Arizona

After executing a missed approach at the Grand Canyon Airport, the pilots diverted to the Bullhead City Airport. The pilots reported that minimal icing conditions were encountered with about 1/8 inch of ice accumulating on the aircraft wings. The pilots stated they cycled the deice boots to shed ice. They did not observe ice on the propeller spinners, and they did not activate the engines' 'override' ignition systems, as required by the airplane's flight manual. Use of 'override' ignition was required for flight into visible moisture at or below +5 degrees Celsius (+41 degrees Fahrenheit) to prevent ice ingestion/flameouts. Subsequently, both engines flamed out as the airplane was on about a 3 mile final approach for landing with the landing gear and flaps extended. The aircraft was destroyed during an off-airport landing.

The airplane was being positioned to another airport at night. The flight was over mountainous terrain. The airplane collided with the top of a 4,600-foot bluff. The pilot had a history of transient global amnesia. Examination of the accident site revealed a 567-foot long wreckage path, oriented along the direct course line from the departure point to the destination. Damage to the engine and propeller indicated that the engine was developing power at impact.

The right engine lost power after an uncontained engine failure during the initial takeoff climb. The airplane would not climb and the pilot was forced to land. The pilot selected a street for a forced landing area. The pilot landed gear up while maneuvering to avoid hitting street light poles and automobiles. After touchdown, the airplane slid into a block wall. A fire erupted as a result of a post impact fuel leak in the left wing. The airplane's engines were examined at the manufacturer's facilities. The right engine exhibited evidence of an uncontained separation of the second stage turbine rotor disk. Examination of the disk fragments revealed a low cycle fatigue fracture mode. The fatigue initiated from multiple areas at and adjacent to the inside diameter bore surface near the aft side of the disk. According to the engine manufacturer, the multiple indication areas were associated with uninspectable size porosity and the primary carbides in the cast material. There were no material or casting defects detected on any of the fractures through the wheel.

Witnesses observed the aircraft departing from runway 14 with a rolling start. They said the aircraft rotated at the departure end of the runway and remained in ground effect with an excessive, nose high attitude. It then struck the airport perimeter fence, a barrier wall, and power lines. Power line wires were dragged through a residential area, resulting in additional damage. The airplane then crashed in a pasture and burned. Investigation revealed the airplane had been loaded to a gross weight (GW) of 50,870 lbs. Its maximum GW was limited to 48,000 lbs at sea level with the use of antidetonation injection (ADI) fluid and 40,900 lbs without ADI. Density altitude at the airport was 6200 feet. For conditions at the airport, maximum GW for takeoff with ADI and 15° of flaps was 43,205 lbs; without ADI and with 13 degrees of flaps, maximum GW was 38,909 lbs. The airplane flaps were found in the retracted position, but there was no performance data for takeoff with the flaps retracted. No ADI fluid was found in the line to the right engine, although it was intact; the ADI tank was destroyed; the ADI line to the left engine was damaged. The airplane was being flown under provision of a ferry permit, which did not provide for the cargo or the two passengers that were aboard. The first pilot (PIC) had accrued about 8 hours of flight experience in the make and model of airplane.

The pilot and 2 nurses departed IFR to transport a patient from another location. During the initial climb, the pilot observed a gear unsafe light. He requested clearance to an area of VFR conditions to address the gear problem. Subsequently, the gear was manually extended with safe gear indications. The flight department requested that the pilot return to base. The pilot obtained an IFR clearance to return for an ILS approach. After handoff to the tower, he was requested to report the FAF inbound after an eastbound procedure turn. That was the last communication from the pilot. Subsequently, the aircraft crashed on the southeast side of Humphreys Peak at an elevation of about 10,500 feet and about 10 miles west of the final approach course. Wreckage was scattered along a heading of 230 degrees. There was evidence that the airplane was in a steep descent when it crashed. Radar data revealed an outbound track west of the published course and no procedure turn. The weather was IMC with light snow and rain. Moderate to severe turbulence was forecast and confirmed by other pilots. The winds at 10,000 feet were forecast to be 50 knots out of the southwest. Moderate turbulence and light rime ice had been reported along the ILS approach course before to the accident time.

