Boeing 707

Flight SN712 was a non-scheduled international cargo flight from Brussels direct to Lagos on behalf of the Federal Government of Nigeria with 34 994 kg of cargo on board. No passengers were being carried. A flight plan was filed for a flight of 6 hours 9 minutes and the total endurance of the aircraft was stated as 8 hours 20 minutes. The designated alternate was Kano. The aircraft took off from Brussels at 2152 hours GMT on 12 July 1968 and routine radio reports were received during the en route phase of the flight. At 0325 hours R/T contact was made with Lagos approach control. The R/T transmissions with the aircraft have been identified as being almost certainly the voice of the co-pilot indicating that he was doing the R/T rhile the pilot-in-command was flying the aircraft. The aircraft gave an ETA at Lagos of 0355 hours and reported that it was at flight Level (FL) 330. A request was then made for the latest Lagos weather and the reply included the following information: wind: 210°/3 kt; visibility: 16 km; cloud: 5/8 stratocumulus 270 m, 7/8 altostratus 2 400 m, temporary thunderstorms, 118 cumulonimbus 2 000 ft; QNH: 1012 mb; temperature 24°. At 0327 hours the aircraft reported an ETA overhead Ibadan NDB of 0344 hours in response to a request for this information from Lagos. One minute later it reported that the Ibadan NDB did not appear to be operating. At 0336 the aircraft requested descent clearance. It was cleared to Lagos at FL60 and commenced the descent from FL330 at that time. Three minutes later the aircraft reported passing Ibadan and descending through FL275 but since it had reported earlier that the Ibadan NDB seemed not to be radiating it is not known how the position was determined. In reply Lagos approach stated that there was no delay in the approach and that the runway in use was 19. At 0341 hours, when the aircraft was about 50 miles north of. Lagos, it was recleared to 2 200 ft on a QNH of 1012 mb - and told to report field in sight. The flight recorder readout shows that shortly after this interchange the descent was interrupted while the speed decreased to a figure corresponding to the recommended maximum for landing gear extension and this speed was not exceeded for the remainder of the flight. Close study of the flight recording shows subsequent irregularity indicating that the automatic pilot was most probably disengaged at this stage of the flight. Subsequent to the speed reduction the rate of descent was re-established to approximately 2 000 ft/min and at 0350 hours the aircraft passed one mile to the east of Lagos airport whilst on a southerly heading at an altitude of 15 000 ft. The aircraft was heard flying over the airport at this time. The flight recorder indicates that a procedure turn was made to the south of the airport in the vicinity of the city of Lagos and at its conclusion there was a second interruption in the descent following which the airspeed remained below the maximum for 25° of flap. At 0354 hours the aircraft passed over the airport northbound at an altitude of 9 000 ft maintaining the average rate of descent of 2 000 ft/min for a further 2 1/2 minutes. At 0356 hours a procedure turn was commenced at an altitude of about 5 000 ft during which the rate of descent was reduced to 1 500 ft/min. The track of the aircraft between its passage over the airport northbound and the commencement of the final procedure turn is almost coincident with the outbound track of the published VOR approach procedure. At 0357 hours Lagos approach control was informed by the aircraft that it was in the procedure turn and requested to give the wind conditions. In reply control stated that the wind was calm and this was acknowledged. Shortly afterwards approach control instructed the aircraft to report runway in sight and this was also acknowledged. On completion of the procedure turn at an altitude of 1 400 ft (a height above the airport of 1268 ft) the airspeed was reduced from 190 kt to a little less than 160 kt and the rate of descent was reduced to 900 ft/min. The heading was stabilized on 197° M and at 0359 hours the aircraft asked for the runway lights to be put on maximum brightness. Approach control replied that the runway lights were on low intensity non-variable. A transmitter switch was then heard but there was no subsequent message from the aircraft before it crashed about 8 1/2 miles north of the airport approximately on the extended centre line of the runway. All the occupants were killed and the aircraft caught fire immediately and was burnt out. All seven occupants were killed.

