Boeing 377 Stratocruiser

The airplane christened 'Clipper Australia' was approaching Tokyo-Haneda following an uneventful transpacific flight. While completing the approach check-list, after the gear were extended, three greens lights appears on the panel. When power was reduced prior to touchdown, the gear unsafe warning horn sounded and a red gear unsafe warning light illuminated. The captain first called for a go-around but noticed that the airspeed was too low. The gear was retracted quickly and a belly landing was carried out. While all 59 occupants were evacuated safely, the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to Juneau Airport, the four engine aircraft was too low and struck an embankment. On impact, the undercarriage were sheared off and the airplane belly landed, slid for several yards and came to rest in flames. All ten occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was written off. For unknown reason, the pilot-in-command completed a too-low approach.

The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from San Francisco, California to Singapore with numerous intermediate stops including Manila, The Philippines. It carried a crew of 8 and 49 passengers including one infant. At 21 23 hours (1 June) GMT the aircraft landed on Runway 06 at Manila. During the landing roll, the main landing gears of the aircraft collapsed. The aircraft skidded and swerved to the right until it finally settled on the right shoulder of the runway approximately 2 850 ft from the west end and 27 ft from the edge of the runway. One of the blades of No. 3 propeller flew off and penetrated the cabin area causing the death of one passenger and seriously injuring another. The aircraft was seriously damaged.

Clipper 944, 1 a regularly scheduled around-the-world flight, originated at San Francisco with its first stop scheduled at Honolulu. It departed San Francisco at 1951 2 on November 8 estimating arrival at Honolulu at 0550, November 9. There were 36 passengers and a crew consisting of Captain Gordon H. Brown, First Officer William P. Wygant, Second Officer William H. Fortenberry, Flight Engineer Albert F. Pinataro, Purser Oliver E. Crosthwaite, Stewardesses Yvonne L. Alexander and Marie L. McGrath, and Flight Service Supervisor John E. King. The flight plan specified a cruising altitude of 10,000 feet and an airspeed of 226 knots. Gross weight at departure was 147,000 pounds, the maximum allowable, and the weight included fuel for approximately 13 hours. Good weather was forecast for the duration of the flight. All required position reports were made and Clipper 944 reported to Ocean Station vessel "November" at 0030; its position was fixed by radar as 10 miles east of the vessel. The last position report, at 0104, was routine with no indication of anything unusual. The next scheduled position report, due at 0204, was not received and 30 minutes thereafter the flight was designated unreported. Five days later, nine bodies and some debris were find about 147 miles northeast of the estimated point of impact. There were no survivors among the 44 occupants.