The pilot was cleared to land, and while on short final the airplane was observed to roll right then left into a yaw and then descend nose down into a parking lot. Witnesses reported the airplane being very low on final approach. According to the pilot's wife, his last flight was about 83 days prior to the accident. No current logbook or other maintenance-type records were recovered except for an invoice. The invoice was dated 12/20/94, and was for an annual inspection and for the replacement of six fuel inlet float valves in compliance with an airworthiness directive. Postaccident examination of the engines, propellers, and airframe components were conducted, with no discrepancies found. Symmetrical power signatures were observed on both propellers. An autopsy revealed mild focal patchy inflammation and mild cardiomegaly, and enlargement of the heart with focal patchy replacement fibrosis. Toxicology revealed Diphenhydramine, Naproxin, acetaminophen, and Salicylate in the blood and the urine at therapeutic levels. Diphenhydramine, at therapeutic levels, causes drowsiness.

The charter flight was on a return tour trip after landing at the Grand Canyon National Park Airport. No fueling or maintenance was performed on the airplane while it sat on the ground for three hours. Shortly after takeoff from runway 21, the pilot transmitted that he had a problem and was declaring an emergency. He then stated '...I'm single engine right now....' The airplane was observed to be 100-200 feet above the terrain at the time. It continued flying for about 6 minutes, turning onto a crosswind, downwind, and then a right base leg for runway 21 before colliding with trees about 2.5 miles northeast of the airport. The airport is located in terrain that slopes upward from south to north and west to east. Winds were gusting to 29 knots. The density altitude was 6,870 feet. Examination of the suspect left engine did not reveal any evidence of failures or malfunctions. The investigation revealed deficiencies in the Federal Aviation Administration's oversight of the airline's maintenance program, and in the airline's extension of the time-in-service interval of the engines. The airline's AAIP does not require a maximum rated power check of the engines as required by the engine manufacturer's service instruction. In addition, the TBO of the engines had been extended from 1,800 to 2,400 hours.

A witness located near the departure end of the runway saw the airplane initially climb in a normal manner, then stay below the clouds and make a shallow bank 180-degree left turn and descend below a tree line. Tower tapes revealed that the pilot twice transmitted that he was "coming back" to the airport during which the background sound of the "fuel selector off" warning horn was heard. The pilot then informed the controller "I've got to get back", and no warning horn was heard. The airplane collided with trees and came to rest about 6,500 feet sse of the runway's end. Prior to departure, the airplane was refueled with 40 gals of jet a (20 gals per tank), which increased the total fuel load to 148 gals. The flight manual required that the fuel balance between the left and right tanks be kept within 200 pounds, and suggested turning off one fuel selector to correct unbalance situations. The condition of one fuel selector turned off will cause the "fuel selector off" warning horn to sound. Exam of the aircraft revealed no evidence of preimpact failures. Prop blade butt signatures indicated it was operating in the governing range, and engine power was being produced at impact.

