Piper PA-31-310 Navajo

The twin engine airplane departed Bucaramanga-Palonegro Airport at 1800LT on a flight to Bogotá-El Dorado Airport. About 14 minutes prior to ETA, the pilot declared an emergency when the aircraft crashed on the slope of Mt El Tablazo en Supatá, about 42 km north of Bogotá-El Dorado Airport. All three occupants were killed.

The aircraft disappeared from radar at approximately 1 mile final on a night ILS runway 13 approach. Radar data indicated that the aircraft completed almost 180° of turn prior to disappearing. The aircraft crashed in a heavily wooded area. No evidence of a preexisting failure on the engines or airframe was found. When the flying history of the pilot was examined, the hours presented on his resume exceeded his log book and his log book hours could not be totally verified. The copilot did not have an instrument rating. The pilot that preceded the accident aircraft on the approach said he experienced moderate turbulence, windshear and that the approach lights were very distracting. The pilot had received a weather briefing which included wind shear and moderate turbulence. All three occupants were killed.

The flight was cleared on an IFR flight from Whitehorse to Juneau, via V-428 to Chill intersection, then direct to Juneau. Chill intersection was located on V-428, 36 miles south of Haines NDB on a bearing of 146°. On reaching Haines NDB, the pilot cancelled his IFR clearance and continued under visual flight rules (VFR). Subsequently, the aircraft crashed on a glacier between Haines and Juneau, approximately 15 miles southeast of Haines NDB at an elevation of about 4,500 feet. A pilot, flying about 5 miles southwest of the crash site at the time of the accident, reported a broken to overcast ceiling at 2,500 feet to 3,000 feet msl. The accident site was near the Haines transition of the Barlo 4 departure (sid). In that area, the minimum en route altitude for flight on the Haines transition was 9,000 feet under instrument flight rules.

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in a charter flight from Teeside to Nantes, carrying two passengers, two pilots and a load of 250 kilos of cargo, including a container of Type A radioactive material weighing 37 kilos. Takeoff acceleration was normal and the pilot allowed the aircraft to accelerate to 100 mph, some 15 mph above the minimum controllable single-engine speed, before lifting off. Very soon after lift-off he felt a loss of power from the left engine but, believing this to be only a partial failure, decided to continue the take-off and raised the landing gear. He felt the aircraft was still climbing and heard the pilot's assistant say 'I have the rudder'. He then realized that the airspeed was reducing rapidly and that he was losing directional control. He lowered the nose and headed for a grass area to the left of the runway, where the aircraft struck the ground in a steep left bank. All four occupants were quickly rescued, only the pilot was seriously injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff from La Carlota-General Francisco de Miranda Airbase, while climbing, the twin engine aircraft stalled and crashed in an industrial area, bursting into flames. All five occupants were killed.

Crashed for unknown reasons shortly after takeoff from Rankin Inlet Airport, killing all five occupants.

The pilot hired the aircraft privately from his employer to conduct a holiday flight during his leave. The journey commenced at Moorabbin on 25 August and the aircraft arrived at Cairns about midday 30 August, after stopovers at Coolangatta and Proserpine. The pilot and his passengers then spent the next three days at leisure in the Cairns area. On the day of the accident, the pilot attended the Cairns Briefing Office where he collected the relevant weather forecasts and submitted a flight plan. The flight plan indicated that the flight would be conducted in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules. It contained a deficiency in that no details were given for the first route segment from Cairns to Biboohra. It is apparent that the pilot had not noticed that the tracks to the west of Cairns, on the relevant enroute chart, emanate from Biboohra and not Cairns. There was no track line which joined Cairns and Biboohra. Such a line might have alerted the pilot at the time he planned the flight. The error in the flight plan was not detected when the plan was submitted. When the pilot was issued with an airways clearance prior to DEPARTURE it was apparent that he did not understand the terms of the clearance, which gave the initial tracking point as Biboohra. The location of this point was explained to the pilot and he subsequently accepted the clearance. He elected to depart using visual procedures, after being offered a choice of these or the published Standard Instrument DEPARTURE profile. A visual DEPARTURE from the particular runway in use allows an aircraft proceeding towards Biboorha to intercept the required track sooner than is possible with an instrument DEPARTURE. The aircraft was issued with takeoff instructions which included clearance for the pilot to make a right turn after takeoff. Witnesses observed that the aircraft complied with this clearance and headed in a southwesterly direction before turning to the north-west and subsequently entering cloud. The cloud base was estimated to be between 2000 and 2500 feet above mean sea level. No further communications were received from the aircraft and a search was commenced that afternoon. The search effort was hampered by the weather and the wreckage was not located until the following afternoon.