Trip 6 of October 13 was a regularly scheduled “around-the-world” flight eastbound from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. to San Francisco, California. with en route stops in Europe, Asia. and various Pacific Islands. All prior segments had been routine and the flight departed Honolulu on the last leg of the -trip on October 15. It was cleared to San Francisco Airport via Green Airway 9, then track to position 30 degrees N. 140 degrees W. at 13,000 feet. the 21,000 feet to San Francisco. There were 24 passengers aboard., including 3 infants, and a crew consisting of Richard N. Ogg, Captain; George L. Haaker. First Officer; Frank Garcia. Jr., Flight Engineer; Richard L. Brown, Navigator; Patricia Reynolds, Purser Mary Ellen Daniel and Katherine S. Araki, Stewardesses. The 8-hour, 54-minute flight was planned IFR and the aircraft carried sufficient fuel for 12 hours. 18 minutes. The gross takeoff weight of the aircraft was 138,903 pounds (maximum allowable 144,000) and the center of gravity was located within limits. N 90943 departed Honolulu at 2026. The climb to initial altitude was normal and the flight proceeded in a routine manner. At OLO2, the approximate midpoint of the flight, a request for VFR climb to its secondary altitude of 21,000 feet was approved by ATC. After reaching 21,000 feet and simultaneously with the reduction of power, the No. 1 engine oversped. Airspeed was immediately reduced by the use of flaps and reduction of power. Attempts were also made to feather the No. 1 propeller. It was impossible to control the engine or to feather the propeller and the captain decided to freeze the engine by cutting off the oil supply. Shortly after this was done there was a momentary decrease in the r. p. m., followed by a heavy thud. The propeller continued to windmill. At this time airspeed had slowed to 150 knots and the aircraft was losing altitude at a rate of approximately 1.000 feet per minute. The captain contacted the U. S. Coast Guard weather station “November” at 0122., alerted it to a possible ditching. and asked assistance. He also alerted the pas angers to the emergency and told them to prepare for a possible water landing. The flight course was altered to "home in” on station “November” and climb power applied to engines Nos. 2, 3, and 4 to cheek the rate of descent. At this time it was noticed that No. 4 engine was only developing partial power at full throttle. At 0125 the flight notified “November” that ditching was imminent and received a ditching heading from the cutter. During the descent the crew found they could maintain altitude at an airspeed of 135 knots with rated power on engines Nos. 2 and 3 and the partial power on No. 4. About 0137 the flight overheated the cutter. Prior to overheating the cutter the maximum range with the fuel remaining had been computed and it was determined to be insufficient either to complete the flight to San Francisco or return to Honolulu. Mortar flares had been fired by the cutter and electric water lights laid to illuminate a ditching track for the aircraft. However, it was decided to postpone the ditching until daylight, if possible. meanwhile remaining close to the cutter. About 0245 the No. 4 engine backfired and power dropped off. Its propeller was feathered normally. The flight was still able to maintain altitude and continued to orbit “November” to burn the fuel aboard down to a minimum while awaiting daylight. At 0540 Captain Ogg notified the U. S. S. Pontchartrain he was preparing to ditch the aircraft. A foam path was laid along the ditching heading of 3150 by the cutter and the aircraft was ditched at 0615. Passengers and crew safely evacuated the aircraft, boarded liferafts, and were completely clear of the aircraft at 0632. The aircraft sank at 0635 at position 30 degrees 01.5’ N. 140 degrees 09’ W.

Flight 2 was scheduled daily between Seattle, Washington. and New York, New York, with intermediate stops at Portland, Oregon, and Chicago., Illinois. It departed Seattle-Tacoma Airport at 0806 on an IFR flight plan to Portland, Oregon, via Victor Airway 23 to cruise at 6,000 feet. There were 32 passengers arid a crew of six consisting of Captain Robert Reeve Heard, First Officer Gene Paul Johnson, Flight Engineer Carl Vernon Thomsen, Flight Service Attendant David V. Razey, Senior Stewardess Elinor A. Whitacre. and Junior Stewardess Dorothy L. Oetting. Takeoff was made on runway 20 and the flight climbed to an altitude of 1,000 to 1,200 feet. At this time power reduced and the wing flaps which had been set at the normal 25-degree takeoff position, were retracted at an airspeed of 145 knots. Immediately the crew became aware of severe buffeting and a strong tendency of the aircraft to roll to the left. Because the buffeting began almost immediately after the flaps ware retracted, the captain believed that it was due to a split-flap condition, i. e., the wing flaps on one side of the aircraft being retracted while the flaps on the other side remained partially or fully down. Power was reduced momentarily in an attempt to alleviate the buffeting but this was not effective and maximum continuous power was again restored. After being cleared by the Seattle tower for return the captain decided not to turn the aircraft because of control difficulty and advised that he would proceed to McChord Air Force Base at Tacoma. Thereafter, the captain testified the trouble became worse and the aircraft continued to lose altitude. The captain elected to ditch and did so at approximately 0810. Touchdown was on smooth water at an airspeed of approximately 120 knots and there was no abrupt deceleration. Passengers and crew members, except the captain and first officer, left the aircraft through the main cabin door and emergency exits. The captain and first officer, after a passenger count, left the aircraft through cockpit windows and swam to the left and right wings, respectively. The aircraft sank in approximately 15 minutes and by that time all persons on the wings had been supplied with buoyant cushions from the cabin seats. Those who survived were rescued by surface craft from the 42-degree F. water within 30 to 35 minutes from the time of ditching.