The four engine aircraft christened 'Clipper Caribbean' was performing the westward Pan Am flight 001 from San Francisco to New York with intermediate stops in Honolulu, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Calcutta, New Delhi, Beirut, Istanbul, Frankfurt and London. Following an uneventful flight from Bangkok-Don Mueang Airport, the crew started the approach to Calcutta-Dum Dum Airport by night and marginal weather conditions due to low clouds at 400 feet and rain showers. The crew deployed the flaps at 50° and continued the approach when he misunderstood the atmospheric pressure value transmitted by ATC. Instead of setting the QNH value of 993 mb, the crew set the QFE at 29,93, which caused the aircraft to descent 360 feet below the glide. It continued below the decision height until it struck tree tops located 1,128 meters short of runway threshold then impacted the ground and came to rest in flames one km short of runway. A crew member and five passengers were killed while 20 others were injured. 37 people were unhurt. The aircraft was destroyed.

A Boeing 707-344C passenger jet, registered ZS-EUW, was destroyed in an accident near Windhoek-Strijdom International Airport, Namibia. The aircraft was operating on South African Airways' flight SA228 from Johannesburg to London via Windhoek, Luanda, Las Palmas and Frankfurt. The first leg of the flight was uneventful. Local weather conditions at Windhoek were fine: there was no cloud and no wind. The night was particularly dark as there was no moon and the horizon was indistinct. At 20:49 the aircraft took off from Windhoek runway 08 into conditions of complete darkness. The aircraft climbed to a height of about 650 feet above ground level. It leveled off and began to descend. Thirty seconds later, the aircraft flew into the ground at a point some 5,327 metres from the end of the runway. The level of the ground at the point of impact was 179 feet below the airport elevation or approximately 100 feet below the point of lift-off. The impact occurred at a ground speed of approximately 271 knots. The initial impact was in a slightly left-wing-down attitude. The fuselage and each of the 4 engine pods gouged deep trenches in the ground and the aircraft then began to break up as its momentum carried it onward. Wreckage was strewn over an area some 1,400 metres long and some 200 metres wide, and 2 separate fires broke out, presumably through the ignition of fuel on impact. Five passengers were seriously injured while 123 other occupants were killed.

