Learjet 35

The flight crew reported to the tower controller that they were over the airport and requested a right downwind circling approach to runway 15. The tower controller and other witnesses observed the airplane in a steep right bank on base leg. The airplane overshot the extended runway centerline. The tower controller observed the airplane entering a steeper right bank to correct back to the runway centerline. The controller stated that he observed the airplane "flutter" and then crash right-wing first, about one mile north of the runway threshold. Other witnesses reported a variety of indications consistent with a loss of control. The last recorded transmission was "Oh no you're (stall…)." The ( ) indicates that the word was questionable text. Both engines were producing about 1,700 pounds of thrust (2,561 pounds available). A snow squall had just passed over the airport and was obscuring mountains to the east. The terrain was snow covered. The accident occurred about eight minutes before official sunset. The approach procedure is not authorized at night or for category D airplanes. Minimums for the approach were three miles visibility with an MDA of 10,840 feet. Airport elevation is 7,815 feet. Both pilots were rated in the airplane. It could not be determined which pilot was at the controls at the time of the accident.

During the takeoff roll on runway 24 at McClellan-Palomar Airport, one of the engine failed between V1 and VR. After both wings struck the runway surface, the crew lost control of the airplane that crash near the runway end. Both pilots were slightly injured and the aircraft was written off.

The crew was positioning the aircraft in preparation for a revenue flight and executing a non-directional beacon (NDB) approach to runway 05. The captain reported that the copilot was flying the aircraft. However, the captain stated that he took control of the aircraft during the approach and made some control corrections before returning control of the aircraft to the copilot. Radar data indicated that aircraft control was erratic throughout the approach and that the airspeed and descent rates were high (3,000 fpm sink rate) shortly before the accident. The aircraft struck a fence short of the runway and impacted the ground. The captain said he realized the aircraft was drifting left of course but did not correct it. He said he told the copilot to add power twice during the approach. The copilot's training history indicated difficulty in control, scan of instruments, and with instrument procedures. Company management described the captain as passive and the copilot as aggressive. Supervision of training and operations by management and surveillance of the company by the FAA was considered inadequate by NTSB.

Witnesses reported a normal takeoff. Radar indicated the aircraft turned right as cleared and began cruise at 1900 feet, heading northwest at 235 knots. 65 seconds after calling clear of the control zone the aircraft's radar track ended. The aircraft was fragmented by the impact with all flight control surfaces and aircraft extremities found at the impact site. Pitch trim was found in the normal cruise setting with gear, flaps, and spoilers in the retracted position. Examination of the engines indicated operation at impact. Aircraft struck the terrain in approx 80° nose down, wings level attitude and heading opposite to the previous direction of flight. In flight simulator tests, with the aircraft initially in level flight at 1,900 feet and then rolled inverted and the pitch control moved aft, the aircraft attitude was similar to the attitude at impact. There were two unauthorized passengers on board, one was the copilot's wife. The impact point was in a very small region of uncontrolled airspace very near the copilot's and relative's homes. The copilot was new to jet operations. The aircraft departed with several discrepancies uncleared. All four occupants were killed.

The copilot (dual student) was to get a prof check on the 1st leg of the flight with a simulated single engine power loss on takeoff. According to witnesses, the takeoff was normal until lift off approximately 3,200 feet down the runway; but after lift-off, the aircraft climbed only about 50 feet and didn't seem to accelerate. They reported the nose pitched up and the aircraft went in a steep bank attitude near the departure end of the runway. Subsequently, it descended and crashed in wooded terrain in a right wing down, nose high attitude. A bystander tried to get in the aircraft to rescue the pilots, but the door was jammed and he was unable to break the cabin windows. A fire erupted and engulfed the aircraft. Due to rough terrain, there was a delay in getting fire fighting equipment to the accident site. No preimpact mechanical failures were found. The gear, flaps and spoilers were found in the retracted position. For takeoff, the flaps should have been extended to the 8° or 20° position. The stall speeds for 20°, 8° and no flaps were 104.5, 109.0 and 119.5 knots, respectively. The captain was an FAA designated flight examiner and a certified flight instructor (cfi).

The crew was engaged in a military exercise consisting of an aerial attack of a US Navy vessel. In unknown circumstances, the aircraft collided with a second Flight International Learjet 24D registered N97DM. Both aircraft crashed in the sea about 27 miles southeast of San Clemente Island and all four crew members were killed.

The aircraft rolled to the right and crashed after a catastrophic (uncontained) failure of the right engine during takeoff for a night flight. The right engine fan rotor disc separated from the hub which damaged the cowling and some disc fragments buried in the fuselage but without damage to the flight controls. The drag created by the loss of thrust and the distorted cowling led to yaw and roll with loss of control of the aircraft. The fan failure propagated from a low grade fatigue crack on the high time fan which was not detected by the visual inspection procedures existing at the time. The manufacturer has since improved the manufacturing and inspection techniques. An AD 86-04-02 was issued on 2/14/86 which deals with fan removal from service according to an operating cycle schedule.

The aircraft had just successfully completed a series of practice approaches to a full stop. The training flight was being conducted to give refresher training to the pilot who had not flown a Lear Jet in over a year and had never flown a lear model 35. The flight instructor requested a practice approach with a missed approach and was cleared for the option. Witnesses stated that the aircraft rolled right and then rolled left to an inverted position. Colliding with the ground shortly thereafter. All three occupants were killed.

During arrival, the aircrew of a Gates Learjet 35A, N873LP, canceled their IFR clearance and contacted the Auburn unicom, then entered the traffic pattern to land on runway 18. The unicom operator reported that the Learjet crew had reported their position on each portion of the traffic pattern. At approximately the same time, the pilot of an unregistered, experimental, Challenger II was in the traffic pattern for runway 10. The two runways intersected at their approach ends. Just before landing, the two aircraft collided as they were crossing over the intersection and crashed on the airport. The challenger (a two place version of an ultralight vehicle) was not equipped with a radio and the unicom operator was unaware of its presence in the traffic pattern. The Learjet pilot stated that neither he nor his copilot had seen any other traffic at the airport. No indication was found that either crew had taken evasive action. An exam of the crash site revealed evidence that the collision had occurred approximately 50 feet above the intersection. A pilot on board the Learjet was killed while six other occupants were injured. The pilot of the Challenger II was also killed.

No evidence of preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction was noted during wreckage examination. The FAA operations inspector who was on board at the time of the accident stated there were no aircraft problems involved. The pic, who was in the process of taking her type rating checkride in the aircraft, failed to maintain directional control during a simulated engine failure after reaching V1 speed during the takeoff run. The total flight experience for the pic was 2,454 hours, most of which was acquired in multi-engine aircraft, with 387 hours being in the make and model aircraft involved in the accident. All listed experience in this make and model was obtained as second-in-command. All three occupants were killed.