Trip 845/26, a scheduled flight from Seattle-Tacoma, Washington, to Sydney, Australia, departed Seattle-Tacoma Airport at 0815LT for Portland, Oregon, the first intermediate stop. There were 13 passengers and a crew of 8 consisting of Captain H. S. Joslyn, First Officer A. G. Kendrick, a Navigator N. F. Kerwick, Flight Engineer D. R. Fowler, Assistant Flight Engineer S. Bachman, Purser Natalie B. Parker, Stewardess Elizabeth M. Thompson, and Steward J. D. Peppin. The flight to Portland was normal in all respects with arrival at 0910. There the aircraft was serviced and two additional passengers boarded. Only inspections and service were accomplished. The flight left the ramp at 1010 and took off for Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, at 1021 on an IFR clearance. Weather conditions at time of takeoff were VFR. There were 15 passengers and the saw crew of 8. Takeoff gross weight was 139,494 (maximum allowable was 145,800 pounds) and the center of gravity was located within limits. The flight plan was via Newberg and Newport, Oregon, and thence to Honolulu to Cruise at 10,000 feet. Estimated flight time was 11 hours and 3 minutes. The flight reported over Newberg at 1031 at 7,000 feet climbing., reached 10,000 feet at approximately 1039, and reported over Newport at 1048 at cruising altitude. The aircraft was then headed to make good the initial track or 221 degrees . Forty-two minutes after takeoff, severe vibration occurred while cruising era at 10,000 feet under VIM conditions. This lasted for five to eight seconds following which No. 3 engine and propeller tore free and fell from the aircraft. The captain immediately disconnected the autopilot. Severe buffeting ensued, the nose want down and the aircraft swung to the right sharply. At this point, the emergency "Mayday" signal was broadcast on both VHF and HF. Direct return to Portland was authorized by Seattle Air Route Traffic Control. The captain, in the left seat, tried to get the airplane under control. Airspeed was about 220 knots and going higher, so he closed the throttles to keep the airspeed down. He still could not get the nose up; it felt to him as though the elevators were still on automatic pilot. He tried the elevator trim tab and could not turn it. After rapid loss of altitude to about 5,000 feet, the captain directed the first officer to assist him with the controls. Their combined efforts finally brought the nose up very rapidly but the aircraft then went into a steep climb. It turned sharply to the right about 180 degrees and, according to the captain, appeared to be on "the verge of a spin." Level attitude was regained by pushing the yoke forward, and by use of the rudder and aileron trim the turn was stopped. At an airspeed of 150 knots, flaps extended 25 degrees, buffeting decreased immediately, however., the aircraft continued to descend rapidly. Attempts to get rated power were futile and a message was broadcast that ditching was imminent. This message was sent at approximately 1106. The aircraft was then at an altitude of 500-1,000 feet. Ditching was imminent. Cabin attendants, realizing the emergency, assumed their respective stations for ditching. All passengers had been seated in the upper desk of the cabin with seat belts fastened and life jackets donned. The aircraft touched down under near ideal sea conditions with little swall. Contact with the water we severe and the impact dislodged life rafts from their storage bins and some seats were torn loose. The aft portion of the fuselage and empennage broke off at impact. Evacuation was orderly and the three rafts, although dislodged from their stowage receptacles, were launched without undue delay. The lanyards of all three life rafts were temporarily held at the cabin door by crow members. However, when one of the rafts was endangered by sharp metal of the broken fuselage its lanyard was released. Another was released by a crew member who then swam to that raft to right it. The lanyard of the third raft was released for unknown reasons. Consequently the rafts were carried away by the light surface wind. Passengers and crew left by both the main cabin door and escape hatches on both sides of the fuselage over each wing. Some crew members and passengers ware able to swim to and board the rafts. Three of the four fatalities, including the copilot and first engineer, were unable to do so and were lost. Members of the crew and passengers tried in vain to paddle to these persons. One other passenger later died in a raft from awe and shock. The purser, a woman, although suffering from shock swam and towed the only seriously injured passenger to the nearest raft, some 200 feet distant. The time of ditching was determined as 1112 and the position at lat. 43 degrees 48'15" N., long. 125 degrees 12'40" W., approximately 35 miles off the Oregon coast. The U.S.S. Bayfield, en route to Seattle, changed course toward the site and by add of search aircraft reached the life rafts some two hours later.