The aircraft was operating Flight BA. 712 from Heathrow Airport, London to Zurich with onward routing to Sydney, Australia. In addition to the normal crew complement, a check pilot was on the aircraft for the purpose of carrying out a route check on the pilot-in-command. The aircraft became airborne from Runway 28 Left at 1527 hours GMT and 20 seconds later, just before the time for the noise abatement power reduction, the flight crew felt and heard a combined shock and bang. The thrust lever for No. 2 engine "kicked" towards the closed position and at the same time the instruments showed that the engine was running down. The pilot-in-command ordered "Engine Failure Drill" and the flight engineer began the immediate actions of that drill. Because the undercarriage was retracted, the warning horn sounded when the flight engineer fully retarded the thrust lever; the check pilot and flight engineer simultaneously went for and pulled the horn cancel switch on the pedestal whilst the co-pilot, instinctively, but in error, pressed the fire bell cancel button in front of him. The flight engineer went for the engine fire shut-off handle but he did not pull it. The lack of a flight deck voice recorder makes it impossible to establish a second by second timing of events, but at about this time the check pilot looked out of a flight deck window on the port side and reported a serious fire in No. 2 engine, adding words to the effect that a landing should be made at the earliest possible moment. No member of the flight crew recalls hearing the fire warning bell. Nevertheless, the fire warning light in No. 2 fire shut-off handle was seen to be on and the pilot-in-command ordered an "Engine Fire Drill". The check pilot suggested, and the co-pilot with the pilot-in-command's approval broadcast, a "Mayday" call. Having initially started an engine failure drill, the flight engineer changed directly to the engine fire drill. According to his evidence, having completed Phase 1 of the engine fire drill, which is required to be done by memory, he subsequently used his own copy of the checklist to complete Phase I1 of the drill, including the operation of the fire extinguisher transfer switch and pushing the discharge button for the second shot thirty seconds after the first. When the co-pilot started to read the check list the flight engineer told him the check was already completed. During this period and subsequently, according to his evidence, the check pilot directed his attention to monitoring the state of the fire on the wing and to providing the pilot-in-command with comments intended to help him position the aircraft for the landing. ATC originally offered the pilot-in-command a landing back on Runway 28L and alerted the fire services but after the "Mayday" call he was offered Runway 05 R which was accepted as it would resulting a shorter flight path. ATC ordered other landing aircraft to overshoot in order to ensure a clear approach to Runway 05 R and to clear Runway 28R for the passage of the fire vehicles. The initial notification to the Airport Emergency Services of the expected landing on Runway 28 L was also revised. About 14 minutes after the start of the fire, No. 2 engine, together with part of its pylon, became detached and fell into a waterfilled gravel pit. This was unknown to the flight crew but because of the separation the light in the fire handle would have gone out. Nevertheless, they were aware that a serious fire continued to burn. At various places along the flight path a number of engine fragments and pieces of cowling had already fallen away, but these caused no injury to persons or damage to property. At about the time the engine fell away the undercarriage was lowered and full flap selected. The undercarriage locked down normally but the hydraulic pressure and contents were seen to fall and the flaps stopped extending at 470, that is 30 short of their full range. The approach to Runway 05 R was made from a difficult position, the aircraft being close to the runway and having reached a height of about 3 000 ft and a speed of 225 kt. There is no glide slope guidance to this runway but the approach was well judged and touchdown was achieved approximately 400 yards beyond the threshold. To add to the pilot-in-command's difficulties, during the final approach the flight engineer informed him that the instruments of No. 1 engine indicated that it might fail, although it did not do so. In order to bring the aircraft to a stop in the shortest possible distance after landing, in addition to the wheel. brakes, reverse thrust from No. 1 and No. 4 engines was used down to a very low speed. The use of reverse thrust caused the flames to be deflected in towards the fuselage. The aircraft came to a stop just to the left of the runway centre line, about 1 800 yards from the threshold, on a heading of 0350M. After the aircraft came to rest the flight engineer commenced the engine shut-down drill and closed the start levers. Almost simultaneously the pilot-in-command ordered fire drill on the remaining engines. Before this could be carried out there was an explosion from the port wing which increased the intensity of the fire and blew fragments of the wing over to the starboard side of the aircraft. The pilot-in-command then ordered immediate evacuation of the flight deck. The engine fire shut-off handies were not pulled and the fuel booster pumps and main electrical supply were not switched off. There were more explosions and fuel, which was released from the port tanks, spread underneath the aircraft and greatly enlarged the area of the fire. The cabin crew had made preparations for an emergency landing and as the aircraft came to a stop opened the emergency exits and started rigging the escape chutes. The passengers commenced evacuation from the two starboard overwing exits and shortly afterwards, when the escape chutes had been inflated, from the rear starboard galley door and then the forward starboard galley door. However, because of the spread of the fire under the rear of the fuselage the escape chute at the rear galley door soon burst and, following the first explosion, the overwing escape route also became unusable. The great majority of the survivors left the aircraft via the forward galley door escape chute. The co-pilot, who could not get into the galley to help with the evacuation, left the aircraft through the starboard flight deck window by use of the escape rope at that position. The Second Officer, who helped guide the passengers in the initial stages, followed, the pilot-in-command, having assisted the stewardess to inflate the port forward chute, also left by the flight deck window after seeing the evacuation was proceeding satisfactorily. The flight engineer saw that the port forward chute had not inflated properly so he climbed down it to straighten it. However, immediately after it inflated it became unusable from heat and burst. The evacuation of passengers had been largely completed by the time the airport fire and rescue services began to provide assistance. The fire services prevented the fuel in the starboard tanks from catching fire but the rear fuselage and port wing were burned out. Four of the passengers and one stewardess were overcome by heat and smoke at the rear of the aircraft and did not escape, whilst thirty-eight passengers sustained . injuries during the evacuation. Some hours after the accident it was not known how many had escaped alive or had been injured because some survivors were quickly removed to various treatment and rest centres whilst others left the vicinity of the airport without leaving their names.