On July 4, 1993, about 0320 hours mountain standard time, a Cessna T303, N9667C, collided with terrain about 2,000 feet short of the approach end of runway 21 at Ernest A. Love Field in
Prescott, Arizona. The airplane was destroyed. The commercial pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was being operated as a personal flight. The local flight departed Love Field about two minutes before the accident. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. The accident airplane arrived at Love Field about 2300 hours on July 3, 1994. An airport operations specialist employed by the City of Prescott greeted the airplane to see if the pilot needed fuel. Three males got out of the airplane, one of which was carrying a can of beer. One occupant of the airplane replied to the operations specialist fuel inquiry and stated, "Not right now, maybe later or in the morning." The operations specialist asked the three men if they had a place to stay and they indicated they were meeting friends. The night manager of the Airport Centre Motel, located off the west boundary of Love Field, noticed the three men walking from the airport 2330 hours on July 3, 1994. The motel manager stated all three men were drinking beverages from cans. The manager was unable to state the type of beverages they were drinking. At 2300 hours, July 3, 1994, the girl friend of one of the airplane's passengers received a call from her boy friend requesting a ride from Love Field to "downtown" Prescott. The girlfriend met her boy friend with two other friends. According to the girl friend, all three men were holding beer cans. The girl friend dropped the men off in the downtown area with plans to meet later. Approximately 0100 hours July 4, 1993, three females were leaving the Palace Saloon in downtown Prescott. The women were approached by three men on the sidewalk. One of the men identified himself as a pilot to the women. One of the women did not believe him and being associated with pilots in the past she asked him, "How many hours do you need [from] bottle to throttle?" The pilot responded, "Eight, but I guess I will have to break that rule tonight." The six walked on the sidewalk continuing the conversations. The woman who previously challenged the pilot walked along side him. She described him as quiet, friendly, not intoxicated, and at one point apologetic for being quiet. The pilot expounded on his quietness by stating he was very tired, and that he had been in Laughlin, Nevada, the night before, worked all day, rented the airplane, and then flew to Prescott. As the evening progressed, the group went to a restaurant, ate, and walked to the women's hotel. The men solicited a ride to the airport and the women agreed. During the ride to the airport, two of the men were talkative but the pilot remained quiet. The pilot was observed closing his eyes with his head back. The group arrived at the airport about 0245 hours. The men offered to show the women the airplane. The pilot opened the airplane and moved into the cockpit. The woman, who earlier challenged the pilot, asked one of the other men, "Why is the pilot so quiet, is he drunk?" The other man said, "No, he only had a few drinks." The woman then heard the pilot and the other man talking in the cockpit. The pilot was trying to turn on the pilot-controlled airport lighting. The woman heard the other man tell the pilot to "stop clicking the button so many times, and that it was supposed to be three clicks and then stop." The men then offered the women a 10-minute ride in the airplane. The woman who earlier challenged the pilot refused. Her two friends accepted and got into the airplane and she went back to their vehicle and waited. At 0254 hours, the pilot contacted the Prescott Flight Service Station (FSS) on frequency 122.4 Mhz and asked about the pilot- controlled lighting system. The pilot indicated that he tried to activate the lights but was unsuccessful. After consulting the Airport/Facility Directory, the air traffic control (ATC) specialist informed the pilot the lights were pilot activated on frequency 125.3 Mhz. The ATC specialist then heard seven "clicks" on 122.4 Mhz. He advised the pilot that he was still on 122.4 Mhz. The pilot replied, "Thank you, sir, we got 'em." At 0259 hours, the ATC specialist asked the pilot if he needed any further assistance. The pilot indicated that further assistance was not needed. The ATC specialist then issued the Prescott altimeter setting, 29.92 inHg, and asked the pilot if he had the flight precaution for turbulence. The pilot responded he did not. The ATC specialist issued AIRMET Tango for occasional moderate turbulence below 20,000 feet. The pilot then acknowledged he had received it. There were no further communications between the pilot and the Federal Aviation Administration ATC specialist. FAA radar data from Albuquerque Center tracked a single aircraft in the Love Field traffic pattern at 0319 hours. The radar data listed ten positions corresponding to right traffic off runway 21. The radar data indicates the tracked airplane reached an altitude of 6,500 feet mean sea level (msl), or about 1,500 feet above the ground.

During a 2 hour and 40 minute training mission, the pilot maintained a low power setting with the fuel mix at full rich. After the mission, the pilot climbed the airplane to 9,000 feet agl to clear obstacles between his location and his destination. During the descent, the pilot said he reduced power more rapidly than usual and descended faster than normal at about 180 kias. About 800 to 1,000 feet agl, in the traffic pattern, the pilot applied power. Both engines lost total power. He set up an 85 kias glide; competed emergency procedures; and retracted the landing gear. The engines did not restart. He did not feather the propellers. He extended the landing gear prior to touchdown. The pilot said he did not flare the airplane during landing which resulted in the airplane colliding with the ground. The engine manual and the poh recommend adjusting the fuel mixture for cruise. An engine manual note states long descents at low power should be avoided because the engines may cool excessively and may not accelerate satisfactorily when power is reapplied. The poh recommends feathering propellers and gliding at 120 kias for dual engine failure. Soot was noted on all spark plugs during engine exam. Both engines started and ran normally from idle to full acceleration during the exam.