The flight from London to Prestwick was uneventful. Throughout the flight the captain kept in touch with the weather conditions and Prestwick Approach Control received the aircraft about 0248 hours. Preceding the aircraft by approximately four minutes in arrival at Prestwick was a Constellation, and these two aircraft were fed into the stack at Prestwick; the Constellation at 4 000 feet and the Stratocruiser at 5 000 feet. The runway to be used was Runway 31 which required the approach to be made from the southeast. The Instrument Landing System (hereinafter called ILS) without the Glide Path and the Ground Control Approach system (hereinafter called GCA) were available on Runway 31. G. C.A. took over the Stratocruiser about 0314 hours and at 0323 hours the talk-down controller 'took over the aircraft. Meantime Meteorological Reports had been passing from ground to air. The talk-down was completed at 0325 hours when the aircraft was 400 yards from the threshold of Runway 31. The approach up to this point had been high but uneventful. A few seconds later the aircraft struck the ground 127 feet short of the threshold of Runway 31, sustaining some damage. It then ran on to the runway and proceeded for some 90 feet where it was again airborne for another 400 feet. It then contacted the runway and sustained considerable damage, and came to rest with the passenger compartment in an inverted position on the south side of the runway about 550 yards from the threshold. Except for the front portion of the fuselage which lay on its port side, severe damage resulted from fire which broke out and spread rapidly, due probably to the partial detachment of the port wing and rupture of the fuel tanks. From the accident there survived seven of the crew and one passenger.

The four engine aircraft christened 'Clipper Good Hope' left Rio de Janeiro at 0243LT bound for Port of Spain, completing an international schedule flight from Buenos Aires to New York. While cruising by night and good weather under VFR conditions at an altitude of 14,500 feet, the airplane suffered severe vibrations, went out of control and crashed in an uninhabited and isolated area located about 120 km southeast of Porto Nacional. The wreckage was found two days later and all 50 occupants have been killed.

The flight departed San Francisco at 1042, operating as "United Trainer 7030." Flight Manager Frederick S. Angstadt was captain and was being given his semi-annual instrument check by Assistant Flight Manager Hugh C. Worthington, who served as copilot. Flight Engineer Charles K. Brogden was the third crew member. In addition to the foregoing instrument check, consideration had been given to investigating the feasibility of using the Oakland, California, Municipal Airport for certain phases of crew training in this type aircraft for a new class of pilots and flight engineers which was to convene that afternoon. Captains Angstadt and Worthington were to supervise this training. United Air Lines' officials stated that Captains Angstadt and Worthington intended to make this determination during the flight. Captain Angstadt was given the 0928 sequence weather reports for the local area prior to completing a clearance form at the UAL dispatcher's office. Pertinent weather was as follows: stratus clouds in the Bay area with tops at approximately 1,600 feet; San Francisco and Oakland - 800 foot ceiling, overcast, visibility three miles, haze and smoke; ceiling and visibility at Fresno and Sacramento unlimited. The forecast for the Bay area indicated scattered clouds by 1100 PST. Clearance was issued for local flight under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), confined to a 100-mile radius from San Francisco and under 10,000 feet. The load was properly distributed with respect to permissible center of gravity limits. Gross weight of the aircraft at takeoff was 114,886 pounds with 4,700 gallons of fuel, well under the maximum permissible gross takeoff weight. After reporting on top of the broken scattered clouds to the San Francisco tower at 1046, the flight proceeded to Oakland. The Oakland tower approved a simulated Instrument Landing System approach; this and a missed approach procedure were performed. The flight again reported on top at 1136. Another simulated ILS approach was requested of the Oakland tower but the flight was advised that there would be a delay due to other traffic. In view of this, the pilot decided to return to San Francisco. The flight changed frequency from the Oakland tower to San Francisco Approach Control at 1137. At 1139, the flight was cleared for an ILS approach to the San Francisco Airport, but did not acknowledge the clearance on the 119.1 megacycle Approach Control frequency. Following two attempts to contact the flight, the controller heard the aircraft make an unreadable call on 121.9 megacycles, and instructed the flight to listen on 119.1. This transmission was followed by further instruction for the flight to hold VFR, and stand by. The frequency change was apparently accomplished by the flight and the pilot again requested permission to make a simulated ILS approach. The request was granted, with instructions to report upon leaving the ILS outer marker inbound. This message and one other were not acknowledged by the flight. No emergency call was received from the aircraft. The crash was reported to the U. S. Coast Guard Air Station at 1046 by the manager of a nearby airport.