Air France Flight 212 was a scheduled service from Santiago (Chile) to Paris (France) with en route stops at Quito (Ecuador), Caracas (Venezuela), Pointe-à-Pitre (Guadeloupe) and Lisbon (Portugal). The flight was operated by a brand new Boeing 707, named "Château de Lavoûte-Polignac", which had just been delivered to Air France a month and a half before the accident. The aircraft took off from Caracas at 19:27 for an estimated one hour and eight-minute flight to Pointe-à-Pitre on the French Caribbean island of Guadeloupe. The aircraft climbed to a cruising altitude of FL330 and the flight crew contacted the Piarco FIR controller at approximately 19:53 hours. They reported flying at FL330 and estimating over Piarco at 20:00, over the OA reporting point at 20:09 and reaching Pointe-à-Pitre at 20:32. At approximately 20:09 the flight reported over OA and requested authorization to descend in five minutes time. Piarco cleared the flight to the Guadeloupe radio beacon at FL90 and asked it to report when leaving FL330 and when reaching FL150. At 20:14, three minutes sooner than planned, the crew reported leaving FL330. Seven minutes later they reported passing FL150. It was then cleared to contact the Guadeloupe ACC and was advised that an aircraft proceeding from Martinique to Guadeloupe was flying at FL80 and estimating Guadeloupe at 20:44 hours. About 20:24 the flight reached the cleared altitude of FL90. After several unsuccessful attempts the flight established radio contact with Pointe-à-Pitre Tower at 20:29. It was again cleared to FL90, given a QNH of 1016 mb and requested to report at FL90, or runway in sight. Following a different route than normal, the airplane passed a brightly lit town (Basse Terre) on the coast of Guadeloupe. The pilot-in-command probably erroneously believed that it was Pointe-à-Pitre and that he would reach Le Raizet Airport in approximately one minute. At 20:29:35 the crew replied that the aircraft was at FL90 and they estimated they would be over the airport in approximately 1-1,5 minute. Less than one minute later they reported seeing the airport and were cleared for a visual approach to runway 11. The aircraft then descended over mountainous terrain and passed Saint Claude at an altitude of approximately 4,400 ft. Flight 212 was observed to impact on the southern slope of La Découverte, the peak of the La Soufrière Volcano, at an elevation of 1,200 m (3,937 ft).

The approach to Vancouver Airport was completed in poor visibility due to foggy conditions. Following a wrong approach configuration, the aircraft landed 1,000 feet past the runway threshold and to the right of the centerline. After touchdown, the captain decided to make a go-around when control was lost. The airplane veered off runway to the right, went through the tarmac and eventually collided with a terminal building. Seventeen occupants were injured while 43 others were unhurt. The copilot and one person in the terminal were killed. The aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the horizontal visibility was limited to 200 meters due to fog with strong winds.

TWA Flight 159 was a scheduled domestic flight from New York to Los Angeles with an intermediate stop at the Greater Cincinnati Airport. It departed the ramp at Cincinnati at 1833 hours Eastern Standard Time. As it was approaching runway 27L for take-off, Delta Air Lines, Inc., DC-9, N-3317L, operating as Flight DAL 379, was landing. As DAL 379 was completing its landing roll, the crew requested and received clearance for a 180° turnaround on the runway in order to return to the intersection of runway 18-36 which they had just passed. After turning through approximately 90°, the nosewheel slipped off the paved surface and the aircraft moved straight ahead off the runway during which time it became mired. The throttles were retarded to idle, and power was not increased again. At 1839:05 hours as DAL 379 was in the process of clearing the runway, TWA 159 was cleared for take-off. The local controller testified that before TWA 159 began moving, he observed that DAL 379 had stopped. He stated that although DAL 379 appeared to be clear of the runway, he requested confirmation from the crew who replied, "Yeah, we're in the dirt, though." Following this report the controller stated "TWA 159 he's clear of the runway, cleared for take-off, company jet on final behind you." Take- off performance had been computed as V1 132 knots, VR 140 knots, V2 150 knots. In fact DAL 379 was stopped on a heading of 004' and located 4 600 ft from the threshold of runway 27L with its aft-most point being approximately 7 ft north of the runway edge, the aft-most exterior lights located on the wing tip and the upper and lower anti-collision lights being approximately 45 ft from the runway edge. The crew of TWA 159 did not have DAL 379 in sight when they commenced the take-off roll. The co-pilot was performing the take-off and the pilot-in-command drew his attention to DAL 379 as the aircraft appeared in their landing lights they could see that it was off the runway by Some 5-7 ft. As TWA 159 passed abeam of DAL 379 the co-pilot experienced a movement of the flight controls and the aircraft yawed. Simultaneously there was a loud bang from the right side of the aircraft. The last airspeed he had observed was 120 knots and assuming that the aircraft was at or near V1, and that a collision had occurred, he elected to abort the take-off . He stated that he closed the power levers, placed them in full reverse, applied maximum braking, and called for the spoilers which the pilot-in-command operated. Directional control was maintained but the aircraft ran off the end of the runway, rolled across the terrain for approximately 225 ft, to the brow of a hill, and became airborne momentarily. It next contacted the ground approximately 67 ft further down the embankment, the main landing gear was torn off and the nosewheel was displaced rearward, forcing the cabin floor upward by approximately 15 in. The aircraft slid down the embankment and came to rest on a road approximately 421 ft from the end of the runway. The accident occurred at approximately 1841 hours, in darkness. A passenger was killed, another was seriously injured, five others were slightly injured. The aircraft was written off.

