Boeing 707

Witnesses reported 1st attempt to takeoff was aborted after aircraft swerved left and right. On 2nd try, aircraft lifted off about halfway down runway. After lift-off, it rolled right, right wing hit ground and aircraft crashed. Investigations revealed rudder trim was 7.9 to 8.3 units (79% to 83%) nose right. Simulator tests with that setting resulted in consistent right wing collisions with ground after liftoff. Crew's checklist referred to mech checklist for critical items to check before takeoff. Mech checklist and 50 of 54 flight instruments had been removed from aircraft, leaving 2 airspeed indicators, altimeter and standby gyro horizon. In 60 simulated takeoffs in this configuration, there was evidence of insufficient attitudinal ref to recognize rolling of aircraft before sufficient altitude was attained. FAA's designated airworthiness rep (dar) had inspected aircraft three days before and issued ferry permit. He lacked FAA mechanical certification and experience with large aircraft. FAA order 8000.62 and ac 183.33 lacked specific guidance for selection, training and oversight of dar activity. Also, lack of guidance concerning minimum equipment list. Pilot not current or medical qualified to fly aircraft.

During the takeoff roll at Addis Ababa-Bole Airport runway 07, at a speed of about 100 knots, the captain spotted pigeons around the runway and shortly later, the power on engine n°2 and 3 dropped. The crew decided to abort the takeoff maneuver and initiated an emergency braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage, went down an embankment and came to rest, broken in two. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was written off.

Upon touchdown, the nose gear collapsed, damaging both engines n°2 and 4. The aircraft slid for few dozen meters before coming to rest. All five crew members escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to Goma Airport, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the ground 38 meters short of runway threshold. Upon impact, the right main gear was torn off. The aircraft slid for about 300 meters then veered to the right and came to rest. All nine occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Avianca flight 052 (AV052), a Boeing 707-321B with Colombian registration HK-2016, crashed in a wooded residential area in Cove Neck, Long Island, NY. AV052 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Bogotá, Colombia, to New York-JFK Intl Airport, NY, with an intermediate stop at Jose Maria Cordova Airport, near Medellín, Columbia. Of the 158 persons aboard, 73 were fatally injured. Because of poor weather conditions in the northeastern part of the United States, the flightcrew was placed in holding 3 times by ATC for a total of about 1 hour and 17 minutes. During the 3rd period of holding, the flightcrew reported that the aircraft could not hold longer than 5 minutes, that it was running out of fuel, and that it could not reach its alternate airport, Boston-Logan Intl. Subsequently, the flightcrew executed a missed approach to JFK Intl Airport. While trying to return to the airport, the aircraft experienced a loss of power to all 4 engines and crashed approximately 21 miles northeast of JFK Airport.

After takeoff from Addis Ababa-Bole Airport, while climbing, the crew encountered technical problems with the undercarriage that could not be raised. Decision was taken to return for a safe landing but after touchdown, due to the malfunction of the hydraulic systems, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. The aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. All 76 occupants were evacuated, among them six passengers were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During the takeoff roll at Nairobi-Jomo Kenyatta Airport, the captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest few dozen meters past the runway end. All 70 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew (one captain under training, one instructor and one flight engineer) was completing a cargo flight from Manaus to São Paulo and the aircraft was carrying a load of 26 tons of electronic equipments. Initially cleared for an approach to runway 09L, the crew was instructed to change to runway 09R as runway 09L was blocked by an aircraft. The crew was aware of a notam saying that runway 09R would be closed to all traffic starting 1200LT due to maintenance. In such conditions, the instructor rushed the approach procedure, interrupted the instruction to the captain under supervision and commanded flaps and speed brake at the same time, causing the aircraft to descend. The left wing struck the roof of a house then crashed in a residential area located about 2,7 km short of runway, bursting into flames. All three crew members and 22 people on the ground were killed. 47 other people on the ground were seriously injured.

Independent Air flight IDN1851, a Boeing 707, departed Bergamo, Italy (BGY) at 10:04 UTC for a flight to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic (PUJ) via Santa Maria, Azores (SMA). At 13:56:47 Santa Maria Tower cleared the flight to descend to 3000 feet for a runway 19 ILS approach: "Independent Air one eight five one roger reclear to three thousand feet on QNH one zero two seven and runway will be one niner." In that transmission, the trainee controller had transmitted an incorrect QNH that was 9 hPa too high. The actual QNH was 1018.7 hPa. After a brief pause the message resumed at 13:56:59: "expect ILS approach runway one niner report reaching three thousand." This transmission was not recorded on the voice recorder of Flight 1851, probably because the first officer keyed his mike and read back: "We’re recleared to 2,000 feet and ah ... ." The first officer paused from 13:57:02 to 13:57:04, then unkeyed the mike momentarily. This transmission was not recorded on the ATS tapes. In the cockpit, the first officer questioned aloud the QNH value, but the captain agreed that the first officer had correctly understood the controller. After being cleared for the ILS approach the crew failed to accomplish an approach briefing, which would have included a review of the approach plate and minimum safe altitude. If the approach plate had been properly studied, they would have noticed that the minimum safe altitude was 3,000 feet and not 2,000 feet, as it had been understood, and they would have noticed the existence and elevation of Pico Alto. At 14:06, the flight was 7.5 nm from the point of impact, and beginning to level at 2,000 feet (610 meters) in light turbulence at 250 KIAS. At 14:07, the flight was over Santa Barbara and entering clouds at approximately 700 feet (213 meters) AGL in heavy turbulence at 223 KIAS. At 14:07:52, the captain said, "Can’t keep this SOB thing straight up and down". At approximately 14:08, the radio altimeter began to whine, followed by the GPWS alarm as the aircraft began to climb because of turbulence, but there was no reaction on the part of the flight crew. At 14:08:12, the aircraft was level when it impacted a mountain ridge of Pico Alto. It collided with a rock wall on the side of a road at the mountain top at an altitude of approximately 1,795 feet (547 meters) AMSL.

During a night approach to Cairo-Intl Airport, the crew initiated a go-around as the visibility was too low (400 meters). A second attempt to land few minutes later was also abandoned. The crew decided to divert to Luxor Airport where weather conditions were better. While approaching Luxor from the north, the crew declared an emergency due to low fuel when the aircraft lost height and crashed onto several houses located in the city of Karm Umran, about 45 km north of Luxor Airport runway 20 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed and all eight occupants were killed as well as one people on the ground.