines Flight 105 was cleared for takeoff on runway 22L at Midway, and took off Immediately. The ground controller observed a flash west of Midway Airport at this time and asked Flight 105 if he had seen a flash. Flight 105 advised that they had seen a flash fire and would fly over the area. As Flight 105 reported over the fire, the radar range was noted to be nine miles west of Midway Airport and the radar return of TWA. Flight 529 had disappeared from the scope. It was later determined that Flight 529 had crashed at this site and that the observed ground fire was the result of the accident. The airplane disintegrated in a field and all 78 occupants have been killed.

The DC-3 was on a regularly scheduled flight en route from La Guardia Field, N Y., to Wilmington, Del., having originated at Boston, Mass., with Memphis, Tenn., as the destination. Takeoff from La Guardia was at 1000, with 12 revenue passengers and a fresh crew consisting of Captain L. R. Matthews, Pilot J. B. Simmons, and Flight Attendant Peter Gobleck. The aircraft was loaded within the prescribed limits for weight and location of center of gravity. The clearance was in accordance with Visual Flight Rules. The flight reported its position as over Freehold, N J., at 1017 and estimated arrival over Philadelphia, Pa., at 1037 and Wilmington, Del., at 1045. This was the last radio contact with the DC-3. The F-6-F-5 was en route from the Naval Air Station Anacostia, DC, to the Naval Air Station, Quonset Point R. I., on a training, or proficiency flight. Takeoff from Anacostia was at 0937 with the aircraft piloted by Lieutenant (j g) Robert V. Poe, USN. Clearance was in accordance with Visual Flight Rules, specifying a cruising speed of 160 knots (184 statute miles per hour) and an estimated time en route of two hours. There is no record of any position report or other radio contact from the F-6-F-5 after it was cleared for takeoff by the Anacostia tower. Weather conditions existing over the route of both aircraft were good. The visibility was 10 miles and there were scattered clouds at 12,000 feet. At about 1030 the F-6-F-5 was observed to perform acrobatics and to "buzz" a small civil aircraft in the neighborhood of Chesterfield, N. J. These maneuvers terminated in collision between the F-6-F-5 and the DC-3. Upon collision the fighter plane lost its left wing and the DC-3 lost the outer portion of its left wing. Both aircraft then fell in erratic paths, losing various parts while falling. The DC-3 burned when it struck the ground. The fighter's pilot was either seriously injured or killed at the time of the collision and was thrown clear of the aircraft during the descent. There was no indication that he attempted to use his parachute. The fighter did not burn on impact. All 16 occupants in both aircraft were killed.

While cruising by night over Derbyshire, one of both left engines failed. The pilot was unable to maintain a safe altitude and instructed the crew to bail out. For unknown reason, only three crew were able to abandon the aircraft that crashed in flames in Palterton, nine km west of Chesterfield. Three crew members were killed:
Sergeant William Arthur Roland Andrew,
Sergeant Arley Carlisle Carl Starnes, air gunner,
Sergeant Russell Irvine Pym, flight engineer.