Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain near San Rafael de Yuma

Date & Time: Apr 5, 2019 at 2228 LT
Operator:
Registration:
YV312
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Venezuela in the evening on a probable drug smuggling flight with an unknown destination. At 2226LT, after it entered the Dominican Airspace, a crew of the Dominican Air Force was dispatched with an Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano but the PA-31 disappeared from radar screens at 2228LT after crashing in a sugar cane field located in the region of San Rafael de Yuma, between La Romana and Punta Cana. Due to limited visibility caused by night and poor weather conditions, SAR operations were suspended shortly after midnight. The wreckage was found in the next early morning. Nobody was found on site and the aircraft is probably written off. The registration YV312 may be a wrong one.

Crash of a Rockwell Sabreliner 60 near Bajamar

Date & Time: Mar 22, 2019
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N990PA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
306-114
YOM:
1976
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in an isolated and uninhabited area located about 14 km east of Bajamar, Honduras. The airplane was engaged in an illegal mission (drug smuggling flight) as a pack of cocaine and a gun were found in the wreckage. The crew disappeared and was not recovered.

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Delaware: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 17, 2019 at 1745 LT
Registration:
N424TW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Dayton - Delaware
MSN:
421B-0816
YOM:
1974
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
3000
Captain / Total hours on type:
48.00
Aircraft flight hours:
8339
Circumstances:
The pilot departed on a short cross-country flight in the twin-engine airplane. Instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) were present at the time. While en route at an altitude of 3,000 ft mean sea level, the pilot reported that the airplane was "picking up icing" and that he needed to "pick up speed." The controller then cleared the pilot to descend, then to climb, in order to exit the icing conditions; shortly thereafter, the controller issued a low altitude alert. The pilot indicated that he was climbing; radar and radio contact with the airplane were lost shortly thereafter. The airplane impacted a field about 7 miles short of the destination airport. Examination of the airplane was limited due to the fragmentation of the wreckage; however, no pre-impact anomalies were noted during the airframe and engine examinations. Extensive damage to the pitot static and deicing systems precluded functional testing of the two systems. A review of data recorded from onboard avionics units indicated that, about the time the pilot reported to the controller that the airplane was accumulating ice, the airplane's indicated airspeed had begun to diverge from its ground speed as calculated by position data. However, several minutes later, the indicated airspeed was zero while the ground speed remained fairly constant. It is likely that this airspeed indication was the result of icing of the airplane's pitot probe. During the final 2 minutes of flight, the airplane was in a left turn and the pilot received several "SINK RATE" and "PULL UP PULL UP" annunciations as the airplane conducted a series of climbs and descents during which its ground speed (and likely, airspeed) reached and/or exceeded the airplane's maneuvering and maximum structural cruising speeds. It is likely that the pilot became distracted by the erroneous airspeed indication due to icing of the pitot probe and subsequently lost control while maneuvering.
Probable cause:
A loss of airspeed indication due to icing of the airplane's pitot probe, and the pilot's loss of control while maneuvering.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737 MAX 8 near Debre Zeit: 157 killed

