Uppland

While being taxied by two engineers at Stockholm-Arlanda Airport, the aircraft went out of control and collided with a hangar door. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed.

Flight ROT 335, a BAC 111 coming from Bucharest, was about to land on runway 26 at Stockholm/Arlanda airport. The pilots had visual contact with the field and the landing was performed according to visual flying rules (VFR). The commander, who was pilot flying (PF), has stated the following. The approach was normal with occasional turbulence and wind gusts from the south. When the aircraft was on 8 nautical miles1 final, the air-traffic controller in the tower reported the wind 160°/13 knots. To begin with the aircraft was somewhat above the glide slope but was on the glide slope when it passed the threshold. The touchdown on the runway was in the normal touchdown zone on the left main gear and nose up. Shortly thereafter came a strong wind gust whereupon the right main gear touched down and the nose gear heavily hit the runway. The commander controlled the aircraft with rudder, reversed the engines and braked lightly. He did not notice anything special in the behavior of the aircraft at that point. When - after the speed had become so low that rudder steering was no longer possible - he reverted to nose wheel steering he noticed that it was not functioning. He continued the light wheel braking but could not prevent the aircraft from veering to the right. He then braked fully but the aircraft continued towards the right runway edge. It left the runway at a speed of around 60 knots out onto the grass field. The retardation was soft and the passengers disembarked through ordinary exit. The airport rescue service was speedily on the scene but no action was necessary. The accident occurred on 7 June 1997 at 1350 hours in position 5939N 1755E; 121 feet (37 m) above sea level.

In the afternoon, the aircraft departed Eskilstuna Airport, carrying one geotechnician and one pilot for a low level survey mission on behalf of the Swedish Geological Service. Approaching the area of Väsby under visual flight rules conditions, while flying at an altitude of 30-50 metres, the aircraft collided with power cables. The right wing was partially sheared off then the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed 180 metres further. Both occupants were killed. There was no fire.

The single engine aircraft departed Stockholm-Bromma Airport runway 12 at 0703LT on a charter flight to Biggin Hill, carrying two passengers and one pilot. During climbout, at an altitude of 1,500 feet, the pilot was cleared to turn right and to continue to climb to FL040. At an altitude of 2,200 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent then partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in a residential area located in Åkeslund, south of the airport, three minutes after takeoff. Several cars and apartments were destroyed but no one on the ground was injured. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with clouds and turbulences.

The MD-81 arrived from Zurich at 22:09 and was parked at gate 2 overnight with temperatures of around +1 deg. C. Approx. 2550 kg of fuel remained in each wing tank. The aircraft was scheduled to leave Stockholm for Copenhagen at 08:30 and the temperature had dropped to -0 deg C in the early morning. During the night and in the early morning clear ice had formed on the upper side of the wings, but this was not detected by the ground crew member who checked the forward part of the wing. The aircraft was fuelled with 1400 kg of fuel and was ready for de-icing at 08:30, which was done using 850l of Type I fluid. After de-icing the mechanic didn't check whether there was any clear ice on the upper side of the wings, since he had previously found none. The flight was then cleared to taxi to runway 08 and the aircraft took off at 08:47. After 25 seconds (at 1124 feet height) bangs, vibrations and jerks were perceived in the aircraft. This was caused by a no. 2 engine surge. The engine was throttled down a little, but throttle control simultaneously changed to an automatic mode which increased throttle setting with altitude (Automatic Thrust Restoration - ATR). This in turn increased the intensity of the surging. The no. 1 engine surged 39 seconds later, but this was not noticed by the flight crew. An attempt to switch on the autopilot at 2616 feet failed. At 76 resp. 78 seconds into the flight both the no. 2 and no. 1 engine failed after breakup of the stage 1 stators of both engines (initiated by high loads from the surges). The aircraft was climbing through 3206 feet at that moment with a 196 KIAS. A no. 1 engine fire warning at 91 seconds into the flight made the crew activate the fire extinguishing system. A SAS captain traveling the passenger cabin realized that there were problems and hurried to the cockpit to assist the flight crew. The aircraft was in a gliding left turn at that moment. When descending through 420 m, still in the clouds, the assisting captain gradually extended the flaps. The flaps were fully extended at 1100 feet (340 m) and the plane broke through the clouds at 980-820 feet. A field in the direction of flight was chosen for an emergency landing. The wheels were selected down and Stockholm control was informed about the imminent crash-landing. The MD-81 contacted trees at 121 knots and a major portion of the right wing broke off. The plane then struck sloping ground tail-first and slid along the ground for 110 m. The fuselage was broken into three pieces, but there was no fire.

Immediately after liftoff from runway 08, while climbing to a height of about 10 meters, the aircraft pitched down. The copilot confirmed that the airspeed value and the engine indications were normal. The airplane was continuing to 'float' above the runway and the captain decided to land back. The aircraft landed hard on its nose gear and bounced. The second touchdown was completed on both main gears but hard again, causing them to penetrate the wings and the fuel tanks, causing the fuel to spill. Out of control, the aircraft slid for about 300 meters then veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a snow covered field, bursting into flames. All 27 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was completing a regular schedule flight from Kristianstad to Stockholm-Bromma with intermediate stop in Växjö and Jönköping, carrying 19 passengers and a crew of three on behalf of Linjeflyg. On approach to Bromma Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather and icing conditions. At an altitude of 1,150 feet and a speed of 137 knots, flaps were deployed at an angle of 40° when control was lost. The airplane entered a nose down attitude and crashed at an angle of 110° and a speed of 210 knots in a parking lot located in the residential area of Kälvesta, about 4,5 km short of runway 12 threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 22 occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were considered as marginal with icing conditions and a horizontal visibility of 5 km with a cloud base at 700 feet.

