De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver

Preliminary investigation revealed that the fuel selector was in the "off" position. This had been the first occasion that the pilot had flown this particular aircraft. The fuel selector in this aircraft was different to that in the other Beaver the pilot had operated. In the previous aircraft, rotating the fuel selector through 180 degrees anti-clockwise changed the selection from the rear to the forward fuel tanks. In the accident aircraft, a similar movement of the selector changed the selection from the rear tank to the "off" position. This difference had not been brought to the pilot's attention, and it was possible that he had not thoroughly familiarized himself with the aircraft prior to commencing operations. It was considered likely that the takeoff had been commenced with the fuel selector positioned to the almost empty rear tank. During the takeoff roll, the fuel low quantity bell and associated light had activated, and the pilot had changed the fuel selector by feel, while continuing with the takeoff. With the fuel supply turned off, the engine had failed from fuel starvation, and the aircraft had subsequently stalled at too low a height above the ground to permit recovery before impact.

The pilot, although experienced in the operation of wheel-equipped aircraft, had limited experience with aircraft on floats. His solo flying experience on float-equipped aircraft was less than one hour and was from the same location the day before the accident. The river flowed at about five knots in the direction of take-off. The water level of the river was low, and, as a result, sand bars were both above and just below the water surface. Because of these conditions, the average usable width of the river for take-offs and landings was less than 100 feet. The river had one prominent bend in the area where the aircraft commenced its take-off and another just downstream of the occurrence site. The riverbank on the left, in the direction of take-off, had tall trees up to the water's edge. The pilot suffered injuries during the crash; the lap belt had a Sliding friction-type buckle that loosened during the crash, and there was no shoulder harness installed in the aircraft. It is probable that the pilot's injuries would have been less serious if he had had a better restraint system. Although the pilot had successfully taken off and landed on the river the day before the accident, the conditions of that area were unsuitable for his limited float-flying experience. When the pilot could not establish directional control during the take-off, a prudent decision would have been to reject, rather than to continue. The supervising pilot should have realized that the conditions of the river were not suitable as a practice area for any pilot, particularly for a pilot whose float-flying experience was limited.

The cause of the accident is that the pilot did not recognize the glassy-water conditions and did not use the glassy-water landing technique. The following findings were reported:
- Glassy-water conditions prevailed at the time of the landing.
- The aircraft struck the water at a high rate of descent, in a nose-down attitude.
- The passenger pre-flight briefing/card did not adequately prepare passengers to deal with emergency water evacuation.
- The pilot was certified and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations.
- The aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures.
- There was no evidence found of any airframe failure or system malfunction prior to or during the flight.
- The weight and centre of gravity were within the prescribed limits.

The pilot was flying under VFR mode in IMC conditions. At the time of the accident, visibility was below minimums.

The following findings were reported:
- Aircraft control was lost for undetermined reasons.
- The pilot departed Wollaston Lake into known icing conditions in an aircraft that was not certified for flight into such conditions.
- There was no evidence of any airframe failure or system malfunction prior to or during the flight.
- The flight crew was certified and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations.
- The aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures.
- The aircraft's weight and centre of gravity were within the prescribed limits.

Occurrence #1: in flight encounter with weather
Phase of operation: cruise
Findings
1. (c) in-flight planning/decision - improper - pilot in command
2. (f) improper use of procedure - pilot in command
3. (c) flight into known adverse weather - continued - pilot in command
4. (f) weather condition - turbulence
5. (f) weather condition - snow
6. (f) weather condition - obscuration
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Occurrence #2: in flight collision with terrain/water
Phase of operation: maneuvering
Findings
7. (c) terrain condition - mountainous/hilly
8. (c) altitude - not maintained - pilot in command

Occurrence #1: in flight collision with terrain/water
Phase of operation: maneuvering
Findings
1. (f) terrain condition - mountainous/hilly
2. (c) in-flight planning/decision - poor - pilot in command
3. (c) proper altitude - not maintained - pilot in command

The investigation was hampered by the extent of fire damage and the cause of the loss of engine power was not positively established.