Illinois

The turbojet airplane was destroyed during a forced landing and post accident fire after a loss of power in both engines during takeoff climb. The pilot reported that both engines operated
normally during taxi and pre-takeoff checks. He reported that, "We rotated positive rate gear up, V2 plus 30 flaps up, and at that point we struck birds taking No. 2 engine out. Upon losing No. 2 engine I advanced thrust levers forward and realized that the No. 1 engine was only producing approximately 70% RPM with EGT over read line." He executed a forced landing to a field and the crew and passengers evacuated the burning airplane. The copilot reported, "At approximately 500 to 1,000 ft. above ground level, I observed a large flock of birds straight ahead of us, and then passing just off our nose to the left side. I immediately heard an engine flameout. As I started to go to the checklist for single engine operations, I quickly realized that we were loosing airspeed and unable to maintain altitude. The PIC said we were going down and heading for the best emergency-landing stop." The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) recorded the pilot stating, "We hit a bird," and the copilot stating, "Yep," immediately following the CVR recording a "sound similar to decrease in engine RPM." The inspection of the airplane's fuel system, pneumatic system, engines, fuel controls and fuel pumps revealed no pre-impact anomaly. No physical evidence of bird ingestion was found in either engine. A CVR sound spectrum plot and a flight profile analysis revealed that one engine flamed out almost immediately after the sound of a "thump" on the CVR. The other engine's speed decreased and experienced stalls until the engine speed was reduced to flight idle. The original engine certification tests indicated that compressor stalls occurred when a 2-4 ounce starling was shot ingested into the engine, but physical damage from bird ingestion was very slight due to the all steel construction and geometry of the engine. Engine flameouts, however, were not recorded during the certification tests. A wildlife specialist conducted a bird count at the accident airport two days after the accident occurred, and he reported counting a flock of about 800 European Starlings.

The airplane collided with trees and terrain following a loss of control during an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach at night. The impact occurred approximately 2.1 miles from the approach end of the runway. A witness reported hearing the airplane at "mid-throttle" as it flew over. He then heard the power increase followed by the impact. The witness stated there was no precipitation at the time of the accident and there were "severe winds, mostly from the south, shifting volatile directly from the east." He also stated the visibility was "extremely poor." Statements were received from five pilots who landed in transport category airplanes around the time of the accident. Three of these pilots reported experiencing a crosswind that varied from 15 to 50 knots during the approach. Four of the pilots reported airspeed fluctuations that varied between +/- 8 knots to +/- 10 knots during the approach. Three of the pilots reported breaking out of the clouds between 200 and 300 feet agl. Radar data indicates the airplane was high on the glideslope until it entered a rapid descent from an altitude of about 2,300 feet. Examination of the airframe, engine, and propeller governors failed to reveal any failures/malfunctions that would have resulted in the loss of control.

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post-impact fire when it impacted the terrain about 1/3 mile northeast of the departure end of runway 20 during takeoff. The airplane was cleared for a right turnout after takeoff, but witnesses observed the airplane climb to about 100 feet, veer left, enter a left bank, go inverted, and then impact the terrain in a nose low attitude. The airplane's left and right wings, fuselage, and cockpit were largely consumed by fire. Inspection of the airplane revealed the flaps and landing gear were retracted. There was aileron control continuity from the control yoke to the aileron bellcranks. There was elevator and rudder control cable continuity from the bellcranks at the forward bulkhead to the control surfaces. Inspections of the engines and propellers indicated the right engine and propeller was producing power in the middle to high power range at impact, and the left engine and propeller was producing power in the low to middle range of power at impact. The 60-year old pilot had flown 942 hours in the accident airplane, and was described as a very safety conscious, conservative pilot, who performed very thorough preflights and adhered to all checklists. The 22-year old pilot rated passenger had not received ground or flight instruction in the make and model of the accident airplane. The toxicology reports were negative for all substances tested. There were no remarkable findings in the autopsies.

The pilot said he performed three-point touchdown, landing to the east on a grass airstrip. He said, '... as we landed, the tail wanted to come up, so I pulled the stick all the way back and held
it back ... while I was reaching to lift the flaps off.' The pilot said that before he got the flaps retracted, he noticed the tail was coming up again. He ensured that the power was off and his feet were off the brakes. 'The airplane came up on its nose. We were almost stopped before we flipped on our back over the nose.' The pilot said that when he later returned to the airplane, he noticed the 'T-handle brake lever was 3/4 engaged.' Examination of the airplane revealed heavy longitudinally running grass rubbing on both tires. The brake discs were free and the wheels rotated freely. An examination of the field showed a pair of parallel-running tire marks moving toward the north side of the landing strip, and 11 succeeding slashes in the ground running perpendicular to the parallel tire tracks on the airplane's left side. An examination of the remaining airplane systems revealed no anomalies. Wind conditions, reported 14 minutes after the accident, were 010° at 7 knots.