Date & Time: Mar 10, 2019 at 0844 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ET-AVJ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Addis Ababa – Nairobi
MSN:
62450/7243
YOM:
2018
Flight number:
ET302
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
149
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
157
Captain / Total flying hours:
8122
Captain / Total hours on type:
1417.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
361
Copilot / Total hours on type:
207
Aircraft flight hours:
1330
Aircraft flight cycles:
382
Circumstances:
On March 10, 2019, at 05:38 UTC, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, Boeing 737-8(MAX), ET-AVJ, took off from Addis Ababa Bole International Airport bound to Nairobi, Kenya Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. ET302 was being operated under the provisions of the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Regulations (ECARAS) as a scheduled international flight between Addis Ababa Bole International Airport (HAAB), Ethiopia and Jomo Kenyatta Int. (HKJK) Nairobi, Kenya. It departed Addis Ababa with 157 persons on board: 2 flight crew (a Captain and a First Officer), 5 cabin crew and one IFSO, 149 regular passengers. At 05:36:12 the Airplane lined up on runway 07R at field elevation of 7,656 ft with flap setting of 5 degrees and a stabilizer trim setting of 5.6 units. Both flight directors (F/D) were ON with LNAV and VNAV modes armed. At 05:37:17the F/O reported to Tower ready for takeoff and at 05:37:36ATC issued take off clearance to ET-302 and advised to contact radar on 119.7MHz. The takeoff roll and lift-off was normal, including normal values of left and right angle-of-attack (AOA). During takeoff roll, the engines stabilized at about 94% N1. Shortly after liftoff, the left Angle of Attack sensor recorded value became erroneous and the left stick shaker activated and remained active until near the end of the recording. In addition, the airspeed and altitude values from the left air data system began deviating from the corresponding right side values. The left and right recorded AOA values began deviating. Left AOA decreased to 11.1° then increased to 35.7° while the right AOA indicated 14.94°. Then after, the left AOA value reached 74.5° in ¾ seconds while the right AOA reached a Maximum value of 15.3°, the difference between LH and RH AOA was59°and near the end of the recording it was 490. At 05:39:30, the radar controller identified ET-302 and advised to climb FL 340 and when able to turn right direct to RUDOL. At 5:39:51, the selected heading increased from 072° to 197°. After the flaps were fully retractedthe1stautomatic nose-down trim activated and engaged for 9 seconds positioning the stabilizer trim to 2.1 units. The pilot flying pulled to pitch up the Airplane with a force more than 90lbs. He then applied electric trim-up inputs. Five seconds after the end of these inputs a second automatic nose-down trim activated. At 5:40:22, the second automatic nose-down trim activated. Following nose-down trim activation GPWS DON’T SINK sounded for 3 seconds and “PULL UP” also displayed on PFD for 3 seconds. At 05:40:43, approximately five seconds after the end of the crew manual electrical trim up inputs, a third automatic trim nose-down was recorded but with no associated movement of the stabilizer. At 05:40:50, the captain told the F/O: “advise we would like to maintain one four thousand. We have a flight control problem”. The F/O complied and the request was approved by ATC. Following the approval of the ATC, the new target altitude of 14,000ft was set on the MCP. The Captain was unable to maintain the flight path and requested to return back to the departure airport. At 05:43:21, approximately five seconds after the last main electric trim up input, an automatic nose-down trim activated for about 5s. The stabilizer moved from 2.3 to 1 unit. The rate of climb decreased followed by a descent in 3s after the automatic trim activation. One second before the end of the automatic trim activation, the average force applied by the crew decreased from 100 lbs to 78 lbs in 3.5 seconds. In these 3.5 seconds, the pitch angle dropped from 0.5° nose up to -7.8° nose down and the descent rate increased from -100 ft/min to more than -5,000 ft/min. Following the last automatic trim activation and despite calculated column force of up to 110lbs, the pitch continued decreasing. The descent rate and the airspeed continued increasing between the triggering of the 4th automatic trim activation and the last recorded parameter value. At the end of the flight, Computed airspeed values reached 500Kt, Pitch values were greater than 40° nose down and descent rate values were greater than 33,000 ft/min. Finally, both recorders stopped recording at around 05 h 43 min 44s. At 05:44 The Airplane impacted terrain 28 NM South East of Addis Ababa near Ejere (located 8.8770 N, 39.2516 E.) village at a farm field and created a crater approximately 10 meters deep (last Airplane part found) with a hole of about 28 meters width and 40 meters length. Most of the wreckage was found buried in the ground; small fragments of the Airplane were found scattered around the site in an area by about 200 meters width and 300 meters long. The damages to the Airplane were consistent with a high energy impact. All 157 persons on board: 2 flight crew (a Captain and a First Officer), 5 cabin crew and one IFSO, 149 regular passengers were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
Repetitive and uncommanded airplane-nose-down inputs from the MCAS due to erroneous AOA input, and its unrecoverable activation system which made the airplane dive with the rate of -33,000 feet per minute close to the ground was the most probable cause of the accident.
The following contributing factors were identified:
1. The MCAS design relied on a single AOA sensor, making it vulnerable to erroneous input from the sensor;
2. During the design process, Boeing failed to consider the potential for uncommanded activation of MCAS, but assumed that pilots would recognize and address it through normal use of the control column, manual electric trim, and the existing Runaway Stabilizer NNC. The OMB and Emergency AD issued after the Lion Air accident included additional guidance but did not have the intended effect of preventing another MCAS-related accident;
3. While Boeing considered the possibility of uncommanded MCAS activation as part of its FHA, it did not evaluate all the potential alerts and indications that could accompany a failure leading to an uncommanded MCAS;
4. The MCAS contribution to cumulative AOA effects was not assessed;
5. The combined effect of alerts and indications that impacted pilot’s recognition and procedure prioritization were not evaluated by the Manufacturer;
6. Absence of AOA DISAGREE warning flag on the flight display panels (PFD);
7. The B737 MAX Crew difference CBT training prepared by Boeing and delivered to Pilots did not cover the MCAS system;
8. Failure by the manufacturer to design simulator training for pilots with regards to safety critical systems like MCAS with catastrophic consequences during undesired activation.
9. The manufacturer failed to provide procedures regarding MCAS operation to the crew during training or in the FCOM;
10. Failure by the manufacturer to address the safety critical questions raised by the airline which would have cleared out crew confusion and task prioritization;
Final Report:

Crash of a BAe 125-600A in San Pedro de Peralta: 1 killed

Date & Time: Mar 10, 2019
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N18BA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
256046
YOM:
1974
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The aircraft was engaged in an illegal flight, carrying two pilots and a load of 200 kg of cocaine. En route, the crew apparently encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing when the airplane crashed in a wooded area located near San Pedro de Peralta. A pilot was killed while the second was seriously injured. Originally registered N299GS, the aircraft was cancelled from the US registered on 15 February 2018 and exported to Mexico. The registration N18BA is false.

