Indiana

American Eagle Flight 4184 was scheduled to depart the gate in Indianapolis at 14:10; however, due to a change in the traffic flow because of deteriorating weather conditions at destination Chicago-O'Hare, the flight left the gate at 14:14 and was held on the ground for 42 minutes before receiving an IFR clearance to O'Hare. At 14:55, the controller cleared flight 4184 for takeoff. The aircraft climbed to an enroute altitude of 16,300 feet. At 15:13, flight 4184 began the descent to 10,000 feet. During the descent, the FDR recorded the activation of the Level III airframe de-icing system. At 15:18, shortly after flight 4184 leveled off at 10,000 feet, the crew received a clearance to enter a holding pattern near the LUCIT intersection and they were told to expect further clearance at 15:45, which was revised to 16:00 at 15:38. Three minutes later the Level III airframe de-icing system activated again. At 15:56, the controller contacted flight 4184 and instructed the flight crew to descend to 8,000 feet. The engine power was reduced to the flight idle position, the propeller speed was 86 percent, and the autopilot remained engaged in the vertical speed (VS) and heading select (HDG SEL) modes. At 15:57:21, as the airplane was descending in a 15-degree right-wing-down attitude at 186 KIAS, the sound of the flap overspeed warning was recorded on the CVR. The crew selected flaps from 15 to zero degrees and the AOA and pitch attitude began to increase. At 15:57:33, as the airplane was descending through 9,130 feet, the AOA increased through 5 degrees, and the ailerons began deflecting to a right-wing-down position. About 1/2 second later, the ailerons rapidly deflected to 13:43 degrees right-wing-down, the autopilot disconnected. The airplane rolled rapidly to the right, and the pitch attitude and AOA began to decrease. Within several seconds of the initial aileron and roll excursion, the AOA decreased through 3.5 degrees, the ailerons moved to a nearly neutral position, and the airplane stopped rolling at 77 degrees right-wing-down. The airplane then began to roll to the left toward a wings-level attitude, the elevator began moving in a nose-up direction, the AOA began increasing, and the pitch attitude stopped at approximately 15 degrees nose down. At 15:57:38, as the airplane rolled back to the left through 59 degrees right-wing-down (towards wings level), the AOA increased again through 5 degrees and the ailerons again deflected rapidly to a right-wing-down position. The captain's nose-up control column force exceeded 22 pounds, and the airplane rolled rapidly to the right, at a rate in excess of 50 degrees per second. The captain's nose-up control column force decreased below 22 pounds as the airplane rolled through 120 degrees, and the first officer's nose-up control column force exceeded 22 pounds just after the airplane rolled through the inverted position (180 degrees). Nose-up elevator inputs were indicated on the FDR throughout the roll, and the AOA increased when nose-up elevator increased. At 15:57:45 the airplane rolled through the wings-level attitude (completion of first full roll). The nose-up elevator and AOA then decreased rapidly, the ailerons immediately deflected to 6 degrees left-wing-down and then stabilized at about 1 degree right-wing-down, and the airplane stopped rolling at 144 degrees right wing down. At 15:57:48, as the airplane began rolling left, back towards wings level, the airspeed increased through 260 knots, the pitch attitude decreased through 60 degrees nose down, normal acceleration fluctuated between 2.0 and 2.5 G, and the altitude decreased through 6,000 feet. At 15:57:51, as the roll attitude passed through 90 degrees, continuing towards wings level, the captain applied more than 22 pounds of nose-up control column force, the elevator position increased to about 3 degrees nose up, pitch attitude stopped decreasing at 73 degrees nose down, the airspeed increased through 300 KIAS, normal acceleration remained above 2 G, and the altitude decreased through 4,900 feet. At 15:57:53, as the captain's nose-up control column force decreased below 22 pounds, the first officer's nose-up control column force again exceeded 22 pounds and the captain made the statement "nice and easy." At 15:57:55, the normal acceleration increased to over 3.0 G. Approximately 1.7 seconds later, as the altitude decreased through 1,700 feet, the elevator position and vertical acceleration began to increase rapidly. The last recorded data on the FDR occurred at an altitude of 1,682 feet (vertical speed of approximately 500 feet per second), and indicated that the airplane was at an airspeed of 375 KIAS, a pitch attitude of 38 degrees nose down with 5 degrees of nose-up elevator, and was experiencing a vertical acceleration of 3.6 G. The airplane impacted a wet soybean field partially inverted, in a nose down, left-wing-low attitude. Based on petitions filed for reconsideration of the probable cause, the NTSB on September 2002 updated it's findings.

The pilot reported ice accretion en route to his destination and subsequently requested, and received a lower altitude from ATC. The flight was issued a clearance for a VOR-A approach to the Greensburg Airport, and was observed by a witness north of the airport to fly for a short period down runway 18 about seven feet above the runway. The witness then observed the airplane began to climb and fly off in a southerly direction. Other witnesses saw the airplane flying in the vicinity of the airport beneath an overcast ceiling estimated between 300 feet and 1,000 feet AGL. One witness, located about two miles south of the airport, saw the airplane turn sharply left, drop nose low, recover, drop nose low, and then descend from sight behind trees. Investigators and rescue personnel discovered a large amount of ice debris along the flight path and outside the fire ring at the crash site.

