Convair CV-240

While taxiing to Runway 23 the flight received an IFR (Instrument Plight Rules) clearance from ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control). Normal pre-takeoff checks were performed and the takeoff roll was started at 1640. The aircraft became airborne after using approximately one-half of the 5.630-foot runway. Immediately after leaving the ground the gear was raised and the first officer saw the left feathering button light come on dimly which indicated that the left propeller was in the process of being feathered by the auto-feathering system. After definitely determining the light was on and visually checking the left propeller, the auto-feathering system was disarmed and the captain., in an effort to stop the feathering cycle, pulled the feathering button to neutral. This effort was unsuccessful. the left propeller feathered, and the engine stopped. During the climb an air speed of 140 m.p.h. was reached and maintained., the right engine remaining at full takeoff power. Approximately 250 feet above the ground a shallow left turn was started and the first officer was ordered to reinstate the left engine. the captain believing the aircraft would climb no farther. In the effort to restart the left engine by unfeathering the left propeller. only 600 r.p.m. could be obtained and the captain felt a buffeting through the control yoke. The aircraft at this time had progressed in the left turn approximately 180 degrees from the takeoff direction and the captain. fearing he would be unable to clear obstructions. Including high tension lines, decided to make a wheels-up landing. The landing was made in a field approximately one mile south of the airport. When the aircraft stopped, the passengers and crew evacuated it in an expeditious and orderly manner. The airplane was damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to Zurich-Kloten Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions. Twice, the approach controller informed the crew about his insufficient altitude but the pilot's responses were indistincts. At this time, the aircraft was about 1,500 feet below the minimum descent altitude. On final, the airplane hit the ground, lost its left wing and crashed in a field located 1,500 meters short of runway 14 threshold. 37 occupants were unhurt, six passengers were injured and a young girl aged three (Mrs. Delsaux) was killed. The aircraft was destroyed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reduced due to bad weather and night.

Shortly after takeoff from Frankfurt-Main Airport, while in initial climb, the crew noticed a loss of power on both engines. In the mean time, the crew raised the flaps according to procedures. The aircraft then stalled and crashed in flames in a wooded area located in Kelsterbach, about three km north of the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 44 occupants were killed.

American Airlines' Flight 723 of September 16, 1953, was a scheduled operation between Boston Massachusetts, and Chicago, Illinois, with intermediate stops among which were Hartford, Connecticut, and Albany, New York. The crew consisted of Captain J. W. Stentz, First Officer W. J. Schanken, and Stewardess J. G. Thornquist, Prior to departing Boston the crew filed a company VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flight plan to Chicago following which the company issued a flight clearance to proceed to Albany INSTOP (Instrument or On Top of Clouds Authorize d) 2 with an intermediate landing at Bradley Field, the airport serving Hartford, Connecticut, and Springfield, Massachusetts. The alternate airport was Syracuse, New York. At the time this flight clearance was issued, the weather en route to Albany was good mid the conditions at Albany were above minimums. The portion of the flight to Bradley Field was without incident and the aircraft arrived there at 0657. At Bradley Field Captain Stentz reviewed the latest weather reports in the company's operations office and was advised that Bradley Field had been added to his flight clearance as a second alternate in addition to Syracuse because the weather at Albany at this time was below the company's landing minimums 3 was forecast to improve to within limits by the time the flight arrived there. The special Albany 0642 weather report available to the captain at this time was: ceiling indefinite zero, sky obscured, visibility zero, fog. The en route weather was clear. According to the company's records, the gross takeoff weight of the aircraft at Hartford was 37,889 pounds which was within the allowable gross take-off weight of 40,503 pounds; the load was properly distributed with respect to the center of gravity limits of the aircraft. Departure from Bradley Field was made at 0714 with 25 passengers. Immediately before departing, the flight advised the tower it was proceeding to Albany VFR. At 0737, a message from the company's dispatcher at New York was relayed to Captain Stentz through the company radio at Albany as follows: "If Albany still below limits on your arrival, if OK with you, suggest hold vicinity until at least 0830 EST. Expect Albany to have limits 0730-0800 EST. Advise fuel on board when over Albany." Flight 723 acknowledged and advised. "We will hold." At 0740, the flight reported to Albany Approach Control that it was over Montgomery Ward, an in-range visual check point, VFR, and requested a clearance of at least 500 feet on top of clouds to the Albany Range Station. This request was approved and the flight was cleared to maintain at least 500 feet on top and to hold north of the Range Station. The 0739 Albany special weather report was given the flight: "Ceiling indefinite, 100 feet, sky obscured, visibility 1/4 mile, fog, wind west-southwest one mile per hour." Flight 723 reported aver the Range Station at 0742. During the holding period the number of aircraft in this pattern varied from six to nine. The special Albany weather report issued at 0750 indicated thin obscurement, ceiling estimated 4,000, overcast, fog, visibility 3/4 miles. At 0753, the first of the aircraft in the holding pattern, American Airlines' Flight 750, was cleared for an instrument approach to Runway 19. At 0800, this aircraft missed its approach and was immediately cleared to climb toward the south and to again remain at least 500 feet on top of clouds. A second aircraft which was holding was then cleared to make a similar approach and it too was forced to execute a missed approach procedure. At 08163 an instrument approach mid a landing on Runway 19 were successfully completed by one of the holding aircraft. Immediately following this landing. Flight 723 was cleared to make an instrument approach to Runway 19. Three minutes later the flight advised the tower that its approach was being abandoned because the aircraft's flaps could not be lowered. It was then still at least 500 feet on top of clouds and was advised by the tower to remain there until further advised. At approximately 0830, the following message was transmitted from the Albany Tower: "All aircraft holding Albany. It now appears to be pretty good for a contact approach from the west. It looks much better than to the north." Immediately following this message, Flight 723 was asked by the tower if it would accept a contact approach from the west for a landing on Runway 10. After requesting and receiving current weather including altimeter setting (29.74) and the length of Runway 10 (4,500 feet). the flight stated it would accept a contact approach. Clearance was then issued the flight to make a contact approach to Runway 10. Acknowledgement of this clearance was the last radio contact with the flight. At approximately 0834, Flight 723 struck the radio towers and crashed. The weather reported at the time of the accident was thin scattered clouds at 500 feet, ceiling estimated 4,500 feet, broken clouds, visibility 1-1/2 miles, fog.