Suffered a ground accident at Stockholm-Arlanda Airport. While taxiing, the airplane collided with an obstacle and came to rest. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The exact circumstances of the mishap remains unclear.

The aircraft was originally planned to fly a non-scheduled international flight from Stockholm-Arlanda to Palma de Mallorca. During the take-off run No. 4 engine did not function properly; the take-off was aborted and the aircraft was taxiied back to the apron. Inspection of the engine revealed damage to the compressor. After consultation with the Spantax Operations Department in Madrid, it was decided to ferry the aircraft on three engines to Zurich, where No. 4 engine would be changed. The technical preparation of the aircraft for the ferry flight was supervised by a ground engineer from Spantax. Meanwhile, the flight crew planned the flight. As the ATS briefing office at Arlanda was closed after 2100 hours, the co-pilot phoned the ATS flight plan to Stockholm Control Centre (ACC) . Neither when phoning the flight plan nor at the weather briefing did the crew advise that the flight was a 3-engine ferry flight. However, the Air Traffic Controller (Tower) in some other way had been informed about the nature of the flight. At 2208 hours the crew received a taxi clearance to Runway 08, but as they considered that this runway was too short for a 3-engine take-off , they requested permission to use Runway 19 and this was granted. Another advantage of using Runway 19 was that it made it possible to join the outbound track with minor heading changes. During taxiing the aircraft and the engine anti-icing system were checked according to the checklist. (After checking the engine anti-icing was switched OFF.) At 2221 hours the flight was cleared to take-off, and at 2224 hours the crew reported "Rolling". According to the pilot-in-command,maximum EPR take-off power was set on engines Nos. 1, 2 and 3 with brakes on, then, after having checked the instruments, No. 1 engine was throttled back to 85 per cent and the brakes were released. When the aircraft had rolled for 5-10 seconds the nose wheel skidded to the right and to regain heading he had to retard throttle No. 1 to 80-60 per cent. When back on the centre line he slowly opened the throttle again. Maximum EPR take-off power was set when the aircraft reached a speed of 100 kt. He rotated the aircraft at the calculated speed Vr - 134 kt (27° of flaps) and it became airborne. He retracted the gear when positive climb was indicated. Just after lift off he was blinded by the aircraft landing lights illuminating unexpectedly low clouds over the runway. Initially he kept the speed at V2 (145 kt) and noticed a rate- of-climb of 800 ft/min. He had to apply extremely hard left rudder to centre the turn indicator (ball). He did not observe any bank or turn tendency, but noted that the indicated airspeed (IAS) was not increasing normally and shortly thereafter that the rate-of-climb and speed decreased. The pilot-in-command felt they urgently needed more power, but all happened very quickly and shortly after he had noticed the speed drop the aircraft collided with the terrain. From the time take-off power had been set on the runway the throttle positions were not changed. The co-pilot stated that they had to taxi down the runway to avoid ice patches on the first part of the runway. He could not say how far they taxiied and it was not possible to determine it in any other way. During preparation for take-off he asked the pilot-in-command if they should use 10° flaps, but the decision of the pilot- in-command to uae 27° was not changed. He completed the pre-take-off instrument check and did not notice any abnormal readings. The three gyro horizons indicated no differences. When rolling he kept the control column forward, to increase the friction on the nose wheel, and gave full left aileron. Gradually he decreased the pressure on the column and reduced left aileron deflection. At V1 the pilot-in-command took mr the controls. The co-pilot kept his left hand on the throttles and verified that no changes were made on throttles Nos. 2 and 3 after takeoff power was set, but he noticed that the pilot-in-command had to vary the No. 1 throttle setting several times during the roll. After lift-off when the gear was retracted the co-pilot received a message from the tower giving the take-off time and instruction to change over to STOCKHOLM RADAR on 124.1 MHz. He never acknowledged the message but when leaning forward to select the new frequency he noticed on his horizon a banking to the right of 4 to 60. He also observed the gyro horizon of the pilot-in-command indicating o bank to the right. Zhe speed had dropped to 10 kt belau V2 and he called: "The speed, the speed". Ifc felt no buffeting in the aircraft aud noted no tendency to Dutch roll. Be also stated that he observed a power drop of about 2 per cent below EPR take-off power. Shortly after the first contact with the treetops the banking to the right had increased to 10-lSO and the co-pilot retarded the throttles. The flight and the ground engineers sitting in the cockpit observed nothing abnormal until the crash. None of them observed any indications of power changes on the instruments. No buffeting was felt in the aircraft, neither were any warning signals heard. Whilst in a right bank of 4-6° the aircraft collided with tree-tops approximately 26 m above and 1 060 m from the far end of Runway 19, or about 1 800 m from the point of lift-off, having turned through about 25 degrees from the runway heading. The aircraft came to a final stop approximately 500 m after first contact with the trees on a heading of 240°. The aircraft was destroyed and five occupants were killed while five others were injured.

Shortly after takeoff from Bromma Airport, the airplane encountered difficulties to gain height. It stalled then crashed onto a building located by the airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and both crew members were killed. There were no casualties on the ground.