Crash of a Douglas DC-3 in Finca La Bendición: 14 killed

Date & Time: Mar 9, 2019 at 1036 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-2494
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
San Jose del Guaviare – Villavicencio
MSN:
33105/16357
YOM:
1945
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
11
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
14
Captain / Total flying hours:
12710
Captain / Total hours on type:
7044.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
12710
Copilot / Total hours on type:
7044
Aircraft flight hours:
23000
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed San José del Guaviare on a charter flight to Villavicencio, carrying 11 passengers and three crew members. While cruising at an altitude of 8,500 feet in good weather conditions, the left engine failed due to an important fuel leak. The crew elected to secure the engine but was unable to feather the propeller. The airplane lost speed and height, and while attempting an emergency landing, the crew lost control of the airplane that stalled and crashed in a palm plantation, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and all 14 occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The investigation determined that the accident was caused by the following probable causes:
- Loss of control in-flight as a consequence of the decrease in minimum in-flight control speed and drag generated by the impossibility of performing the No. 1 engine propeller feathering in the face of engine failure.
- Malfunction of the lubrication system of engine No. 1, evident in the abundant oil leakage from the engine, in flight, and in the governor of the left propeller; although discrepancies were found in the maintenance of the propeller feathering pressure line, it was not possible to determine the origin of the oil leakage.
- Weaknesses in the aircraft Operator's operational procedures, lacking a standard that would facilitate a crew's decision making to act in the event of critical failures, in matters such as making an emergency landing on unprepared field or the selection of an alternate airfield.

Contributing Factors:
- Deficiencies in standard maintenance practices during repairs performed on the No. 1 engine's propeller propeller feathering oil pressure line.
- Non-compliance with an effective and reliable maintenance program, which did not verify the operating conditions of the aircraft components; it was not possible to determine compliance with the last 50-hour service, Phase A, to engine No. 1 according to the company's maintenance program, since there are no records of that service in the Flight Log.
- Inefficient safety management system of the Operator for not detecting errors in the maintenance processes and in the conduct and control of operations.
Final Report:

