Cessna 402

The pilot departed on a scheduled flight conducted under night instrument meteorological conditions. Arriving in the area of the destination airport, the weather was reported as, winds from 220 degrees at 18 knots, gusts to 25 knots; 1/2 statute miles of visibility and haze; vertical visibility of 100 feet. The pilot was vectored and cleared for the ILS 24 approach. As the airplane crossed the glideslope, the pilot observed that the "ride" became increasingly bumpy and turbulent, with a strong wind component from the right. The approach lights came into view as the airplane neared the runway, but soon disappeared due to the low visibility. The pilot executed a missed approach, and as full power was applied, the airplane began to move laterally to the left. During the missed approach, a "thunk" was heard on the left side of the fuselage, and the airplane descended into the trees. The airplane came to rest in a wooded area about 1/4 mile from the Runway 24 threshold, about 1,000 feet to the left of the extended centerline. Review of the approach plate for the ILS 24 approach revealed that the glide slope altitude at the final approach fix for the non-precision approach, which was located about 4 miles from the approach end of the runway, was 1,407 feet. The glide slope altitude at the middle marker, which was located about 0.6 miles from the approach end of the runway, was 299 feet. Review of radar data revealed that the airplane intercepted the glideslope about 4 miles from the threshold of runway 24. In the following 2 minutes, 30 seconds, the airplane deviated below and returned to the glideslope centerline approximately 4 times, with a maximum deviation of 2-dots below the glideslope centerline. About 1-mile from the runway, the airplane began a trend downward from the glideslope centerline, descending below the 2- dot low deviation line of the glideslope to an altitude of about 300 feet, when the last radar hit was recorded. During the approach, the airplane's ground speed varied between 50 and 125 knots. According to the Aeronautical Information Manual chapter on Navigation Aids, Instrument Landing System (ILS), it stated that "Make every effort to remain on the indicated glide path." It also cautioned the pilot to, "Avoid flying below the glide path to assure obstacle/terrain clearance is maintained."

On December 20, 2000, about 1045 mountain standard time, a Cessna 402B, N908AB, registered to Pitts Aviation, Inc., and operated by TS Aviation, as a Costa Rican air taxi flight from Nosara, Costa Rica, to San Jose, Costa Rica, crashed while making a forced landing following loss of engine power shortly after takeoff from Nosara. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot and one passenger received serious injuries. Five passengers received minor injuries. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. Civil aviation authorities reported the flight had a loss of power in one engine during initial climb after takeoff, was unable to maintain altitude, and collided with trees. A post crash fire erupted.

After departure from San Juan, the pilot of N405MN contacted the FAA San Juan Approach Control, was identified on radar by the controller, and told to climb to 7,000 feet. About 1 minute later, the pilot is told to proceed direct to St. Croix. About 4 minutes later, the pilot requested radar vectors to St. Croix, and was told to fly heading 140 degrees. Radar data showed the flight leveled at the cruise altitude of 7,000 feet at about 0444. At about 0453:36, the pilot requested a lower altitude, and was cleared to 2,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the clearance, and no further transmissions were received from the pilot. The flight began descent from 7,000 feet at about 0454. At 0454:29, the aircraft's transponder reports the flight is at 6,500 feet. At 0454:41, the transponder reports the flight is at 5,600 feet, and at 0454:49, at 4,000 feet. At 0454:53, the transponder reports the flight is at 1,100 feet. The flight is not observed on radar after this. No other aircraft or radar returns are observed near the flight as it began it's descent. One main landing gear tire, wheel, and brake assembly; the left wing lower skin from the area above the wing flap; the left wing baggage compartment door; the right nose baggage compartment door; the cabin floor cover; and some items from the U.S. mail cargo, were recovered floating in the ocean, at points north of the last observed radar contact with the airplane, on the day of the accident and in the days after the accident. The recovered components had damage from being separated from the airplane. None of the recovered components had any fire, heat, or soot damage. The remainder of the airplane was not located and recovered. The depth of the sea in the area of the accident site was reported by the Coast Guard to be about 6,000 feet. U.S. Post Office personnel reported the flight carried 1,517 pounds of U.S. mail. No hazardous materials were in the mail. A 75-pound pouch of mail was recovered from the ocean and identified as having been placed on N405MN. The weather at the time of the accident was reported to scattered clouds with visibility 10 miles.

While descending to Kamina Airport, the twin engine aircraft struck a mountain and crashed. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

During the last segment, while completing the flare, the twin engine aircraft landed hard. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid on its belly for few dozen metres before coming to rest. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft departed Orán Airport at 0845LT on an executive flight to Salta, carrying two passengers and two pilots. At 0910LT, while flying under VFR mode, the crew reported his position over Moxat at an altitude of 8,000 feet. At 0923LT, he informed ATC about his position 15NM northeast of Salta Airport and was instructed to contact Salta Tower. Shortly later, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain (Finca el Desmonde) located near Mojotoro. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all four occupants were killed.

