Saint Louis-Downtown

The airplane was on an instrument flight in night instrument meteorological conditions approaching the destination airport. The pilot contacted the approach control facility by radio and was subsequently cleared for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to the destination airport. During the approach, the air traffic approach controller advised the pilot twice that the airplane was to the right of the approach course. The controller suggested a left turn of 5 to 7 degrees to the pilot. Once the airplane was back on the inbound course, the approach controller instructed the pilot to contact a tower controller. The pilot never contacted the tower controller, but later reestablished contact with the approach controller, who provided radar vectors for a second attempt at the ILS approach. During the second approach, the controller again advised the pilot that the airplane was to the right of the approach course and provided the pilot a low altitude alert. The airplane then started a climb and a turn back toward the inbound course. The controller advised the pilot that the airplane would intercept the inbound course at the locator outer marker (LOM) for the approach and asked if the pilot would like to abort the approach and try again. The pilot declined and responded that he would continue the approach. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. The airplane impacted a building about 0.4 nautical miles from the LOM. The building and airplane were almost completely consumed by the postimpact fire. A postaccident examination revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunction or failure. The airplane's turning ground track and the challenging visibility conditions were conducive to the onset of pilot spatial disorientation.

The turbojet airplane was destroyed during a forced landing and post accident fire after a loss of power in both engines during takeoff climb. The pilot reported that both engines operated
normally during taxi and pre-takeoff checks. He reported that, "We rotated positive rate gear up, V2 plus 30 flaps up, and at that point we struck birds taking No. 2 engine out. Upon losing No. 2 engine I advanced thrust levers forward and realized that the No. 1 engine was only producing approximately 70% RPM with EGT over read line." He executed a forced landing to a field and the crew and passengers evacuated the burning airplane. The copilot reported, "At approximately 500 to 1,000 ft. above ground level, I observed a large flock of birds straight ahead of us, and then passing just off our nose to the left side. I immediately heard an engine flameout. As I started to go to the checklist for single engine operations, I quickly realized that we were loosing airspeed and unable to maintain altitude. The PIC said we were going down and heading for the best emergency-landing stop." The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) recorded the pilot stating, "We hit a bird," and the copilot stating, "Yep," immediately following the CVR recording a "sound similar to decrease in engine RPM." The inspection of the airplane's fuel system, pneumatic system, engines, fuel controls and fuel pumps revealed no pre-impact anomaly. No physical evidence of bird ingestion was found in either engine. A CVR sound spectrum plot and a flight profile analysis revealed that one engine flamed out almost immediately after the sound of a "thump" on the CVR. The other engine's speed decreased and experienced stalls until the engine speed was reduced to flight idle. The original engine certification tests indicated that compressor stalls occurred when a 2-4 ounce starling was shot ingested into the engine, but physical damage from bird ingestion was very slight due to the all steel construction and geometry of the engine. Engine flameouts, however, were not recorded during the certification tests. A wildlife specialist conducted a bird count at the accident airport two days after the accident occurred, and he reported counting a flock of about 800 European Starlings.

Before takeoff, the pilot received a weather briefing and was advised of thunderstorms and heavy rain along the route. The briefing included a warning of a severe thunderstorm watch with hail, wind gusts to 65 knots and a sigmet (31c). The pilot filed an IFR flight plan and took off at 1148 cst. While en route at 15,000 msl, he requested and received clearance to divert 10° left to avoid 'some clouds.' Soon thereafter, the ATC controller noticed the aircraft was about 500 feet high and reminded the pilot to maintain 15,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged, then there was no further communication with the aircraft. Subsequently, an in-flight breakup of the aircraft occurred and the plane crashed. The left outboard wing panel separated from positive overload failure and was found about one mile from the main wreckage. No preimpact fatigue was found. A witness, who saw the aircraft descending out of the clouds, saw a funnel cloud in the area before the accident. Both occupants were killed.

On approach to Saint Louis-Downtown Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility with low ceiling and icing conditions. Too low, the twin engine airplane struck power cables and crashed in Centreville, near the airport. Three passengers were killed while three other occupants were injured.