Crash of a Pilatus AU-23A Turbo Porter in Wat Bang Sala

Date & Time: Mar 5, 2019 at 1300 LT
Operator:
Registration:
74-2079
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Pattani - Hat Yai
MSN:
2079
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane departed Pattani (9th AF Command) at 1156LT bound for the Wing 56 Air Division 4 located at Hat Yai Airport. En route, the crew encountered technical problems with the engine and attempted an emergency landing when the airplane crashed in a banana plantation located in the region of Wat Bang Sala. All three occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Cessna 421C Golden Eagle III near Canadian: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 15, 2019 at 1000 LT
Registration:
N421NS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Amarillo – Canadian
MSN:
421C-0874
YOM:
1980
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
5000
Aircraft flight hours:
6227
Circumstances:
The pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight with one passenger in his twin-engine airplane. There was no record that the pilot received a weather briefing before the accident flight. While en route to the destination, the pilot was in contact with air traffic control and received visual flight rules flightfollowing services. About 18 miles from the destination airport, the radar service was terminated, as is typical in this geographic region due to insufficient radio and radar coverage below 7,000 ft. The airplane was heading northeast at 4,900 ft mean sea level (msl) (about 2,200 ft above ground level [agl]). About 4 minutes later, radar coverage resumed, and the airplane was 6 miles west of the airport at 4,100 ft msl (1,400 ft agl) and climbing to the north. The airplane climbed through 6,000 ft msl (3,300 ft agl), then began a shallow left turn and climbed to 6,600 ft msl (3,800 ft agl), then began to descend while continuing the shallow left turn ; the last radar data point showed the airplane was about 20 nm northwest of the airport, 5,100 ft msl (2,350 ft agl) on a southwest heading. The final recorded data was about 13 miles northwest of the accident site. A witness near the destination airport heard the pilot on the radio. He reported that the pilot asked about the cloud height and the witness responded that the clouds were 800 to 1,000 ft agl. In his final radio call, the pilot told the witness, "Ok, see you in a little bit." The witness did not see the airplane in the air. The airplane impacted terrain in a slightly nose-low and wings-level attitude with no evidence of forward movement, and a postimpact fire destroyed a majority of the wreckage. The damage to the airplane was consistent with a relatively flat spin to the left at the time of impact. A postaccident examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. A detailed examination of the cockpit instruments and other portions of the wreckage was not possible due to the fire damage. A cold front had advanced from the northeast and instrument meteorological conditions prevailed across the region surrounding the accident site and the destination airport; the cloud ceilings were 400 ft to 900 ft above ground level. The airplane likely experienced wind shear below 3,000 ft, and there was likely icing in the clouds. While moderate icing conditions were forecast for the accident site, about the time of the accident, investigators were unable to determine the amount and severity of icing the flight may have experienced. The weather conditions had deteriorated over the previous 1 to 2 hours. The conditions at the destination airport had been clear about 2 hours before accident, and visual flight rules conditions about 1 hour before accident, when the pilot departed. Based on the available evidence it is likely that the pilot was unable to maintain control of the airplane, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin into terrain.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane while in instrument meteorological conditions with icing conditions present, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin into terrain.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B200 Super King in Whatì: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 30, 2019 at 0915 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-GTUC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Yellowknife – Whatì – Wekweèti – Ekati
MSN:
BB-268
YOM:
1977
Flight number:
8T503
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2762
Captain / Total hours on type:
1712.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
566
Copilot / Total hours on type:
330
Aircraft flight hours:
20890
Aircraft flight cycles:
18863
Circumstances:
At 0851 Mountain Standard Time on 30 January 2019, the Air Tindi Ltd. Beechcraft King Air 200 aircraft (registration C-GTUC, serial number BB-268) departed Yellowknife Airport (CYZF), Northwest Territories, as flight TIN503, on an instrument flight rules flight itinerary to Whatì Airport (CEM3), Northwest Territories, with 2 crew members on board. At 0912, as the aircraft began the approach to CEM3, it departed controlled flight during its initial descent from 12 000 feet above sea level, and impacted terrain approximately 21 nautical miles east-southeast of CEM3, at an elevation of 544 feet above sea level. The Canadian Mission Control Centre received a signal from the aircraft’s 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter and notified the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Trenton, Ontario. Search and rescue technicians arrived on site approximately 6 hours after the accident. The 2 flight crew members received fatal injuries on impact. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
These are conditions, acts or safety deficiencies that were found to have caused or contributed to this occurrence.
- For undetermined reasons, the left-side attitude indicator failed in flight.
- Although just before take off the crew acknowledged that the right-side attitude indicator was not operative, they expected it to become operative at some point in the flight. As a result, they did not refer to the minimum equipment list, and departed into instrument meteorological conditions with an inoperative attitude indicator.
- The crew’s threat and error management was not effective in mitigating the risk associated with the unserviceable right-side attitude indicator.
- The crew’s crew resource management was not effective, resulting in a breakdown in verbal communication, a loss of situation awareness, and the aircraft entering an unsafe condition.
- The captain did not have recent experience in flying partial panel. As a result, the remaining instruments were not used effectively and the aircraft departed controlled flight and entered a spiral dive.
- The captain and first officer likely experienced spatial disorientation.
- Once the aircraft emerged below the cloud layer at approximately 2000 feet above ground, the crew were unable to recover control of the aircraft in enough time and with enough altitude to avoid an impact with terrain.

Findings as to risk:
These are conditions, unsafe acts or safety deficiencies that were found not to be a factor in this occurrence but could have adverse consequences in future occurrences.
- If flight crews do not use the guidance material provided in the minimum equipment list when aircraft systems are unserviceable, there is a risk that the aircraft will be operated without systems that are critical to safe aircraft operation.
- If flight crews do not use all available resources at their disposal, a loss in situation awareness can occur, which can increase the risk of an accident.

Other findings:
These items could enhance safety, resolve an issue of controversy, or provide a data point for future safety studies.
- A review of Air Tindi Ltd.'s pilot training program revealed that all regulatory requirements were being met or exceeded.
Final Report:

Crash of a Partenavia P.68B Victor near Strausberg: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 12, 2019 at 1155 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
D-GINA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Strausberg - Strausberg
MSN:
59
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2923
Copilot / Total flying hours:
632
Aircraft flight hours:
5750
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Strausberg Airport at 1100LT on a local training flight, carrying one instructor and one pilot under supervision. About 50 minutes later, while cruising in clouds at an altitude of 1,300 feet, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a field located 7,5 km northwest of the airport. The airplane disintegrated on impact and both occupants were killed.