Aguadilla

The commercial pilot and three passengers were making a personal cross-country flight over ocean waters in the MU-2B airplane. During cruise flight at flight level (FL) 240, the airplane maintained the same relative heading, airspeed, and altitude for about 2.5 hours before radar contact was lost. While the airplane was in flight, a significant meteorological information notice was issued that warned of frequent thunderstorms with tops to FL440 in the accident area at the accident time. Satellite imagery showed cloud tops in the area were up to FL400. Moderate or greater icing conditions and super cooled large drops (SLD) were likely near or over the accident area at the accident time. Although the wreckage was not located for examination, the loss of the airplane's radar target followed by the identification of debris and a fuel sheen on the water below the last radar target location suggests that the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent after encountering adverse weather and impacted the water. Before beginning training in the airplane about 4 months before the accident, the pilot had 21 hours of multi engine experience accumulated during sporadic flights over 9 years. Per a special federal aviation regulation, a pilot must complete specific ground and flight training and log a minimum of 100 flight hours as pilot-in-command (PIC) in multi engine airplanes before acting as PIC of a MU-2B airplane. Once the pilot began training in the airplane, he appeared to attempt to reach the 100-hour threshold quickly, flying about 50 hours in 1 month. These 50 hours included about 40 hours of long, cross-country flights that the flight instructor who was flying with the pilot described as "familiarization flights" for the pilot and "demonstration flights" for the airplane's owner. The pilot successfully completed the training required for the MU-2B, and at the time of the accident, he had accumulated an estimated 120 hours of multi engine flight experience of which 100 hours were in the MU-2B. Although an MU-2B instructor described the pilot as a good, attentive student, it cannot be determined if his training was ingrained enough for him to effectively apply it in an operational environment without an instructor present. Although available evidence about the pilot's activities suggested he may not have obtained adequate restorative sleep during the night before the accident, there was insufficient evidence to determine the extent to which fatigue played a role in his decision making or the sequence of events.The pilot's last known weather briefing occurred about 8 hours before the airplane departed, and it is not known if the pilot obtained any updated weather information before or during the flight. Sufficient weather information (including a hazardous weather advisory provided by an air traffic control broadcast message about 25 minutes before the accident) was available for the pilot to expect convective activity and the potential for icing along the accident flight's route; however, there is no evidence from the airplane's radar track or the pilot's communications with air traffic controllers that he recognized or attempted to avoid the convective conditions or exit icing conditions.

The pilot stated he experienced a high temperature in the right engine and a partial loss of engine rpm while at 9,000 feet mean sea level in cruise flight. He requested and received clearance from air traffic control to descend and divert to another airport. He leveled the airplane at 2,500 feet and both engines were operating; however, the right engine experienced a loss of rpm which made it difficult to maintain altitude. The pilot reduced power in both engines, turned the fuel boost pump on, opened the cowl flaps and the engine continued to run with a low rpm. The pilot elected to ditch the airplane in the ocean, instead of landing as soon as practical at the nearest suitable airport, as instructed in the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH). Additionally, he shut down the right engine before performing the troubleshooting items listed in the POH. He attributed his decision to ditch the airplane to poor single-engine performance and windy conditions. The wind at the destination airport was from 060 degrees at 6 knots and runway 8 was in use at the time of the accident. The airplane was not recovered.

The non-instrument rated pilot departed VFR on a dark night at 0359, with an adequate fuel supply for the intended flight, and proceeded in a south-southeasterly heading (approximately 150 degrees) climbing to a maximum altitude of 4,700 feet msl. The flight continued on the south-southeasterly heading, descended to 4,500 feet msl, then descended gradually to 3,800 feet msl where radar contact was lost at 0411:37. The flight continued 4.6 nautical miles on the south-southeasterly heading, and impacted trees in upslope mountainous terrain while on a magnetic heading of 150 degrees. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a postcrash fire; the accident site was located north of, and approximately 146 feet below an east-west oriented ridge line. The tree elevation was 3,299 feet msl, while the elevation at a ridge south of the site was 3,445 feet msl. Cloud tops in the area were calculated to be about 4,000 feet msl. Examination of the airplane structure, flight controls, engines, propellers, and systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The altimeter settings for the departure and destination airports were 30.02 inches Hg and 30.01 inches Hg, respectively. The altimeter was found positioned to 29.91 inches Hg. This error would have resulted in the altimeter reading 100 feet lower than if the correct altimeter setting was entered.

