PZL-Mielec AN-2

Engine failure resulted from a malfunction of the fuel-feed system, most probably due to incorrect installation of the altitude regulator of the carburetor and incorrect actions by the pilot.

Analysis of available evidence make it reasonable to classify the event investigated as an unintentional terrain impact, Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). At accident time, because of the reduced visibility, incompatible with VFR flying, the crew could not evaluate correctly the orography of the area along there route. It has to be noted that it was not possible to ascertain if adequate maps were available to the crew showing the exact position of ground relief and obstacles. It was not possible to determine if the pilots had flown across the same area in the past. Given the meteorological conditions over the area, the crew did not conform to the Visual Flying Rules that mandated for a track change to maintain the required flight parameters (visibility/clearance from obstacles) and/or a diversion to a suitable alternate airport (as international rules mandate).
Contributing factors:
Analysis of available evidence suggests that the following may be considered as contributory factors to the accident. The prevailing meteorological conditions existing on March 9, 2002 over the flight path of LY-AVD across the central part of Italy did not allow for the flight to be continued under VFR. The Antonov AN-2 was not fit for flying in low visibility (IMC) and was not equipped for flying in icing conditions. The pilot of the LY-AVD did not hold the required English language radio-telephony (RT) qualification to operate outside the country of licensing. The pilot of the LY-AVD did not hold an IFR qualification (for flying in IMC).

It was reported that the loss of control after landing was the consequence of the brakes lock.

The following contributing factors were identified:
- A possible unpremeditated entry into conditions with severe icing and late decision making by the captain to manoeuvre the aircraft away from the icing area,¨
- A loss of engine power and a subsequent loss of speed due to icing of the carburetor,
- The failure of the captain to remove ice from the propeller blades by changing their pitch mode.

The accident was the consequence of a crew error in the piloting technique when flying in difficult terrain conditions, which manifested itself in a loss of speed and flight altitude, which led to an unintentional landing of the aircraft and its collision with ground obstacles. The error in the piloting technique became possible due to the unstable piloting skills of the pilot-in-command and the failure of the instructor to fulfill his duties. It was reported that the pilot-in-command did not fly for about five years.

The engine failed because the fuel used by the operator was not approved nor suitable for such engine.

The accident was the consequence of the combination of the following factors:
- Poor flight preparation on part of the crew who failed to locate various obstacles situated in and around the spraying area,
- The captain took the decision to complete the mission at an insufficient height of five metres while the minimum height was fixed at 20 metres,
- Poor crew coordination.

It was determined that the captain was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that he started the mission from Pokrovsk already drunk. He took the decision to take off from Kobyay Airstrip despite the propeller blades have been damaged during the previous overrun.

The following findings were identified:
- It was not possible to determine the contribution of the physiological aspect because the pilot was not found and his license had expired.
- At the critical moment of landing, a state of indecision was triggered in the pilot regarding the procedure to be adopted (landing or going around), impairing its decision-making capacity and causing delay in decision making.
- The pilot did not act adequately on the aircraft controls in order to counteract the action of the crosswind, allowing the aircraft to stand to the right of the approach axis and touch the right side of the runway. Subsequently, he was unable to prevent the left wings from climbing, causing the lower right wing to touch the ground and exit the runway.
- The pilot's decision not to go around immediately when he noticed the first signs of the aircraft's turning tendency, forced by the wind effect and, consequently, having lost full control of the aircraft, contributed to the worsening of the subsequent facts. The pilot acted belatedly when he decided to go around.
- The owner of the aircraft no longer verified that the technical qualification and the Certificate of Physical Capacity of the pilot were up to date for the performance of the air activity, as well as the certificates necessary for the operation of the aircraft. It also went against what prescribes the CTA certification, which establishes two pilots as the minimum crew for the aircraft.
- The left cross wind, associated with the inadequacy of the pilot's controls to counteract it, resulted in the right wing touching the ground, with consequent loss of control of the aircraft.
- The pilot failed to carry out a readaptation flight in the aircraft with a qualified instructor, being for more than three years without flying in the equipment.