MBB HFB-320 Hansa Jet

The Hansa 320, a corporate turbojet airplane departed runway 26L at night on a maintenance ferry flight at 1954 central standard time, and was destroyed when it impacted a river two miles west of the departure airport. Radar track data indicated that the airplane climbed to about 900 feet msl at about 180 knots before it began losing altitude and impacted the river. The current weather was: winds 270 degrees at 13 knots gusting to 19 knots, visibility 7 miles, light rain, 1,000 feet scattered ceiling, 1,800 feet broken, 2,400 feet overcast, temperature 2 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 2 degrees C, altimeter 29.90. The FAA had issued the pilot a Special Flight Permit for the flight. The limitations listed in the flight permit included the following limitations: Limitation number 6 stipulated, "IFR in VMC conditions approved, provided all equipment required for IFR flight is operational and certified iaw 14 CFR Part 91.413. If this equipment is NOT certified and operational, then VFR in VMC conditions ONLY." The ferry permit listed, "Additional Limitations: Engine power assurance runs, compass swing, and functional check of avionics equipment must be performed, and appropriate maintenance entries in the aircraft log prior to departure." The pilot was informed that none of the additional limitations had been performed prior to takeoff. The pilot had aborted a previous takeoff at about 1830 due to no airspeed indications. At the request of the pilot, maintenance personnel disconnected the lines to the pitot tubes and blew out the tubes, but no leak check, as required by FAR 91.411, was performed prior to the accident flight. The pilot performed a high-speed taxi to test the airspeed indicators prior to takeoff. The copilot did not have any ground school or flight time in a Hansa 320. The second-in-command requirements stated in FAR 61.55 9 (f) (1), required that the flight be conducted under day VFR or day IFR. The Toxicology report for the pilot indicated that 0.106 (ug/ml, ug/g) Diphenhydramine was detected in the blood. Diphenhydramine is an antihistamine commonly used in over-the-counter cold/allergy preparations. In therapeutic doses, the medication commonly results in drowsiness, and has measurable effects on performance of complex cognitive and motor tasks (e.g. flying an aircraft). The pilot's currency in the Hansa 320 expired on November 30, 2004, the day of the accident. He would be required to have an FAA checkride in a Hansa 320 to be a pilot-in-command (PIC) after November 30th. Engine teardown inspections revealed that both engines were developing power at the time of impact. The inspection of the elevator trim system revealed that the elevator trim cables were improperly installed when they were replaced to comply with an Airworthiness Directive (AD) 224-01-11. The maintenance manager who inspected the installation of the elevator trim cables did not perform an operational check of the elevator trim tabs. The maintenance manager signed the aircraft log stating the "Aircraft is approved for one time ferry flight from SUS to TOL," although all stipulations of the ferry permit had not been met, and that a leak check of the pitot-static system had not been performed after the pitot tubes had been blown out.

The Hansa Jet HFB-320 aircraft crashed on takeoff from the Aberdeen Airport after the flight crew selected the incorrect runway for takeoff. The aircraft was observed running off the end of runway 17, which is 3,860 feet long, where it struck a fence, ditch, road and another ditch then became airborne, the landing gear separated during the above sequence. The aircraft was than observed to level off momentarily, then descend in a right turn until impact. Investigation revealed the crew had been flying 12 hours except for refueling stops and cargo loading. In addition, calculations revealed the aircraft was over gross weight by approx 1 ton. The proper runway for takeoff was 13 (40° chance) and 6,900 feet long. Runway used was restricted to aircraft less than 12,500 gto weight. N127MW weighed over 20,000 lbs. All three occupants were killed.

The aircraft was performing an executive flight from Lagos to Abidjan. While completing a last turn to the right to join the glide for runway 03, the airplane lost height then crashed into the sea, about 500 meters offshore. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed. No flight plan was filed and it was reported that the aircraft did not have all required certificates while flying for the first time since its delivery two years ago.

While cruising at an altitude of 9,500 feet on a training mission, the Hansa Jet was hit behind by a German Luftwaffe Fiat G.91T-3 fighter registered 34+49 and carrying a crew of two. The Fiat struck the Hansa Jet in a slight left turn at a speed of 145 knots. Following the collision, both aircraft went out of control, entered a dive and crashed in a field located in Schwabmünchen. All five occupants on board the Hansa Jet were killed while both pilots on board the Fiat ejected safely. At the time of the collision, it was determined that the crew of the Fiat was just leaving a Temporary Reserved Airspace and was descending to FL100 to a VFR airspace. At this time, the Fiat's transponder was on a 'stand by' mode.

