Oregon

Although low altitude flight within the gorge was not in accordance with the mission profile the pilot entered the canyon and proceeded upslope towards rising terrain. 87% of the pilot's extensive flight experience was in helicopter aircraft and he had acquired an estimated total of only 13 hours in make/model at the time of the accident. The aircraft was slightly over its gross weight at the time of the accident and high density altitude conditions existed. During the pilot's attempt to reverse direction at the end of the gorge the aircraft stalled and a loss of control followed. A stall/spin maneuver resulted placing the aircraft in an uncontrolled descent into the terrain. All six occupants were killed.

The pilot reported a loss of power on both engines during descent to land. Approximately 3 minutes prior, tower gave pilot option of 'straight-in' to runway 14 or regular pattern to runway 32. The pilot hesitated and said 'just a minute' and tower offered wind info as '210 at 13.' Pilot replied, 'kay.' Approximately 1 minute later pilot said '33W will make a left base for 14.' Tower cleared him and declared visual contact. Pilot acknowledged '3 whiskey.' One minute and 54 seconds later, pilot declared power loss and emergency. Tower rogered. Seven seconds later, pilot said 'gonna hit it' followed 2 seconds later with an unintelligible comment. Witnesses saw the aircraft gliding wings level toward runway when a loud 'rev' was heard, the aircraft pitched up and rolled left to an inverted position before ground contact and explosion. Post accident investigation did not disclose any engine or fuel system malfunction. This aircraft had experienced a power loss after descending from 15,500 to 12,000 feet msl on 2/2/85 with the same pilot as reported by the copilot on that flight. After approximately 1 1/2 minutes power was restored. All four occupants were killed.

The aircraft was on a functional check flight. According to the pilot and a witness (employed by the pilot), the left brake was locked during touchdown. Subsequently, the aircraft nosed over and a ground fire erupted which destroyed the plane. The pilot reported that the left brake had locked due to rust and corrosion and that the aircraft logbooks were destroyed in the fire. The pilot, sole on board, was uninjured.

On approach to Burns Airport, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances. All three occupants were killed.

After takeoff from Ashland-Parker Airport, the twin engine airplane encountered difficulties to maintain a positive rate of climb and crashed on a hill. The pilot was killed while four other occupants were injured.

Using the call sign Tanker 69, the aircraft was on a company business flight from Redmond to Medford with an en route stop at Klamath Falls. At Redmond, about 600 gallons of 100/130-grade fuel were added to the 1,000 gallons on board, 8 employees were enplaned, and the aircraft departed Redmond for Klamath Falls about 1945. The purpose of the flight was to transport Butler employees to an end-of-season barbecue in Medford that had started between 1930 and 2000. Tanker 69 landed at Klamath Falls at 2029. Two additional Butler employees were enplaned, and the aircraft departed runway 14 at 2040. The flightcrew did not file a flight plan and the weather was such that none was required. Witnesses saw the aircraft begin a steep right turn about one mile south of the runway and momentarily disappear from their view behind hangars and airport buildings; it then proceeded on a westerly course. A few minutes later, a pilot located 11 miles west-southwest of the airport saw the aircraft pass overheard an altitude he estimated to be 750 feet above ground level. He said that the aircraft lights were on and that engine sounds were normal. About 2047, witnesses located 25 miles west-northwest of the airport heard sounds, which they first thought to be from a car or truck with loud mufflers. Subsequently, they determined that the sounds were an approaching aircraft. They heard engine sounds become 'choppy', resembling the noise made by a helicopter blade, and saw a fireball on Surveyor Peak, about 3,5 miles south of their location. Weyerhauser Company and Oregon State Forestry Department personnel located about 12 miles from Surveyor Peak also saw the fireball on the peak. After notifying authorities, they took firefighting equipment to the scene. The aircraft crashed at night during hours of darkness at an elevation of about 6,400 feet. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 12 occupants were killed.

On a night approach to Pendleton Airport, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions and failed to realize his altitude was too low when the twin engine airplane struck the ground and crashed few miles from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured.