At the time of the attempted take-off, the night was dark, with overcast cloud conditions and light rain falling. Wind conditions were light and variable. The pilot reported that initial acceleration was normal, and the aircraft became airborne at about 95 knots. A positive rate of climb was established and the landing gear was selected up. The pilot subsequently advised that the speed then decayed to 90 knots. At this time there was nothing unusual in the engine noise and the controls felt normal. Shortly afterwards the propellers struck the ground 116 metres beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft then struck an embankment and passed through a fence before coming to rest 247 metres from the initial ground strike. All four occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed.

The pilot was being vectored around thunderstorms in the area just prior to the accident. During the last radio contact the pilot was issued a vector to the destination airport. During this turn, for unknown reasons, the pilot lost control of the aircraft and descended from the assigned altitude of 6,000 feet msl to the ground in approximately 40 seconds. The aircraft reportedly was in clear weather conditions at this time and had not encountered adverse weather during the entire flight. The pilot did not mention any problems during the radio transmission with ATC. Impact in a shallow lake occurred while in a near vertical nose down attitude at a high rate of speed. The right propeller was found to have been feathered at the time of impact while the left propeller was set in the cruise range. No evidence of any preimpact failure or malfunction of the right engine or propeller was discovered during post accident tests. Path and toxicological exams revealed no physiological factors. Pilots flight time records not available at time of investigation. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft departed Kidlington at 1133 hrs, the takeoff and initial climb to 1,500 feet being uneventful. Radio contact was made with Brize Norton Controller who requested the aircraft to climb to 2,000 feet on the Brize Norton QFE of 1005 millibars. This was complied with, and at 1140 hrs the aircraft experienced surging of one, then both engines culminating in a complete loss of power at a position 5 nautical miles north north west of Brize Norton. The commander advised the controlled that an engine problem had developed and that he was turning southwards towards the airfield. He subsequently declared a Mayday after opening the crossfeed and switching on the two electric fuel pumps to no avail. The commander stated that up until that time he had been on straight feed, ie right inboard tank feeding the right engine and left inboard tank feeding the left engine, with the crossfeed OFF. The commander also stated that during the unsuccessful attempts to restart the engines, the tank selectors remained as selected as he was aware of the physical presence of fuel in both inboard tanks prior to the departure from Cardiff, and uncertain of the contents of the outboards. The company pilot seated behind the front seats recalled the right fuel gauge was still reading over FULL, and that the left gauge was indicating empty. The commander decided that a forced landing short of the airfield was inevitable, and lowered the gear. The passengers were also warned to tighten their seat belts. At approximately 250 feet above ground level, the mixture levers were pulled back to idle cut off, and the magneto switches thought to have been selected to OFF. The aircraft landed in a field of standing barley and the nose gear detaches causing the nose and the right wing to strike the ground, the aircraft rotate approximately 180° to the right, and the main gear to collapse. On impact, the right engine caught fire immediately followed by the cabin, with fire spreading rearwards along the aisle. The two front seat occupants left by the left main door, the rear passenger by the right overwing exit. Minor injuries were suffered, the commander being detained in hospital for 24 hours with burns. The aircraft was destroyed by a severe fire.