Shortly after being cleared for takeoff on runway 18 (3,899 feet by 150 feet, dry concrete) at Merrill C. Meigs Field, Chicago, Illinois, the airplane impacted into Lake Michigan, approximately 300 feet south of the end of the runway. The tower controller said that at the 3/4 field point, the airplane had not rotated. 'All I can see are lights [from the airplane]. At the point where he would have been at the end of the runway, [I] lost the lights.' A witness on the airport said that when the airplane went by, it 'didn't sound like most King Airs do at that point.' There was a pulsating sound, but it was not heavy. The witness said that the airplane was 'bouncing up and down on the [gear] struts, and wasn't coming off the ground.' NTSB Materials examination of the pilot's control yoke showed that there were small distortions in the holes of the column and the rod where the control lock would be inserted. A small crack was observed around 1/4 of the control lock rod hole. The control lock was a substitute for the original airplane equipment. The examination of the control lock showed 'several shiny scratches ... parallel to the length of the pin.' A small deformation was observed near the top of the pin part of the control lock. The company flight department's third pilot said that when they flew the airplane, they always placed the control lock in the pilot's side cockpit wall pocket, along with a car key and a remote hanger door opener. The car key and the door opener were found in the wall pocket during the on-scene investigation. The control lock was
recovered from the lake, 7 days later.

The pilot reported the airplane decelerated during the takeoff roll. He applied the brakes and as he advanced the throttles to full power the airplane accelerated. The airplane cleared the end of the runway then stalled into Lake Michigan, flipped inverted and sank. One passenger reported that it felt as if someone put on the brakes. One passenger drowned. The pilot used 32' of manifold pressure for takeoff versus 37.3' as placarded. The pilot operating handbook lists normal takeoff speed as 91 KIAS, however the airplane was equipped with vortex generators. The pilot reported looking for 105 to 110 KIAS for takeoff. No evidence was found of the pilot having a multi-engine rating. No evidence of a mechanical failure/malfunction was found.

On February 9, 1998, about 0954 central standard time (CST), a Boeing 727-223 (727), N845AA, operated by American Airlines as flight 1340, impacted the ground short of the runway 14R threshold at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) while conducting a Category II (CAT II) instrument landing system (ILS) coupled approach. Twenty-two passengers and one flight attendant received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane, being operated by American Airlines as a scheduled domestic passenger flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, with 116 passengers, 3 flight crewmembers, and 3 flight attendants on board, was destined for Chicago, Illinois, from Kansas City International Airport (MCI), Kansas City, Missouri. Daylight instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The airplane departed runway 1L and radar data indicated the airplane maintained about a 110 knot ground speed for 37 seconds as it climbed to 1,400 feet msl (642 feet agl) with a 008 degree heading. The last radar 14 seconds later indicated the airplane's heading was 342 degrees and had a 130 knot ground speed. The winds were 290/11. Witnesses reported seeing the airplane flying low and slow, and then it made a turn like a "barrel roll" to the left before impacting the ground. Examination of the engines and airframe revealed no pre-existent anomalies. The left and right propellers exhibited leading edge damage and chordwise abrasions. The pilot had a total of about 1,175 flight hours with about 250 hours in the type and model aircraft. The copilot had 4,094 total hours, but had 10 hours of turbine time and no flight time in the type and model of aircraft. The pilot had indicated he was practicing simulated single engine failures. The gear was fully retracted. The trim settings were set for a right engine out situation. The flap selector was set to "UP" flaps, but the flaps were found in transit at approximately 2 degrees of flaps. The Airplane Flight Manual indicated that during "Engine Failure in Takeoff-Gear Fully Retracted" stated that the required airspeed before selecting flaps to 5 degrees was 140 KCAS. The Pilot's Operating Handbook stated the flaps take approximately 31 seconds to retract from 20 to 0 flaps, or 21 seconds to retract from 5 to 0 flaps.

The Beechcraft 1900C, N87GL, was in its landing roll on runway 13, and the Beechcraft A90, N1127D, was in its takeoff roll on runway 04. The collision occurred at the intersection of the two runways. The flight crew of the Beechcraft 1900C had made appropriate efforts to coordinate the approach and landing through radio communications and visual monitoring; however they mistook a Cherokee pilot's transmission (that he was holding for departure on runway 04) as a response from the Beechcraft A90 to their request for the Beechcraft A90's intentions, and therefore mistakenly believed that the Beechcraft A90 was not planning to take off until after the Beechcraft 1900C had cleared the runway. The failure of the Beechcraft A90 pilot to announce over the common traffic advisory frequency his intention to take off created a potential for collision between the two airplanes.

The Beechcraft 1900C, N87GL, was in its landing roll on runway 13, and the Beechcraft A90, N1127D, was in its takeoff roll on runway 04. The collision occurred at the intersection of the two runways. The flight crew of the Beechcraft 1900C had made appropriate efforts to coordinate the approach and landing through radio communications and visual monitoring; however they mistook a Cherokee pilot's transmission (that he was holding for departure on runway 04) as a response from the Beechcraft A90 to their request for the Beechcraft A90's intentions, and therefore mistakenly believed that the Beechcraft A90 was not planning to take off until after the Beechcraft 1900C had cleared the runway. The failure of the Beechcraft A90 pilot to announce over the common traffic advisory frequency his intention to take off created a potential for collision between the two airplanes.