On 13 December 1999 at 1029 5H-GTO took off from Zanzibar airport for a direct VFR flight to Chankonde. The endurance was six hours and the pilot was the only occupant. The aircraft was destined to pick a party of five hunters at Chankonde hunting airstrip for a flight to Dar es Salaam. The forward leg of the flight was uneventful and the pilot reported to Dar Control at 1153 hours that he has Chankonde in site and was estimating to land at 1215 hours. The aircraft did in fact land at 1216 hours. The pilot reported that shortly before he landed at Chankonde he circled around the airstrip and noticed that there were some pools of water on the runway. Five passengers boarded the aircraft at Chankonde for a flight to Dar es Salaam. The pilot said that all the heavy baggage and two members of the hunting party left by road for Dar es Salaam. The remaining five who boarded the aircraft carried only hand luggage. In the preparation for take-off the pilot taxied to the threshold of runway 07, made the "first selection" of flaps and applied full power on brakes. He testified that he did not lean the mixtures since he saw no requirement for this. The initial phase of the take-off rolI appeared' normal to the pilot. When the aircraft 'had' covered about 600 metres and was accelerating through 65/70 kt it went through a muddy ditch causing the pilot to feeI deceleration. It immediately became apparent that he was not going to achieve the take off speed and clear the trees in the foreground. The pilot subsequently decided to abort the take-off. When the engines were throttled back and brakes were applied the aircraft continued to rolI on wet and slippery sandy surface till it overran the end of runway 07 and collided with trees located about 60 metres beyond the end of the runway. As the aircraft impacted the trees in the accident sequence, both wing sections outboard of the engines separated and caught fire. The aircraft came to rest about 56 metres forward of the detached wing sections. The grass beneath the aircraft and the right engine were also on fire. The pilot was unable to open the cockpit door because it was blocked by a tree. He subsequently rushed behind and opened the main door. As he did so, one passenger, "who was tall and muscular" pushed the pilot causing him to falI by the doorway on the ground where grass surface was on fire. All the five passengers stepped on the pilot and escaped. The pilot managed to rise an his own, returned to the cabin and picked the fire extinguisher. He subsequently fought the fire under the fuselage, the tail and the right engine. He was also joined by a vehicle which had 20 litres of water and this was used to put out the fire on the left hand side of the fuselage. The passenger who was in the copilot seat sustained a cut on his eyebrow and another passenger suffered minor burns on his fingers. The pilot whom the passengers used as a stepping stone and a fire blanket sustained first degree burns to his face and both arms. Both wings and parts of the tail plane were torn off the fuselage by impact with the trees. They were also partly destroyed by fire. The fuselage suffered relatively less "damage and the cabin remained intact. However, much of the interior equipment was destroyed by unknown persons a few days after the accident when the wreckage was left unguarded. The weather at the time of the accident was reported to be sunny with no wind. The ground was wet from rains which had been falling in the area. Chankonde Airstrip, elevation 3,386 feet, has one runway 07/25 which is 1,000 metres long and 30 metres wide. The surface is sand with some patches of scattered grass. There are tall trees starting 60 metres beyond the end of runway 07.

The twin-engine airplane impacted the ground in an uncontrolled descent following the inflight separation of the right wing during a normal descent. The airplane had accumulated a total time of 20,457 hours and had been flown 52 hours since the most recent annual inspection, which was performed by the current operator 3 weeks prior to the accident. Available maintenance records indicated that since 1988, maintenance personnel had made numerous repairs to the right wing, including repairing skin cracks, working rivets, wing stub spar straps, and the right main landing gear. Metallurgical examination revealed that the right wing's front spar failed due to fatigue that started at an area of mechanical damage and rough machining marks. The presence of primer covering the mechanical damage strongly suggests that the damage was produced during the manufacturing process. It could not be determined whether the mechanical damage or the machining, acting alone, could have caused the fatigue cracking to initiate. Fatigue cracking found on the rear spar and the forward auxiliary spar is most likely secondary fatigue due to load shedding as the crack grew in the front spar.

While on approach to land the left engine surged and lost power. The pilot switched the left engine fuel selector to another fuel tank and the engine restarted. A short time later the left engine surged and lost power again. The pilot switched the left engine fuel selector to the right main fuel tank and the engine again restarted. A short time later the left engine quit again and he shutdown the engine and feathered the propeller. A short time later the right engine surged and lost power. He shut down the right engine and feathered the propeller. He then made a forced landing in a field and during landing rollout the aircraft's left wing collided with a tree. A fire erupted in the left wing area. Post crash examination showed the right main fuel tank was empty. The right auxiliary fuel tank contained 2.5 gallons. The left main fuel tank contained one half gallon of fuel and the left auxiliary tank was ruptured. The pilot operating handbook stated that the main fuel tanks had one gallon unusable fuel and the auxiliary fuel tanks had one half gallon of unusable fuel.