United Airlines Flight 173, departed New York-JFK on a scheduled flight to Portland International Airport (PDX), with an en route stop at Denver (DEN). The DC-8-61 took off from Denver about 14:47. The planned time en route was 2 hrs 26 min. The planned arrival time at Portland was 17:13. There was 46,700 lb of fuel on board the aircraft when it departed the gate at Denver. This fuel included the Federal Aviation Regulation requirement for fuel to destination plus 45 min and the company contingency fuel of about 20 min. At 17:05, Flight 173 called Portland Approach and advised that its altitude was 10,000 ft and its airspeed was being reduced. Portland responded and told the flight to maintain its heading for a visual approach to runway 28. Flight 173 acknowledged the approach instructions and stated, "...we have the field in sight." At 17:07, Portland Approach instructed the flight to descend and maintain 8,000 ft. Flight 173 acknowledged the instructions and advised that it was "leaving ten." At 17:09, Flight 173 received and acknowledged a clearance to continue its descent to 6,000 ft. When the DC-8 was descending through about 8,000 ft, the first officer, who was flying the aircraft, requested the wing flaps be extended to 15 degrees, then asked that the landing gear be lowered. As the landing gear extended, an unusual sound was heard and the aircraft yawed. At 17:12, Portland Approach requested, "United one seven three heavy, contact the tower, one one eight point seven." The flight responded, "negative, we'll stay with you. We'll stay at five. We'll maintain about a hundred and seventy knots. We got a gear problem. We'll let you know." Portland Approach replied, "United one seventy-three heavy roger, maintain five thousand. Turn left heading two zero zero." The flight acknowledged the instructions. At 17:14, Portland Approach advised, "United one seventy three heavy, turn left heading, one zero zero and I'll just orbit you out there 'til you get your problem." Flight 173 acknowledged the instructions. For the next 23 min, while Portland Approach was vectoring the aircraft in a holding pattern south and east of the airport, the flight crew discussed and accomplished all of the emergency and precautionary actions available to them to assure themselves that all landing gear was locked in the full down position. The second officer checked the visual indicators on top of both wings, which extend above the wing surface when the landing gear is down-and-locked. About 17:38, Flight 173 contacted the United Airlines Systems Line Maintenance Control Center in San Francisco. The captain explained to company dispatch and maintenance personnel the landing gear problem and what the flight crew had done to assure that the landing gear was fully extended. He said they were planning to land in about twenty minutes. About 17:44, the captain and the first flight attendant discussed passenger preparation, crash landing procedures, and evacuation procedures. At 17:46, the first officer asked the flight engineer, "How much fuel we got...?" The flight engineer responded, "Five thousand." About 17:50, the captain asked the flight engineer to "Give us a current card on weight. Figure about another fifteen minutes." The first officer responded, "Fifteen minutes?" To which the captain replied, "Yeah, give us three or four thousand pounds on top of zero fuel weight." The flight engineer then said, "Not enough. Fifteen minutes is gonna really run us low on fuel here." Some calculations were made and at 17:52 the flight engineer talked to Portland and discussed the aircraft's fuel state, the number of persons on board the aircraft, and the emergency landing precautions at the airport. A fuel check at 17:57 learned that there were 1,000 lb in each tank, totalling 4,000 lb of fuel. From 17:57 until 18:00, the captain and the first officer engaged in a conversation which included discussions of giving the flight attendants ample time to prepare for the emergency, cockpit procedures in the event of an evacuation after landing, whether the brakes would have antiskid protection after landing, and the procedures the captain would be using during the approach and landing. At 18:01, the flight engineer reported that the cabin would be ready in "another two or three minutes." At 18:02, the flight engineer advised, "We got about three on the fuel and that's it." The aircraft was then about 5 nmi south of the airport on a southwest heading. Portland Approach then asked Flight 173 for a status report. The first officer replied, "Yeah, we have indication our gear is abnormal. It'll be our intention, in about five minutes, to land on two eight left. We would like the equipment standing by. Our indications are the gear is down and locked. We've got our people prepared for an evacuation in the event that should become necessary." At 18:03 Portland Approach asked that Flight 173 advise them when the approach would begin. The captain responded, "...They've about finished in the cabin. I'd guess about another three, four, five minutes." At this time the aircraft was about 8 nmi south of the airport on a southwesterly heading. At 18:06, the first flight attendant entered the cockpit and reported that they were ready in the passenger cabin. At this time the aircraft was about 17 nmi south of the airport on a southwesterly heading. The captain then said, "Okay. We're going to go in now. We should be landing in about five minutes." Almost simultaneous with this comment, the first officer said, "I think you just lost number four ..." followed immediately by advice to the flight engineer, "... better get some crossfeeds open there or something." At 18:06:46, the first officer told the captain, "We're going to lose an engine..." At 18:06:49, the first officer again stated, "We're losing an engine." Again the captain asked, "Why?" The first officer responded, "Fuel." The captain replied, "Why?" Between 18:06:52 and 18:07:06, the CVR revealed conflicting and confusing conversation between flight crewmembers as to the aircraft's fuel state. At 18:07:06, the first officer said, "It's flamed out." At 18:07:12, the captain called Portland Approach and requested, "...would like clearance for an approach into two eight left, now." The aircraft was about 19 nmi south southwest of the airport and turning left. This was the first request for an approach clearance from Flight 173 since the landing gear problem began. Portland Approach immediately gave the flight vectors for a visual approach to runway 28L. The flight turned toward the vector heading of 010 degrees. At 18:09:21, the captain advised Portland Approach, "United, seven three is going to turn toward the airport and come on in." After confirming Flight 173's intentions, Portland Approach cleared the flight for the visual approach to runway 28L. At 18:10:17, the captain requested that the flight engineer "reset that circuit breaker momentarily. See if we get gear lights." The flight engineer complied with the request. At 18:10:47, the captain requested the flight's distance from the airport. Portland approach responded, "I'd call it eighteen flying miles." At 18:12:42, the captain made another request for distance. Portland Approach responded, "Twelve flying miles." The flight was then cleared to contact Portland tower. At 18:13:21, the flight engineer stated, "We've lost two engines, guys." At 18:13:25, he stated, "We just lost two engines - one and two." At 1813:38, the captain said, They're all going. We can't make Troutdale." The first officer said, "We can't make anything." At 18:13:46, the captain told the first officer, "Okay. Declare a mayday." At 18:13:50, the first officer called Portland International Airport tower and declared, "Portland tower, United one seventy three heavy, Mayday. We're--the engines are flaming out. We're going down. We're not going to be able to make the airport." This was the last radio transmission from Flight 173. About 18:15, the aircraft crashed into a wooded section of a populated area of suburban Portland about 6 nmi east southeast of the airport. There was no fire. The wreckage path was about 1,554 ft long and about 130 ft wide. Two crew members and eight passengers were killed, 34 other occupants were injured.

While in cruising altitude on a flight from Portland from Sacramento in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine airplane suffered an airframe failure. It entered a dive and crashed in a field located near Cheshire, northwest of Eugene. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all seven occupants were killed.

En route from La Verne to La Grande, while in cruising altitude, a wing separated and detached. Out of control, the airplane entered a spin and crashed in flames. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.