Indiana

A witness reported that, despite the darkness, he was able to see the navigation lights on the airplane as it flew over the south end of the airport at an altitude of 150 to 200 feet above the ground. The airplane made a left turn to the downwind leg of the traffic pattern and continued a descending turn until the airplane impacted the ground in a near-vertical attitude. Due to the airplane’s turn, the 10- to 20-knot quartering headwind became a quartering tailwind. The airplane was also turned toward a rural area with very little ground lighting. A postaccident examination of the airplane and engines did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

The instrument-rated pilot was issued a clearance to descend to 4,000 feet for radar vectors to a non precision instrument approach in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The last 1 minute 23 seconds of radar data indicated the airplane leveled at 4,000 feet for about 35 seconds and then varied between 3,800 feet and 3,900 feet for the remainder of the flight for which data was available. During this timeframe, the airspeed decreased from 131 knots to 57 knots. Witnesses observed the airplane descending in a spin, and one reported hearing the engine running. Recorded engine data showed an increase in engine power near stall speed, which was likely the pilot's response to the low airspeed. The airplane damage was consistent with a low-speed impact with some rotation about the airplane's vertical axis. The pilot did not make any transmissions to air traffic control indicating any abnormalities or emergency. Post accident examination of the airplane revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. During training on the accident airplane, the instructor recommended that the pilot get 25 to 50 hours of flight in visual meteorological conditions before flying in IMC in order to gain more familiarity with the radios, switches, and navigation equipment. The pilot only had 14 hours of flight time in the accident airplane before the accident flight, however it could not determined whether this played a role in the accident.

For unknown reasons, the aircraft landed hard at Jeffersonville-Clark County Airport. There were no injuries among the people on board and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair due to severe damages to the left wing and the tail section.

The pilot departed his home airport at 0502 and landed at another airport where he picked up employees of a marketing company to fly them to an out of state meeting. The accident occurred at 2003 shortly after taking off on the return trip to fly the employees back home. Shortly before departure a fourth passenger was added to the flight after his commercial flight was cancelled. A person who worked for the fixed base operator at the departure airport stated the pilot looked tired or just ready to go home. The pilot received his clearance for the IFR flight prior to takeoff. The pilot misread the clearance back to the controlled and was corrected. Radar data showed the pilot initially flew the assigned south-southwest heading prior to the airplane turning right to a westerly heading. The controller queried the pilot and issued a heading to intercept the VOR. The pilot corrected the heading and shortly thereafter the airplane once again began a right turn back toward the west. The airplane continued to climb throughout the heading changes. Radar data showed the airplane then began another left turn during which time it entered a spiraling rapid descent. According to weather data, the airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions when this occurred. The airplane impacted the terrain in an open cornfield. Weight and balance calculations indicate the airplane was at least 383 pounds over gross weight. Post accident inspection of the airplane and engines did not reveal any preexisting failure/malfunction.

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire after it impacted the intersection of runway 23 and 32 while attempting a missed-approach. The pilot's crew day started at 1300 and the 14 hour duty limit was 0300 the following morning. The second leg of the flight was delayed 1 hour and 36 minutes due to a freight delay. The operator reported the pilot exceeded his 14 hour crew day by 45 minutes as a result of the freight delay. The flight was cleared for the runway 23 ILS instrument approach. A witness, who was monitoring the Unicom radio frequency, reported that he heard clicking sounds on the Unicom frequency (to bring up the runway light intensity), but the pilot did not make any radio transmissions. The witness reported the ground fog was very thick. Two witnesses reported they heard the airplane's engines. They then heard the engines go to "full power," and then they heard the airplane impact the ground. They saw an initial flash, but could not see the airplane on fire from 2,500 feet away. FAR 135.213 requires that, "Weather observations made and furnished to pilots to conduct IFR operations at an airport must be made at the airport where those IFR operations are conducted." The destination did not have authorized weather reporting, and the operator's Operating Specifications did not list an alternate weather reporting source. At 0253, the observed weather 20 miles to the north, indicated the following: winds 190 at 4 knots, 1/4 statute mile visibility, fog, indefinite ceilings 100 feet, temperature 22 degrees C, dew point 22 degrees C, altimeter 30.00. From the initial point of impact (POI), the wreckage path continued for about 210 feet on a heading of about 180 degrees. The outboard section of the left wing outboard of the nacelle was found on runway 32, about 85 feet from the POI. Separated, unburned, portions of the left aileron and left flap were also found on the runway. The remaining pieces of the left wing were located with the main wreckage. The right wing was located with the main wreckage and the entire span of the right wing from the wing root to the wingtip exhibited continuity. The inspection of the airplane revealed no preexisting anomalies.

