Alamogordo

The multi-engine fire bomber, which was not carrying retardant, was established at its cruise altitude while en route to a fire base where it would be used as part of the effort to fight a local fire. While en route, the flight crew encountered a forecast area of instrument meteorological conditions, whereupon they began a series of descents to lower altitudes in order to stay in visual flight rules (VFR) conditions beneath the clouds. During the last few minutes of their flight, the flight crew had descended to an altitude that was less than 1,300 feet above ground level (agl) over nearly level terrain. As they approached rapidly rising terrain at the end of the broad open valley they had been flying over, they inadvertently entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Soon thereafter, while still in a nearly wings-level attitude, the airplane impacted a ridge about 240 feet below its top. The First Officer, who was flying at the time, had asked the Captain about ten minutes prior to the impact if their altitude was high enough to clear the upcoming terrain, but the Captain did not respond, and the First Officer did not challenge the Captain about the issue. Witnesses in the area reported low clouds with ceilings about 200 feet above ground level with a visibility of one-quarter mile or less, with rain and fog. One of the witnesses reported momentarily viewing the airplane flying "very low," while the others reported only being able to hear the airplane.

Prior to departing on the first leg of the flight, the dispatcher advised the pilot that he needed him to check the weather. After advising the pilot that he would be flying an additional leg, the
dispatcher again advised the pilot that he needed him to check the weather, which the pilot did, as observed by the dispatcher. After reaching 14,500 feet at 2028 the pilot contacted Albuquerque Approach Control, advising the controller that he had information "Yankee" and was requesting a lower altitude. The controller instructed the pilot to proceed via his own navigation and to descend at pilot's discretion. The pilot replied "Roger." From 2034 to 2041 the controller made four attempts to contact the pilot, each without success. At 2039 and 2042 the controller asked two other aircraft in the area to try establishing radio communication with the pilot; neither were successful. At 2033:19 the last radar return with altitude information was received from the aircraft, with a reported altitude of 10,200 feet MSL. A primary radar contact, with no transponder or altitude information, was received at 2033:32, 2.2 nautical miles southeast of the accident site, putting it on a straight line between the last radar contact and destination airport. The accident site was located at the 9,012 foot level of a mountain range, 19 nautical miles southeast of the destination airport. Post-accident examination revealed no anomalies with the airframe or engines which would have prevented normal operations. At 1956, the weather observation facility located at the destination airport reported a few clouds at 800 feet, scattered clouds at 2,500 feet, and overcast clouds at 4,200 feet. The remarks section stated rain ended at 35 minutes past the hour, and mountains obscured northeast to southeast. At 2024, the same weather facility reported scattered clouds at 600 feet and overcast clouds at 4,200 feet.

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the planned cross-country flight for which the pilot obtained a weather briefing, filed an IFR flight plan, and received an ATC clearance. Approximately 8 minutes after takeoff, radar indicated the airplane was at 11,200 feet msl, heading 241 degrees, with a ground speed of 180 knots. No distress calls or additional communications with the pilot were recorded, and radar contact was lost. The airplane impacted the ground in an uncontrolled descent. The right wing tip tank separated from the airplane and was found 0.18 nautical miles from the main wreckage. The teardown and examination of both engines disclosed that the type and degree of damage was indicative of engine power section rotation and operation at the time of impact. There were no complete systems intact at the accident site due to the impact sequence and post-impact fire which consumed the aircraft. The landing gear and flaps were found in the retracted position. The portion of the right propeller shaft coupling found at the site was fractured through 360 degrees. Metallurgical examination revealed that the propeller shaft coupling failed in fatigue. The presence of the fatigue cracks indicated the coupler fractured in fatigue in service, and the fatigue cracks were not the result of ground impact. The circumferential fracture intersected the ends of several internal spline teeth. The origin of the fatigue crack could not be determined because of severe corrosion damage on the fracture surface. Fatigue propagation was in the aft direction and from the inside to the outside of the coupling. The engine core rotating components would have bee free to rotate when uncoupled from the propeller shaft. The maintenance records indicated that the failed coupling had accumulated approximately 4,000 hours since new, and 1,250 hours since engine overhaul in 1989. Since 1990, as a result of fatigue fractures, the manufacturer introduced several design changes for the propeller shaft coupling via optional Service Bulletins to be accomplished at the next access or hot section inspection (HSI). Impact and thermal damage of the right propeller precluded a determination of the in-flight blade angles. The calculations by the airplane manufacturer indicated that "the [intact] airplane was capable of continued flight" with the right propeller feathered, and that the "airplane can keep attitude, but cannot climb and cannot maintain altitude" with the right propeller in the flat pitch or wind milling positions, respectively. Metallurgical examination of the component brackets and associated bolts from the right tip tank revealed the separation of the tip tank resulted from a single-event overstress fracture of both the forward and aft tank attachment fittings. Calculations showed that a 3.763 radians per second (35.9 RPM) spin rate would cause the failure of the forward wing fuel tank attachment fitting. There had not been a previous in-flight separation of a wing tip fuel tank on this model airplane.

The flight had departed the Alamogordo-White Sands Regional Airport after a fuel stop. The pilot had earlier indicated to ATC that he was unfamiliar with the area. Prior to departure at 2321 the pilot was informed that departure radar was out of service. The flight departed with a VFR departure. At 2324 the pilot was advised that radar was back in service, and confirmed that the aircraft was climbing thru 5,300 feet. Discussion ensued between the pilot and controller concerning terrain clearance. At 2324 the pilot indicated he was turning left due to not being sure if a hill was in his path. The airplane impacted a mountain at 6,100 feet msl, 1,500 feet below the summit. The minimum vectoring altitude in the area was 11,000 feet. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all six occupants were killed.

Shortly after takeoff from Del Rio Airport, while climbing, the airplane went out of control and crashed. All three occupants were killed. They were completing a search and rescue mission to Alamogordo.

The crew departed Alamogordo on a fire fighting mission in the region of Socorro. During a second pass at low altitude, the airplane contacted trees and crashed in flames. Both pilots were killed.

Few minutes after its takeoff from Holloman Airport, the aircraft hit a mountain located 10 miles northeast of Alamogordo. All seven crew members were killed.

The aircraft departed Alamogordo Airfield on a night training mission. While flying at an altitude of 15,000 feet in the region of Weatherford, Texas, the aircraft collided with a second USAAF Boeing B-29 registered 42-93895 and carrying a crew of eleven from Clovis. After the collision, both aircraft went into a dive but during the descent, two crew members of the 42-93895 were able to bail out and survived. Both aircraft crashed in a field located 3 miles west of Weatherford and were totally destroyed. 18 others were killed.
Crew:
2nd Lt Benson W. Cohen,
Sgt Clarence A. Jurgens,
2nd Lt Edward E. Lahniers,
Sgt Donald V. Lefebvre,
Sgt Johnny A. Moseley,
2nd Lt Gordon E. Myers,
Sgt Donald E. Reed,
1st Lt Aubrey K. Stinson,
2nd Lt Harold Lannis Swaim.

Crashed on take off. No casualties.

Crashed in unknown circumstances 15 miles northwest of Alamogordo. Crew fate remains unknown.