After a run of 700 meters on runway 05, the captain started to rotate. During the initial climb, at a height of approximately 50 to 60 feet and at a speed of 233 km/h, the pilot-in-command retracted the flaps when the aircraft lost height and stalled. The pilot closed the throttles and belly landed the airplane on the remaining runway. The aircraft slid for 200 meters, overran, crossed a road where it struck two standing girls before coming to rest near a drainage ditch, broken in two. All 34 occupants were evacuated safely while two girls aged 16 and 4 were killed. The aircraft was destroyed.

En route from New Delhi to Dhaka, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and was unable to locate Dhaka Airport. The airplane continued to the east and the captain eventually decided to reduce his altitude in an attempt to establish a visual contact with the ground when the aircraft hit the slope of a mountain located near Kailashahar. All 16 occupants were killed.

The approach to Newark was completed in marginal weather conditions with a ceiling at 400 feet and a 3/4 mile visibility. For unknown reason, the aircraft deviated from the approach path to the left and, in a relative flat attitude, hit an obstacle and eventually crashed in flames on several houses located in the city of Elizabeth, about three miles from runway 06 threshold. All 23 occupants on board the aircraft and seven people in the ground were killed while nine others were injured. Few houses were destroyed.

Flight 801 originated at Boston, Massachusetts, for LaGuardia Field, nonstop, with a crew of Captain A. V. R. Marsh, First Officer Austin Officer Austin E. Briggs, and Stewardess Carolyn Mc Hull. It departed Boston at 0745, as schedules, in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules, via Airways Amber 7 and Red 3 to LaGuardia, Idlewild (New York International) Airport was the specified alternate. Upon departure from Boston the aircraft's gross weight was 38, 23 pounds, with a maximum allowable weight of 39,650 pounds, and the center of gravity was within prescribed limits. The flight proceeded uneventfully at its assigned altitude of 6,000 feet MSL in instrument weather with almost continuous rain. No actual icing occurred although the aircraft's de-icing equipment was used as a precaution because of the near freezing air temperatures. All required position reports were routine. At approximately 0845, the flight contacted LaGuardia approach control and advised, "Northeast 801 over New Canaan - cleared to New Rochelle." (The flight had been cleared to New Rochelle by ARTC.) Approach control then requested the flight to report over the Port Chester, New York, fan marker, and gave it an expected approach clearance time of an the hour (0900), Runway 22, and the 0828 LaGuardia weather, as follows: "estimated 3,000 overcast, one end one-half miles, rain and smoke, Wind southeast six, altimeter zero-zero-zero" (30.00). The light reported over Port Chester at 0849 and was successively cleared to descend to 4,500 foot, to 3,500 foot, and to 2,500 foot altitudes. At 0855 it was cleared to leave New Rochelle, inbound, and shortly was instructed to make a 360-degree turn to assure separation from a preceding aircraft. The flight acknowledged and complied. At 0858 it reported leaving New Rochelle and was cleared for an approach to Runway 22, and at 0859, was told that Ground Control Approach advisories were available on a frequency of 109.9 megacycles. The flight acknowledged, and then was given the 0900 LaGuardia weather, ceiling 1,700 feet and visibility 1 1/2 miles. Flight 801 reported leaving the LaGuardia range at 0900 and was cleared to land on Runway 22. There was no further message from the flight. At 0903 it struck the water of Flushing Bay some 3,600 feet from the approach end of Runway 22. A motorboat operated by the Edo Corporation, docked about one-half mile away, reached the site approximately four minutes later. Passengers and crew, who had climbed out through the emergency exits and who were standing on and holding to the fat sinking aircraft, were taken aboard and then transferred to a tugboat that arrived shortly. All occupants were taken ashore and hospitalized.