While en route to the first schedule stop, the pilot heard a radio transmission that weather conditions in the vicinity of his next destination were 'bad.' Upon arriving, the pilot attempted to telephone Flight Service for a weather briefing and to file a flight plan. After efforts to contact Flight Service failed, the pilot elected to takeoff without a filing a flight plan. A few minutes into the flight, the pilot decided to return to the departure airport after the flight encountered deteriorating weather conditions that included heavy turbulence, and low ceilings. The airplane collided with trees as the pilot maneuvered the airplane. The post-accident examination of the airplane failed to disclose a mechanical malfunction or a component failure. The pilot did not report a mechanical problem with the airplane. A review of the en route flight charts disclosed that the terrain elevation at the departure point was approximately 24 feet. The terrain elevation at the approximate location of the accident site was 2,500 feet.

Two U.S. Customs Service airplanes collided in formation cruise flight while being evacuated from Borinquen, Puerto Rico, to Curacao, Dutch Antilles, due to an approaching hurricane. While in cruise flight at 6,500 ft. msl, N6305U maneuvered closer to the lead airplane, N6302W, to take some photographs. Several minutes later, N6305U's right side of the vertical stabilizer collided with the left side of the nose of N6302W. N6305U was ditched while on short final to an airstrip due to a lack of airplane controllability, while N6302W returned to Borinquen and landed without incident. Prior to departure, the crewmembers of both airplanes were directed to fly as a flight of two. Neither of the second-in-commands (SICs) of either airplane had any previous formation flying training, nor was it approved for the flight. Interviews with U.S. Customs personnel revealed that formation flight occurred, as did photographs taken from the SIC aboard N6305U during the accident flight. The U.S. Customs Service required two pilots to operate the airplane due to mission equipment installation.

The aircraft departed Santo Domingo-Las Américas Airport at 0822LT on a cargo flight to Aguadilla. Few minutes later, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and was cleared to return. In unclear circumstances, the aircraft crashed 88 minutes after its departure in an isolated area located in the region of La Romana. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

The pilot, sole on board, was transferring the aircraft from a parking space to another one at Aguadilla Airport. While on a taxiway, the aircraft suffered hydraulic problems. The pilot lost control of the airplane that collided with a parked Lockheed L-1049H Super Constellation operated by Aerolineas Mundo (AMSA) and registered HI-542CT. The C-54 continued and eventually came to rest in a ditch. The pilot was uninjured while both aircraft were damaged beyond repair.

The airplane sustained a partial loss of engine power on the left engine on takeoff climb due to the failure of the n°8 engine assembly cylinder. The airplane was observed by witnesses at 400 feet agl in a 20° left bank while maneuvering to return to the departure airport. The angle of bank increased to 60° with a noticeable decrease in airspeed while the airplane descended below 300 feet agl. The left wing dropped 90° to the left and the nose pitched down vertically. The airplane appeared to regain elevator authority and leveled out before encountering a secondary stall. The airplane collided with the terrain and was destroyed by post crash fire. Both pilots were killed.

The airplane was completing a cargo flight from St Petersburg to Aguadilla, carrying two pilots and a load of 9,000 lbs of dynamite. While approaching Aguadilla, both engines lost power and stopped almost simultaneously. The crew elected to ditch the aircraft that crashed into the sea about 800 meters offshore. The airplane sank by 50 feet of water and its wreckage was not recovered. Both pilots, slightly injured, were evacuated.