The PA-32, N82419, had been receiving atc radar services en route to the Greenwood Municipal Airport. Radar services were terminated 3 miles from the airport. The MU-2, N74FB, had just taken off from the airport, and had reported to ATC in anticipation of receiving his IFR clearance. The flight had not yet been identified on radar. The two airplanes collided approximately 2 miles from the airport at 2,100 feet msl. The collision took place just outside and to the east of the Indianapolis airport radar service area (arsa). The MU-2 track was 066°, and the PA-32 track was 174°. The pax/pilot on the PA-32 took control of the airplane and was able to make a controlled landing. Guidance for traffic pattern operations and recommended arrival and departure procedures is found in the airman's information manual. All five occupants on board the MU-2 were killed.

The pilot was on second corporate flight of the day and complained to the avionics technician about the autopilot and asked him to adjust it. The technician said it would require a flight check. The pilot said he didn't have time for that, and got the technician to tell him how to perform the adjustment. Radar shows the airplane stable at 14,100 feet after departure. It then begins to deviate from cruise altitude between plus 100 feet to minus 200 feet. Center gives the pilot a 15° course change for traffic and the pilot acknowledges the instruction while the airplane is deviating off course. Radar contact was lost and no further radio transmissions were received from the pilot. Witnesses on the ground reported hearing a loud explosion followed by a muffled explosion, and seeing the airplane exit clouds vertically. The outboard six feet of both wings were found 1.25 miles from crash site. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Evansville-William H. Dress Airport on behalf of the Kentucky National Guard, consisting of touch-and-go maneuvers. On approach to runway 22, the crew was instructed by ATC to initiate a go-around for unknown reasons. The crew increased engine power and climbed to a height of 1,500 feet when the aircraft entered a nose down attitude, plunged and crashed onto an hotel located 4,800 feet short of runway 22 threshold. The aircraft, the hotel and a restaurant were destroyed. All five crew members as well as 11 people on the hotel/restaurant were killed. A police officer who was seriously injured in the accident died from his injuries 10 days later.

After being cleared to descend to 12,000 feet and to deviate around a 'big cell', the aircraft entered an area of level two and three thunderstorms. Subsequently, an in-flight breakup occurred and wreckage was scattered over a four mile area. During the breakup, the right wing and empennage separated from the aircraft. The left wing and spar also failed at the same location as the right wing, but the left wing remained with the fuselage. No pre-accident failure, malfunction or metal fatigue of the aircraft was found drg the investigation. All three occupants were killed.

An IFR flight was terminated with a visual approach. Conditions were conducive to airframe icing. The aircraft was being positioned empty, with a cg at 22.1% mac. On short final, at approximately 400 feet agl, 35° of landing flap was selected. The aircraft was observed to pitch downward to an unusual attitude and to enter a steep descent. A partial recovery was observed before the aircraft impacted a dirt hill 500 feet short of runway 28. Examination of the airframe after the accident revealed 1/2 to 3/4 inch of rime ice adhering to the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. No ice was found on any other portion of the airframe. Evidence in the cockpit indicated that engine, pitot, and windshield anti-ice systems were on, but wing/empennage deice was off. No evidence of a powerplant or systems malfunction was found. Both pilots were killed.

The flight crew failed to adhere to appropriate procedures and directives when they failed to select the hp cock levers to the hswl (lock out) position while performing an approach to landing stall during a training/test flight. When stall recovery was initiated, both propellers 'hung up' when the high (cruise pitch) stops of each propeller failed to withdraw. As the power levers were advanced, turbine gas temperatures (tgt's) exceeded limitations; the left propeller auto-feathered, the right propeller was later feathered by the captain. Restart procedures were attempted without success, and a forced landing in a plowed cornfield ensued. Examination of the engines revealed that the turbines had been 'subjected to severe (and destructive) thermal degradation during operation' as a result of the propellers being constrained during low speed operations. Testing of the relays revealed that the high stop withdrawal relay for the right propeller functioned intermittently. All three crew members escaped uninjured.

The aircraft was enroute to the Chicago Midway Airport. While letting down to 16,000 feet the pilot reported he was shutting down the right engine. ARTCC cleared the aircraft to 5,000 feet. Ten minutes later ARTCC lost radio transponder and mode C contact. 15 minutes later the aircraft descended out of the 1,800 feet overcast and struck a 170 feet utility tower at the 150 feet level. The aircraft then ground impacted and burned. Investigation revealed that the right engine had a bearing failure due to lack of lubrication. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot was on the fourth leg of a night cargo flight cruising at approximately 500 feet agl enroute to Mt Vernon, IL, when the aircraft struck some trees and subsequently collided with the ground. The engines and propellers were both torn down and tested and no evidence of malfunction was discovered. The pilot stated he did not recall the crash sequence at all. The pilot was wearing a 'walkman' radio at the time of the accident. He stated it was to help keep him awake, because he had fallen asleep at times in the past while flying night cargo.