PZL-Mielec AN-2

Engine failure due to poor maintenance. Deficiencies were reported during investigations regarding the operator's maintenance procedures. The documentation related to aircraft maintenance was incomplete. Also, several mechanics and engineers working on the AN-2 fleet were not qualified and authorised to do so.

Engine failure resulted from a malfunction of the fuel-feed system, most probably due to incorrect installation of the altitude regulator of the carburetor and incorrect actions by the pilot.

Analysis of available evidence make it reasonable to classify the event investigated as an unintentional terrain impact, Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). At accident time, because of the reduced visibility, incompatible with VFR flying, the crew could not evaluate correctly the orography of the area along there route. It has to be noted that it was not possible to ascertain if adequate maps were available to the crew showing the exact position of ground relief and obstacles. It was not possible to determine if the pilots had flown across the same area in the past. Given the meteorological conditions over the area, the crew did not conform to the Visual Flying Rules that mandated for a track change to maintain the required flight parameters (visibility/clearance from obstacles) and/or a diversion to a suitable alternate airport (as international rules mandate).
Contributing factors:
Analysis of available evidence suggests that the following may be considered as contributory factors to the accident. The prevailing meteorological conditions existing on March 9, 2002 over the flight path of LY-AVD across the central part of Italy did not allow for the flight to be continued under VFR. The Antonov AN-2 was not fit for flying in low visibility (IMC) and was not equipped for flying in icing conditions. The pilot of the LY-AVD did not hold the required English language radio-telephony (RT) qualification to operate outside the country of licensing. The pilot of the LY-AVD did not hold an IFR qualification (for flying in IMC).

It was reported that the loss of control after landing was the consequence of the brakes lock.

The following contributing factors were identified:
- A possible unpremeditated entry into conditions with severe icing and late decision making by the captain to manoeuvre the aircraft away from the icing area,¨
- A loss of engine power and a subsequent loss of speed due to icing of the carburetor,
- The failure of the captain to remove ice from the propeller blades by changing their pitch mode.

The accident was the consequence of a crew error in the piloting technique when flying in difficult terrain conditions, which manifested itself in a loss of speed and flight altitude, which led to an unintentional landing of the aircraft and its collision with ground obstacles. The error in the piloting technique became possible due to the unstable piloting skills of the pilot-in-command and the failure of the instructor to fulfill his duties. It was reported that the pilot-in-command did not fly for about five years.

The engine failed because the fuel used by the operator was not approved nor suitable for such engine.

The accident was the consequence of the combination of the following factors:
- Poor flight preparation on part of the crew who failed to locate various obstacles situated in and around the spraying area,
- The captain took the decision to complete the mission at an insufficient height of five metres while the minimum height was fixed at 20 metres,
- Poor crew coordination.

It was determined that the captain was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that he started the mission from Pokrovsk already drunk. He took the decision to take off from Kobyay Airstrip despite the propeller blades have been damaged during the previous overrun.