The crew was completing a flight from San Francisco to Santa Fe with intermediate stops in San Diego and Phoenix. At Sky Harbor Airport, the airplane landed on its belly, slid for several dozen yards and came to rest in flames. While all seven occupants escaped uninjured, the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft was one of a number of aircraft of this type used for the carriage of company employees and goods for Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm GmbH. A twice-weekly charter service was operated from Germany to Warton Aerodrome in the United Kingdom or, alternatively, to Blackpool civil airport. D-CASY left Munich on the morning of 29 June 1972 and landed at 09:04 hrs at Blackpool, as Customs facilities were not available at that time at Warton. During the day the aircraft remained on the ground at Blackpool and for most of the time the captain and co-pilot were with it. At 15:20 hrs six of the eight passengers to be carried on the return trip to Germany arrived at Blackpool Airport and, as it was raining, sat in the aircraft, the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) of which was running. Two more passengers were expected. A flight plan was prepared for Munich via Rotterdam and filed at 15:30 hrs. The two passengers did not turn up at the appointed time and the APU was shut down while the passengers and crew waited in the aircraft. About 16:30 hrs word was received that the two extra passengers were not coming. This meant that extra fuel could be accommodated and a new flight plan direct to Munich could be prepared. It was filed by the first officer, while the captain carried out the pre-flight check. The captain then started the APU and sat in the left hand seat with the first officer in the right hand seat and, according to the passenger who survived the accident, indicated that the first officer should operate the aircraft in command under supervision. The aircraft taxied out and lined up and the surviving passenger saw the right hand wing slat extended when the first officer applied power with the brakes 'on' at the start of the take-off. The port side wing slat and the flaps were outside this passenger's field of view. During the take-off run the aircraft reached its normal rotation speed in the usual distance. However, although the aircraft was travelling fast enough, rotation did not take place and it did not become airborne. The surviving passenger saw the first officer's hand holding the throttles fully open and wondered why the aircraft did not take-off. Then he saw a gesture from the captain indicating that the take-off should be abandoned. The first officer immediately closed the throttles. Observers on the aerodrome heard the engine noise die down approximately 300 metres from the end of the runway. Subsequently brake marks were found commencing in the same area. Braking was not effective, however, and the aircraft left the end of the runway at high speed, in a level attitude with its nose wheel and main wheels in contact with the ground. Shortly before the first impact the surviving passenger noticed the captain's hand on the controls and saw aileron movement. The first collision occurred when the starboard wing tip struck and severed a post supporting one of the airfield runway approach lights. The aircraft continued, colliding with and badly distorting the double track railway lines at the edge of the airfield. The nose wheel of the landing gear was broken off by this impact and some structural damage was done to the underside of the fuselage. Almost immediately beyond the railway lines the aircraft broke through a wall and collided with a row of single storey masonry chalets in the adjacent holiday camp, demolishing six of them and setting them on fire. The wings were broken off during this impact, spilling fuel over the area, but the main part of the aircraft continued its progress, sustaining further structural damage as it did so. The forward part of the fuselage, including the flight deck, was twisted to starboard and progressively destroyed. The final impact brought the aircraft to rest against a second row of chalets which were also badly damaged. The wreckage caught fire and was destroyed. The crew of two and five of the six passengers on board were killed. The sixth passenger, although thrown clear, was seriously injured.

The Hansa Jet departed Hamburg (HAM) at 0725LT on a positioning flight to Cologne (CGN) where it was to pick up some passengers who were to be taken to Paris for the signing of the Airbus treaty. While descending through a thick layer of clouds for Cologne, the right engine high pressure fuel pump failed. Some 22 seconds later the electrical system failed. The airplane entered a spiral descent until the first officer was able to light the instrument panel using a flash light. He noticed the severe right bank and told the captain to turn left and pull up. The airplane was brought under control and the crew climbed above the layer of clouds. It was decided to fly on a heading of 330° towards the North Sea, because the crew expected VFR weather there for an emergency landing. After flying for about half an hour the crew saw an island between the clouds, which turned out to be the Dutch island of Texel. Failing to see an airport in the area, it was decided to carry out a forced belly landing on the beach of Texel. The aircraft sustained additional substantial damage when being salvaged.

The airplane was involved in a test flight and the crew was supposed to make stalls at high altitude. While flying at an altitude of 22,000 feet, the airplane attained an extreme angle of attack resulting in a stall. Out of control, it entered a flat spin and two crew members were able to parachute to safety while the third occupant was killed.