Flight 507 departed Miami, Florida, at 0700, September 2, 1951, and made a routine scheduled stop at Camagüey, Cuba. No irregularities were reported by the flight crew upon arrival at Camagüey, and the flight departed there on schedule at 0900, cleared under visual flight rules direct to Kingston, Jamaica, with Montego Bay, Jamaica, as an alternate. The gross weight of the aircraft and distribution of the disposable load were within allowable limits upon departure from Camagüey. The flight was uneventful between Camagüey and Kingston, and routine radio contacts were made en route At 1003 Flight 507 reported its position to Palisadoes Airport Tower, Kingston, as 20 miles north and a little later was cleared into the traffic pattern for Runway 14. The flight acknowledged this clearance and shortly thereafter reported that the field was in sight Palisadoes Tower then advised Flight 507 of the presence of a local squall between Kingston and the approach end of Runway 14, with heavy rain at the airport, and suggested a low approach. When the aircraft first came into view of the air traffic controller, it was just emerging from the heavy part of the squall, which was then over the approach end of Run-way 14 and moving northwesterly. At this time the flight requested and received permission to circle the airport to the right Witnesses located near the approach end of Runway 14 observed the aircraft flying in a southeasterly direction, paralleling the runway. At approximately the runway intersection, 2 the aircraft turned right and continued around the airport to a point northwest of the approach end of Runway 14 and over Kingston Harbor, here it was observed to descend into the water about 800 feet short of the runway. No one was seriously injured. A motor launch from a nearby salvage vessel arrived alongside the wrecked aircraft in a matter of minutes and took the survivors ashore. The wreckage floated for a short time, then sank, leaving only a part of the tail group and one wing visible above the surface of the water.

The flight departed Minneapolis, Minnesota, at 0746LT, bound for Houston, Texas, via schedules intermediate points. A crew change was made at Kansas City, Missouri, and no mechanical discrepancies were reported by the incoming crew with the exception that the left engine torque meter pressure indication was approximately 90 FSI, the normal being approximately 145 PSI The flight departed Kansas City and proceeded in a routine manner to Tulsa, arriving at 1244. The left engine, torque meter pressure indicator was considered inoperative because of its low reading, and was, therefore, disregarded during the flight 2. Following touchdown at Tulsa, the propellers were placed in reverse thrust, and when being returned to positive thrust, the left propeller went to the full feathered position and the engine ceased operation. While taxiing to the loading ramp, attempts were made to start the left engine but were not successful. On departure from Tulsa, no difficulty was encountered in starting the left engine, and the propeller which was in the full feathered position was returned to the low pitch position by use of the propeller governor control. Take-off was accomplished from Tulsa at 1302LT, with 29 passengers, including one infant, and a flight crew consisting of Paul C. Walters, captain, Forrest A. Hull, copilot, Cecelia Littell and loan Stoltenberg, the two stewardesses. Total aircraft weight was 40,304 pounds, which was within the allowable gross weight of 40,500 pounds, and the load was distributed so that the center of gravity was within the certificated limits. Prior to take-off, the engines were run up and the pre-flight check accomplished using a check list. All items checked satisfactorily, with the exception that the left engine torque meter pressure indicator was abnormally low. Flaps were positioned at 24 degrees for take-off. The take-of roll was started on Runway 12, and the signal devices in the cockpit indicated that the automatic feathering unit and the anti-detonation injection unit were functioning. During the take-off roll, the copilot called out the following indicated air speeds. VMC, 107 miles per hour, V1, 121 miles per hour, and V2, 122 miles per hour. The aircraft became airborne at 124 miles per hour, or slightly higher. The landing gear was immediately retracted and the air speed was then observed to be 145 miles per hour at this time, at an altitude estimated to be not over 50 feet, the left propeller was observed to feather and then immediately to rotate slowly. It continued to rotate until the aircraft struck the ground. The crew first became aware that the left engine was malfunctioning when a severe vibration was felt immediately after the gear had been retracted and at the same time the aircraft yawed to the left momentarily. Both engine controls were left at the take-off setting, and a single-engine climb was then initiated. The air speed decreased to approximately 124 miles per hour during the climb to a maximum altitude of approximately 150 feet. At this point, since it was doubtful that this air speed could be maintained, the aircraft was leveled off and a shallow turn to the left was made to avoid flying over a building. As the aircraft started turning at an approximate air speed of 122 miles per hour, the captain, according to the copilot, gave the command to retract the flaps from the 24-degree position to the 12-degree position. The copilot states that he immediately executed the command, stopping the retraction of the flaps at 12 degrees. The captain states that he gave the following command, “ 12-degree flaps. No, leave them where they are.” However, the captain testified that the command was given when the air speed was 107 miles per hour and at a point approximately 3000 feet further along the flight path than where the copilot stated he retracted the flaps. While in the left turn, the aircraft was observed to lose altitude steadily until it struck a grove of trees at a point approximately 17 feet above the ground. After striking the trees it slid on the ground on the underside of the fuselage. All passengers and crew were evacuated safely and in an orderly manner. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.