BOAC Flight 911 was a scheduled service from San Francisco (SFO) to Hong Kong (HKG) via Honolulu (HNL) and Tokyo (HND). The Boeing 707 was expected to arrive at Tokyo Airport at 16:45 on 4 March. However, due to poor meteorological conditions at Tokyo and because the precision approach radar (PAR) of the GCA was out of service, it diverted to Fukuoka (FUK) and landed there at 18:00. After staying overnight at Fukuoka, Flight 911 left for Tokyo at 11:25 and landed there at 12:43. The aircraft was prepared for the next leg to Hong Kong and a flight plan was filed for a flight in accordance with the instrument flight rules via Oshima on airway JG6 to Hong Kong at FL310. At 13:42 hours the crew contacted ATC requesting permission to start the engines and clearance for a VMC climb via Fuji-Rebel-Kushimoto. The aircraft left the ramp at 13:50. It was instructed to make "a right turn after take off", and departed Tokyo Airport at 13:58. After takeoff the aircraft flew over Gotemba City on a heading of approximately 298 deg at an altitude of approximately 4900 m and indicated airspeed of 320 to 370 knots. The aircraft, trailing white vapor, then suddenly lost altitude over the Takigahara area, and parts of the aircraft began to break away over Tsuchiyadai and Ichirimatsu. Finally over Tarobo at an altitude of approx. 2000 m, the forward fuselage broke away. The mid-aft fuselage together with the wing, making a slow flat spin to the right, crashed into a forest at the foot of Mount Fuji. The forward fuselage crashed into the forest approx. 300 m to the west of the above site and caught fire. All 124 occupants were killed.

The aircraft christened 'Kanchenjunga' was on a flight from Bombay to New York with intermediate stops in New Delhi, Beirut, Geneva, Paris and London, carrying 106 passengers and 11 crew members. The airplane departed Beirut with one VOR inoperative and while approaching Geneva at an altitude of 15,000 feet, the crew contacted ATC and requested the permission to perform a 'VMC on top' descent, about 1,000 feet above the cloud layer. Twenty minutes before its ETA at Geneva-Cointrin Airport, the four engine aircraft struck the Mont Blanc at an altitude of 4,677 meters. The airplane disintegrated on impact and debris scattered in deep snow near the 'Rocher de la Tournette'. Among the victims were Giani Bertoli, Director of Air India for Europe and the Indian Atomist Homi Bhabba who was travelling to Geneva for a conference, accompanied with 20 monkeys. At the time of the accident, the airplane should be at an altitude of 17,500 feet but the crew failed to follow this procedure, probably following misunderstanding with ATC.

PanAm Flight PA292 was a scheduled service from Fort-de-France, Martinique to New York with en route stops at Saint John's, Antigua, Christiansted, St Croix, and San Juan, Puerto Rico. An IFR flight plan had been filed for the 30-minute leg to Antigua. Cruising altitude would be FL165. The airplane christened 'Clipper Constitution' departed Fort-de-France's runway 27 at 0704LT. Cruising altitude was reached at 0709. The crew established radio contact with the Antigua controller at 0715. The controller cleared the flight to the Coolidge NDB beacon at 2 500 feet and told the crew to report at the beacon outbound leaving 2 500 feet or field in sight. At approximately 0725 the flight reported through FL40 with the field not yet in sight. At the same time the airplane was observed flying along the coast of the island of Montserrat in rain and below the clouds with landing gear down and flaps partially extended. Shortly afterwards the airplane struck a mountain at an elevation of 2 760 feet asl and 242 feet below the summit. The airplane was totally destroyed and all 30 occupants have been killed. Weather was poor at the time of the accident with thunderstorms activity, towering cumulus and heavy rain falls.