The MU-300 on-demand passenger charter flight sustained substantial damage during a landing overrun on a snow/ice contaminated runway. The captain, who was also the company chief pilot and check airman, was the flying pilot, and the first officer was the non flying pilot. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Area weather reporting stations reported the presence of freezing rain and snow for a time period beginning several hours before the accident. The captain did not obtain the destination airport weather observation until the flight was approximately 30 nautical miles from the airport. The flight received radar vectors for a instrument landing system approach to runway 30 (5,401 feet by 100 feet, grooved asphalt). The company's training manual states the MU-300's intermediate and final approach speeds as 140 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and Vref, respectively. Vref was reported by the flight crew as 106 KIAS. During the approach, the tower controller (LC) gave the option for the flight to circle to land or continue straight in to runway 30. LC advised that the winds were from 050-070 degrees at 10 knots gusting to 20 knots, and runway braking action was reported as fair to poor by a snow plow. Radar data indicates that the airplane had a ground speed in excess of 200 knots between the final approach fix and runway threshold and a full-scale localizer deviation 5.5 nm from the localizer antenna. The company did not have stabilized approach criteria establishing when a missed approach or go-around is to be executed. The captain stated that he was unaware that there was 0.7 percent downslope on runway 30. The company provided a page from their airport directory which did not indicate a slope present for runway 30. The publisher of the airport directory provided a page valid at the time of the accident showing a 0.7 percent runway slope. Runway slope is used in the determination of runway performance for transport category aircraft such as the MU-300. The airplane operating manual states that MU-300 landing performance on ice or snow covered runways has not been determined. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder with a remote cockpit erasure control. Readout of the cockpit voice recorder indicated a repetitive thumping noise consistent with manual erasure. No notices to airman pertaining to runway conditions were issued by the airport prior to the accident.

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire, when it impacted the ground about 3.7 miles from the destination airport. The airplane had been cleared for an ILS approach to the airport. No anomalies were found during the on-scene examination of the airframe, engine or gyroscopic flight instruments that could be associated with a pre-existing condition. The minimum descent altitude for the approach is 243 feet above ground level. The inbound course for the instrument approach is 298 degrees magnetic. The radar data shows that the airplane headed in a northerly direction prior to commencing a left turn onto the inbound course of the instrument approach. The last radar return, was received prior to the airplane reaching the locator outer marker for the approach. Altitude returns show the airplane descending from a pressure altitude of 4,000 feet to a pressure altitude of 2,800 feet. The 2,800-foot return was the final return received. The wreckage path was distributed on a magnetic heading of approximately 145 degrees. The weather reporting station located at the destination airport recorded a 100 foot overcast ceiling with 1 statute mile of visibility about 20 minutes prior to the accident. The current weather was available to the pilot via the Automated Weather Observing System at the destination airport. No communications were received from the airplane after controllers authorized the pilot to change to the destination airport's advisory frequency.

The airplane was destroyed on impact with trees and terrain after takeoff. A post-impact fire ensued. A courier stated that he put 14 cases and 5 bags into the airplane and that "everything took place as it normally does." A witness stated, "I heard a very low flying aircraft come directly over my house. ... It sounded very revved up like a chainsaw cutting through a tree at high speed." The accident airplane's radar returns, as depicted on a chart, exhibited a horseshoe shaped flight path. That chart showed that the airplane made a left climbing turn to a maximum altitude of 2,479 feet. That chart showed the airplane in a descending left turn after that maximum recorded altitude was attained. The operator reported the pilot had flown about 75 hours in the same make and model airplane and had flown about 190 hours in the last 90 days. The weather was: Wind 090 degrees at 7 knots; visibility 1 statute mile; present weather light rain, mist; sky condition overcast 200 feet; temperature 9 degrees C; dew point 9 degrees C. No pre-impact engine anomalies were found. NTSB's Materials Laboratory Division examined the annunciator panel and recovered light assemblies and stated, "Item '29' was a light assembly with an identification cover indicating that it was the '[Right-hand] AC BUS' light. Examination of the filaments in the two installed bulbs revealed that one had been stretched, deformed and fractured and the other had been stretched and deformed." The airplane manufacturer stated that the airplane's left-hand and right-hand attitude gyros are powered by the 115-volt alternating current essential bus. Two inverters are installed and one inverter is used at a time as selected by the inverter select switch. The inverter select switch is located on the right hand switch panel. The airplane was not equipped with a backup attitude gyro and was not required to be equipped with one. The airplane was certified with a minimum flight crew of one pilot. Subsequent to the accident, the operator transitioned "from the single pilot operation of our Fairchild Metroliner to the inclusion of a First Officer."

The pilot said that he 'landed properly' on the runway, touching down at about 700 feet from the approach end. He said that he 'applied brakes, which had no effect, ran out of runway, and turned to the right to avoid trees. [The] Grassy field should have worked out, except for the drainage ditch.' The pilot said that later he was told that there was a tail wind estimated at 45 knots, when he landed. Examination of the airplane revealed no anomalies. Approximately 34 minutes before the accident, the weather observation at Louisville, Kentucky, 11 miles south of the accident site, reported winds of 320 degrees at 16 knots, with gusts to 20 knots.

Upon reaching an altitude of 400 agl after takeoff, the left side door on the nose baggage door opened. The pilot-in- command initiated a left turn to return to the airport. During the turn the stall horn sounded. The airplane then descended and impacted the terrain. Investigation revealed that both pilots did a portion of the aircraft preflight inspection. Both pilots were qualified to act as PIC for the flight and this flight would typically have been a single pilot operation. However, the company who hired the operator to transport their employees requested two pilots. The operator did not have any written procedures regarding the division of duties for a two pilot operation on this type of aircraft.